Regulating Indonesia's high wealth individual taxpayers: ideas for policy transfer by Widihartanto, Sekti
REGULATING INDONESIA’S HIGH WEALTH 
INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS: IDEAS FOR 
POLICY TRANSFER 
 
 
 
 
 
Sekti Widihartanto 
Regulatory Institutions Network 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy of 
The Australian National University 
 
July 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page has been left intentionally blank 
 
i 
 
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
 
I declare that this thesis in my own original work. This thesis is account of research 
undertaken between July 2010 and July 2014 at Regulatory Institutions Network 
(RegNet), The Australian National University (ANU), Canberra, Australia. 
I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material 
previously submitted in whole or part for a degree in any university and that to the best 
of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or 
written by any other person except where due reference is made in the text and/or in the 
references. 
 
 
ii 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
You’ll get there, Sekti… 
(Professor Valerie Braithwaite, said at the end 
of many discussions in my office at RegNet) 
 
 
I would not have ‘got there’ in my PhD journey without generous help from many 
people at different places and times. First and foremost, I would like to thank Valerie 
and John Braithwaite – my chair supervisor and advisor, respectively. I hope they 
recognise in my simple ‘thank you’ my gratitude for everything they have given me 
during my PhD candidature: endless support, encouragement and guidance. Val and 
John have generously donated their time, experience, expertise and love to this project. 
Val, especially, has always been by my side at difficult times.  
My sincere thanks also go to my panel members, Dr Jenny Job, Dr Timothy Legrand, 
and Dr Andrew Stout, for their genuine support and valuable comments on my chapter 
drafts. Special thanks to Mary Ivec who helped me in ‘transforming’ Val’s big idea into 
chewable pieces. 
Being part of Australia’s world-renowned Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) 
has developed my intellectual soul beyond my short-sighted professional background of 
iii 
 
collecting tax. The RegNet community has changed my perceptions about cold 
academic environments with its warm, vibrant, collegial, but still very serious academic 
atmosphere. I would especially like to thank RegNet leaders Professor Hillary 
Charlesworth, Professor Veronica Taylor, and Professor Sharon Friel. RegNet staff 
Hillary Greenhill and Paulina Piira assisted me in the administrative aspects of my PhD. 
Friends and colleagues at RegNet gave freely of their time and advice whenever I 
needed it. In particular, I thank Dr Mamoun Alazab, Shane Chalmers, Dr Nathan Harris, 
Dr Kathryn Henne, Dr Budi Hernawan, Dr Robyn Holder, Seung-Hun Hong, Kate 
Macfarlane, Dr Kylie McKenna, Michael McKenzie, Dr Natasha Tusikov, and Dr 
Jeroen van der Heijden for their generosity in giving feedback on my draft thesis 
chapters at various stages and being partners in deep discussions.   
I would like to extend my gratitude to all my respondents in Australia, Indonesia and 
the US who shared their knowledge, experience and expertise in managing the tax 
compliance of very wealthy individuals. Their narratives developed my understanding 
about how policy should be implemented in different circumstances. 
The support of an Australian Leadership Awards Scholarships (now called an Australia 
Awards Scholarship) from AusAID-DFAT was crucial to the completion of my PhD. I 
also have benefited from the help of Australia Awards Liaison Office staff under the 
leadership of Gina Abarquez. I also thank my institution in Indonesia, the Directorate 
General of Taxation (DGT), which gave me the opportunity to pursue my aspiration.  
I thank Dr Campbell Aitken of Express Editing Writing and Research for his thesis 
editing services. His assistance was provided in accordance with the national guidelines 
for the editing of research theses by professional editors. 
iv 
 
I wish to thank Karina Pelling of the ANU Cartography and GIS services for her 
assistance with making Figure 4.3 look more meaningful, and Candida Spence of the 
ANU Information Literacy Program for being so generous with her time to help me 
with formatting. 
My love and deep gratitude to my extended family in Indonesia, who kept asking me 
when I would finish my studies, so helped me to focus on my PhD. Finally, my heartfelt 
thanks go to my wife Lina and daughter Echa for the wonderful love and 
encouragement they have always given me. 
  
v 
 
Dedications 
 
 
 
 
 
To the loving memory of my parents who, although not high net-worth individuals, 
understood the worth of knowledge and taught me how to be persistent in accumulating 
it. 
 
To my beloved wife Lina and daughter Echa who have accompanied me in this long 
winding journey of PhD and filled it with love, joy and laughter. 
 
  
vi 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
A growing challenge for tax authorities worldwide is managing the tax compliance of 
high wealth individuals (HWIs). The OECD promotes comparative policy learning as 
an approach to addressing such shared problems. It also gives its imprimatur to ‘best 
practice’ for OECD countries wishing to strengthen their regulatory frameworks. 
Among OECD recommendations are for tax administrations to invest in specialised 
HWI initiatives. While such initiatives have gained popularity, this thesis presents 
evidence to suggest that the divergence of tax regulatory practices and policies can 
reduce the transferability of such policy lessons and practices.  
Indonesia, despite its developing status and the relative immaturity of its tax 
administration, adopted a HWI initiative in 2009. This thesis investigates the process of 
this transfer and, in particular, its implementation in the Directorate General of Taxation 
(DGT). 
The policy transfer framework of Dolowitz and Marsh (1996; 2000) was used as the 
theoretical starting point for the thesis. The notions of ‘uninformed’, ‘incomplete’, and 
‘insufficient’ transfer provided by the framework, however, are terms too broad for 
understanding processes that may lead to failure. A process approach, as advocated by 
Christensen (2013), Eccleston (2006), Radaelli (2000) and Sharman (2010) was needed 
that could take account of multiple, competing processes, some of which assisted the 
vii 
 
HWI office, others which undermined it. Braithwaite and Drahos’ (2000) concepts of 
actors, principles, mechanisms, and webs of influence were applied to disentangle the 
dynamics that occurred at the implementation stage of the transferred policy.  
Evidence of implementation processes and consequences was collected through an 
empirical case study of HWI taxation regulatory arrangements in Indonesia and 
Australia. Australia was the single most important advisor to DGT on establishing a 
HWI unit.  In all, 54 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Indonesian and 
Australian tax officials and other relevant actors between September 2011 and April 
2013. Archival material and public documents were also analysed.  
Policy transfer occurred with a political imperative to ‘do something’ to modernise the 
tax administration. The policy was adopted voluntarily by Indonesia, with support 
sought and received from the international epistemic community. Within Indonesia and 
DGT, however, there was no opportunity for negotiating the time frame for the HWI 
initiative. There was little time for deep learning. 
In the early stages, DGT invested in training and dialogue to build a shared commitment 
among staff and stakeholders around the functions of the HWI unit. After three months, 
the DGT’s direction on how it managed compliance of the HWI taxpayers changed 
dramatically. The old DGT ethos of meeting revenue targets was imposed on the HWI 
unit. During this second period of the HWI unit’s operations, webs of dialogue took 
second place to webs of control. Coercion undermined the process of building 
commitment to the new HWI unit. Blocked communication channels prevented 
cooperation. Resistance emerged – among stakeholders, to the idea of a HWI unit, and 
to a return to old tax collection practices by those who favoured reform. For the 
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moment, the contest of principles for Indonesia’s tax system, and control of 
mechanisms to realise these principles, has led to a crushing of HWI tax reform.  
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Governments may imitate what peer countries do 
simply because they are peers, or governments may 
imitate what apparently successful countries do 
simply because they are high-status countries that 
are considered to know best. 
Meseguer (2005, p. 73) 
 
 
Background to the study 
In March 2009, in front of Indonesia’s wealthiest people and hundreds of other guests 
(Adamrah & Suharmoko 2009), Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY) declared the establishment of an institutional arrangement within the Indonesian 
tax administration dedicated to very wealthy individual taxpayers. The unit was named 
the High Wealth Individual Tax Service Office (HWI TSO). The unit started operating 
on May 1, 2009. This initiative was designed to assist HWIs in fulfilling their tax 
obligations (Directorate General of Taxation [DGT] 2009). It was a campaign promise 
made a few months before when the President faced the Indonesian people in an 
election to extend his presidency for another 5 years (Sherlock 2009). This policy, 
2 
 
however, had been planned one year earlier as part of the President’s ‘quick-win’ 
initiative, wrapped in a bigger rhetorical slogan of ‘bureaucratic reforms’.1  
At the same time, in the last quarter of 2008, the global financial crisis (GFC) led to the 
Indonesian government anticipating a decline in tax revenue from corporate taxpayers 
(Djaja 2009). The history of the Indonesian tax system was that it relied heavily on 
revenue from corporate income taxes: more than 80 per cent of total income tax revenue 
was contributed by this sector (Nugraha & Lewis 2013). Most big corporations in 
Indonesia relied on international markets for their profits (Djaja 2009). The GFC 
reduced profits, which in turn reduced their tax payments. Therefore, tax revenue from 
individual taxpayers became of greater interest to government and the Indonesian tax 
system, after being neglected for a long time. The switch to personal income tax was 
regarded as useful in the eyes of policymakers for two reasons. In contrast to income tax 
revenue from corporations, which fluctuated with global economic conditions, personal 
income taxes were relatively stable, at least in the short term.  
The second reason for the interest in personal income tax was that Indonesian 
policymakers recognised that in countries with mature tax systems (i.e., more developed 
economies), personal income tax constituted a relatively larger proportion of tax 
revenue (Arnold 2012). As shown later in this thesis, there is potential to collect more 
tax from individual taxpayers in Indonesia. In the early years of the 21st century, it was 
estimated that registered individual taxpayers constituted only 27 per cent of individuals 
who should be registered in the system (Marks 2003). In a more recent study of the 
                                                 
1  The quick-win initiative was a series of programs proposed by government institutions in which the 
benefits could be felt instantly (in less than one year) by the program stakeholders (Indonesia Ministry of 
Administrative and Bureaucracy Reform 2011). 
3 
 
Indonesian tax system, Brondolo et al. (2008, p. 15) concluded that ‘only a very small 
fraction of the taxpayer population was registered with the DGT’. 
High wealth individuals became the first target in the Indonesian government’s effort to 
make individual taxpayers the major source of public revenue rather than corporations. 
The DGT defines HWIs as those who (a) are corporate shareholders and principal 
business owners; (b) have financial asset and property at least Rp10 billion (US$1 
million); (c) reported taxable income at least Rp1 billion; and (d) whose domicile is in 
Jakarta (International Monetary Fund [IMF] 2011, p. 8).2  
In order to achieve this goal, the Indonesian tax authority (Directorate General of 
Taxation, or DGT) decided to adopt a regulatory model that had been known to work 
elsewhere to increase compliance of HWIs. The idea of establishing an appropriate 
structure in tax administration to deal specifically with HWIs had been promoted by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Forum on Tax 
Administration (FTA). A special HWI regulatory model had been adopted in countries 
such as Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States (OECD 2009a, 
p. 56). It is of note that most of the countries that have adopted a HWI3 unit are more 
developed countries and mature democracies. 
                                                 
2  The threshold amounts of net worth vary across countries. For instance, Australia has a threshold of 
A$30 million (Australian Taxation Office [ATO] 2008); in the United Kingdom the threshold is £20 
million (HM Revenue & Customs 2010); and in New Zealand the threshold is NZ$50 million (Inland 
Revenue 2012). 
3  'HWI' is pronounced as ‘hui’, with a silent h, instead of ‘ach də-bəl-yü ī’; that is why the article ‘a’ is 
used prior to this abbreviation rather than 'an'. 
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When Indonesia decided to go down the same route as more developed countries and 
adopt a regulatory model that increased HWI tax compliance, the DGT received 
assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) to establish a HWI unit. DGT learnt from its counterpart in Australia how 
to manage tax compliance among HWIs. 
Despite the fact that the HWI regulatory arrangement is regarded as an effective way to 
maximise tax compliance by the very wealthy (OECD 2009a, chap. 3), the HWI unit did 
not meet the expectations of DGT’s leaders. In February 2012, only 34 months after its 
inception, the experiment was called to a halt: the HWI unit’s formerly exclusive focus 
on the administration of taxes for affluent individual taxpayers was broadened to 
administering taxes for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The unit’s name was also 
changed following alteration in its functions.  
In this thesis, the argument for the failure of the HWI policy has been made on 
‘programmatic’ grounds rather than ‘political’ grounds (Bovens 2010).4 It should be 
acknowledged that SBY did win his second term of office with his quick-win policy 
promise of which the HWI unit was part, although public endorsement had waned by 
the end of his second term. The argument for failure on programmatic grounds, 
however, focuses on other non-political questions (Marsh & McConnell 2010, p. 571): 
Did the policy achieve its intended outcomes? Was the policy an efficient use of 
resources? Was the policy made operational in a way that was consistent with achieving 
its objectives?  
                                                 
4  See also Bovens et al. (2001) for the distinction between programmatic and political dimensions of 
success and failure in public governance. 
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The HWI unit was unsuccessful in that it did not achieve its policy objectives. It did not 
succeed in collecting more tax from wealthy people or substitute the traditional revenue 
dominance of corporate income tax in the Indonesian budget with personal income tax. 
Located within the Large Taxpayers Regional Office (LTRO) portfolio5, the HWI unit, 
in its two full years of operation6, contributed only 0.24 per cent on average of total 
revenue collected by the Office. 
The failure of the HWI unit in Indonesia gives rise to the question of why the policy did 
not work as expected in spite of a significant investment of resources. The initiative had 
the support of the President, advice was provided by the IMF and Australia, and DGT 
sent their staff to Australia to learn how to set up and operate such a unit. DGT 
developed a new office, assembled their best staff and located them together in Jakarta. 
The investment, however, was not enough to enable the HWI unit to increase tax 
payments from HWIs. The unit was regarded as inefficient from a collection cost-
efficiency ratio perspective (DGT n.d., p. 6). 
Indonesia’s HWI unit did not allow for the holistic monitoring of tax compliance of 
HWIs and their entities. Only through a holistic monitoring approach, in which a HWI 
and her/his related entities were treated as an integral economic entity, could there be 
any hope of collecting more tax and shifting the balance of tax contributions from 
corporations to individuals, in particular to individuals who controlled corporations. 
                                                 
5  In terms of revenue, the LTRO has been contributing significantly to the Indonesian state budget. 
Consisting of only four tax service offices (TSOs) including the HWI unit, the LTRO contributed almost 
38 per cent of the total DGT revenue for fiscal years 2007–2011 (DGT 2012). 
6  That is, for the fiscal years 2010 and 2011. For fiscal year 2009, the unit was yet to be given any 
revenue targets. For fiscal year 2012, the structural change which saw the HWI unit merged with large 
enterprises (i.e., state-owned enterprises or SOEs) occurred in the middle of the fiscal year, which meant 
that the revenue for the new unit included revenue from SOEs. 
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Indonesia’s HWI unit targeted wealthy individual taxpayers but not their entities when 
assessing compliance. 
This thesis investigates the reasons why a policy shown to be effective elsewhere in the 
world for managing tax compliance of HWIs did not meet its potential when it was 
transferred to Indonesia.7 The purpose of my research was to investigate the processes 
that Indonesia undertook to establish a HWI unit, and through this analysis, ask the 
question of whether transfer of HWI policy, or of other tax policies, can be undertaken 
in ways that improve the likelihood of success. The more generalised challenge of my 
thesis was to identify a set of processes for the successful transfer of a tax policy such as 
a HWI policy from elsewhere. A process is defined as ‘a series of actions or steps taken 
in order to achieve a particular end’ (Stevenson 2010).  
Research problems and aims  
The approach taken to investigating the reasons for the HWI policy’s shortcomings in 
Indonesia was located within the research field of policy diffusion and transfer. This 
research tradition examines why policies used in one country or region are taken up in 
other countries or regions, a particularly puzzling question in my research because the 
originating country for modelling and learning about the policy, Australia, is so 
dissimilar from the adopting country, Indonesia. 
Generally speaking, policy diffusion and transfer are likely when there is dissatisfaction 
with local conditions and public institutions have limited resources to deal with this 
                                                 
7 This refers to increasing tax contributions from high wealth individuals as mentioned above but also to a 
broader potential to alter Indonesian’s attitudes towards individual taxation, starting with Indonesia’s 
wealthy taxpayers and then extending the idea of individual taxpaying tax to other income earners. 
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dissatisfaction (Rose 1993). Authorities then look to other governments or non-
governmental organisations to search for solutions to common problems (Evans 2004a; 
Rose 1993). Learning from or even copying others’ solutions is cheaper than developing 
a solution from scratch. But the process of implementing a policy transferred from other 
countries may take a different form, as was the case when the Indonesian tax authority 
decided to adopt a HWI project based on Australia’s model. This is particularly likely 
when policy and institutions are adapted from a jurisdiction with a different level of 
economic development, political structure, culture, and legislative and regulatory 
infrastructure (e.g., Evans 2009). This gave direction to the main research question that 
I sought to answer: Why did the HWI initiative in Indonesia fail to build a cooperative 
relationship with high wealth individual taxpayers, lift tax contributions from high 
wealth individuals and prepare Indonesia for growth in the individual taxpaying sector? 
In examining policy implementation one also needs to understand the forces driving the 
policy agenda (Eccleston 2006, p. 4), because they will affect the way in which the 
policy is carried out. Accordingly, in this research I collected considerable background 
information on the originating and adopting countries and the steps they took to 
progress the policy, from setting the policy agenda through implementation. 
In order to answer the main research question mentioned earlier, I posed a series of 
more specific questions:  
 How was the HWI unit set up in other countries, specifically Australia, prior to 
Indonesia adopting this policy? How was the HWI unit in Indonesia set up?  
 Who were the instigators and designers of the unit and who was recruited to work 
in the unit (actors)? 
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 What was the purpose and priority of the unit (principles) and how was it to achieve 
its objectives (mechanisms)?  
 How was the effectiveness of the HWI unit helped or hindered by being included or 
excluded from webs of influence inside and outside DGT?  
 How has the process in setting up the HWI unit affected policy outcomes? 
The policy transfer literature was useful in showing the deliberativeness (Evans 2006) 
associated with the establishment of a HWI unit in Indonesia. Indonesia wanted to be a 
modern state, and a HWI unit was perceived to be state-of-the-art in tax administration 
because of its distinctiveness in monitoring tax compliance of HWIs and their related 
entities (Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001; Hong & Braithwaite 2011). Other countries’ 
tax offices had shown that an HWI-specific unit could work well in eliciting 
cooperation and effectively monitoring taxable income (OECD 2009a; 2013b). The 
policy transfer literature was also useful in emphasising the importance of processes in 
the transfer of policy (Eccleston 2006; Radaelli 2000; Sharman 2010). In Indonesia’s 
case, processes of implementation of the policy will be shown to be critically important 
to its failure. There was some indication of policy learning, but also signs of superficial 
learning, even emulation. In order to understand these processes and the different 
currents that were influencing how events unfolded in Indonesia, I adapted a model of 
principles, mechanisms, actors, and webs of influence from Braithwaite and Drahos’ 
work on global business regulation (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000) and used it to guide 
the analysis of interview data and other materials. Nine propositions emerged to explain 
why the HWI policy did not translate successfully into the Indonesian context. 
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The first three propositions are extensions of ideas from the diffusion and transfer 
literature on when and why one country adopts another’s policy. These propositions 
explain the limited success of Indonesia’s HWI initiative.   
Proposition 1: Structural compatibilities are necessary between the transferring and 
adopting country in terms of legislation, regulations, frameworks and codes of practice 
for tax administration. These elements, if compatible, provide tax system integrity. 
Incompatibility in these elements risks undermining tax system integrity. Importing a 
new initiative without checking structural compatibility and effects on integrity is a high 
risk process. 
Proposition 2: Physical compatibilities between the transferring and adopting country 
in terms of geographical features, population size, means of record keeping and 
information sharing determine the degree to which a transferred policy must be adjusted 
and modified to suit the adopting country’s circumstances. Importing a new initiative 
without planning for adjustments will introduce disruption into the transfer process. 
Proposition 3: Cultural compatibilities from a broader societal perspective between the 
transferring and adopting country require consideration before a decision is made to 
transfer a policy. In particular, attention should be paid to how much respect is afforded 
to the tax system in the two countries and how much trust placed in authorities. A 
program needs to be accepted if it is to be implemented successfully. 
The remaining six propositions emerged primarily from researching processes of 
implementation using a principles, mechanisms and actors framework. These 
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propositions describe the steps that need to be taken to give a new program such as the 
HWI unit the best chance of working effectively. 
Proposition 4: Adoption of a new program requires an analysis of how the rigidity of 
the structure of the current organisation might obstruct implementation of a new 
program. 
Proposition 5: Adoption of a new program requires knowledge of the overarching 
principles for the organisation that coordinate action and give meaning and purpose to 
actions. 
Proposition 6: Adoption of a new program requires a generous time frame and repeated 
educational encounters to ensure the organisation develops familiarity with the program, 
is comfortable with the change, and learns how to operate the program effectively.  
Proposition 7: Adoption of a new program requires vertical and horizontal 
communication in order to reach all parts of the organisation to explain the purpose of 
the new program, how it is to operate and the resources available to help it operate. 
Proposition 8: Adoption of a new program requires continuing dialogue across the 
organisation and with those outside the organisation to respond effectively to problems 
in implementation and to ensure continuous learning about how to operate the program 
more effectively. 
Proposition 9: Adoption of a new program requires acknowledgement of resistance 
within the organisation and opportunity for dialogue with those who wish to express 
that resistance to improve the operations of the program. 
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This thesis presents the journey of discovery of these propositions. 
Outline of the thesis 
This thesis comprises eight chapters.  
Chapter 1 provides a review of the literature on policy transfer and its comparison with 
other closely related concepts, notably policy convergence and diffusion. These 
concepts are examined within the context of globalisation. The works of David 
Dolowitz and David Marsh (1996; 2000) and the analytical framework they developed 
were used as a basic guide for a policy transfer analysis of the HWI unit. Several studies 
in taxation that used policy diffusion and policy transfer concepts are reviewed in this 
chapter using the Dolowitz and Marsh framework. Few studies in taxation focus on the 
actual implementation process and how it fails internally (notable exceptions are 
Christensen’s (2013) and Sharman’s (2010) works). Exploring a tax policy 
implementation phase systematically within a policy transfer framework is the 
contribution of this thesis to the literature.  
In my review of the literature on policy transfer (Chapter 1), I recognised different 
pressures at the international, national, and organisational levels, from the ‘decision to 
transfer’ phase through to the ‘implementation-practice’ phase, that determine the 
success or otherwise of policy transfer. Pressures of different kinds in different spheres 
of government activity have an effect on the depth of learning that takes place. At some 
levels, learning and deliberation may be taking place, while at other levels emulation 
and ’doing something’ (Sharman 2010) may be the best that can be offered in support of 
the new program. Appreciation of these different kinds of pressures and unevenness in 
the depth of learning is necessary to understand the fate of the HWI unit in Indonesia. 
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In Chapter 2 I delve further into the question of implementation in policy transfer by 
employing the concepts of ‘principles’, ‘mechanisms’, ‘actors’ and ‘webs of influence’ 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000). These concepts were used by John Braithwaite and Peter 
Drahos to explain the processes of globalising business regulation: Different actors 
employ different mechanisms to push for or against particular principles. This model 
opens the analysis to understanding complementary processes and conflicting processes 
at the implementation stage. Organisations are not homogeneous entities. Some 
members of DGT supported the HWI initiative, others opposed it. These differences 
play an important role in explaining how policy initiatives unfold and their ultimate 
success. 
In particular, Chapter 2 explains how different interpretations of a policy’s principles by 
different actors in privileged positions can change the implementation process. Webs of 
influence are used by powerful actors to promote certain principles; they can enable 
persuasion and dialogue or they can be used to control relationships and the means for 
achieving certain outcomes. Webs of dialogue and control were mechanisms that 
enabled some practices to gain ascendancy while others are disestablished. Of relevance 
to later data analysis is the way in which webs of control gained importance to re-
establish old practices, with subordinates directed by powerful actors to achieve policy 
objectives as new practices were dismantled. 
Chapter 3 contains a description and explanation of the research methods employed in 
the study. Empirical fieldwork was conducted in Indonesia as the primary focus of the 
study, but also in Australia. The ATO had a HWI Taskforce and was the country that 
provided most advice and guidance to DGT in setting up their HWI unit. In both 
countries, the method for data collection was two-fold: interviews and document and 
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archival analysis. Interviews were conducted with tax officials and stakeholders from 
inside and outside the tax authority to elicit their understanding of the policy and seek 
their views and analysis of aspects of the HWI policy: its appropriateness, its potential, 
positives and negatives in implementation, supportive and non-supportive elements, and 
challenges and opportunities. Documents were obtained from a variety of sources. Some 
were publicly available, others were obtained by request. I collected and analysed 
formal government papers, reports from inter-governmental organisations, academic 
reports and research papers, and media releases and reports.  
Interviews and documents and archival analysis were used in two basic ways: first, to 
understand how the HWI unit should be operated and provide the best possible account 
of the functioning of the HWI unit, and second to describe the expectations surrounding 
the HWI unit and what happened in practice. 
The first part of Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of the features of the HWI 
initiative in Australia, with particular attention to tax compliance management. The 
chapter includes a discussion of the Taxpayers’ Charter (ATO 2010) and the ATO 
compliance model (ATO 2009) and how the Charter and the model were applied to tax 
authority-taxpayer relationships and to managing tax compliance of HWI taxpayers in 
Australia. The model serves as guidance for the ATO to provide taxpayers with a 
proportionate and appropriate response to compliance issues, based on their 
understanding of taxpayer’s individual circumstances. The Charter serves as the basis 
for the cooperative, trusting, and respectful relationship between the Tax Office and the 
Australian public (Braithwaite & Reinhart 2000, p. 1). 
In the second part of Chapter 4 I discuss the HWI regulatory arrangement within the 
ATO, with particular attention to the influence of the policy principles, the mechanisms 
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used to achieve those objectives, the roles that various actors played in implementation 
and how coordination across the organisation was achieved. I contend that it is crucial 
to understand the elements of the Australian tax system that underpin the operation of 
the HWI program as part of learning how this policy works, before attempting to 
transfer the policy to another jurisdiction. Importantly, there was a gap between 
Australia and Indonesia in relation to these elements that contributed to unsuccessful 
transfer. 
Chapter 5 provides evidence to demonstrate that policy transfer had occurred in 
Indonesia in relation to the HWI initiative. Indonesia’s HWI unit was intentionally 
adopted after examining what other countries had been doing to improve the tax 
compliance of wealthy individuals. Indonesia did not arrive at the policy without 
consultation and information from other countries facing similar problems.  
Chapter 5 also describes the operation of the Indonesian tax system to illustrate the 
context that led to the adoption of the HWI policy. The relevant features of Indonesia’s 
tax system are: low tax burdens and high non-compliance; a tax system driven by 
revenue targets and not interested in individual taxpayers; a taxpaying culture 
dominated by disengagement with the tax system; and tax administration that is 
geographically dispersed, rigid and hierarchical (with headquarters controlling 
operations).  
Chapter 5 illustrates the structural rigidity of DGT in adopting the HWI unit that 
contributed to its failure. As the organisation was inflexible, it could not accommodate 
the unit as a new initiative with high status and high priority. Structurally the HWI unit 
in Indonesia was placed at a level which made it difficult for the unit to coordinate its 
role with that of others. In contrast to the ATO’s HWI Taskforce, Indonesia’s HWI unit 
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faced impediments when dealing with taxpayers, other parts of DGT, and other 
institutions. Therefore, understanding and assessing the rigidity of the structure of the 
current organisation is vital for adopting countries when wanting to implement a new 
policy from elsewhere. 
The implementation phases of the HWI unit in Indonesia are discussed in Chapters 6 
and 7. In Chapter 6 I show how actors in leadership positions in DGT interpreted policy 
ideas differently, setting different priorities for DGT, and favouring different 
mechanisms in terms of networks and strategies to achieve policy objectives. This 
chapter illustrates the significant differences in the approaches and mechanisms of two 
leaders of DGT at two different points of time during the implementation of the HWI 
unit. The difference in mechanisms used by different actors was caused by different 
meanings given to the policy by the leaders. Mechanisms incorporated the networks 
cultivated to advance policy implementation (coercive and controlled versus open and 
discursive) as well as specific strategies such as developing databases for taxpayers and 
staff retention. 
Chapter 6 also describes time pressures and how a longer time frame was not given to 
staff so that they could try to develop new taxpayer databases and develop knowledge 
and expertise. The implementation of new ‘foreign’ policies requires a reasonable time 
for the policy to be fully understood and bedded down and to implement new practices. 
Communication among actors plays an important role in disseminating policy ideas 
from the top to the bottom of an organisation, and in channelling new ideas and 
feedback, to benefit policy implementation from the bottom up. Continuing 
communication can only be maintained through the use of dialogic webs: that is, webs 
of influence that allow actors to share their ideas. Webs of control, on the other hand, 
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utilise rewards and punishment to elicit compliance from subordinate actors and do not 
facilitate the open flow of communication. 
In Chapter 7 I demonstrate that the use of webs of control, rather than webs of dialogue, 
by powerful actors diminished opportunities for actors on the ground to participate in 
the policy implementation process, to suggest feedback, and contribute new ideas based 
in their ‘grounded’ knowledge. Most importantly, poor communication resulted in lack 
of support for the policy and deteriorating trust among actors. Dialogic webs offered the 
prospect of sustaining the commitment and mutual understanding of shared interest 
among actors (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, chap. 23). Powerful actors could have 
elicited commitment and mutual understanding from internal and external stakeholders 
through continuing dialogue.  
When trust in leadership deteriorates, resistance to change is very likely to occur. 
Nevertheless, a degree of resistance is always likely during the process of implementing 
a new policy. The problem with Indonesia was that resistance to change was not 
anticipated when the country implemented the HWI initiative in its tax administration. 
Resistance is the main theme of the conclusion of the thesis, provided in Chapter 8. This 
chapter argues that the HWI initiative in Indonesia failed because a range of factors 
posed obstacles to implementation, which when unresolved, fomented resistance. The 
obstacles included institutional, human capital, and social capital barriers. 
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Chapter 1 
Globalisation, Policy Diffusion and Policy 
Transfer 
 
 
…rapid diffusion within the world system 
seems linked to the homogeneous cultural 
construction of contemporary nation-states… 
they provide fertile ground for the rapid 
diffusion of public policies and institutional 
structures. States subscribe to remarkably 
similar purposes… 
  (Strang & Meyer 1993, p. 491). 
 
 
Introduction 
It is not new for one polity to learn practices and approaches from another. Such 
learning can be traced back as early as 315 BCE, when Aristotle advised the rationality 
of lesson-drawing from other’s experience elsewhere (Evans 2004a) and studied the 
different ways in which Greek cities were governed in order to learn how to create the 
best political system (Rose 2005). The international proliferation of Value Added Tax 
(VAT)-style consumption taxes in the later decades of 21st Century, after being 
introduced in France in the early 1950s (Eccleston 2006), and the establishment of large 
taxpayer units (LTUs) within tax administration structures dedicated for managing tax 
compliance of large corporations since early 1980s (Baer 2002), are other examples of 
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policy transfer. In the last few decades, rapid advancement in communication, 
information and transportation technologies combined with the internationalisation of 
politics have intensified global sharing of ideas and practices. Globalisation has reduced 
barriers to economic, political, and cultural exchange between societies (Drezner 2001).  
Scholars (e.g., Bernstein & Cashore 2000) distinguish globalisation from 
internationalisation. The former has an economic focus on ‘increasing economic 
transactions that transcend borders’, while the latter concerns ‘the increased activities 
and influence [on states] of actors, ideas and institutions from beyond state borders’ 
(p. 70). Even with this shade of difference in meaning, both terms are relevant in this 
thesis. Both refer to the domestic elements (politics, economy, culture, or policies) of 
one country becoming more and more influenced by and integrated with other countries, 
leading to policy similarities. 
Similarity in policy between countries can be achieved in many ways. Bennet (1991) 
described four processes that lead to a global convergence of policy and that entail 
different kinds of agency on the part of the state: emulation, where state officials copy 
other countries’ actions; elite networking, where convergence is facilitated by 
knowledge and ‘state of the art’ policy shared among transnational policy communities; 
harmonisation, where policy converges through the adoption of basic shared inter-
national norms; and penetration, which occurs when policy convergence results from 
external actors and interests, where the state’s autonomy in policy making is curtailed 
and instead ‘the state is presumed to act in accordance with the preferences of the 
dominant social group rather than its own’ (pp. 220-226 & 232). These four descriptions 
of processes that lead to the adoption of a policy are not mutually exclusive. As this 
thesis shows, in the case of Indonesia’s HWI taxpayers unit, Bennet’s processes 
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resonate with different aspects of the implementation of the HWI unit. To understand 
the adoption and early history of the HWI unit in Indonesia, this thesis will traverse 
literature of policy convergence, diffusion and transfer (Chapter 1) and global regulation 
(Chapter 2). 
Taxation is a subject that combines economic, political, social and cultural dimensions, 
and as such needs to be understood from both a globalisation and internationalisation 
perspective. With globalisation has come mobile capital and increasing numbers of 
HWIs whose business interests and assets cross national boundaries. Economic 
development in emerging economies (e.g., Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South 
Korea) has contributed to the increasing population of HWIs, adding to the global 
number of HWIs from developed economies (e.g., Australia, Japan, the US and the UK) 
(Becerra et al. 2012; Capgemini & RBC Wealth Management 2013). HWIs are people 
who, based on their net worth, exceed a certain wealth threshold (definition of wealth 
and arbitrary thresholds vary across states), and thereby fall into this category.8 The 
fast-growing population of HWIs internationally poses similar challenges to state-based 
tax authorities around the world in terms of managing their tax compliance. Challenges 
include: more complex business and tax affairs which generally include financial 
interests that transcend national boundaries; greater opportunity and greater access to 
resources to undertake tax minimisation practices through aggressive tax planning; 
greater amounts of tax revenue at stake than for individual taxpayers more generally; 
                                                 
8  Net worth is defined as current value of assets less current value of liabilities or debt. Some scholars 
(e.g., Slemrod 2002; Wolff 2002) distinguish high-wealth individuals from high-income individuals. The 
latter refers to people who fall into this category based on the amount of annual income they earn. The 
threshold of either net wealth or annual income used for categorisation of the high-wealth individual or 
high-income individual varies from one tax authority to another and from one institution (e.g., research 
institutions) to another. 
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and greater capacity through their non-compliance to undermine the integrity of the tax 
system (OECD 2009a, p. 3). Facing these similar challenges and threats to their revenue 
base, tax authorities have an incentive to learn from each other. A policy specifically 
designed to monitor tax compliance of HWIs that is regarded as a success in one 
country encourages tax authorities in other countries to learn from and adopt it. 
‘Voluntary’ learning by policy officials, however, is only one explanation as to why a 
policy in one country is adopted by another. 
All states have an eye to collecting their fair share of tax from HWIs operating across 
national boundaries, but how they do this depends on a range of factors, including legal, 
political, trade and cultural considerations. At the same time, international pressure can 
be significant. As Bernstein and Cashore (2000) noted, internationalisation of policies 
occurs when policies which traditionally operate within a domestic domain ‘face 
increased scrutiny, participation, or influence from transnational actors and international 
institutions, and the rules and norms they embody’ (p. 72). Consequently, states’ 
autonomy in developing policies that are feasible for their own context is reduced to the 
point where they may have no choice but to agree (voluntarily or coercively) to adopt 
global norms or practices.9 Such norms and practices do not always fit in their local 
context. Pressures from the global environment (or actors) force individual countries to 
adopt certain principles and embed them in their policies (e.g., transparency may have 
to be embedded in environmental policy, occupational health and safety policy, privacy 
protection policy, or tax policy). When pressure of this kind is exerted on the world 
stage, convergence begins to occur, that is, policies tend to grow more alike, in the form 
                                                 
9   Bennet (1991, p. 215) presented a different view. He argued that policy convergence should not 
always refer to an absence of state autonomy, but rather processes of policy convergence may still occur 
through states’ autonomous preferences to formulate convergent policies. 
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of increasing similarities in structures, processes, and performances (Drezner 2001; 
2005; Kerr 1983, p. 3).  
Policy convergence in domestic tax laws among European Union (EU) members, with a 
pre-determined and agreed principles, is an example of how domestic tax policies have 
become more consistent (e.g., Kemmerling 2010; Ladi 2000). The principle of fiscal 
neutrality is evident in EU tax harmonisation, where EU members are ‘forced’ to adopt 
that principle in their domestic tax laws ‘to ensure fair competition throughout the 
single market’ (Mousis 2011, sec. 14.1.2). Less explicitly coercive are the global 
changes observed by Swank (2006). He traced the way in which nations have moved 
toward the adoption of neo-liberal tax reform. One factor has been the way in which 
‘the capacity of mobile asset holders to move investment across national borders forces 
incumbent governments … to compete for investment. Taxes on capital (and generally 
mobile, high-income earners) are progressively lowered…’ (p. 851). Swank is one of 
several researchers who have argued persuasively for understanding policy adoption in 
terms of a combination of factors, of which global competition is one. 
My research concerned the adoption of a policy from other jurisdictions due to the 
influence of both extraneous and domestic factors. Using the adoption of an HWI unit in 
Indonesia’s DGT as a case study, I examined factors that facilitated or impeded the 
implementation of the HWI unit, an initiative that had previously been embraced by 
other countries including Australia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, the U.S., and the UK (OECD 2009a; 2013b). The 
case study used a policy transfer framework, a concept that emerged in recent years as 
an attempt to unify some of the theoretical insights that varying disciplines have 
contributed. Within a policy transfer process officials may choose to adopt a new policy 
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wholesale or make changes to an existing one. In the area of taxation both kinds of 
changes occur. Indonesia’s HWI initiative involved the adoption of a mode of 
administration of the tax system that went beyond adoption of a new policy. It changed 
public administration and challenged the values and assumptions built into public 
administration more generally. 
The adoption of the HWI initiative in Indonesia was the result of a culmination of 
multiple forces from inside the DGT, from influential bodies and nation states, and from 
global factors. Internally, pressures to generate more tax revenue for the state budget on 
one hand, and to appear competent and professional in front of wealthy taxpayers on the 
other, forced DGT to look for a way of collecting tax (DGT 2009) from its wealthiest 
taxpayers that was cost-effective as well as respectful of investors or future investors. 
Various policy alternatives had been tried in the past, from reforming tax laws and 
administration to establishing large taxpayers units (LTUs) for corporate taxpayers in 
the early 2000s (Rizal 2006). Increased tax revenue remained a priority (Brondolo et al. 
2008); there seemed little harm in DGT adopting a policy that was being used 
elsewhere, and hailed as a success for lifting tax collections without alienating 
taxpayers. Externally, forces for the adoption of a HWI unit were also at work. Policy 
recommendations appeared in an OECD report (OECD 2009a) for tax authorities to 
establish a dedicated unit within their structure to deal with HWIs. Such a 
recommendation encouraged Indonesia’s tax authority to adopt the HWI initiative. 
More direct and operationally significant influence came from a ‘policy intermediary’ 
(Stone 2011, p. 491), the IMF, which provided assistance during the adoption process. 
Transferring a policy from other jurisdictions has been advocated as a cheaper and more 
rapid option for policymakers to pursue than developing the policy from scratch (see for 
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instance Marsden & Stead 2011).10 When policymakers face a problem that they believe 
is a common one (not unique to them), and they are aware of the availability of a 
solution elsewhere, then transferring policy from elsewhere to solve the problem is an 
attractive option (see for instance Rose 1993).11 Developing policy from scratch is 
costly and time-consuming, and presents risks, particularly if policymakers are facing 
problems that need a quick solution and they fear that their credibility as public officials 
is under scrutiny. Time and resource constraints encourage policy-makers to find a 
policy that they understand is effective elsewhere, to learn from it, and to adopt and 
implement it in their context.  
Advances in communication and information technologies facilitate lesson-drawing 
(Rose 1991) of this kind much more easily than in the past. Policy documentation from 
around the world can be accessed through the internet as a primary source of 
information in the policy transfer process. Yet, adopting a policy developed in a very 
different setting from its destination poses risks at the implementation stage. Economic, 
social, political and ideological differences between the originating and adopting 
country, if not well considered, will hinder the achievement of the underlying policy 
objectives (e.g., Hulme 2005; Jacobs & Barnett 2000). At worst, it might also cause the 
policy to depart in a different direction from what was intended originally. As Common 
(2001, p. 3) observed, ‘[u]ndue haste to seize on policies and programmes developed in 
other countries apparently shows little appreciation for the potential consequences of 
                                                 
10 ‘Examples from elsewhere are often seen by politicians and civil servants as a quick, cheap and/or 
simple means to solve their problem without reinventing the wheel...’ (Marsden & Stead 2011, p. 493, 
emphasis is added). 
11  This may involve direct copying or thoughtful adaptation, the basic point being that learning from 
others expedites the policy implementation process. 
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importation and transplantation’. Examining this problem in the case of HWI units was 
the primary focus of my research.  
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it provides a review of the vast literature 
on how a policy in one jurisdiction converges with one in another country. Under the 
umbrella of globalisation, I review the literature on policy convergence, policy 
diffusion, and policy transfer in order to get a better understanding of the similarity and 
the difference between the concepts. Second, this chapter highlights key empirical 
works pertaining broadly to policy convergence, diffusion and transfer, and specifically 
to policy transfer research that explored tax policy transfer. Lastly, based on theoretical 
frameworks discussed earlier, this chapter contains the hypotheses that guide this 
research.  
1.1 Reviewing the literature on policy transfer 
The literature concerned with explaining why policies developed in one country are also 
adopted in another can be divided into three main categories, each with its distinct 
methodological approach and focus. The first is the policy convergence literature, 
discussed in the first part of this section. Policy convergence studies offer the 
phenomenon of globalisation as the fundamental explanation as to why national policies 
are becoming more alike. Globalisation means that as barriers to the transfer of goods, 
services and people are broken down (Stallings 2007), economic challenges observed in 
one country are also observed in others as they compete with each other for trade and 
investment. In other words, globalisation and the pressure for change that it creates are 
used by policy convergence theorists to demystify the phenomenon of policy 
convergence among countries. This literature is relevant to understanding the challenge 
that Indonesia faced in needing to find a way of taxing its HWI population, with their 
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capacity to transcend the legal obligations imposed by nation states. The taxation of 
HWIs was not a problem unique to Indonesia but rather was a problem shared with all 
other democracies because HWIs have mobile capital and assets that can span the globe. 
The second relevant category of literature, discussed in the second part of this section, 
covers studies broadly identified as policy diffusion research. Policy diffusion is 
distinguished conceptually from policy convergence (discussed below in section 1.1.1) 
and policy transfer (discussed below in section 1.1.3). Policy convergence assumes that 
similarity in policy in one place has evolved independently of what has happened 
elsewhere. Unbeknown to each other, nation states will come to favour certain 
arrangements because the arrangements are conducive to dealing with pressures that 
have emerged with a global economy. In contrast, diffusion studies add a further layer 
to the analysis of global sharing of policy. Diffusion studies open the analysis to the 
assumption of active engagement by actors in the dissemination of policy and program 
ideas (Common 2001, p. 12). While policy convergence research looks for explanations 
for why everyone is doing the same thing independently of others, policy diffusion 
research seeks explanation for why certain states engage with particular policy options 
while other states follow different paths or remain untouched by international 
convergence. Diffusion studies examine a range of factors that could account for 
differences, including economic, structural, geographical, political and networking 
determinants. 
The third body of literature revolves around the issue of policy transfer. In general, 
these studies provide a more in-depth analysis of cases and how and why transfer has 
occurred in a particular form. Policy transfer studies pay particular attention to the role 
that actors play in consciously choosing to adopt, or adapt, and implement a policy or 
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idea in another jurisdiction. According to Common (2001), for transfer to occur, ‘they 
[policies and ideas] must be adopted and implemented’ (p. 14). Common pointed out 
that a policy and idea may be diffused without being adopted. ‘Policy transfer becomes 
an observable process once organisations and actors pick up a policy idea or model’ 
(p. 14). The formation of the HWI unit within the DGT was a process of adopting and 
implementing an idea and program from other countries, with Australia in particular 
serving as a role model. The policy transfer framework, therefore, has immediate appeal 
for this study of adoption and implementation of the HWI unit. The reason for choosing 
a policy transfer framework is discussed further in section 1.2. 
1.1.1 Globalisation and policy convergence 
Similar problems faced by policymakers in various jurisdictions resulting from 
globalisation force states to find solutions in the forms of similar policies, institutional 
designs, or administrative arrangements. These similarities may occur independently 
from one country to another due to policy-making processes that recognise similar 
characteristics of the problem. The globalised economy triggers similar analyses across 
countries, and the analyses, in turn, give rise to similar solutions that contribute to 
convergence. The theory of convergence, according to Wilensky (1974, p. xii), is the 
idea that whatever political economies, unique cultures and histories societies may have, 
over time they become more alike in both social structure and ideology. 
This argument has relevance for the current research because, as the result of 
globalisation, tax authorities are confronted with relatively similar problems associated 
with the rise of capital flows. The globalised economy makes capital flow at a much 
greater pace than a few decades ago (Stallings 2007). Indonesia, despite its relatively 
high rate of economic growth, has been experiencing a high level of capital flight 
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(Harrigan, Mavrotas & Yusop 2002; Maski & Wahyudi 2012). According to Khan and 
Haque (1985), capital flight can reduce governments’ ability to generate revenues and to 
service external public debt; with the erosion of the tax base, the need to borrow from 
abroad rises, thereby increasing the foreign debt burden. This phenomenon has become 
a critical challenge for Indonesia and other ASEAN countries (e.g., Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand) (see also Basri & Hill 2011; Beja 2006).  
The following example illustrates the phenomenon that contributes to convergence in 
tax policy. Increasingly free capital movements between jurisdictions, coupled with 
opportunities for firms to disperse geographically, create problems between countries in 
terms of determining taxing rights. Owen (1993, p. 23) has argued that as the base for 
taxes on income and wealth becomes geographically mobile, taxpayers become more 
sensitive to tax differentials. The problem arises due to different national taxation norms 
and interstices between jurisdictions (FitzGerald 2002). These conflicts appear in the 
form of international double taxation when two or more jurisdictions exercise 
conflicting principles in determining their tax base. The ‘income source principle’ 
grants to the country from which income is generated the right to tax the income. The 
‘residence principle', on the other hand, gives taxing rights to the country in which 
people or firms reside, regardless of the source of their income (Devereux 2008).  
If not resolved, conflicts of these kinds create uncertainty for business. Countries that 
entertain uncertainty will deter investment and lose in competition with other countries 
to attract or retain business. Not only will this result in declining investment, but also 
the loss of tax revenue. In order to minimise these effects, international institutional 
frameworks for international tax cooperation have developed. These frameworks (e.g., 
the OECD’s model tax convention on income and on capital and the United Nation’s 
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model for a double taxation convention between developed and developing countries) 
remove conflicting interests that strain economic relations between countries. Moreover, 
they provide taxpayers with certainty by clarifying and standardising taxpayers’ fiscal 
situations when they engage in activities in different jurisdictions (OECD 2010). These 
international regulatory frameworks contribute to convergence in how countries define 
income for taxation purposes to avoid double taxation. The trigger for such convergence 
does not lie with particular states and their governments, but rather with globalisation 
and capital flows. 
A country’s choice to adopt and implement policy to address problems created by 
capital flows is no longer independent of the global setting. The adoption of the HWI 
initiative in tax administration is another example of how a policy choice is influenced 
by the global environment. Global growth in the number of wealthy individuals requires 
tax authorities around the world to anticipate this phenomenon; otherwise, they will lose 
opportunities to generate tax. Resource-rich HWIs have greater access to practices that 
make it possible to minimise their tax obligations through using certain business 
structures such as trusts, or moving their capital from one place to another easily as the 
result of the globalised economy. Furthermore, determining and collecting taxes on 
activities that take place outside a country’s tax jurisdiction becomes more difficult 
(Owens 1993, p. 23), particularly as the mechanisms for tax avoidance become more 
sophisticated (e.g., using transfer pricing arrangements with intellectual property).  
The following illustration adopted from Sheppard (2010) explains how intellectual 
property (IP) can be used as a way to minimise tax. Suppose a US multinational 
company wants to sell high-margin Chinese-made products to German customers. The 
company puts its IP in a tax haven, and requires its Chinese manufacturing affiliate to 
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pay royalties. The company also converts its German distributor to a stripped-risk 
intermediary called a commissionaire to limit taxable profits of the affiliated distributor 
in Germany. Those profits are booked to a principal company in a European tax haven 
as compensation for assuming inventory risk. Consequently, no profits are taxed in the 
United States, and little in Germany. Anticipation of these problems can be in the form 
of cooperative action between tax authorities, though the lag between recognition of the 
problem and action tends to be measured in decades rather than years (e.g., Avi-Yonah 
2000 for tax competition; Rawlings 2007 for transnational tax treaties with regard to tax 
havens). 
As problems arising from globalisation are shared and countries realise they can learn 
from each other’s experiences, the third phase of globalisation (Deprez 2003) emerges, 
in which international coordination, harmonisation, and standardisation become 
important elements in inter-state relations.12 This phase of globalisation occurs when 
‘order and organization are imposed…’ (p. 372). International policy coordination, 
harmonisation, and standardisation provide a partial explanation as to why international 
experiences and policy structures influence national policy choices (Stone 2002, p. 2).  
A question remains: How does convergence occur? Daniel Drezner (2001, pp. 56–64), 
after reviewing theories that relate the concept of globalisation to policy convergence, 
proposed a simple 2x2 schema to capture differences between various theoretical 
accounts. According to Drezner, the first dimension on which theories vary is whether 
                                                 
12  According to Deprez (2003, pp. 371–372) the globalisation process can be identified into three 
distinct phases. The first phase is dominated by the breaking down of traditional trade barriers. The first 
phase of globalisation is aimed at reducing and eliminating both tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The second 
phase of globalisation involves restructuration of the domestic component of a country’s economy that 
alters the way in which the economy operates. Key components of this phase are deregulation and 
privatisation. 
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the prime emphasis is on structural forces or whether there is also recognition of the 
power of autonomous agents. The former defines the structural approach in which most 
attention is given to the role of extraneous factors that affect political units. 
Environmental conditions determine states’ courses of action by strictly limiting the 
possible national responses to a certain problem. In contrast is the agent-centred 
approach which, while still acknowledging the role of extraneous powers that constrain 
national policy responses, also acknowledges that within these bounds, states have 
power to choose among the policy alternatives available. 
The difference between those schools of thought, Drezner (2001) maintained, is in the 
language they use to describe international regulatory regimes. Structural approaches 
view convergence as the dependent variable: Different national policies are 
homogenised into one global policy due to transnational power that constrains political 
units. Agent-based approaches use the term policy coordination and look for 
coordination to illustrate policy convergence. Policy coordination reflects states’ 
agreement on acceptable policy principles. In reality, states may differ in developing 
their rules or regulations, but the principles upon which the rules and regulations are 
developed are similar. The abovementioned example of fiscal harmonisation in the EU 
illustrates well how policy coordination occurs when certain ‘acceptable bounds of 
regulatory policies’ are agreed to by states (Drezner 2001, p. 57), while still providing 
them with sufficient spaces to manoeuvre in response to their domestic constituency 
(e.g., in determining tariffs on VAT under a predetermined standard VAT rate) (see also 
Eccleston 2006). However, in some cases (e.g., taxes on capital and labour), the room to 
manoeuvre is relatively limited (Swank & Steinmo 2002, p. 651) due to intensifying 
pressures faced by contemporary democratic polities. 
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The second dimension of Drezner’s 2x2 schema relates to the source of the pressures for 
convergence. One approach views economic factors as the principal source of pressure 
for convergence. According to Drezner (2001), the threat of the flight of mobile capital 
has pushed states to modify their regulatory policies. This implies states that do not 
follow suit will lose their competitiveness in the global economy. The other approach 
on the source of pressure to converge is ideational. According to Drezner (2001), ‘states 
alter institutions and regulations because a set of beliefs has developed sufficient 
normative power that leaders fear looking like laggards if they do not adopt similar 
policies’ (p. 57). 
Drezner’s schema offers useful insights into the approach that is most suitable for 
understanding the adoption and implementation of the HWI unit in Indonesia. If 
external economic factors were the main source of influence for policy convergence, the 
story of the HWI unit in Indonesia may have been somewhat different. For example, the 
theory of a ‘race to the bottom’ predicts that mobility of trade and capital flows 
contribute to policy convergence by forcing the state to act in accordance with market 
forces. According to this theory, capital will seek places that provide the highest rates of 
return, and states will compete to attract capital by lowering their regulatory standards 
(Drezner 2001, p. 58) (e.g., using low tax rates, flexible tax compliance monitoring, or 
lenient environmental regulations) (see also Swank & Steinmo 2002 for tax rates on 
capital and labour). This structural model leads to an expectation for policies to 
converge ‘at the bottom’; however, convergence in tax collection strategies (as opposed 
to tax rates) tends to be in the opposite direction. Tax authorities are becoming more 
stringent in monitoring tax compliance of very wealthy taxpayers by adopting relatively 
similar approaches and setting in place institutional arrangements that are more ‘at the 
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top’ than at the bottom. Understanding the development of the HWI unit in Indonesia 
requires recognition of factors beyond the economic, although there can be no argument 
that global economic changes create a challenge for tax collectors in relation to HWIs 
regardless of where they operate or reside.  
An approach to policy convergence theory that extends beyond a standard structural 
economic approach was offered by Meyer et al. (1997): the world society model. The 
model suggests that ‘… society would rapidly adopt ‘modern’ structures and purposes 
upon incorporation into world society’ (p. 148)13. Policy convergence according to this 
model is driven more by the need for nation-states to conform to a world-wide model, 
irrespective of the applicability of the model to their local context. More often than not, 
copying world models takes the form of simple mimesis (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) 
that gives more attention to nominal rather than substantive problems (Drezner 2001).14  
Meyer et al. (1997) provided an interesting example of how, in the 1950s, many 
countries re-structured their mass schooling systems around a six-year/three-year/three-
year model in order to meet the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO)’s requirement of comparable educational enrolment data. The 
reason was simply that UNESCO’s statisticians chose to report enrolments for the six-
year primary level and three-year junior level and three-year senior secondary level. 
                                                 
13  Although a world society model ‘de-emphasizes conventional notions of social actors and agency’ 
(Hironaka 2014, p.4), the model does not negate the role of actors as Drezner puts it: ‘These approaches 
[the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, the neoliberal approach, and the world society theory] posit a world 
where an ideational structure dominates individual agency. This statement implies that a world society 
model can still provide space for the role of agency; it is just that agency is not independent of broader 
global forces. 
14  Mimesis refers to a ‘rhetorical term for the imitation, re-enactment, or re-creation of someone else's 
words, manner of speaking, and/or delivery’ (Nordquist 2014). In policy context, it refers to the imitation 
of a policy from another jurisdiction with more attention given to the “surface value” of the policy than to 
its substance.  
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Copying of this model generally occurred ‘without investigating whether it would best 
meet any of the presumed purposes of schooling’ (pp. 158-159). Meyer and his co-
authors cited support for their approach from how ministries and agencies are named 
internationally. Common evolving world-societal models lead states to establish quite 
similar ministries and agencies, because they need to conform to ‘an ideal of the 
rationalised bureaucratic state’ (Drezner 2001, p. 61). This situation contributes to a 
‘institutional isomorphism’, in which agencies become more alike in their structure, 
process, and behaviour (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).  
One of the processes that shapes such isomorphism is the construction of nation-state 
identity and purpose (Meyer et al. 1997, p. 157). Meyer and his colleagues argued that 
the increasing number of countries that adopt other prescribed institutions of modernity 
is due to their orientating themselves to the identity and purposes of the nation-state 
model. As national leaders are committed to the identity of the rationalizing state, some 
policies that reflect that identity are adopted (p. 159): policies for social welfare, the 
education system, taxation and development economics. Moreover, even if a state does 
not fully agree with the world identity model, it will still try to pursue many purposes 
within this model by developing modern institutions such as a central bank or modern 
tax administration. 
In summary, the globalisation perspective may in part provide an explanation for policy 
convergence between Indonesia and more developed countries. HWIs with mobile 
capital and international residences challenge tax authorities everywhere. But more than 
an economic explanation is required for why Indonesia became one of the relatively 
small group of countries in the world to adopt a HWI unit, particularly given that most 
in the group are developed countries. The world society model (Meyer et al. 1997) 
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connects globalisation to policy convergence by arguing that nation-states have a need 
to conform to an ideal of the rationalised bureaucratic state. In her study on Indonesia’s 
adoption of a new bankruptcy law in 1998, imposed by the IMF following the country’s 
economic crisis (an IMF loan was conditional on adoption of the law, among others), 
Steele (1999) found that the adoption of the new bankruptcy law was used by the IMF 
as ‘an index of modernity’ of Indonesia’s legal infrastructure (p. 147). Modern, in this 
context, according to Steele, refers to reforming and changing law to encourage and 
support a market economy by accommodating the perceived needs of investors and 
business people (pp. 144-145). In the context of Indonesia’s tax administration, 
administrative reforms conducted in 2002 and 2008 through organisational restructuring 
were undertaken to achieve what was called a ‘modern tax administration’ (Pandiangan 
2008; Rizal 2006; Rizal 2011). 
The world society model describes the adoption of policies or institutions that depict 
modernity. Nation-states, despite differences in economic development, political 
structure, or cultural tradition, are eager to converge with other modern states by 
adopting a standardised form of policies and institutions. This increases rates of 
institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). This model, nevertheless, does 
not take sufficient account of the role of state actors in the spreading of particular 
policies from one country to another. Diffusion studies are discussed in the next section 
to uncover what they can contribute towards an understanding of why Indonesia 
adopted a HWI unit and other similar countries have not. While diffusion studies 
maintain a strong emphasis on structural explanations, they also give attention to the 
aspect of agency. 
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1.1.2 Policy diffusion 
Unlike the policy convergence literature that gives most attention to policy and 
institutional similarities across nation-states (Bennett 1991; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; 
Kerr 1983), policy diffusion studies focus more on the processes that result in policy 
similarities (Knill 2005, p.3) – the drivers of policy diffusion. Rogers (2003) defined 
diffusion as ‘the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain 
channels over time among the members of a social system’ (p. 5). Diffusion is also 
described as ‘the chronological and geographic patterns of the adoption of a policy 
innovation across government units (Squires & Lord 2012, p. 819). These definitions 
depict the interdependence of the process: Actors communicate innovation. In other 
words, many stakeholders and networks are involved in a policy innovation process 
(Leeuwis & Aarts 2011, p. 23) and they communicate with each other to disseminate 
the policy. 
However, criticism has been directed at suggestions that the policy diffusion process is 
limited to direct contact between prior adopters and potential adopters (Strang 1991). In 
response, Strang offered a more general definition of diffusion that encompasses 
indirect contact between actors. Strang (1991) used the term diffusion to refer to ‘any 
process where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability 
of adoption for remaining non-adopters’ (p. 325). This leads to the incorporation of the 
idea of ‘uncoordinated interdependence’. That is, diffusion may occur through watching 
what others are doing. An innovation might be tested out in one country, emulated by 
some and rejected by others (Elkins & Simmons 2005, p. 38). Elkins and Simons 
identified the lack of coordination in observed interdependence as the essential feature 
or important quality of diffusion in comparison to other means of policy dispersion: ‘the 
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action and choices of one country affect another, but not through any collaboration, 
imposition, or otherwise programmed effort on the part of any of the actors’ (Elkins & 
Simmons 2005, p. 38). 
Having identified the focus of the diffusion literature as ‘pattern finding’ (Marsh & 
Sharman 2009, pp. 275–276) across jurisdictions, it is not surprising that the dominant 
methodology in diffusion studies uses quantitative techniques to analyse large N cases 
and draw conclusions that are expressed as generalizable statements about causes and 
consequences of diffusion. Several of diffusion studies have been undertaken in the 
taxation domain.15 Studies by Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels (2006), Martin (2010) and 
Miller and Richard (2010) are briefly described below. 
Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels (2006) examined the factors that determine tax 
innovation. In doing so, they explored the introduction of new environmental taxes (or 
‘green taxes’) across 308 Flemish municipalities in Belgium over the period 1991-1999. 
The study predicted the probability of a given municipality adopting the green tax from 
internal and regional factors. The internal determinants were ‘factors within the 
jurisdiction that affect innovative behaviour’ (p. 232), and included: per capita revenue 
from all other kinds of taxes; the amount of waste per capita; election year; government 
ideological position; the number of parties participating in government (single-party 
government or coalition government), and fragmentation within government. External 
factors aiding diffusion referred to influences from other jurisdictions that encouraged a 
given jurisdiction to adopt a similar green tax policy. External variables included the 
                                                 
15  See Appendix A for a more detailed account of the method used for literature search on policy 
diffusion and transfer studies in the taxation area and Appendix B for the summaries of the studies. 
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percentage of neighbouring municipalities with a green tax and the percentage of 
second-order neighbours (neighbours of neighbours) with a green tax. 
Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels (2006) concluded that the diffusion of the green tax 
among Flemish municipalities followed a pattern dictated by the electoral constraints 
under which incumbent governments work. Importantly, the study underlined the role 
that political factors played in the adoption of environmental tax policy. At the same 
time, Ashworth and his colleagues found that a green tax was more likely to be adopted 
when neighbours had already adopted such a tax. The relationship was strongest with 
direct neighbours, but also evident for second-order neighbours. In addition to spatial 
proximity, ideological proximity increased the likelihood of adopting a green tax. 
A study conducted by Christian Martin in the US also typifies the diffusion studies 
tradition. Martin (2010) drew 1728 observations from the 48 contiguous US states in 
order to predict the level of cigarette taxes in a particular state. Martin examined the 
average tax levels in adjacent states for their diffusion influence, along with domestic 
factors, the most important of which was the government’s ideological position. Martin 
hypothesised and found that diffusion from one state to another was conditional on 
ideology: ‘The ideological position of the government changes the diffusion influence’ 
(p. 7). Left-leaning governments will adopt the higher tax rates of their neighbours 
following a diffusion model, but right-leaning governments will not. Right-leaning 
governments often respond competitively and lowered their tax rates. The study 
concluded that interdependence studied through diffusion research needed to aspire to a 
further level of sophistication. Martin proposed addressing ‘conditional diffusion’ (p. 
20) so that interdependence and domestic conditions in a globalised environment could 
be analysed side by side, along with their mutual influence. 
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Like Martin (2010), Miller and Richard (2010) employed a large N and mathematical 
modelling (event history analysis) (Newmark 2002). They examined 772 state-year 
observations of policy diffusion of state research and development (R&D) investment 
tax credit among US states. What distinguishes Miller and Richard’s study from 
Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels’ (2006) and Martin’s (2010) studies discussed above is 
that they also employed qualitative interviews to enrich their quantitative analysis. 
Miller and Richard hypothesised that adoption of R&D tax credits was more likely in 
states with: higher unemployment rates; lower per capita incomes; higher patent 
activity; greater federal R&D spending; a more prominent manufacturing sector; a 
single party with legislative control; and a higher percentage of economically similar 
states and of contiguous neighbouring states having previously adopted the policy (pp. 
27-28). 
Miller and Richard (2010) concluded that the adoption of R&D tax credit policy is 
strongly related to an existing manufacturing base and that political factors aided the 
implementation of that policy. They suggested that not only is the manufacturing sector 
more R&D intensive, but a larger manufacturing sector will have increased political 
power that allows sectoral interests to push through legislation from which they will 
gain benefits (p. 30). Their study also found that economic proximity rather than 
geographical proximity between states led toward adoption of the policy.  
Through investigating the role of factors such as geographical proximity (Ashworth, 
Geys & Heyndels 2006), ideological closeness (Martin 2010), or economic proximity 
(Miller & Richard 2010), diffusion studies have looked for explanatory variables 
beyond structural factors. These studies highlight the importance of not just looking at 
pressures beyond the state, but also within the state. Domestic, national, and 
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international factors matter. Beyond this observation, however, diffusion studies can be 
criticised for not offering a nuanced understanding of the adoption of similar policies by 
different countries or states (Marsh & Sharman 2009, p. 270).  
The implicit assumption is that the same policy framework can be adopted in various 
national settings (Common 2001, p. 12). As Weyland (2005) pointed out: ‘these waves 
of diffusion affect countries that are at very different levels of economic, social, and 
political development’ (p. 262). The major concern of diffusion studies has been more 
about the width of the dispersion of policies and less about the depth of the diffused 
policy in its influence on particular countries. All states are assumed to adopt exactly 
the same policy and there are no variations in the policy adopted by those states (Clark 
1985,  p. 63). 
In reality, although policies seem the same superficially, there is almost always 
variation in the extent to which a policy has been adopted, as with the HWI case in this 
thesis. This variation relates to the policy environment in which the policy is introduced. 
A ‘forest–trees’ analogy is useful for identifying the essence of diffusion studies. A 
diffusion study sees the forest from a very long distance. The trees look much the same, 
but when one leaves the diffusion study framework and examines the forest close up, 
the trees become much more diverse and are less likely to be easily identified with the 
whole. 
Moreover, few diffusion studies have explored the role of agency. This is mainly 
because the quantitative large N methodology applied in many of the diffusion studies 
does not lend itself to providing an analysis of the role of agents, or to a more nuanced 
analysis of diffusion generally (Marsh & Sharman 2009, p. 274). In particular, Marsh 
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and Sharman argued that the quantitative methodology used by diffusion scholars 
makes it difficult to take account of the meanings that agents, whether bureaucrats or 
elected actors, attach to structural factors. This, however, is not to suggest that diffusion 
scholars deny the role of agents in the process of policy diffusion. As Newmark (2002) 
pointed out: ‘It may not be the case that agents have a lesser role in policy diffusion, 
rather less attention may be paid to their role in the process [of diffusion]’ (p. 170). The 
utilisation of qualitative interviews in Miller and Richard’s (2010) study may answer 
this criticism. A more complete literature review on diffusion and policy transfer studies 
in the area of taxation is presented in section 1.2. 
In summary, the diffusion literature provides insights into the kinds of factors that lead 
to the adoption of similar policies by some countries or states. Using quantitative 
techniques and mathematical modelling, diffusion research is able to predict to some 
degree who the adopters of a particular policy will be, based on information about the 
structural features of the countries and a host of economic, political and geographical 
variables. In diffusion research, ‘any pattern of successive adoption of policy 
innovation’ (Eyestone 1977, p. 441) is called diffusion, without consideration of 
whether or not actors were aware of the existence of similar policy models elsewhere, or 
were interested in utilising the model to formulate policy in their own context.  
Identification of a pattern of successive policy adoption falls short in providing 
sufficient explanation of how or why a policy has been adopted (Bennett 1991). As 
Bennett pointed out: ‘…the policy diffusion literature focuses more on the spatial, 
structural and socio-economic reasons for a particular pattern of adoption…’ (p. 221, 
italics in original). A deeper understanding of why and how policies are transferred is 
the aim of the third body of research on policy adoption: the policy transfer literature. 
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Policy transfer researchers focus on the role of agents, their motives and their 
aspirations, in the transfer of policy. Table 1.1 contrasts the research elements of the 
diffusion and policy transfer literature; the latter is discussed further in the section 
below. 
Table 1.1 Comparisons: Policy Transfer and Diffusion  
 Policy transfer Diffusion 
Cases Few cases Many cases 
Methodology Qualitative Quantitative 
Generalizability Low degree High degree 
Statistical modelling Little or none Complex/mathematical 
Prediction None High degree 
Source: Adapted from Newmark (2002, p. 160)  
 
1.1.3 Policy transfer 
It has been recognised that policy in one jurisdiction may draw inspiration from others, 
but there has been debate about how to refer to the process (Jacobs & Barnett 2000, 
p.187). Terminology includes ‘lesson drawing’ (Rose 1991), diffusion (Majone 1991), 
emulation (Hoberg 1991), policy transfer (Wolman 1992),  and ‘social learning’ (Hall 
1993). The concept used for the purposes of my research was policy transfer. Building 
on work by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), policy transfer is defined as a ‘process in 
which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in 
one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting’ (p. 5). 
The key characteristic that differentiates policy transfer from policy diffusion is the 
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element of consciousness in adopting a policy from another jurisdiction. Both policy 
convergence and diffusion are attributed to structural dynamics in an international 
environment that give rise to similarities in problem-solving and policy responses. 
Policy transfer research has an additional prerequisite: Policymakers must have 
awareness of, and demonstrate interest in, the policy and institution of the other system 
(Dolowitz 1997, p. 24). Therefore, Wolman (2009) asserts that ‘policy transfer … 
requires “policy learning”’ (p. 1). 
In order to analyse the process of policy transfer, a framework needs to be developed 
which identifies elements in the process. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) suggested that 
such a conceptual framework will help to better understand motivations that drive 
policy-makers to engage in the policy transfer process, how and when policy transfer 
occurs in the policy-making cycle, and who is involved in the process. These issues are 
addressed through the Dolowitz and Marsh Model (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). The 
framework revolves around eight questions16: Why has the transfer occurred and with 
how much coercion? Who is involved in the transfer? What is transferred? Where is the 
transfer from? What is the degree of the transfer (from copying to inspiration)?17 What 
are the constraints on the transfer? How is policy transfer demonstrated by the adopter? 
And, what leads to failure when transferring policy? (See Table 1.2) This framework for 
                                                 
16  Five of which originated in their earlier work (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996). 
17  Rose (1993) establishes a typology of lesson-drawing (policy transfer) process which illustrates the 
degree of reflectivity that actors put into the process of transfer, namely: copying, adaptation, 
hybridisation, synthesis, and inspiration (pp. 30-32). According to Rose, copying merely involves 
enacting more or less intact a policy that was already in effect elsewhere. In adaptation, a policy that was 
adopted from another jurisdiction is adjusted to meet contextual differences. Elements of programs or 
policies from two or more different jurisdictions were combined to produce a hybrid policy. In synthesis, 
policies’ elements from different programs or policies are combined to create a new program. Finally, 
examination of policies from another jurisdiction serves as a source of inspiration instead of analysis of 
the policies; it is used only as an intellectual stimulus to develop a novel program. 
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analysing policy transfer is discussed below in relation to studies of policy transfer in 
taxation. 
Before doing so, it should be acknowledged that the framework is a heuristic device that 
helps to systematically collect data that can be used for theory building. The framework 
is used in Chapter 5 to describe the background to DGT setting up the HWI unit in 
Indonesia. Evans and Davies (1999) have criticised policy transfer analysis because it is 
not based on an explanatory theory, since it does not provide ‘a systematically related 
set of statements, including some law-like generalizations, that is empirically testable’ 
(Rudner 1966, p. 10) as a theory commonly does.  
Dolowitz (2000a, p.11) defended the concept of policy transfer and refers to its 
theoretical potential. The concept of policy transfer can serve as an independent 
variable. Policy transfer provides an explanation for why a policy change/innovation 
has occurred and a basis for explaining the policy outcome. For instance, failure of a 
policy to produce desired outcomes may be due to the policy being transferred from a 
dissimilar country, to it being coerced, the transfer being incomplete, or the civil 
servants being disengaged from the policy transfer process. On the other hand, policy 
transfer can be used as a dependent variable, whereby researchers explain under what 
circumstances transfer is more likely to occur (see for instance Evans 2004b, p. 11; 
Marsh & Sharman 2009, p. 278). For example, transfer might only occur after all 
stakeholders are consulted or when it is compatible with earlier policies and structures. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the argument.  
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For the purposes of my research, the primary interest is in explaining the success or 
otherwise of the HWI unit in Indonesia and the form that the HWI unit took. Rose 
(2002, pp. 8–9) identified five conditions that need to be met when policymakers decide 
to transfer a policy from a particular country if the learning, and consequently the 
transfer, is to be successful: ideological compatibility; similarities in resources; 
psychological (not geographical) proximity; availability of evidence; and 
interdependence. 
Dependent variable  Independent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Policy transfer uncoupled  
Source: adapted from Dolowitz (2000, p. 11) 
 
Ideological compatibility 
It has been suggested that ideological proximity between originating and adopting 
countries explains why an adopting country chooses that country from which to transfer 
a policy (e.g., Legrand 2012a; Page 2000; Strang & Meyer 1993). Although there are no 
two countries in the world exactly the same ideologically, ‘perception of similarity’ 
(Strang & Meyer 1993, p.491) assists in policy transfer. Legrand (2012b), in his study 
Why actors 
engage in policy 
transfer 
 
ideological 
political 
economic 
social 
Policy transfer Policy outcomes 
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of the Windsor Conference Policy Network (WCPN) – an informal network of 
Anglosphere18 public service mandarins from Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and the US observed a pattern of policy learning that could be attributed to ‘an 
underlying governance affinity that reaches back to the common history shared by 
Anglosphere countries’ and common institutions that facilitate active exchange of 
policy ideas and experiences among members (p. 537). 
In the area of taxation, for instance, the Commonwealth Association of Tax 
Administrators (CATA) comprises 49 tax authorities from Commonwealth countries. Its 
primary mission is ‘to promote the improvement of tax administration’ through ‘the 
exchange of ideas and experiences’ among members (CATA n.d.). In Asia and the 
Pacific, the Study Group on Asian Tax Administration and Research (SGATAR) has a 
similar mission; this is not to say member countries have similar ideologies, but shared 
membership may lead some to consider themselves similar enough to engage in policy 
transfer. 
Studies by Baturo and Gray (2009) and Ellis (2009) on the adoption of a flat tax in 
Eastern European countries confirmed the role that ideological factors played in the 
diffusion of flat tax policy. Although the flat tax promised countries a solution to the 
pressing issues of preventing tax evasion, attracting foreign direct investment, and 
simplifying tax collection, the adoption of the policy was only possible within 
governments with a certain political ideology, that is, centre-right governments. 
                                                 
18  Legrand (2012b) uses the term Anglosphere to describe a group of English-speaking countries 
‘marked by differing degrees of sharing of the core Anglosphere characteristics’ or ‘a network civilisation 
without a corresponding political form’ (Bennet 2007, p. 80, cited in Legrand 2012b, p. 527). 
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Similarities in resources 
When adopting countries are attracted to a policy that has proven effective elsewhere, 
they sometimes overlook the extent to which resources were allocated by the originating 
country to make the policy work effectively. Resources include money, personnel, and 
institutional capacity (Rose 2002, p. 8). Too little of these resources commonly creates 
problems when developing countries try to adopt policies from developed economies. 
This often occurs when policy transfer is facilitated by a policy intermediary (Stone 
2011, p. 491) such as the IMF, the World Bank or other international agencies and 
policy consultants that are not familiar with the adopting country’s needs and resources.  
…they [policy consultants] tend to offer advice based upon what they regard as the best 
practice elsewhere, often paying little attention to the particular context in the borrowing 
political system. (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, p. 10) 
International aid agencies and intergovernmental bodies such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund may recommend first-world programmes as best practice 
measures that developing countries ought to adopt. (Rose 2002, p. 8) 
The establishment of the Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in the Indonesian tax 
administration in 2002 is an example of a first-world program adopted by a developing 
country as part of loan conditionality (Brondolo et al. 2008). The adoption of the HWI 
initiative, on the other hand, was influenced by the OECD’s recommendation for tax 
authorities to establish a dedicated unit for HWIs within their organisations (OECD 
2009a) based on similar practices that had been employed by its member countries. 
Examples provided in the recommendation, however, came from developed countries 
with better-resourced tax administrations. 
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Psychological, not geographical proximity 
Psychological proximity refers to the sense of comfort that actors experience while 
interacting with others who can offer policy lessons. As Rose (2002) suggested: ‘… 
policymakers should look for lessons in countries where they and their colleagues feel 
comfortable’ (p. 8). Elsewhere Rose gives an example of how Britain’s policy-makers 
are ‘ignoring geographical propinquity in favour of social psychological proximity’ by 
looking ‘across the ocean to the United States or Canada, or even farther away to 
Australia’ (Rose 1993, p. 107). If actors feel comfortable with those with whom they 
interact, learning a policy will be a much easier undertaking. 
In discussing the adoption of a flat tax in Slovakia, Ellis (2009) described how the 
Slovak Prime Minister consulted with Estonia’s on how to make the transition from a 
former Soviet republic to a free market democracy and what kind of tax system was best 
suited to the transition. Ellis’ analysis addresses a range of issues relating to policy 
transfer, but included in the narrative are accounts of influential voices, reflecting the 
way in which psychological compatibility and significant others influence policy 
formulation. 
Similarly, Gilardi and Wasserfallen (2009) noted how finance ministers from regional 
networks of Swiss cantons cooperated more than might have been expected if a 
competitive economic model was in play all the time. The finance ministers used their 
institutional networks to exchange information and coordinate collective action. 
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Availability of evidence 
Evidence about the policy in question is a valuable source of information for policy-
makers in the adopting country. This may include other countries’ legislation; policy 
recommendations and reviews provided by third parties; government documentation on 
the policy in question; and policy evaluations. Gathering such documentation is the first 
step for actors in the adopting country to learn about the policy. Evidence that actors 
gather informs them about the background of the policy initiative, from which they can 
learn how similar the policy problems of the originating country are to the adopter’s 
problems; how the policy works in the originating country; and what regulatory and 
institutional arrangements were put in place to facilitate the operation of the initiative.  
Without sufficient evidence, actors involved in the policy transfer will face challenges 
to convince stakeholders about the likely gain in implementing the transferred policy. 
Advances in information technology make the gathering of policy-relevant information 
much easier and facilitate comparison between policies in a more efficient way. 
Interdependence 
In the taxation context, Jeffry Owens has asserted that ‘greater interdependency [as the 
result of globalisation] will have profound implications for tax systems’, especially 
changes in the ways in which tax administrations operate (Owens 1993, p. 23). 
Interdependence in policy, according to Rose (2002, p. 9), is an invisible force that 
pushes policy-makers to pay attention to what their counterparts in other countries are 
doing. The concept of interdependence recognises that policy does not work in a 
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vacuum. It is influenced by the global environment, but at the same time, policy choices 
influence the choices of others. 
The policy transfer literature has immediate appeal in the tax context. Increasingly, tax 
authorities are becoming interdependent as capital becomes more mobile and individual 
states become less successful in collecting taxes from trans-national or multi-national 
corporations (TNCs or MNCs) and HWIs. Tax authorities are in contact with each other 
over a range of matters; looking to each other for new methods for collecting tax, and 
transferring these policies across jurisdictions is an attractive option. In the following 
section I review selected empirical literature on policy transfer (and diffusion) in 
taxation with respect to a subset of questions from the Dolowitz and Marsh policy 
transfer framework: where is the transfer from, who is involved, and why has it 
occurred? 
1.2 Policy transfer in taxation: a literature review  
This section reviews selected studies that have contributed to an understanding of policy 
transfer in the taxation field. Articles were chosen based upon search terms derived 
from the principal elements of policy transfer (more detail accounts of criteria for 
selecting articles is provided in Appendix A). A summary of 24 studies, including the 
three discussed above in the context of policy diffusion, is provided in Appendix B. 
This section starts with reviewing the paradigms and methods employed by selected 
studies. 
1.2.1 Research paradigms and methods 
The 24 studies reviewed here illustrate both diffusion and policy transfer approaches 
and methodologies at work. Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels (2006) tested a series of 
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hypotheses that reflected both previous findings on how domestic politics affect the 
adoption of new taxes and how regional diffusion should work across municipalities. 
Regional diffusion is represented by both spatial and ideological proximity. In contrast, 
Eccleston (2006) Radaelli (2000) and Sharman (2010), undertook more detailed 
analyses of how transfer takes place – how is it done, by whom and why, as well as the 
more problematic question of what exactly is being transferred? Radaelli (2000) has 
argued that the new challenge is to push the ‘processual perspective’ further instead of 
being satisfied with ‘mechanical transfer models’ (p. 39) and to begin paying attention 
to the logic of appropriateness in transfer studies as opposed to the logic of choice. The 
findings of the selected studies support the importance to the transfer process of 
perceptions of benefits, persuasion through networks, building credibility as a source of 
valuable information, technical legitimacy, strategically supporting initiatives that have 
been used ‘successfully’ elsewhere, and political alliances. Together these studies 
suggest that the policy transfer research field has moved beyond prime consideration of 
what is rational and efficient to a paradigm that incorporates bounded rationality and 
social influence. 
The expansion in research approaches and methods that is evident in the policy transfer 
tax literature reflects movement toward what Marsh and Sharman (2009) called the 
‘process-tracing approach’ of policy transfer analysis as opposed to the ‘pattern-finding 
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approach’ of policy diffusion analysis (p. 269).19 How policy transfer happens, what is 
transferred, by whom, why, and with what effects are the questions posed by Dolowitz 
and Marsh (1996; 2000) that are being addressed by this new wave of research. 
The reviewed studies collectively raise important issues that guided my research. First, 
it is evident that most of the policy transfer in the tax field that has been studied through 
this framework involves developed countries, such as countries within the EU 
(Kemmerling 2010; Radaelli 2000; 2003) or OECD (Barthel & Neumayer 2012; Jensen 
& Lindstädt 2012; Cao 2010; Swank 2006; van Stolk & Wegrich 2008; Ward & Cao 
2012) or between two developed countries (Christensen 2013; Squires & Lord 2012).20 
Other studies have been conducted at the sub-government level – states/counties within 
the US (Berry & Berry 1992; Kim, Bae & Eger 2009; Martin 2010; Miller & Richard 
2010; Prakash & Caro 2010; Seljan & Weller 2011), cantons within Switzerland 
(Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2009) and municipalities within regional government in 
Belgium (Ashworth, Geys & Heyndels 2006). 
Exceptions to studying policy transfer in developed sites include studies by Baturo and 
Gray (2009), Eccleston (2006), Ellis (2009), Sharman (2010), and Stewart (2007). 
Baturo and Gray’s (2009) and Ellis’ (2009) studies involved transitional countries in 
Eastern Europe, particularly post-communist countries. Eccleston included developing 
                                                 
19  See also Lee and Strang (2006) for the distinction between process-tracing and pattern-finding 
strategies in the diffusion literature. According to Lee and Strang, process-tracing research follows the 
spread of a policy or practice from one place to another. This strategy allows examination of the role 
played by external models, and inquiry into why and how a concrete example of learning or mimicry 
occurs. On the other hand, pattern-finding research tests a priori hypotheses about diffusion channels. 
Rather than demonstrate that actors in country A were aware of and influenced by country B, this strategy 
asks whether structures of covariance and temporal ordering are generally consistent with a theoretically 
specified model of influence. 
20  See for instance Evans (2004b) for studies of policy transfer that involves transfer between developed 
and developing countries in areas other than taxation. 
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countries in his study of the proliferation of the VAT since it was first introduced in 
France in the early 1950s. Sharman’s study of the adoption of tax blacklists also 
included developing countries which demonstrated unreflective transfer by these 
countries. Stewart’s study involved transfer of tax ideas to developing countries under 
structural adjustment (Stewart 2007). Using Ghana’s tax reforms as a case study, 
Stewart demonstrated the important role that intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) 
such as the IMF and the World Bank played in reforming tax policy through structural 
adjustment programs for developing countries. These studies are explored in more detail 
in the following sections. In short, it can be said that there is relatively little research on 
the policy transfer process from developed to developing countries in relation to 
taxation.  
1.2.2 Where is the transfer from? 
Three levels of governance can be implicated in policy transfer (Dolowitz 2000a, p. 24): 
international, national, and local. Searching for solutions to government problems is not 
a random process. The easiest place to search for a solution may be within one’s own 
country (Rose 1993, p. 97). Rose pointed out, however, that policymakers are embedded 
in a multiplicity of networks based on proximity and power relationships that influence 
where policy-makers look for ideas and lessons (Rose 2005, p. 47).  
Ideological proximity emerged as a factor in policy transfer in the studies of Ashworth, 
Geys and Heyndels (2006), Baturo and Gray (2009), Ellis (2009), and Martin (2010). 
John Ashworth and his colleagues found that ‘the closer … the ideology of those 
authorities that have adopted the tax to the ideology of a given authority, the more likely 
54 
 
it is that the authority will adopt the tax’ (Ashworth, Geys & Heyndels 2006, p. 242).21 
In the same vein, Joseph Ellis, in his study of the adoption of the flat tax in Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic, concluded that: ‘The ‘idea’ of the flat tax also was wedded to 
certain ideological considerations, which made its adoption only possible by those 
center-right groups’ (p. 2, my emphasis). Baturo and Gray (2009), also examining the 
adoption of a flat tax regime in Eastern Europe, produced findings consistent with 
Ellis’s. They suggested that in the presence of the right ideological environment, 
policymakers will learn from other countries’ successes with the flat tax and move to 
adopt the policy. In relation to political ideology and its effect on policy diffusion, 
Martin (2010, p. 20) argued for a more nuanced form of diffusion, conditional diffusion, 
depending on the ideology of the government that can potentially be influenced by the 
transferred policy. 
Psychological proximity due to shared identity or common interest is relevant to why a 
jurisdiction adopts a policy from one jurisdiction rather than another. Psychological 
proximity refers to the feeling of comfort that occurs when policy-makers from one 
jurisdiction interact with their counterparts in others (Rose 2002, p. 8). Despite major 
differences in terms of legal systems and property taxation between the US and the UK, 
policy actors from the UK may prefer to learn from the US than from European 
countries. This was the case with Tax Increment Financing (TIF), an urban policy for 
spatially targeted economic development. The UK’s learning about this policy from the 
                                                 
21 ‘Ideology’ in this context refers to systems of ideas (especially to social, political or religious ideas) 
shared by a social group or movement (van Dijk, 2000). According to van Dijk group members who share 
‘similar’ ideology stand for a number of very general ideas that are at the basis of their more specific 
beliefs about the world, guide their interpretation of events, and monitor their social practices. This could 
be comunism, socialism, or liberalism. When two tax jurisdictions share these ideas they have ideological 
proximity. 
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US was attributed to, among other things, shared first language of English, shared 
similar urban problems and experiences, and strong personal political relations (Squires 
& Lord 2012, p. 819) that make actors from both countries psychologically close to 
each other. 
The tax studies testing the importance of geographical propinquity have produced 
ambiguous results. Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels (2006), Cao (2010), Gilardi and 
Wasserfallen (2009), and Seljan and Weller (2011) showed that tax reforms in 
neighbouring jurisdictions influenced tax policy transfer. In examining the adoption of a 
green tax, Ashworth Geys and Heyndels (2006) found that it was more likely if one’s 
neighbours already had adopted the tax. Similarly, Gilardi and Wasserfallen (2009) 
found in their study of tax cuts for high income earners in Swiss cantons that tax cuts 
were more likely among neighbours. However, in their study on the adoption of R&D 
tax credit policy in the US, Miller and Richard (2010) concluded that there was a 
negative relationship between having a high percentage of neighbouring states that had 
already enacted the policy and transferring that same policy to a new jurisdiction. They 
argued that rather than looking to neighbouring states, a state will look to the policies of 
economically similar states.  
Separating geographical propinquity from psychological similarity is not an easy task. 
The two are likely to be confounded in many situations due to common history, 
experience of cooperative ventures, and interests. In examining the adoption of a capital 
tax, Cao (2010) found that ‘closeness’ between two countries affects tax policy 
diffusion. Closeness in Cao’s study included geographical proximity as well as other 
network effects, such as cultural ties, capital flows, trade, and connection of IGOs. 
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1.2.3 Who is involved in the transfer process? 
The studies reviewed here provide insight into the answer to the second question from 
the Dolowitz and Marsh model: Who is involved in the transfer? Political leaders 
emerge as important actors in the studies of Baturo and Gray (2009), Eccleston (2006), 
Ellis (2009) and Miller and Richard (2010). Political leaders championed policy transfer 
after learning what ‘allied’ leaders were doing and how they were facing shared 
problems. Political leaders were important in deciding on the timing of the introduction 
of new policy, depending on election cycles, political agendas, environmental 
circumstances, domestic budgetary concerns, and political priorities. In their study of 
the adoption of a flat tax across post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, Baturo 
and Gray (2009) demonstrated how political leaders in the countries realised that in an 
environment where ‘a tangle of rules and little previous history made tax payments 
erratic at best’ (p. 132) due to the past political system, the aim of the tax reform was to 
widen the tax base through increasing compliance and attracting foreign capital. Estonia 
initiated a flat tax of 26 per cent in 1994 as part of comprehensive tax reform. Since 
then, 15 post-communist countries have enacted a flat tax in 13 years (1994–2007). 
Slovakia adopted a flat tax in 2004 and its then Prime Minister, Mikloš Džurinda, 
frequently cited Estonia’s then Prime Minister, Mart Laar, as his mentor in this regard 
(see also Ellis 2009, p. 18). 
Epistemic communities also play an important role in policy transfer. An epistemic 
community is defined as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas 1992, p. 3). In his study of the 
proliferation of VAT, Eccleston (2006) presented evidence pointing to the existence of 
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an international epistemic community of senior economic policy officials around the 
OECD which served as the basis for a policy transfer network. The role of the epistemic 
community, in this case the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD), in advising the 
implementation of a VAT is so substantial that ‘half of all countries which have 
introduced a VAT during the last twenty years [make] use of FAD (The IMF Fiscal 
Affairs Department) advice’ (Ebrill et al. 2001 as cited in Eccleston 2006, p. 10). In the 
European Union, Radaelli’s work (2000) showed the role that an epistemic community 
played in tax reform among EU countries.  
Cao (2010), Eccleston (2006), and Ward and Cao (2012) also demonstrated the role of 
supra-national institutions such as the OECD and the IMF in disseminating specific 
policy agendas. Cao’s work (2010) outlined the role that IGOs such as the IMF and the 
EU played in driving policy changes in capital taxation. Ward and Cao (2012) showed 
the role of trade and environmental IGOs in promoting the adoption of a green tax 
among OECD members. In the context of the adoption of the consumption tax, 
Eccleston (2006) pointed out the significant role that the IMF played in recommending 
VAT-style consumption taxes to transitional and developing nations and introducing the 
taxes to OECD members. The work done by epistemic communities in spreading policy 
is evident in Stewart’s (2007) study. Conditions and rules that were established by 
international organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank, or other regional 
economic organisations had a significant impact on tax policies in developing countries 
(Stewart 2007, p. 183). More specifically, the role of ‘think tanks’ (Stone 1996) such as 
Crown Agents (UK) or the Harvard Institute for International Development (USA) were 
prominent in designing Ghana’s VAT policy (Stewart 2007, pp. 192–193). 
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1.2.4 Why transfer? 
The transfer literature has shown that preferred solutions to problems are not always a 
rational choice, but rather are often tightly bounded (see also Marsden & Stead 2011). 
As Dolowitz and Marsh put it: ‘Despite the assumption of rationality inherent in most 
studies of policy transfer, it is rare that actors are perfectly rational’ (2000, p. 14).  The 
selected studies reveal a range of motives for policy transfer in taxation.  
International tax competition is one factor that motivates national policymakers in some 
jurisdictions to move towards neoliberal tax policy. Swank’s (2006, p. 873) study on the 
spread of neoliberal tax policy shows the presence of this notion:  
The diffusion of the neoliberal tax regime was driven by tax policy changes in the United 
States … Policymakers in other nations say they were quite concerned with the tax 
competition for mobile assets with the United States that was implied by the structural 
change in tax policy…. 
Gilardi and Wasserfallen (2009) suggested that tax cuts to wealthier taxpayers for 
political or ideological purposes could be disguised as rational economic policy for the 
benefit of the region. Tax cuts for supposedly competitive reasons were interpreted as a 
rationalisation to defend a policy of elite tax cuts that would be unpopular with the 
larger electorate. As noted earlier, Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels’ (2006) study on the 
adoption of a green tax in 308 Flemish municipalities found that a green tax was more 
likely to be adopted if neighbours adopted it and if governments were more left-oriented 
and were not facing elections that year. In general, the idea that states want to appear 
modern and adopt policy in line with other governments of an appropriately progressive 
or conservative nature remains plausible. The studies in policy diffusion and transfer in 
taxation cited here are less supportive of explanations that are strictly in line with a 
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rational analysis. Objective and economically relevant characteristics such as population 
size, environmental problems, and fragmentation of government, proved non-significant 
in predicting the likelihood of setting the green tax in Ashworth and his colleagues’ 
study for instance. The findings of Radaelli (2000) on the Euro single currency, media 
ownership policy and tax policy highlighted the importance of strategy and power in 
setting in train a process of copying and adopting policies recommended by the 
European Commission.  
Competition to attract capital featured as a motive in Barthel and Neumayer’s (2012) 
study of the diffusion of double taxation treaties (DTTs). They suggested that while net 
capital importing countries can face a considerable loss of tax revenues when entering 
DTTs, they will look toward and are influenced by the policy choices of other focal 
countries and will follow their DTT activity in order to gain a competitive advantage in 
terms of attracting foreign direct investment. 
A political imperative to take action on international tax evasion has been a motivation 
for the transfer of national tax blacklists. An interesting finding of Sharman’s (2010) 
study was that the adoption of tax blacklists, rather than depicting a learning process, 
normative mimicry or market pressure, reflected the ‘political imperative to “do 
something” about tax evasion’ (p. 621). Sharman demonstrated through the data he 
collected that jurisdictions had unreflectively copied from other jurisdictions’ lists (see 
also Sharman & Rawlings 2006). This situation led to what Sharman termed 
dysfunctional policy transfer (Sharman 2010). Sharman argued that pressures such as 
domestic economic crises (e.g., fiscal crises) and popular discontent give rise to such 
shortcuts for countries to develop national tax blacklists. Compiling blacklists of tax 
havens is an action that a government – which is facing fiscal crisis – can adopt to avoid 
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a backlash from the public. The backlash would be expected if the public saw the 
government as doing nothing in response to anger toward tax havens that are blamed for 
creating revenue loss.   
Economic coercion in the form of loan conditionality was identified as the reason why 
Ghana engaged in tax policy reforms (Stewart 2007). Faced with the problem of 
declining revenue, Ghana’s government turned to the IMF to obtain a loan. In return, 
some conditions were required. Tax reform was one of the conditions the IMF required; 
it was intended to increase revenue by, among other things, establishing an autonomous 
revenue agency. It is common for developing countries to be the recipient of transferred 
policies under the pressure of external actors. In the Indonesian context, tax 
administration reform was undertaken in 2002 as the condition required the IMF before 
it was willing to provide a loan (Brondolo et al. 2008).  
The introduction of the HWI unit in Indonesia, however, has a different story. 
Coerciveness in the transfer is less evident in the adoption of the HWI initiative at 
international level. Pressure to transfer a policy that is regarded as successful elsewhere 
emerged domestically. In a more indirect way, an OECD document on managing tax 
compliance of HWI taxpayers also influenced Indonesia’s tax authority to adopt a HWI 
policy (for more discussion about OECD’s recommendation for tax authorities to 
establish a unit dedicated to wealthy taxpayers see OECD report on this subject (OECD 
2009a). 
1.3 Policy transfer of the HWI unit: what the literature teaches 
The main question that my research sought to answer was why the HWI initiative 
adopted in Indonesia failed to build cooperative relations with high wealth individuals, 
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improve individual tax collections from HWIs and build cooperative taxpaying relations 
with Indonesian taxpayers more generally. In doing so, demonstrating the occurrence of 
policy transfer and how it occurred was one of my first objectives. Another objective 
was to offer a nuanced understanding of why the transfer occurred and how it was 
implemented. The policy transfer literature, together with the convergence and diffusion 
literature proved useful in providing part of the answer to this second objective. 
However, the rest of this chapter shows that further elaboration of these models is 
required to understand why the fate of the HWI unit unfolded as it did.   
One useful way of developing the framework used in this thesis is to revisit the question 
of ‘how deep’ a policy was transferred (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996; 2000), that is, degrees 
of transfer. This question focuses on how reflectively the transfer was carried out, 
ranging from the simplest form of transfer – copying a program from others – to 
synthesis where different elements from different programs are examined and are 
combined in order to create a distinctive and new program (Rose 1993, pp. 30–32). The 
latter requires a deeper degree of reflection on the policy in question than the former, 
especially on what elements of the programs are suitable for the local setting. This 
question can also be answered by looking at whether a policy transfer is merely a case 
of policy emulation or of policy learning. Unlike policy learning, where consequences 
of a policy are thoughtfully considered, emulation tends not to involve much attention 
to the detailed consequences of the policy. What can matter in policy emulation is the 
symbolic and socially constructed characteristic of policies (Cao 2010; Maggetti & 
Gilardi 2014). In this thesis, I argue that the adoption of the HWI initiative in Indonesia 
can be seen as having elements of emulation and too little investment in reflection. This 
may affect policy outcomes. For instance, an argument can be made when a policy 
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transfer occurs predominantly through a process of emulation rather than learning, the 
chance of the policy failing to meet desired outcomes is quite likely.  
Related to emulation rather than learning is whether the transfer was part of a voluntary 
process (at one end of the continuum) or part of a coercive process (at the other). 
Knowing what drives actors to engage in the process of transfer helps explain why a 
particular policy is transferred inappropriately in a certain situation (Dolowitz 2000a, 
p. 12) and why emulation might replace reflection and learning.  
Coercion and voluntariness are usually used in the policy transfer literature to indicate 
how much influence outside actors have in the adoption of a ‘foreign’ policy by a 
recipient country. I broaden the terms to cover both the adoption and implementation of 
a policy. 
Moreover, coercion and voluntariness are considered to operate at different levels. It is 
useful in explaining not only how much pressure was received from external sources to 
adopt a certain policy, but also how much pressure was exerted domestically to 
influence the decision to adopt HWI policy in Indonesia. International and domestic 
pressures are both factors that need to be considered to explain why actors engage in the 
HWI transfer process. Both are implicated in explaining policy outcomes.  
Table 1.3 illustrates different possibilities for sources of pressures to engage with policy 
transfer. This table expands the straight-line heuristic continuum in the policy transfer 
literature (e.g. Dolowitz 2000a, p. 13; Dolowitz & Marsh 1996; Dolowitz & Marsh 
2000) and highlights the possibility of differentiating pressures at different levels 
(domestic, international) that may drive policy transfer and implementation (e.g., IGOs, 
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International Financial Institutions (IFIs), foreign countries). In this table, domestic 
elements (e.g., incumbent government, dominant political party, the general public and 
NGOs) feature alongside international pressures as drivers of the policy transfer 
process. 
Table 1.3 Possible Sources of Pressures to Engage with Policy Transfer  
P
ressu
re 
The existence and significance of pressures (from different sources) 
 
Domestic International 
 
No (insignificant) No (insignificant) 
Yes (dominant) No (insignificant) 
No (insignificant) Yes (dominant) 
Yes (dominant) Yes (dominant) 
 
At the top level of Table 1.3, transfer occurs purely voluntarily in the sense that there 
are no pressures from either domestic or international actors, or if it does exist it is 
insignificant. Actors involved in this kind of process make decisions to adopt policy 
from elsewhere consciously, exercising choice over the policies they will adopt 
(Dolowitz 2000, p. 12). This is an ideal condition of transfer which probably is very 
rare. When transfer occurs through this process, involved actors have more time, are 
more willing, and are motivated to learn about the policy. Aspects of the policy in its 
originating setting are more likely to be thoroughly examined in order to find which 
parts are suitable for the local context, which are not, and which are able to be adapted 
to make it work in the local context. 
As shown at the bottom of Table 1.3, transfer can occur through coercion. Actors 
involved in the policy transfer receive pressure from both domestic and international 
actors. Coercive mechanisms of policy transfer may be in the form of direct imposition 
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by other countries or IGOs. Government or other powerful agents can exert domestic 
pressure. Coercion may be in the form of a government making demands for a quick 
measure to secure a political agenda. At an organisational level, pressure may come 
about in the form of high expectations from senior officials without providing sufficient 
resources and supports.  
The second and third levels in Table 1.3 describe contexts where pressures for policy 
transfer are predominantly domestic and predominantly international respectively. That 
is, when domestic actors (president, dominant political party, NGOs) exert pressure that 
leads to the adoption of policy from elsewhere (second level); or, when international 
actors pressure a certain country to adopt a policy. 
The case of Indonesia 
In this thesis I argue that the pressure to introduce the HWI unit was high domestically, 
both at the political level and at the organisational level. Internationally, the pressure 
was lighter but not negligible. Acceptance of international pressure was more voluntary 
than coercive. 
The literature reviewed in this chapter provides many illustrations of  pressures that 
occur nationally, associated with political and economic cycles, the political agendas of 
governments, and epistemic communities operating within nation states (Baturo & Gray 
2009; Christensen 2013; Eccleston 2006; Ellis 2009; Sharman 2010; Swank 2006). All 
of these dynamics are informative for understanding the adoption of the HWI unit in 
Indonesia. 
65 
 
The literature also provides glimpses of the importance of what happens within 
bureaucratic organisations as they try to design and implement policies. Christensen’s 
(2013) study, although its focus is national, clearly indicates the importance of events at 
organisational level that contributed to the diverging trajectories in the tax policies of 
New Zealand and Ireland. Christensen argued that differences at the administrative 
institutional level in who is recruited to be a civil servant and how they are trained to 
operate can give rise to profound differences in the direction of tax policy change. 
Christensen’s study resonates strongly in the context of Indonesia’s DGT introducing a 
HWI unit in the mould of the HWI unit introduced by the ATO. 
The literature discussed above about sources of pressure for policy transfer leads to the 
supposition that on the domestic front, the HWI policy in Indonesia was transferred due 
to an imperative to ‘do something’ in front of domestic stakeholders. The directive to do 
something came from government. The suggestion to experiment with a HWI initiative 
came from DGT (evidence supporting this claim is presented in Chapter 5). The time 
frame for offering the suggestion was short. Once accepted prior to the general election 
in Indonesia of 2009, the HWI unit was introduced hurriedly to satisfy powerful actors 
who set high expectations for what it would deliver and how quickly it would deliver. 
As revealed in Chapter 5, the HWI unit was to be a quick-wins program offered by the 
DGT as part of the President’s broader campaign to undertake bureaucratic reforms in 
Indonesia.22  
                                                 
22  The quick-win program is an initiative launched by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in 
which every government agency was asked to nominate a flagship program. The program’s outcome 
should be perceived by the public in a short-term period. 
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The international story of the transfer of the HWI unit introduces more voluntary 
elements. Assistance and advice around the idea came from the OECD’s FTA. 
Recommendations for ‘best practices’ to deal with HWI taxpayers appeared in an 
OECD report (OECD 2009a), in which experiences from countries that had already 
implemented some or all of those practices were presented. In regard to implementation, 
help came from the IMF and Australia, a near neighbour with close economic ties.23 In 
this chapter I provided examples of how these pressures have operated in other tax 
contexts. Previous research has illustrated how international influence and assistance is 
shared through epistemic communities that cohere around IGOs like the EU, IMF, 
OECD and World Bank (Cao 2010; Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2009; Radaelli 2003; 
Stewart 2007; van Stolk & Wegrich 2008). 
In the tax area, as in other economic and financial areas, international comparison is 
difficult to avoid. I have argued that while the international level incorporates pressures 
to be economically competitive, it also stimulates, particularly for developing countries, 
pressure to be a modern state.  
In this chapter I drew on the convergence literature to show that policy transfer 
internationally can be driven by the perceptual need to join world society. Actors in the 
adopting country fear being seen as laggards if they do not adopt policy that is regarded 
as best practice. The policy convergence theory of the world society model (Meyer et al. 
                                                 
23  Since the major financial crisis experienced by Indonesia in the late 1990s, the Australian and 
Indonesian governments have worked collaboratively in the area of economic governance. The economic 
partnership between the two countries is manifested by the establishment of the Australia Indonesia 
Partnership for Economic Governance (AIPEG). AIPEG is aimed at improving the quality of Indonesia’s 
economic management. AIPEG undertakes collaborative activities in institutional strengthening and 
provides technical advice in several areas including: tax administration reform, financial system stability, 
trade, and public financial management (AIPEG 2010a). 
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1997) is relevant to Indonesia. On the eve of a presidential election, the hope of 
Indonesians for a first-world system of democratic governance was attractive 
electorally. Part of that hope in the adopting country was an expectation for positive 
world-wide recognition of their systems (e.g., taxation system, educational system, 
election system) as best practice policy. 
With forces of coercion and voluntary adoption at play, the question must be asked 
whether, in the policy transfer of the HWI unit in Indonesia, the process of emulation 
dominated the process of learning and thereby handicapped the unit from the beginning. 
Did the domestic imperative demanding that governmental institutions, including the 
DGT, ‘do something’ to satisfy powerful actors and, internationally, to earn recognition 
for conforming to a world society model of tax administration, place so much pressure 
on tax officials that learning became impossible and gave way to unreflective 
emulation? 
With these ideas in mind, I present two broad orienting hypotheses formulated from the 
literature to guide analysis and data collection. These orienting hypotheses are not as 
specific as hypotheses in the scientific literature, but they reflect a direction that the 
analysis can take based on the literature. 
Hypothesis 1(a): Policy transfer of the HWI initiative in Indonesia occurred due to a 
political imperative to ‘do something’ to satisfy powerful actors who 
used the policy to advance their political agenda, of being recognised 
as having a modern bureaucracy.  
Hypothesis 1(b): Policy transfer of the HWI initiative in Indonesia had elements of both 
coercion and voluntariness. Coercion was strongest at the levels of 
68 
 
the national government and the administering organisation, the 
DGT. Voluntariness was accompanied by active enlisting of advice at 
the international level from the epistemic community of tax experts. 
This mix of pressure had implications for how much learning as 
opposed to emulation could take place. 
In the next chapter I will elaborate and refine the learning and emulation hypotheses 
foreshadowed in the above discussion.  
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, pp. 18–20) have distinguished uninformed, incomplete, and 
inappropriate transfers to illustrate unsuccessful transfer, because of lack of information 
about policy being gathered by the adopting country (uninformed transfer), or when 
important elements of the policy in the originating country were not transferred 
(incomplete transfer), or when not enough attention was given to the differences in 
structure between transferring and adopting country (inappropriate transfer). All of 
these factors are relevant to the Indonesian case of setting up a HWI unit, but there were 
also different pressures for change at different levels of the organisations, the state and 
internationally with different bodies of knowledge and understanding. In particular, as 
will be addressed in the next chapter, it is helpful to recognise that emulation can be 
happening at some levels, learning at others, but that these processes may be occurring 
in quite different spheres of government activity. 
Conclusion 
This chapter contains a review of selected literature on how a policy in one jurisdiction 
can be adopted in another. I identified the universalities of the challenge of collecting 
tax from HWIs in a globalised world where capital is mobile. The globalisation 
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literature draws attention to the adoption of very similar policies in very different 
jurisdictions, the root cause being structural constraints imposed by a global economic 
system. A race to the bottom in offering attractive tax conditions to large corporates and 
investors exemplifies one side of this argument. The other is a race to the top to be seen 
as part of the group of prosperous, advanced, developed democracies. Indonesia now 
thinks of itself as an important member of the G20 – a club of the most important 
economies in the world. The idea of nation-states striving and competing to be modern 
and to have best practice is an important motivational lever for change described in the 
globalisation and convergence literature. This presents a plausible explanation for why 
Indonesia was interested in establishing a HWI unit within its tax administration.  
Also valuable is the policy diffusion literature, which sheds light on the reasons why 
one nation would follow another in adopting a certain policy while others do not. The 
diffusion literature demonstrates a complex set of factors that explain adoption of a 
policy in one polity. These factors span domestic/local, national, and international 
spaces and can be operating simultaneously. 
Broadly speaking, the central argument of the policy convergence and diffusion 
traditions is that given a set of global pressures and structural constraints, a rational 
economic analysis, with efficiency being the prime objective, will lead to certain 
options universally gaining ascendancy as attractive solutions. The legacy of the 
diffusion literature is to demonstrate empirically that efficiency and rationality do not 
necessarily trump other considerations in policy adoption. Power and social influence 
through political leaders and epistemic communities became the focus of research 
attention in the wake of diffusion studies which uncovered signs of their importance. 
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The policy transfer framework provides a richer analytical tool than is provided through 
diffusion studies to explore how and why policy is transferred from one jurisdiction to 
another by revealing the complex set of interactions that explains policy transfer in a 
particular case. A more nuanced explanation of policy outcomes can be gained by using 
the framework as an independent variable. However, for understanding processes that 
may lead to failure, the notions of uniformed, incomplete, and insufficient transfer 
offered by the framework are too broad. It requires other variables to accommodate 
different actions and understanding operating at different levels and in different spaces 
where policy is being discussed, designed, and implemented. 
The success or otherwise of policy transfer can be explained from the perspective that 
different pressures occur at international, national, and organisational levels from the 
decision to transfer through the implementation phase. This contributes to different 
processes of transfer in different spheres of government activity: learning at some 
levels, emulation at others. Appreciation of these different kinds of pressures is 
necessary to understand the fate of the HWI unit in Indonesia. 
The concepts of ‘principles’, ‘mechanisms’, ‘actors’ and ‘webs of influence’, be they 
oriented to control or dialogue (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000), are discussed in the next 
chapter to help explain why emulation trumped learning in adopting and implementing 
the HWI unit in Indonesia. 
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Chapter 2 
Policy Transfer: Principles, Mechanisms and 
Actors and Their Application to Indonesia’s 
HWI Unit 
 
 
…it is often easier to fight for principles than 
to live up to them.  
(Adlai Stevenson’s speech to the American 
Legion convention, New York City 27 August 
1952, cited in Safire (2004, pp. 79–80)) 
 
 
Introduction 
Tax policy has bridged developed and developing countries for many decades. 
International taxation networks involving tax administrators and tax professionals pre-
date more recent responses to globalisation that have put pressure for convergence on 
nation-states (e.g., Cao 2010; Christians 2010; Deprez 2003; Pinto & Sawyer 2009; 
Pinto & Sawyer 2011). Chapter 1 introduced some organisations that provide the 
institutional bridges for OECD, Asian, and Commonwealth countries. Forums include 
the International Tax Dialogue (ITD) initiated by ‘organizations of states’ (Braithwaite 
& Drahos 2000, p. 24) such as the European Commission (EC), Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), IMF, OECD, World Bank Group and Centre interaméricain 
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des Administrateurs Fiscaux (Inter-American Centre of Tax Administrations – CIAT), 
FTA, CATA, and SGATAR. These forums provide space for discussion of common 
problems and developments of new solutions among national tax officials, international 
organisations, and a range of other key stakeholders. Their business is to share 
knowledge, provide a retreat to brainstorm problems, encourage harmonization where it 
will be of economic benefit, and assist jurisdictions with coordination challenges that 
increasingly have come to the fore with globalisation. All tax jurisdictions have been 
affected by international companies, HWIs with multiple residences, mobile capital and 
other manifestations of globalisation, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
Because of the high level of networking that has traditionally existed across tax 
jurisdictions, it is unlikely that any policy transfer occurs without engagement with 
some networks. Reasons for engagement in network discussion around HWI taxpaying 
are likely to be multiple: the need for nation-states to conform to a world-wide model, 
desire to be an early adopter of innovative strategies (at the international level), or an 
acute domestic problem that governments want solved, including a political imperative 
to ‘do something’ (national or domestic pressures). In this thesis, however, the main 
theme is not why a particular policy has been transferred, though the reasons for 
Indonesia’s interest in an HWI unit are discussed broadly in Chapter 5 as part of my 
argument for why Indonesia’s HWI unit should be seen as a case of policy transfer. 
Once this argument is made, my main focus is addressing the question of how the HWI 
initiative in Indonesia was adopted and implemented and why it did not meet its 
potential. 
In this chapter I consider first the meaning of an unsuccessful policy transfer or one that 
does not meet its potential. Next, attention is given to the implementation process as 
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opposed to the decision-making process in introducing an HWI unit to Indonesia. It is 
postulated that these two processes need to be understood in order to explain the success 
or otherwise of the Indonesian HWI unit. The framework chosen for understanding the 
decision-making and implementation process is an adaptation of Braithwaite and 
Drahos’ (2000) globalisation of business regulation model, originally developed for 
understanding the spread of regulatory practices internationally. The Braithwaite and 
Drahos model is a process model in the tradition described by Marsh and Sharman 
(2009) and Radaelli (2000) in Chapter 1. The model identifies the social dynamics that 
enable some ideas to catch on while others do not. 
Braithwaite and Drahos applied the concepts of actors, principles, mechanisms and 
webs of influence to show how micro-level social processes contribute to produce a 
macro-level event such as the globalisation of a system of regulation. The relations 
among principles, mechanisms, and actors also have intuitive appeal for understanding 
how successfully or unsuccessfully policy is transferred at an organisational level. This 
involves applying the concepts of principles, mechanisms and actors at a micro-level of 
analysis (Rhodes & Marsh 1992, p. 12), and showing how these concepts explain the 
way in which HWI initiatives are implemented within a particular tax authority and why 
forms of implementation differ across jurisdictions. 
This way of looking at the introduction of the HWI unit in Indonesia has parallels in 
Eccleston’s (2006) analysis of VAT and its adoption across both developing and 
developed countries. In his study of the proliferation of VAT-style taxes in the second 
half of the 20th century, Richard Eccleston maintained that macro elements tend to 
imply policy transfer that leads to policy convergence, while micro elements such as the 
engagement of involved actors, combined with domestic political and economic 
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circumstances, cause variations in how the policy is implemented (e.g., when VATs 
were introduced, the rates at which they were levied, and how they are administered 
(Eccleston 2006)). 
The Braithwaite and Drahos model is used to analyse the operation of the HWI unit in 
Indonesia to answer such questions as: who were the instigators and designers of the 
unit and who was recruited to work in the unit (actors), what was the purpose and 
priority of the unit and what were the pros and cons behind its introduction (principles), 
and how was the unit to operate within the DGT (mechanisms)? It is hypothesised that 
events at the decision-making level and at the level of implementation were not always 
in step. In Braithwaite and Drahos’ terms, the webs of dialogue involving actors, 
principles and mechanisms at the level of decision-making were not always consistent 
with what happened at the implementation. These two phases (i.e., decision-making and 
implementation) were connected through a web of control from the top of the 
organisation reaching down to the bottom, but the control was not enough to ensure 
learning and successful implementation. A model developed to guide the research and 
the discussion in this chapter appears later (Figure 2.1). First, however, I present a 
discussion of the terms for deciding whether a policy transfer is a success, followed by a 
discussion of why implementation is significant for understanding the success or 
otherwise of the HWI unit. 
2.1 How to decide whether or not a policy transfer was a success? 
A policy introduced into a new environment does not always function as it does in its 
originating place. This is not to say that a policy that was transferred from other 
jurisdictions has to be exactly the same as that in its originating country; it is difficult to 
imagine a policy that has this characteristic. Different policy environments require 
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policymakers to make adjustments to the initial form of the policy, especially if the 
policy is adopted from a country that has many structural differences from the 
borrowing country’s conditions. Even when a policy is transferred between two 
countries that have many similarities, it does not mean that the policy is ready to use 
without any adjustment. When New Zealand adopted a Health Service Taskforce and 
the associated changes in its health policy, it was evident that the policy had an explicit 
link to initiatives in other jurisdictions (Jacobs & Barnett 2000, p. 210). Nevertheless, it 
was also noted that some aspects of the policy were different from initiatives in the 
Netherlands, the UK, or the US from where the policy lessons were drawn. Adjustments 
were made to the policy when local technical and political conditions did not facilitate 
the adoption of the ‘foreign’ model.  
The review of the policy transfer literature in the previous chapter shows that 
transferring policy from other jurisdictions can bring about different consequences from 
those intended. The notions of uninformed, incomplete, and inappropriate transfers 
introduced by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, pp. 18–20) describe how one jurisdiction can 
struggle when transferring policy from another. They relate to different reasons for 
failure, but do not directly address what success means in the HWI context. The HWI 
unit could involve an incomplete transfer for good reasons: it could be uninformed, 
being a complex innovation in some respects, and its original conception could have 
been entirely inappropriate. This does not mean, however, that it could not have edged 
its way toward making a significant contribution to improved tax collections from 
HWIs through a series of experimental modifications (Sabel & Zeitlin 2012).  
Explaining the success or otherwise of policy transfer can be seen from the perspective 
that different pressures are being exerted at different levels: when the idea about the 
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policy was introduced at global level; when the idea to adopt a policy was raised, and 
when the policy was actually transferred at national level; and, when the policy was 
implemented at the organisational level. I argued in the previous chapter that 
appreciation of these different kinds of pressures is necessary to understand the fate of 
the HWI unit in Indonesia. At each of these levels, success and failure can be described 
in terms outlined by Bovens et al. (2001). 
Bovens et al. (2001) suggested that when assessing the success or failure of a particular 
policy, one should distinguish between the programmatic and the political dimension of 
the policy. The programmatic perspective on policy success and failure evaluates policy 
in terms of its objectives and goal achievement and the effectiveness, efficiency, and 
resilience of its processes (Bovens 2010, p. 584; Bovens et al. 2001, p. 20). The key 
questions asked from the programmatic perspective are whether the policy achieves its 
intended outcomes, whether it is an efficient use of resources, and whether it is made 
operational in a way that is consistent with achieving its objectives (Marsh & 
McConnell 2010, p. 571).  
The political perspective assesses success or failure of a policy in terms of political 
casualties and spoils that result from the policy. The political perspective on policy 
assessment refers to the way in which the policy in question and its policy-makers 
become associated in the political arena with ‘political upheaval (press coverage, 
parliamentary investigations, political facilities, litigation) or lack of it, and changes in 
generic patterns of political legitimacy (public dissatisfaction or satisfaction with policy 
or confidence in authorities and public institutions)’ (Bovens et al. 2001, p. 20). In the 
political mode of assessment, Bovens et al. argued, what counts is not the social 
consequences of policies, but rather the political construction of these consequences, 
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which might be driven by considerations of wholly different kinds. In short, in political 
perspective, what makes a policy a success or failure depends not only on its substance 
but upon the impressions of its appearance, which to some extent need not reflect the 
policy’s substance and operational reality (Bovens & ’t Hart 1998, p. 35). In this thesis, 
I make the argument for the success or failure of the policy on programmatic grounds 
rather than political grounds.24 
In Chapter 5, the HWI policy transfer is discussed in terms of whether it achieved its 
objectives as specified within DGT as well as whether it was perceived by those outside 
DGT to have achieved its objectives. In other words, this thesis limits policy assessment 
from a programmatic perspective with particular attention given to policy objectives and 
goal achievement.  
While generally attention is more on the implementation phase, the earlier phase when a 
decision is made to adopt a policy from elsewhere is somewhat neglected. The 
following section discusses the importance of the decision-making phase in policy 
transfer.  
                                                 
24 The programmatic dimension is chosen not to disregard the role of the political dimension in the 
success (or failure) of the policy in question, but rather to limit the analysis used in this thesis to the 
operations of policy, i.e. whether the policy instruments are appropriate, the skills of those delivering the 
policy are adequate and the resources available are sufficient to ensure that the policy is implemented as 
intended (e.g., Marsh and Lewis, 2014). The thesis relied on the collection of empirical data: that is, how 
those involved in the operations perceived events and experienced the process of implementation. 
Political elites were not willing to be interviewed in sufficient numbers to extend the study into an 
analysis of the politics behind the HWI unit’s rise and fall. 
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2.2 Why is implementation as important as the decision to adopt the 
policy? 
Implementation requires actioning a policy within a nest of other policies that may vary 
in their compatibility with the new policy and within a culture and organisation that 
may vary in its capacity to put the policy into effect. Implementation has been an issue 
of common concern for tax administrations. The OECD’s FTA has become a leader in 
defining best practice in tax administration and providing a forum for learning and 
exchanging knowledge and experience. The Forum has promoted the development of a 
service culture within tax administration (OECD 2013a; 2013b), the benefit of risk 
analyses of non-compliance (OECD 2009b; OECD 2009c), along with the introduction 
of HWI units to focus on the wealthy taxpayers group that is best resourced to evade or 
avoid tax (OECD 2009a). All of these developments require changes in tax 
administration that are traditionally hierarchical rule-book cultures (Hobson 2003, 
p. 148). 
A large literature exists on culture change. For the purposes of this research, I discuss a 
more targeted literature on the challenge of implementation of new initiatives in tax 
authorities. The initiative that is used to illustrate the challenge in implementation is the 
ATO compliance model. This example is chosen because Australia introduced an HWI 
unit in 1996, and was an adviser to Indonesia in the modernisation of its tax 
administration and the setting up of its HWI unit (ATO 2010; 2011). A discussion of the 
ATO’s compliance model is more relevant in this chapter to explain two assertions 
underpinning this thesis: implementation and decision-making are two different 
processes, both of which are important for shaping the success of a policy; and 
background cultural and policy factors that differ between countries affect prospects of 
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successful policy transfer, thereby making learning and adaptation a necessary part of 
the transfer process. As Indonesia looked to Australia to learn how to implement its 
HWI unit, Indonesian tax officials did not recognise the other changes (represented by 
the compliance model) that had taken place in the ATO to bolster the effectiveness of 
the Australian HWI unit. 
2.3 The introduction of the ATO’s compliance model: learning to deal 
with change  
In the 1990s, the New Public Management (NPM) movement was about market-
oriented management, but also challenged public administration to re-think its 
relationship with communities (Gruening 2001). The NPM is the label given to a series 
of public administration reforms, to improve the efficiency and performance of public 
sector organisations (Pollitt et al. 2007). The focus was on thinking of the community as 
clients or customers, eliciting their cooperation with policy implementation and making 
it easy for them to comply. 
In response to these administrative reforms, the ATO introduced several measures 
intended to make it more open and sensitive to the concerns of taxpayers, including the 
Taxpayers’ Charter  in July 1997 (ATO 1998). The charter sets principles and standards 
to guide tax officers in their dealings with taxpayers in the course of administering the 
tax system. It covers taxpayer rights, service standards, avenues of redress, and taxation 
obligations. In short, the charter consists of commitments that the ATO made to the 
public, in relation to formal ATO communications and decisions as well as 
interpersonal encounters (V. Braithwaite 2005, p. 7). 
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The other measure – perhaps more revolutionary in the change it heralded for the 
ATO’s operations – was the implementation of the compliance model, a responsive 
regulatory approach for tax administration. Adopting a regulatory approach which is 
more responsive to taxpayers changed organisational culture and the ‘traditional social 
order’ within the ATO (Job & Honaker 2003, p. 3). It is suggested that unlike 
innovations that pertain to either changes in products or processes, the compliance 
model is an example of both product and process changes (Hobson 2003). Hobson also 
argued that the introduction of the model in the ATO was ‘an unusual form of 
organisational innovation…’ (p. 132) since it encouraged ATO staff to treat taxpayers 
as individuals who are embedded in specific contexts which, therefore, affected 
processes. ATO staff needed to think pre-emptively about how to write and target their 
correspondence, information sheets and guidance notes, affecting products. In short, the 
introduction of the compliance model as a new idea presented similar challenges to the 
introduction of the HWI unit.  
The ATO compliance model was designed to change the operational approach of the 
ATO to tax non-compliance (e.g. Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001; Murphy 2004a; 
Wood et al. 2010). Prior to the introduction of the model, the ATO relied on auditing 
and application of legally enforced sanctions to gain compliance. Some attention was 
given to educating taxpayers, but little consideration was given to a taxpayer’s 
individual circumstances, and little thought was given to how ATO actions might 
endanger future compliance (Murphy 2004, p. 13). With responsive regulation, the 
enforcement strategy that the regulators employed was to take into account taxpayers’ 
attitudes to compliance. This gave tax officers more room to use discretion; to be less 
punitive than they might otherwise have been, and also to escalate to being more 
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punitive than they had been. This approach is somewhat challenging for bureaucrats 
whose focus is on rules and discipline, narrowly interpreted as ‘conformance with 
regulations, whatever the situation’ (Merton 1940, p. 563), which then develops into 
rigidities and an inability to adjust readily to complex problems. Understanding 
resistance to the introduction of a responsive style of regulation with the ATO 
compliance model informed my work on resistance in Indonesia to the HWI initiative. 
2.3.1 Challenges in making change 
The introduction of a new policy that might change a long-held organisational culture 
faces challenges because members of the organisation must change well-entrenched 
behaviours and practices. As a regulatory agency, tax authorities commonly adopt a 
command-and-control style with a focus on rule-following. Job, Stout and Smith (2007, 
p. 88) argued that regulation is not only about ensuring the following of rules; in a 
broader sense, it also means ‘influencing the flow of events’ (Parker & Braithwaite 
2003, p. 119). It is important to distinguish the two approaches, since the behaviour and 
practices of those who pursue rule-following are different from the behaviour and 
practices of those who pursue the influencing of events. This was part of the challenge 
of the implementation of the compliance model.  
The other part of the implementation challenge was a coordinated organisational shift 
from merely administration to management (Hughes 2012, chap. 4). Hughes argued that 
the difference between administration and management is that ‘administration means 
following instructions, whereas management means the achievement of results and 
taking personal responsibility for doing so’ (p. 76). This dramatic change in behaviour 
and culture resulted in tensions between long-held principles and new ones. In the case 
of the ATO compliance model, scholars (Hobson 2003; Job & Honaker 2003; Job, Stout 
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& Smith 2007; Shover et al. 2003) identified the challenges faced by the ATO as 
organisational barriers or individual barriers. 
Organisational barriers 
Organisations’ capacity to adopt and implement new policies are constrained by a 
variety of characteristics and conditions (Shover et al. 2003, p. 161). One of the 
structural barriers to change identified by Job and Honaker’s (2003) study of the ATO 
was failure in the delivery of messages from headquarters to staff at the operational 
level – from high-level bureaucracy to ‘street-level bureaucracy’ (Lipsky 2010, p. xii). 
In this context, Hobson (2003) suggested senior staff played an important role in 
translating the idea of the compliance model into everyday behaviours for staff through 
informal mentoring. Job and Honaker (2003) maintained that the implementation of an 
innovative idea like the compliance model in a hierarchical and segmented organisation 
requires the introduction of procedures to ensure good communication between 
management and staff. Moreover, at an operational level the challenges created by a 
new policy will be different from those imagined at senior levels. Organisations 
therefore need to create staff opportunities for mutual support. 
Scholars have consistently suggested that in order to create support and communication 
networks, an organisation must first consult fully with affected stakeholders (Argyle 
1972; Hollander 1964; Wood et al. 1998). In this way, obstacles to implementation can 
be identified, dealt with and future problems anticipated. Proper open consultation will 
also provide room for participation of all staff, which in turn creates increased 
identification with the organisation and its goals (Argyle 1972; Hobson 2003). This is 
particularly important when new ideas are introduced into the organisation. 
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The other organisational barrier found in the implementation of the Compliance model 
was rigidity in observing traditional role definitions. The ATO had a long history of 
rigid work practices, of collecting revenue by ‘set means and seeing the taxpayers as the 
enemy that needs to be outwitted’ (Hobson 2003, p. 148). This mentality had to be 
transcended for the compliance model to be successfully implemented. Interestingly, 
some ATO staff thought the answer to changing culture was ‘belting [staff] over the 
head’ (p. 143) with the new model to inculcate the idea. The reality was that the 
compliance model needed to be translated meaningfully into action.  
Traditionally, ATO staff followed protocols in response to a problem, not acting on 
their own initiative, or they followed senior staff’s instructions. Problems were noted in 
particular with prosecution and audit tax officers (Hobson 2003, p. 148). Traditional 
beliefs about how they should work and professional norms led to resistance. A further 
problem was that some managers resisted change, holding strongly to the principle of 
rule-following that had been established over a long period of time within the 
organisation. These old principles of regulating by the book were contested by new 
principles of responsiveness embedded in the compliance model. When old principles 
prevailed, staff members were hindered from adopting the compliance model. This was 
particularly problematic when old practices were favoured by senior managers. These 
powerful actors’ views had a strong influence on the approach that staff adopted in 
doing their work, and how ready and willing staff were to accept the new program (Job, 
Stout & Smith 2007, p. 93). It is suggested that implementing a new program that might 
change regulatory culture requires active, genuine, and visible support from the highest 
levels of the organisation (e.g., Cawsey 2012; Heuvel 2013). Moreover, the chain of 
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commitment to the change from the most senior officials to the most junior cannot be 
broken if successful implementation is to occur. 
Individual level barriers 
Barriers to implementing a new program come not only from organisational 
characteristics but from individual-level concerns. At an individual level within the 
ATO, challenges arose from fear to embrace new ideas. The compliance model 
resonated with the way many ATO staff thought about people and how to motivate 
them, but fear came with the thought of making a mistake, lack of confidence to try 
doing things differently, and fear of losing their privileged status (Job & Honaker 2003, 
p. 120). With the introduction of responsive regulation, tax officers were encouraged to 
use discretion and a more flexible approach when dealing with taxpayers. As a result, 
‘some staff felt confused, uncomfortable, and/or angry’ (Job, Stout & Smith 2007, p. 
94) with the way they did their jobs. In their study of the implementation of the ATO 
compliance model in the building and construction industry, Shover et al. (2003) found 
that at the operational level there was limited awareness combined with some 
disappointment and cynicism about the model. Some argued that applying the law with 
a responsive approach may contradict ‘fundamental legal principles of openness, 
accountability, consistency, proportionality, and procedural fairness’ (Parker & 
Braithwaite 2003, p. 129), and concern was felt over ‘the potential failure of effective 
and responsive regulation to secure certainty, consistency, and predictability in legal 
principles and values’. 
At a very early stage of the implementation of the compliance model, Job, Stout and 
Smith (2007) reported complaints about a lack of clarity in how to apply the model to 
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different business situations, how to balance consistency and equity with consideration 
of an individual’s circumstances, and how to use discretion while observing standard 
operating procedures (Job, Stout & Smith 2007, p. 94). The strategies that the ATO 
adopted to manage these problems included interactive training methods involving 
storytelling and case studies (Braithwaite & Wirth 2001). In this way, the concepts of 
responsive regulation were translated into the language of different groups within the 
ATO. 
Shover et al. (2003) also found rigidity in adopting new ideas at the individual level 
when the ATO compliance model was introduced. The idea of responsive regulation 
adopted in the compliance model suggested the importance of persuasion, education and 
support in securing compliance at the first step while being ready to use sanctions when 
taxpayers chose not to comply. In the early years of the introduction of the model, staff 
with the long- held belief that a strong threat is fundamental to the compliance 
assurance process questioned whether the ‘benign big gun’ would be able to maintain an 
acceptable level of tax compliance (p. 167). Put differently, there was a level of rigidity 
at the individual level to implement a new approach that suggested that punishment 
should be used as the last resort when persuasion failed to bring taxpayers to comply. 
In summary, the issue of implementation of an innovation in tax administration is 
important for the following reasons. Globally, tax authorities tend to be hierarchical and 
segmented in their function. They have a rule-following culture. In the case of the ATO, 
the compliance model threatened to disrupt this culture. Implementation of this model 
was made difficult by poor communication across the organisation, by managers who 
resisted change and staff involvement in the change program, through lack of 
knowledge of how to put the compliance model into practice, through fear of making 
86 
 
mistakes, and because of conflict between old principles (rule book mentality, social 
distance from taxpayers) and new principles (being responsive, treating taxpayers as 
customers). The ATO tackled these problems through the compliance model innovation 
across the organisation, which affected the operations of the HWI unit along with other 
parts of the ATO. Implementing Indonesia’s HWI unit may have been doubly 
challenging because DGT had no corresponding compliance model or awareness that 
this innovation may have shaped the way the ATO did its HWI unit work. The HWI 
unit in Indonesia could not be a replica of that in Australia at the level of 
implementation. 
2.3.2 What was learnt from the introduction of the ATO compliance model? 
It is highly likely that problems of the kind faced by the ATO in introducing the 
compliance model to their staff were also the kinds of problems relevant to the 
implementation of the HWI unit in Indonesia. HWI units are designed with many of the 
responsive features of the compliance model in mind. At a more general level, the 
problems involved powerful actors in the DGT, some of whom supported the change 
and allowed staff to embrace the change, and others who did not. There are also 
contesting principles in the DGT – old against new – like in the ATO. To further 
particular principles and make sure old principles trump new principles or vice versa, 
certain mechanisms were favoured. Mechanisms can also limit options for change. 
Mechanisms of training courses and assembling new teams of tax officers comprising 
educators and trainers favoured the roll out of responsiveness with the Compliance 
model (Braithwaite & Wirth 2001), strict adherence to templates and recording sheets 
based on the old rules did not (Waller 2007). It might be argued that programs that 
encouraged learning about policy change, as opposed to reliance on practices of 
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emulation, were mechanisms necessary for successful implementation of the ATO 
compliance model. In their study on the introduction of a responsive regulatory 
approach to taxation in East Timor, Job, Stout and Smith (2007) argued that changing 
organisational culture to shift from a command-and-control style of regulation to one of 
responsiveness could be done not through mental reprogramming or diffusion of an 
idea, but rather through translating new ideas into local context and shaping them to 
meet local needs. In other words, the role of a subculture within an organisation in 
adapting new ideas so that it is feasible to their own situation is particularly important. 
Similarly, learning about the HWI unit among other DGT staff was likely to be an 
important part of the success of the unit within DGT and through the eyes of others. 
In summary, adopting a new policy is very likely to face challenges at the 
implementation stage at both organisational and individual levels. The challenges 
mainly arise from tension that occurs between long-held principles and the new 
principles embedded in the new policy. Understanding and accepting policy principles 
and how they might be reconciled with old principles then becomes a crucial element in 
successful implementation. In the case of the ATO and their compliance model, the 
principle of flexibility that underlies responsive regulation was competing with the 
principles of narrow rule-following traditionally used by tax officers to secure their 
objectives. Debating, persuading, and learning about being responsive was important, 
particularly among those actors who, because of their elevated position in a hierarchical 
organisation, have power to influence others in the organisation.  
The other element that emerges as being critical from the analysis of implementation of 
the compliance model, and that is likely to determine the success of implementation of a 
new HWI policy, is good communication with all affected stakeholders. Good 
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communication with involved actors provides space for stakeholders to learn and 
participate in decision-making, which will strengthen overall understanding of the 
policy, its aims and processes. 
2.4 The roles of principles, mechanisms and actors in globalisation: a 
macro analysis approach 
This section begins with an introduction to the concepts of principles, mechanisms, and 
actors and how these concepts are used at a macro-level in analysis on the globalisation 
of a system of regulation. As the concepts have benefit in explaining the social dynamic 
that occurs at the global level, they also have intuitive appeal for explaining the 
adoption of a policy at an organisational level. Therefore, in this section I describe my 
use of the concepts at the organisational level to examine the adoption of an HWI 
initiative in Indonesia’s DGT. 
2.4.1. Actors and the contestation of principles 
The notion of principles is different from the notion of rules, although in many cases the 
distinction is difficult to make (Dworkin 1967). According to Braithwaite and Drahos 
(2000), principles stand behind rules or are used to create rules. This idea, they 
suggested, is founded in the jurisprudential literature that deals with the theories of 
judicial decision-making and interpretation. However, different scholars have different 
views on distinguishing principles and rules. For Dworkin (1967) the difference 
between principles and rules is logical; he argued that although both set standards and 
point to particular decisions in particular circumstances, they differ in the character of 
the direction they give. Decisions that Dworkin referred to are in the context of legal 
obligation. Rules, he maintained, ‘are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion’ (p. 25). A 
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principle, on the other hand, articulates ‘a reason that argues in one direction, but does 
not necessitate a particular decision’ (p. 26). 
Joseph Raz (1972) did not fully agree with Dworkin’s opinion. Raz argued that the 
suggestion offered by Dworkin that a logical distinction exists between principles and 
rules must be greeted with some suspicion, because they play different roles in practical 
reasoning either in the law or outside it. Raz suggested that it is ‘the character of the 
norm-act prescribed’ (p. 838) that distinguishes principles and rules. He argued that 
whilst principles prescribe highly unspecific actions, rules prescribe relatively specific 
acts. Unlike rules that to some extent have a higher degree of specificity, principles can 
conflict (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000). Braithwaite and Drahos suggested that this 
conflict occurs because decision-makers assign relative weight (see also Dworkin 
1967)25 to the principles in question in order to reach decisions. How to weigh 
principles when arriving at decisions creates contestation among principles and among 
different actors. 
After understanding the meaning of principles, the next question is: what role do 
principles play in the globalisation of business regulation? Principles play their role in 
securing objectives and goals which are important to the actors involved (Braithwaite & 
Drahos 2000, p. 19). Through principles, powerful actors seek to incorporate into 
regulatory systems and social practices changes that are consistent with or are a means 
to expressing their general values, goals and desires. Principles such as transparency, 
reciprocity and national sovereignty may give rise to quite different decisions about 
which course of action to pursue, depending on which has priority over another.  
                                                 
25  Dworkin (1967, p. 27) called it ‘the dimension of weight or importance’. 
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In financial regulation, for instance, the principle of conditionality is contested with the 
principle of national sovereignty. The national sovereignty principle suggests that ‘the 
nation-state should be supreme over any other source of power on matters affecting its 
citizens or territory’ (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, p. 25). The principle of conditionality 
means that the borrower agrees with prescribed requirements set out by the lender (an 
International Financial Institution – IFI) in order to access the lender’s funds. In effect, 
the lending financial institution secures their objective by steering a nation-state’s 
domestic policy (e.g., budgetary, fiscal, or trade policy). 
The contestation of the two principles occurs when conditions required to get access to 
either the World Bank or IMF development finance contravenes a borrower state’s 
wishes (Kovach & Lansman 2006, p. 3). In this case, the principle of conditionality 
takes precedence over the principle of national sovereignty.  
Actors, to achieve their goals, use principles with which they are already aligned. The 
goals that actors want to achieve can be in different forms. In the above example, the 
goals that international funding actors want to achieve through the conditionality 
principle are, firstly, making sure that creditors’ resources are utilised effectively. In 
other words conditions are necessary – from the international lender’s perspective – to 
‘provide assurance to the international community that borrowers will adopt adequate 
policies to resolve their economic difficulties ... and will, therefore, be in a position to 
repay the loans on schedule’ (Mayer & Mourmouras 2008, p. 106). Secondly, 
conditions also serve to gain the Fund or the Bank’s goal to achieve economic growth 
(Dreher 2006, p. 18). 
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Actors fight for their own principles, and against principles that they oppose. In 
Braithwaite and Drahos’ (2000) analysis, actors were entities significant in the global 
context, including states (e.g., the US, France, Germany, the UK), organisations of 
states (e.g., the IMF or World Bank); corporations, CEOs of large companies, and 
government leaders. 
2.4.2 Applying the concepts of principles and actors to the Indonesian HWI case 
study  
The concepts of actors and principles can be readily applied to the context of 
transferring a policy to establish a HWI unit in Indonesia. My review of the policy 
transfer literature in Chapter 1 revealed the roles that actors such as politicians and 
political parties play in tax policy transfer (Ashworth, Geys & Heyndels 2006; Baturo & 
Gray 2009; Ellis 2009; Jensen & Lindstädt 2012; Miller & Richard 2010). Also 
featuring are principles and how they affect the policy and the policy transfer process. 
Left-right political ideology was considered in the works of Baturo and Gray (2009), 
Ellis (2009), Jensen and Lindstädt (2012) and Martin (2010). Other research was based 
on the presumption of the value of efficiency in the collection of taxes. But as van Stolk 
and Wegrich (2008) pointed out, efficient tax collection is not the only indicator of the 
success of tax administration. The principle of efficiency in tax collection is contested 
with the principle of integrity, which is represented by the quality of the relationship 
between tax authorities and taxpayers, and of service provided by tax authorities. 
In the twelve months preceding the decision to introduce the HWI initiative, the 
integrity of the tax system was a topic of discussion in Indonesia and elsewhere 
(Irwansyah 2008; Barnard et al. 2007; Rubin 2011). Tax authorities linked to each other 
through membership of international bodies such as OECD, SGATAR, or CATA were 
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considering the problems HWIs posed for tax collection. Tax officials, such as those 
within the ATO and Indonesia’s DGT, were sharing information and experiences about 
this initiative. 
As previously mentioned, the Indonesian President initiated the idea of developing 
flagship programs in government agencies that became a seed for the development of 
the HWI initiative. DGT headquarters, with its Director General, represented actors with 
powerful influence to shape the interpretation of policy principles. Regional office 
(kanwil), the HWI tax service office, and tax officials were the actors at the operational 
level with responsibility for action to implement the policy. 
Job, Stout and Smith (2007) demonstrated that tax offices are rife with capacity to fight 
back against a policy innovation that comes from outside. The top of the organisation 
may favour implementation, so might those at the bottom of the organisation, but those 
in the middle of a hierarchical organisation exercise significant control over the degree 
of uptake of the policy and the quality of implementation. 
One significant problem that must be considered in relation to a conflict of principles in 
implementation is whether or not the principles so commonly appearing in the tax 
literature, particularly in documents on best practice in tax administration, have the 
same meaning in different tax jurisdictions. This question is particularly relevant when 
considering the transfer of policy and its underlying principles to a developing country. 
Issues relating to responsiveness, taxpayer rights, service charters, and risk analysis 
assume different meanings in different tax contexts. Sally Engle Merry’s work on 
‘vernacularisation’ highlights the significance of this problem (Merry 2006a; Merry 
2006b). In the human rights context, Sally Engle Merry explored how transnational 
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ideas opposed to violence against women become meaningful in local settings (Merry 
2006a; 2006b). She argued that as opposition to violence travels to different 
communities, the ideas are typically ‘vernacularised’, that is, the ideas are ‘adapted to 
local institutions and meanings’ (Merry 2006b, p. 39). It is a way to facilitate 
transferability of new ideas (e.g., human rights, good governance, transparency) into 
local contexts since ‘there is a great distance between the global sites where these ideas 
are formulated and the specific situations in which they are deployed’ (Merry 2006a, 
p. 3).  
Depending on how extensively local values and practices are incorporated into 
transferred ideas and institutional arrangements, vernacularisation falls along a 
continuum from replication to hybridisation. Merry suggested that the differences 
between the two are a matter of degree (2006b, pp. 44–48). In translation by replication, 
the model from the transnational sphere sets the overall organisation, mission and 
ideology, whilst still giving room for local context to provide distinctive content. In 
other words, how ideas are acted upon in the transferred institution is shaped by local 
cultural understandings, but the transnational ideas remain the same. In hybridisation, 
vernacularisation occurs in a more interactive form in which ‘symbols, ideologies, and 
organizational forms’ (p. 46) of the local merge with transnational forms to produce 
new, hybrid institutions. Within the context of principles and policies, Merry’s work 
suggests that transnational ideas enshrined in principles can change as a result of those 
principles being blended with local values at the hands of powerful actors.  
The process of vernacularisation often does not proceed easily or uniformly in the 
human rights context. Merry maintained that tension is caused, on one hand, by local 
actors’ lack of knowledge of relevant documentation and provision of the human rights 
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system, and on the other hand, global actors’ lack of understanding of local social 
situations in which human rights are violated. Transnational actors are typically rooted 
in a transnational legal culture which is distant from local culture. In this situation, a 
crucial role is played by ‘the people in the middle’, that is, ‘those who translate the 
discourses and practices from the arena of international law and legal institutions to 
specific situations’ (Merry 2006b, p. 39). Merry calls them ‘intermediaries’ or 
‘translators’. 
Transferring a new policy, ideas, or institutional models into a new environment is not 
always successful. As Merry (2006b, p. 40) suggested in the translation of human rights 
approaches to prevent violence against women: 
New ideas and practices may be ignored, rejected, or folded into pre-existing institutions 
to create a more hybrid discourse and organization. Or they may be subverted: seized and 
transformed into something quite different from the transnational concept … but 
nevertheless called by the same name.  
As in the human rights arena, transnational ideas influence local practices in the taxation 
field. How tax administrations are structured and re-structured, how a country’s tax law 
defines income to avoid double taxation disputes, and how tax administrations should 
allocate resources to monitor tax compliance of the very wealthy are all ideas that come 
from the transnational sphere of tax policy. Local conditions, however, still need to be 
considered when transnational ideas, programs, or institutional arrangements are 
introduced into a new environment. 
In summary, in adapting Braithwaite and Drahos’ (2000) conceptions of actors and 
principles from the globalisation of business regulation, I argue that in the process of 
introducing new policy within a tax jurisdiction, a range of actors will bring their own 
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principles to fight for as well as their own interpretations of international best practice 
principles. When the principles of certain actors conflict with the principles of others, 
contestation between principles within the organisation will occur. At times, a principle 
may be latent because it is so embedded in the institution. For example, collecting the 
maximum revenue possible is the traditional prime purpose of a tax authority, though it 
is not always openly acknowledged. Both the principle of efficiency and service may 
challenge this latent traditional mission. Or, in the transfer process, these principles may 
take on a local meaning or are reconciled in local ways to determine the direction of 
policy and its implementation. Service within an Indonesian context may imply a degree 
of deference that is not accepted as appropriate in more developed western democracies. 
In order to pursue principles and put ideas into action in a way that supports these 
principles, actors look to mechanisms of implementation. Put in a different way, 
mechanisms are used by actors to give greater weight to some principles than others. 
This leads us to a discussion in the next section of the third concept adopted from the 
Braithwaite and Drahos model: mechanisms (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, chap. 4). 
2.5 The concept of mechanisms 
The concept of mechanisms helps explain how particular events come about. This 
approach can be utilised in the tax policy context. For instance, why did tax havens 
grow significantly from the late 1970s to the early 2000s (Palan et al. 2010) after the 
introduction of transfer pricing guidelines? Explanation through a mechanism 
perspective may point to the increasing demand for financial systems that provide 
secrecy. As Panal and his colleagues pointed out: ‘Abusive transfer pricing involves the 
manipulation of prices of transactions between MNEs’ [multinational enterprises] 
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related affiliates … The veil of secrecy makes abuse much easier through tax havens’ 
(p.69). A veil of secrecy is a mechanism that tax havens offer: 
[p]rivacy is a key advantage to utilizing tax havens as a corporation may be able to sell its 
product at a lower price than its competitor, as a result of using tax havens, thereby 
having an overall international tax rate that is dramatically lower than its competitor 
(Ginsberg 1991, p. 22). 
In order to explain events of globalised business regulations, Braithwaite and Drahos 
(2000) identified mechanisms or series of mechanisms used by actors to achieve their 
goals. In doing so, they focused on lower-order mechanisms, rather than on higher-order 
mechanisms: lower-order mechanisms are ‘concrete specifications of higher-order 
mechanisms’ (p. 16). Braithwaite and Drahos used terms such as coercion or the threat 
of it (e.g., economic or military coercion) to note one particular form of mechanism 
used by actors to gain their objectives. Other mechanisms that Braithwaite and Drahos 
identified in their study as ‘tools that actors use to achieve their goals’ (p. 17) were 
‘systems of reward’ and ‘capacity-building’ (pp. 25-26). 
Mechanisms connect with principles in the following ways. In the case of global 
financial regulation discussed earlier, lenders (IMF, World Bank) adopt the principle of 
conditionality. This principle guides every action they take to achieve goals when 
lending money to debtor countries, the goals being either to preserve their resources 
(Dell 1983, p. 26) or to secure international monetary arrangements through supervising 
members to ensure they respond to their balance of payments deficits (Williamson 
1983, p. 607). In order to achieve these objectives, lenders must utilise certain 
mechanisms. Economic coercion is a mechanism the IFIs often use to achieve their 
goals (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, p. 132). Economic coercion, as Tiewul (1975, 
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p. 670) pointed out, is an attempt to constrain state conduct through the threat of 
withholding economic resources. It may take various forms, from discreet conditionality 
in an onerous finance development contract to outright trade embargoes. Whatever the 
form, economic coercion encompasses ‘interventions in the internal and external affairs 
of another state using economic measures’ (Villaroman 2009, p. 8). This practice, as 
Dicke (1988) suggested, places economic coercion in the service of the conditionality 
principle in violation of another fundamental principle of international law: the principle 
of non-intervention in the domestic policy of a sovereign state.  
The above example illustrates that there is a relationship between principles that actors 
weigh as important and mechanisms they employ to secure their goals. A tax authority 
might use training as a mechanism to ensure that an innovation like the ATO’s 
compliance model is fully understood. Training may be supported by champions of the 
model (Hobson 2003). Opportunities to use this mechanism may be blocked by those 
who dislike the idea of responsiveness and prefer a rule book approach to tax collection. 
2.6 The application of mechanisms to the Indonesian HWI case study  
Mechanisms are defined pathways for achieving goals. That said, many different 
mechanisms can be used to achieve the same goal. As Hobson (2003) showed, ATO 
staff were expected to understand and use the compliance model. Some favoured a more 
consistently coercive mechanism to achieve change; others favoured a more consistently 
persuasive mechanism through dialogue. 
In accordance with the discussion of Merry’s (2006a; 2006b) work earlier, mechanisms 
must suit contexts. Thus, similar actors with similar goals may use different 
mechanisms to achieve those goals depending on context. In other words, the 
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mechanisms favoured by the HWI unit in Indonesia are likely to be very different from 
the mechanisms used in Australia.  
Finally, an important feature of the concept of mechanisms, as advocated by Braithwaite 
and Drahos, is that mechanisms used by actors are largely of their choosing. In other 
words, actors are conscious of utilising certain mechanisms. Actors choose mechanisms 
based on which one fits their needs best, just as a chef chooses which knife will be used 
for which food. This feature is important to note. Sometimes mechanisms are unknown 
to actors, such as the mechanism of natural selection being unknown to the species it 
affects, but in the present context, actors consciously utilise or develop mechanisms to 
achieve their goals. 
In summary, in this thesis, mechanisms are operationally defined as measures that 
actors choose to employ in their effort to achieve certain goals that are directed by 
principles to which they strongly adhere. The achieved outcomes from applying certain 
mechanisms might be positive or negative. The term mechanism is used generally to 
take account of both possible consequences.  
Although efforts have been made to examine why some transfers are a success and 
others are not, research on tax policies that have employed a policy transfer framework 
(as discussed in Chapter 1) has made limited use of the concepts of principles, 
mechanisms and actors (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000) as process variables in their 
analyses. In contrast, before commencing my data collection I undertook an analysis to 
identify the actors within DGT who use certain mechanisms to support principles that 
best served their interests or goals in the HWI context. The contest of principles 
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determines outcomes: in the HWI case, did integrity, efficiency, service or revenue take 
precedence in defining the mission of Indonesia’s HWI unit? 
2.7 Principles, mechanisms and actors  
Chapter 1 focused on the policy convergence, diffusion and transfer literatures, and 
revealed the importance of international, domestic, and organisational factors in whether 
a policy is adopted, the timing of the adoption and the form it takes. In Chapter 2 I 
presented an argument for why the introduction of an HWI unit can be considered a 
transfer undertaken with networks of knowledge support, why implementation and the 
decision to adopt a policy are each important for a successful outcome, and how the 
concepts of principles, mechanisms and actors can be used to determine the way in 
which the policy is put into effect. 
Based on the work presented in Chapters 1 and 2 to this point, I proposed a simple 2x3 
schema for the ways in which principles, mechanisms and actors operate at different 
phases of policy transfer and diffusion on taxation (see Table 2.1). The first dimension 
relates to either the decision to adopt a policy from another jurisdiction or the 
implementation of that policy. The second dimension represents international, domestic, 
and organisational/internal levels of contestation and deliberation about the policy. The 
concepts of principles, mechanisms and actors are used in each cell to capture the 
different dynamics. The discussions in Chapter 5 to 7 involving Indonesia’s HWI unit 
traverse the cells in Table 2.1, but the main focus of this thesis is on the 
‘implementation-organisational’ cell. It is not suggested that the principles, mechanisms 
and actors in Table 2.1 exhaust all possible principles, mechanisms and actors that are 
in play, just some of the most important ones in this empirical study. Where policies 
involve cultural change, are politically charged, and involve judgment and negotiation – 
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as HWI units do – policy success is impossible without highly skilled, motivated and 
knowledgeable staff. Having such staff depends on effort and resources being dedicated 
to the concepts in the ‘implementation-organisational’ cell in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Principles, Mechanisms and Actors at Different Phases of Policy 
Transfer and Diffusion in Taxation  
 Adoption Implementation 
 
International P: tax neutrality, tax coordination, efficiency, 
perceived competitive benefits  
 
 
P: race-to-the-bottom, competitive advantage, 
political imperative ‘to do something’, 
economic crisis and popular discontent 
M: normative pressure, mimetism, coercion, 
learning, coordination  
 
M: emulation, copying, spatial dependence, 
negotiated strategy 
 
A: multi-national corporations, epistemic 
community, policy entrepreneur 
A: OECD, IMF, international forums, 
bureaucrats, IGOs 
 
Domestic P: economic development, political interests 
 
P: best practice, competition, efficiency 
 
M: emulation, competition M: networks, inter-personal communication 
channels, cooperation 
 
A: politicians, political institutions A: bureaucrats, experts, businesses, IGOs, 
community leaders 
 
Organisational P: international benchmarking, service quality, 
customer satisfaction 
 
P: tax appropriateness; fair, simple, and 
investment oriented; perceived benefits; 
neoliberal tax system 
 
M: coercive, mimetic, isomorphism  
 
M: cooperation; rational learning; political 
pressure; peer pressure from neighbouring 
countries; training, openness of administrative 
institution, and open recruitment 
  
A: IGOs, think-thanks, trans-national 
administrative networks 
A: The IGOs’ advisers, local bureaucrats (civil 
servants), officers from other countries 
 
Source: Studies summarized in Appendix B. 
Note: P = principles, M = mechanisms, A = actors. Shaded cells are the focus of this thesis. 
 
Policy transfer frameworks usually look at the concepts of principles, mechanisms and 
actors – perhaps in different terms – at the macro level. That is, when a policy is in the 
process of being transferred from one jurisdiction to another. As mentioned earlier, in 
this thesis these concepts are examined at the implementation phase of the transferred 
policy. This is discussed in the following section. 
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2.7.1 Graphical representation of the research approach  
In this section I present the model (Figure 2.1) that guided the research. The left side of 
illustrates, in a simplified way, the process of policy transfer from one jurisdiction to 
another. The transfer can involve policy goals, contents or instruments, institutions, or 
programs. Actors are involved in policy transfer and may include elected officials, 
bureaucrats and civil servants, policy entrepreneurs and experts, consultants, political 
parties, pressure groups, think tanks, corporations, and both governmental and non-
governmental international organisations (e.g., the Tax Justice Network) and institutions 
(e.g., Cao 2010; Eccleston 2006; Ellis 2009; Miller & Richard 2010; Prakash & Caro 
2010; Radaelli 2000). At a macro level, as Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) have argued, 
these actors engage with principles in a bid to influence the flow of events. 
The principle or set of principles that actors can weigh up according to the tax literature 
on policy transfer include tax neutrality, tax coordination, fighting against harmful tax 
competition (Radaelli 2000), the race-to-the-bottom (Eccleston 2006), service quality 
and customer satisfaction (van Stolk & Wegrich 2008), competitive advantage (Barthel 
& Neumayer 2012; Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2009) and efficiency (Swank 2006; Ward & 
Cao 2012). International organisations such the OECD and the IMF promote principles 
of tax integrity and sustainability, among others. 
The principle or set of principles that actors can weigh up according to the tax literature 
on policy transfer include tax neutrality, tax coordination, fighting against harmful tax 
competition (Radaelli 2000), the race-to-the-bottom (Eccleston 2006), service quality 
and customer satisfaction (van Stolk & Wegrich 2008), competitive advantage (Barthel 
& Neumayer 2012; Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2009) and efficiency (Swank 2006; Ward & 
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Cao 2012). International organisations such the OECD and the IMF promote principles 
of tax integrity and sustainability, among others. 
      Macro level v Micro level 
Country A                                 Country B 
  Actors                                                                     Actors 
 
 
 
 
   Country A                            Country B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision to transfer policy (macro level) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Webs of control & dialogue    Webs of control & 
dialogue1 
 
 
Process of implementing policy (macro-micro 
levels) 
  
Figure 2.1 Comparing decision to transfer a policy and process of implementing a 
transferred policy  
 
The right side of Figure 2.1 illustrates implementation of a transferred policy. Principles 
are enacted to guide and justify a particular policy transfer. In the case of the Indonesian 
tax administration, some of these principles might have been articulated at the most 
senior levels, but some would not. Among senior personnel, some might not have been 
consciously aware of the principles driving the policy transfer (see Hobson 2003; Job et 
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al. 2007 for the Australian context when introducing ATO compliance model). 
Whatever the levels of awareness, the policy will have embedded principles that guide 
mechanisms used to achieve certain goals. With the transfer of the HWI policy to 
Indonesia, embedded principles may not have been evenly understood across different 
levels of the organisation, nor evenly accepted as legitimate. Pockets of resistance were 
likely. The extent of the resistance and its enduring quality depended on how effectively 
DGT’s networks of dialogue and control persuaded and informed staff of the value of 
the principles and the appropriateness of the mechanisms used to implement them. The 
next section introduces the idea of two types of webs of influence: a web of control and 
a web of dialogue. 
2.7.2 Webs of influence: control and dialogue 
Understanding the operation of a web of influence, Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) 
suggested, helps understand how an accomplishment as difficult as the globalisation of 
regulation is institutionalised. Actors build global as well as local networks through 
which knowledge, resources, and mentalities are shared (Cartwright 2011, p. 49) and it 
is through these networks that actors have the capacity and power to influence the flow 
of events (Parker & Braithwaite 2003, p. 119). Braithwaite and Drahos distinguished 
two different types of webs of influence: dialogic webs, and webs of control 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, pp. 551–552). Both types of webs are used by actors to 
achieve their goals, but different types of webs are associated with different 
consequences. 
In their research, Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) found that in all cases, while webs of 
control (reward and coercion) were connected to dialogic webs, dialogic webs often 
existed without any webs of reward and coercion. Braithwaite and Drahos argued that 
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most actors in the world system prefer to work through dialogue before they opt for 
control (p. 552). Moreover, it is worth noting that webs of control are only accessible to 
actors who have resources to execute reward and coercion. 
Webs of dialogue tend to have different consequences to webs of control because they 
provide greater room for communication between actors. In dialogic webs, actors 
convene officially and unofficially, formally and informally. Unofficial and informal 
forms of dialogue are important, especially in organisations that are highly bureaucratic 
and hierarchical such as tax authorities. Dialogue conducted in informal ways provides 
higher levels of the bureaucracy with opportunities to hear the ideas and insights of 
‘street-level’ officials (Lipsky 2010). This kind of communication is often not possible 
through formal channels. The core idea of the concept of webs of dialogue is that 
‘[d]ialogue helps actors to define their interests, thereby giving scope for the operation 
of mechanisms of reciprocal adjustment and non-reciprocal coordination’ (Braithwaite 
& Drahos 2000, p. 553). Reciprocal adjustment means that through ‘non-coerced 
negotiation … parties agree to adjust the rules they follow’ (p. 25). Non-reciprocal 
coordination occurs when ‘movement toward common rules happens without all parties 
believing they have a common interest in that movement’ (p. 25). In short, webs of 
dialogue facilitate a process of building commitment and mutual understanding of 
shared interests that can be sustained without enforcement activity. 
In contrast, webs of control do not rely on or prioritise dialogue between actors involved 
in the process. Actors utilise webs of control by employing a command-and-control 
style of regulation to achieve their goals. It is understood, however, that command and 
control is not the only or the best way to control coercively. Hegemony, implied threats, 
and incentives are other mechanisms that may be used by more powerful actors to 
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achieve their goals.26 Webs of control reflect ‘harder’ forms of regulatory processes that 
deliver top down and robust forms of reward and punishment (Cartwright 2011, p. 51). 
In order to ensure compliance, actors who engage with webs of control usually apply 
coercion, the threat of coercion or reward rather than use dialogic forums to bring 
involved actors to the same table to talk and negotiate. 
Relationships built between actors in webs of control differ from those in webs of 
dialogue. In webs of control, weaker actors accept prescribed regulatory goals without 
much questioning because they understand that negative consequences may result if 
they do not comply. On the other hand, they also understand that they may receive 
certain incentives or rewards by conforming to powerful actors’ directions. In other 
words, webs of control build a culture in which conformity to the process is more 
important than being active participants in the process (Cartwright 2011, p. 55). 
Moreover, as Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, p. 49) and Bruno Frey (1997) argued, the 
use of extrinsic incentives (rewards or punishments) undermines intrinsic motivation to 
comply. Although webs of control might succeed in accomplishing compliance in the 
short term, they are likely to fail to gain long term commitment to meeting compliance 
standards. 
When applied to the implementation of the HWI unit in Indonesia, the concept of webs 
of influence together with the concepts of principles, mechanisms and actors provide a 
way of analysing how the directive from Indonesia’s DGT was understood and cited by 
                                                 
26  In the globalisation of regulation context, hegemony, according to Braithwaite and Drahos (2000, p. 
26), achieves its goals ‘by actors following the lead of the dominant power because those other actors 
define interest in terms of those of the dominant power (without need of threat or offer of reward by the 
hegemonic power)’. 
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different groups within the HWI TSO during the implementation of the transferred HWI 
policy. 
When introducing a new policy, there is a case for actors who have more power to use 
dialogic webs rather than webs of control to influence other actors to achieve goals. The 
ATO’s introduction of a compliance model, as discussed earlier, as a new policy for 
dealing with taxpayers in Australia, is an example of how dialogic webs are used to 
elicit compliance. This is not say, however, that webs of controls are not also used 
under the compliance model; they are used if persuasion and education fail. In certain 
situations, powerful actors might still need to use webs of control along with webs of 
dialogue. But excessive use of webs of control by powerful actors without dialogue to 
explain and persuade will undermine the long term commitment of actors who are 
involved in implementing the policy. The use of webs of control means that 
communication between different levels of bureaucracy does not flow smoothly, since 
there are likely to be barriers between high levels of the bureaucracy and operational 
level staff (e.g., resistant middle managers). Therefore, I predicted that poor 
communication, especially with regard to the HWI policy, was one of the factors that 
contributed to the failure of the implementation of the HWI policy in Indonesia. 
My conclusion from this exploration of webs of influence was that when webs of 
control dominate webs of dialogue in a hierarchical, highly segmented organisation, and 
when principles remain contested, then the success of implementation of a policy 
directed by the most senior tax officers to those operating at street level is likely to be 
partial at best. This insight led to the new hypothesis listed below that (in conjunction 
with the hypotheses listed in section 1.3) guided my data analysis. 
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2.7.3 Hypotheses in relation to implementation of the HWI policy in Indonesia 
In Chapter 1 I proposed the following set of hypotheses based on my review of the 
policy transfer literature. 
Hypothesis 1(a): Policy transfer of the HWI initiative in Indonesia occurred due to a 
political imperative to ‘do something’ to satisfy powerful actors who 
used the policy to advance their political agenda of being recognised 
as having a modern bureaucracy.  
Hypothesis 1(b): Policy transfer of the HWI initiative in Indonesia had elements of both 
coercion and voluntariness. Coercion was strongest at the levels of 
the national government and the administering organisation, the 
DGT. Voluntariness was accompanied by active enlisting of advice at 
the international level from the epistemic community of tax experts. 
This mix of pressure had implications for how much learning as 
opposed to emulation could take place. 
The discussion presented in this chapter gave rise to three additional hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: Transferring a complex policy such as an HWI unit requires flexibility 
in organisational structure that is able to tolerate structural changes to 
accommodate mechanisms required to achieve policy outcomes.  
Hypothesis 3(a): Learning about implementation of the HWI policy requires 
understanding of the principles underlying the policy (particularly 
as enacted in Australia).  
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Hypothesis 3(b): An understanding of the principles underlying the HWI policy is 
essential for choosing appropriate mechanisms for its 
implementation. 
Hypothesis 4(a): The use of webs of control rather than webs of dialogue by powerful 
actors blocked channels of communication across different levels of 
the organisation and with stakeholders involved in the 
implementation of and affected by the policy. 
Hypothesis 4(b): Poor communication to disseminate new policy ideas such as the 
HWI unit resulted in poor support for the policy and an inability to 
learn from others with local ‘grounded’ knowledge for how the 
policy could be best implemented. 
The hypotheses place principles and contests over principles at the centre of the 
analysis. Policy principles guide practices and mechanisms used to achieve policy 
objectives. Therefore, it is important for an adopting country to gather knowledge, not 
only about technical aspects of the transferred policy, but about what principles 
exponent countries (Australia being the most influential in this case) held with regard to 
the policy in question. Failure to gather comprehensive knowledge about the policy 
leads to policy failure, because the practices and mechanisms required to achieve policy 
goals may be overlooked. This issue relates to Hypothesis 1.  
In addition to seeking knowledge about the changes required to set up Indonesia’s HWI 
unit, I investigated the flexibility of DGT’s structure required to support the new 
initiative. Christensen’s (2013) study on tax reform in New Zealand and Ireland found 
that distinctive administrative institutions in the two countries had a major impact on the 
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direction of tax policies. Among other factors, Christensen examined the openness of 
administrative institutions, which in New Zealand allowed the Treasury to recruit 
experts with strong economic-specialised expertise from outside the bureaucracy: 
foreign economists, academics, and business people (Christensen 2013, p. 570). In 
contrast, the closed recruitment process practised in Ireland resulted in more generalist 
tax policy-makers (pp. 573-574). Consequently, tax policy reforms in New Zealand and 
Ireland have moved in different directions: New Zealand adopted ‘one of the most 
neoliberal tax systems in the world, whereas Ireland pursued a heterodox tax policy’ 
(Christensen 2013, p. 579). 
Openness means flexibility to adopt ideas from outside. In Christensen’s study, it meant 
flexibility to recruit experts from outside the bureaucracy as practised by New Zealand’s 
Treasury. In the context of my study, flexibility is required in organisational structure to 
tolerate structural change that may be needed to introduce mechanisms required to 
implement the transferred policy. This certainly is not to say, however, that these 
mechanisms should be identical with those of other countries. Adjustments will always 
be needed. However, in many cases, even a simple adjustment is not easy to make in an 
organisation with a rigid structure. Organisational rigidity is proposed as a factor that 
contributed to the HWI unit in Indonesia not meeting expectations and reaching its 
potential (Hypothesis 2). 
A hurried and coercive transfer is likely to lead to incomplete or inadequate learning 
because actors responsible for implementation of the transferred policy are either doing 
so without deep reflection or unwillingly. Or, if a transfer is conducted only to win 
recognition, then actors are likely to superficially engage with best practice, with little 
understanding of how it works in its originating setting and what should be done to 
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make it work in a new setting (see for instance Dolowitz 2000a; Rose 1993; 2002). 
These are the insights from the literature that led to Hypothesis 3.  
Hypothesis 4 recognises that there is potential for conflict between higher-level 
officials, at the strategic level of the organisation, with lower-level officials at the 
operational levels. The conflict results from different interpretations of the principles of 
the transferred policy. Based on their interpretations of the principles, different actors 
conclude that different policy goals should be prioritised and, therefore, different 
mechanisms will be used as the best tool to achieve their goals. In their classic article, 
Dorf and Sabel (1998) suggested involvement of actors through ‘pooling of 
information’ (p. 287) in which actors at different levels learn from each other. In the 
context of my study, actors at the operational level are given more chances to participate 
in policy ‘refinement’ through dialogic processes. Through this process, Dorf and Sable 
argued, efficiency is increased and accountability is heightened as actors participate in 
the decisions that affect them (p. 267). However, in practice the mechanisms that will be 
supported and resourced will often reflect the wishes of the most powerful actors. The 
concepts of contestation between principles and how powerful actors within Indonesia’s 
DGT weigh up these principles and favour particular mechanisms provide valuable 
insight into why the HWI unit in Indonesia proved so unstable and unsustainable 
compared with HWI units in Australia, France, Japan, or New Zealand, where such 
units have been operating for more than a decade.27 
                                                 
27  In February 2012, only 34 months after its inception, the role of the HWI tax service office as a 
dedicated unit for administering HWI taxpayers was altered. Its name (HWI Tax Service Office) and 
function were changed; it became Large Taxpayers Tax Service Office IV, with a new function of 
administering state-owned companies (especially those in service sector) as well as HWIs (see Chapter 5 
for more detailed explanation).  
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Conclusion 
Implementing a policy that has been transferred from elsewhere requires a shared 
understanding of the policy principles in the adopting country. As demonstrated through 
the introduction of a new compliance model in the ATO in the late 1990s, new 
initiatives are more likely to succeed when powerful actors commit to the initiative and 
involve stakeholders in the implementation process.  
In imposing policy principles that are regarded as the best alternative to achieve 
organisational goals, powerful actors may utilise webs of influence they have built. By 
using such webs, powerful actors are able to bring other actors on board. Webs of 
influence consist of dialogic webs and webs of control. While webs of control rely 
heavily on the use of command-and-control mechanisms to secure compliance to the 
organisational ethos, dialogic webs give more opportunity for involved actors to share 
their views about the policy in question. When policy principles are understood well, 
accepted and shared evenly among actors involved in the implementation process, it is 
very likely that the policy can achieve its goals, though the goals may be different from 
those in other countries. Local actors, mechanisms and principles work through webs of 
influence to re-shape the transferred policy to fit the local setting. 
 
113 
 
Chapter 3 
Research Methods 
 
 
Conversation is an ancient form of obtaining 
knowledge.  
(Kvale 1996, p. 8). 
…narration is how people express their 
understandings of events and experiences. 
(King & Horrocks 2010, p. 213) 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodological framework used in this thesis for gathering 
and analysing data. The overall objective of the research was to answer the question: 
Why did the HWI initiative in Indonesia fail to meet its potential? In doing so, I aimed 
to understand the transfer dynamic that occurred at international, domestic, and 
organisational levels. The implementation in Indonesia of a policy adopted from a 
mature democracy necessarily requires considerable planning. This process was the 
prime focus of my research. 
Chapter 1 introduced the concepts of globalisation, policy convergence, diffusion and 
policy transfer as concepts explaining why policies tend to be similar between countries 
and how one country adopts a policy (or a series of policies) from another. However, at 
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the implementation phase (as opposed to the transferring phase) of the adopted policy, 
the interaction between actors at the organisational level is important (see, for instance, 
Christensen’s (2013) study). Understanding the interaction between involved actors 
through their narratives about the implementation process helps to advance our 
knowledge of how policy transfer can meet expectations. I discussed actors, principles, 
mechanisms and webs of influence that can serve as a framework for understanding the 
dynamics of implementation in Chapter 2, and presented the model that guided my 
analysis. 
Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996; 2000) policy transfer framework and Braithwaite and 
Drahos’ (2000) concepts of actors, principles, mechanisms, and webs of influence 
underpinned my theoretical analysis of the adoption of HWI policy in Indonesia’s tax 
administration. These works also guided the methodology used in collecting the primary 
data. One of the tasks was to document how the transferred policy produced unexpected 
outcomes. The policy transfer framework sets the scene by recognising that a policy is 
transferred from one country to another for particular reasons. Hence, I sought 
documentation that provided evidence of intentional transfer by Indonesia and why the 
HWI policy was transferred. I also searched for documentation identifying the actors 
involved in the transfer process, how the policy was transferred, and what kinds of 
reflection were accorded to the transferred policy. However, in order to give a more 
nuanced explanation of the dynamics that occurred at the implementation stage, 
particularly at the organisational level, I borrowed Braithwaite and Drahos’ concepts 
principles, mechanisms, actors and webs of influence, and applied them through 
interviewing key actors. 
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Braithwaite and Drahos’ (2000) concepts of actors, principles, and mechanisms 
recognise that different actors engage with different mechanisms to secure principles 
they regard as important. Webs of influence explain relationships built between actors 
who have different levels of power.28 Policy documents gathered during the study 
signalled which actors had more power and which had less. After reading the 
documentation, I organised a series of interviews with identified actors in order to 
acquire a deeper knowledge of the principles to which certain actors ascribed and what 
mechanisms they used to achieve their goals. Not surprisingly, these elements of what 
actors were trying to do, who was opposing them, and how they furthered their goals 
did not appear in any policy documents. Gathering information from both conversations 
and written narratives enabled me to identify (a) actors who played key roles in certain 
situations; (b) the principles to which particular actors assigned most weight; (c) 
mechanisms perceived by actors as the best pathways to achieving their policy goals; 
and (d) the form of the webs of influence actors used to achieve their goals. 
3.1 Approach to answering research questions 
In order to answer the research questions, I collected and analysed the available 
documentation about HWI units, how they should be set up and how it was set up in 
Indonesia. Documentation included formal government papers, reports from IGOs, 
academic reports and research papers, and media releases and reports. 
                                                 
28 Power in this context refers to the possession of authority, control, or influence by which a person 
influences the actions of others, either by direct authority or by some other, more intangible means 
(Extension, 2013). From the gathered documents power of individuals was inferred from their formal 
level or position. This information was used to direct me to which persons should be interviewed. When 
suggestions were made to talk to others, I endeavoured to gain further information through requesting 
further interviews. Needless to say, power can be wielded out of sight or knowledge of others. 
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It is common for the implementation of a policy initiative to stray from formal 
expectations and the formal plan. Unexpected events occur, ad hoc responses are made 
and subsequent decisions can have consequences for how further implementation 
unfurls. It is therefore important to avoid sole reliance on formal documentation in an 
analysis of an event such as the implementation of the HWI initiative in Indonesia. 
Formal documentation is likely to present a picture of how things should be and provide 
the best possible account of proceedings. In contrast, I needed to describe and explain 
what actually happened. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 2, it was inevitable that 
different views would exist about the implementation of the HWI unit. While it was 
unrealistic to capture all of these views, I was committed to capturing as much of the 
diversity as possible. In particular, it was important to understand differences in the 
interpretation of the policy and how these differences in policy interpretation led to 
policy failure. 
In order to obtain informal accounts of events that reflected the diversity of views 
surrounding the implementation of the HWI initiative, I conducted interviews with 
individuals who I expected to have direct or expert knowledge. Interviews were 
conducted inside and outside the ATO and DGT to gather narratives from actors 
involved in and affected by the HWI policy. 
While an analysis of documentation and interviews with key informants provided 
different kinds of information, there was also opportunity to use the two sources of data 
as a check on the other and as a way of triangulating on findings. 
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3.2 Choosing a comparison country 
When Indonesia made the decision to create an HWI unit in mid-2009, at least 10 other 
countries already had HWI units operating (OECD 2009a). Understanding how these 
units were operating provided a benchmark against which the operation of the HWI unit 
in Indonesia could be evaluated. For the purposes of this research, it was unwieldy to 
use all ten other countries as benchmarks; instead, I used one comparator – Australia. 
There are three reasons for choosing Australia. First, at the time of introducing its HWI 
unit, Australia’s operation was regarded as cutting edge in tax administration. Australia 
had the reputation of successfully introducing a ‘holistic approach’ for monitoring the 
tax compliance of HWIs and their related entities – an approach never before used in tax 
administrations (Braithwaite et al. 2003, p. 205; Senate Economics References 
Committee 2000). Second, while the OECD led the way in urging countries to adopt an 
HWI unit, it was Australia that provided much of the initial advice to Indonesia (ATO 
2010). Third, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, regional proximity can explain the adoption 
of similar policies in neighbouring states (e.g., Ashworth, Geys & Heyndels 2006; 
Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2009). Australia is one of Indonesia’s closest neighbours, and 
certainly the closest with an HWI unit in 2009. 
Australia’s HWI unit was established in May 1996 within the ATO’s High Wealth 
Individuals Taskforce (HWI Taskforce). Indonesia’s unit was established in May 2009 
and called the High Wealth Individual Tax Service Office (HWI TSO). 
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3.3 Methods in detail 
This section explains sources of data that I used in this research and how to obtain them. 
Methods used in this research include document studies and interviews which will be 
discussed in further in the following. 
3.3.1 Document studies 
The documentation accessed for this research was publicly available or obtained by 
request. I used five main sources of secondary data: data from tax authorities, data from 
other government agencies, data from non-governmental institutions, data from the 
mass media, and data from published research. 
Data from the tax authorities, both the ATO and the DGT, appears in aggregated form: 
the growth in the number of HWI taxpayers, the growth in tax revenue from the 
compliance activities generated by the HWI unit, and the growth in resources utilised to 
manage the HWI segment. Data from the DGT also included the growth in the number 
of taxpayers in general (not only HWIs), the growth of tax revenue, and the growth in 
the number of tax return lodgements.  
In the case of Australia, these data were mainly gathered through the ATO’s website 
(ATO n.d.), which provided access to the Commissioner of Taxation’s annual reports, 
booklets, meeting minutes, and press releases. Documentation gathered during 
interviews included ATO bulletins in relation to HWI operations and presentation 
materials about the HWI taskforce for internal and external purposes. 
Other government departments and agencies in Australia from which materials were 
collected included the Parliament of Australia (Parliament of Australia n.d.), the 
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Australian National Audit Office (The Auditor General n.d.) , the Inspector-General of 
Taxation29 (Inspector-General of Taxation n.d.), and the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman n.d.). 
In the case of Indonesia, I collected published material from DGT, and the MoF and its 
echelon I units30. Information gained from these institutions was gathered through their 
public websites (Ministry of Finance Republic Indonesia n.d.) and from publicly 
available publications and reports, or obtained by special request during fieldwork. This 
included data from the Indonesian budget for various years, policy documentation in 
relation to the establishment of the HWI unit, policy papers, memos, and meeting 
minutes. 
In general, Australian government websites proved to be a richer source of data than the 
comparable Indonesian websites. This had consequences for the interview phase of the 
project. Interviews with Indonesian participants became a very important source of 
information on how and why the HWI policy was transferred. 
Other sources of data utilised in this study came from non-governmental institutions, 
especially those with a focus on taxation or HWIs. These institutions included 
consultancy firms (for example, Capgemini, Boston Consulting Group, Citi Private 
Bank, Knight Frank) which regularly publish reports on growth in centres of wealth. 
                                                 
29  The Inspector-General of Taxation (IGT) in Australia is an independent statutory agency that was 
established under the Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003. Its functions are to review: (1) systems 
established by the ATO to administer the tax laws, and (2) systems established by tax laws in relation to 
administrative matters (Inspector-General of Taxation n.d.). While a number of Commonwealth 
Government agencies examine systemic taxation administration matters, the IGT is the only agency with 
sole responsibility for such reviews. 
30  Indonesian MoF consists of 12 echelon I units in which DGT is one of them.  
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Also included are non-governmental agencies with a particular interest in taxation: The 
Tax Institute (Australia), the Indonesian Tax Consultants Association (IKPI), Tax 
Justice Network (international), the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank. 
This study also benefited from publicly available research documents. In particular, I 
utilised an interview transcript from a program called ‘Innovations for Successful 
Societies’ produced by Princeton University (Princeton University 2014) with senior 
officials of the Indonesian MoF and the DGT. The topic discussed in the interview was 
the process of bureaucratic reform in the Indonesian MoF and tax administration. The 
interview recording and transcript are available online.31  
Finally, insight into the operations of Australia’s and Indonesia’s HWI units was gained 
through searching the media, specifically magazines, newspapers, and news networks in 
both countries for articles related to the operation of HWI units. 
3.3.2 Interviews 
Recruitment of participants 
Participants were sought from two major groups: individuals with an affiliation with a 
past or present tax authority and stakeholders who had observed or taken part in the 
setting up of the HWI unit from outside the tax authority both in Australia and 
Indonesia. Ensuring representation from both groups was strategically important for 
identifying the different webs of influence that shaped the way in which the HWI unit 
was introduced and developed in both countries.  
                                                 
31  The interview materials can be accessed at the program’s website:  http://www.princeton.edu/ 
successfulsocieties /index.xml. 
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In recruiting interviewees, I followed the method of Braithwaite (2003b). John 
Braithwaite examined the performance of the ATO’s HWI Taskforce a few years after 
the taskforce was established. In Braithwaite’s study, participants were selected 
strategically because of their knowledge of and experience with HWIs (p. 246); they 
were not selected randomly from a pool of possible tax advisers or tax officers. I 
adopted the same approach. In King and Horrocks’ (2010, p. 31) terms, interviewees 
were people who had demonstrated a systematic relation to the topic under study, that 
is, the taxation of HWIs and the administrative arrangements for doing so.  
The strategy for developing contacts in the Australian and Indonesian tax authorities 
differed. In Indonesia, my position as a tax official on study leave during the course of 
my PhD placed me within an ‘insider-outsider’ research frame (Kanuha 2000). The term 
insider-outsider is used when researcher(s) ‘conduct studies with populations and 
communities and identity groups of which they are also members’ (Kanuha 2000, 
p. 439) and ‘shares an identity, language, and common professional experiential base’ 
(Asselin 2003, p. 100), but are not currently living in the context of the group (Oladele 
et al. 2012, p. 10). An insider-outsider researcher status gave me both opportunities and 
challenges in conducting fieldwork. My background and keen familiarity with the 
Indonesian tax system contributed to ease in recruiting and developing rapport with 
participants – an advantage I did not have in my Australian case study. In other words, 
this insider role status granted me ‘more rapid and more complete acceptance’ (Dwyer 
& Buckle 2009, p. 58) by my Indonesian respondents.  
In Australia, an Australian Leadership Awards scholarship offered by the Australian 
Government allowed me to work as an intern within the ATO for one week in April, 
2011. This internship helped me to develop relationships with ATO officials. To further 
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build relationships with potential Australian informants outside the ATO, in April 2012 
I attended an international conference on tax administration, introduced myself and my 
research, and followed up with email and phone contact afterwards. I also made contact 
with consultancy firms, especially accounting and tax consultants and advisers, which 
advertised themselves as ‘advisers to high wealth individuals’ on their websites.  
Selecting the sample 
Within the tax authorities of both Australia and Indonesia, I recruited participants from 
that group of tax officials who held a strategic position in the HWI units or whose 
positions involved understanding the management of taxpayers’ compliance. In 
recruiting informants from the ATO, I benefited from ‘insiders’ (King & Horrocks 
2010, p. 31) who provided me with lists of relevant officials and their positions. I made 
direct contact with the officials I thought had a systematic relation to the topic of my 
study. Some of my participants had been in the Australian or Indonesian HWI units 
since their inception.  
Stakeholders from outside the tax authorities were selected because of their knowledge 
of HWIs and their taxation and/or influence in the adoption and running of the HWI 
units. The criteria used for selection of participants outside the tax authorities were: (a) 
taxpayers who are included in the HWI program; (b) individuals who provided advice to 
the HWIs or represented HWIs when dealing with the tax authority; (c) representatives 
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of peak industry and professional bodies32; and (d) academics. Details of the interviews 
conducted in this study are given in the following section. 
Unfortunately, in Australia, efforts to obtain respondents who fitted the ‘stakeholders 
other than tax office’ category failed. The Indonesian focus of the study made it difficult 
to attract such respondents. This shortcoming was ameliorated to some extent by the 
amount of quality information that could be freely accessed through the public domain 
in Australia.  
Table 3.1 presents a breakdown of participants interviewed in Australia and Indonesia. 
The ‘tax official’ group in Table 3.1 includes people who had retired from the tax 
authority and lacked an association with another institution, or held other positions in 
the MoF. This kind of respondent is identified as a ‘former tax official’ when quoted in 
subsequent data chapters.  
Participants who were tax officials were in middle and senior positions, both operational 
and strategic. All had more than 15 years of experience as tax officials. In the Australian 
case, all respondents from the tax official group in Table 3.1 were still active in the 
ATO.  
In Indonesia, one of the 20 participants in the tax official group had retired a few 
months before the interview was conducted. Three other participants had left their 
positions in the DGT, taking up new positions in the MoF (of which the DGT was a 
                                                 
32  For Australia, these bodies were the Taxation Institute of Australia and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants. For Indonesia, these bodies were the IKPI and the Indonesian Taxation Institute and the 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  
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subordinate organisation) or other government agencies. Their quotations are identified 
as ‘former tax official’. 
Respondents who were not tax officials were distributed among six categories in Table 
3.1. They could be tax practitioners (tax preparers, lawyers, accountants or consultants), 
academics, representatives of professional bodies, representatives of international 
organisations and other organisations (such as government, or an ombudsman’s office), 
or taxpayers. 
Table 3.1 Categorisation of Participants  
  
 Tax 
official 
Tax 
practitioner1 
Academic Prof 
body2 
Int’l 
Org3 
Other  
Org4 
Taxpayer 
Total 
 
Australia 
 
12 
 
- 
 
1 
 
- 
 
1 
 
- 
 
- 
 
14 
 
Indonesia 
 
20 
 
10 
 
2 
 
4 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
42 
 
Total 
 
32 
 
10 
 
3 
 
4 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
 
56 
 
Note:  
1 Includes professional tax preparers, tax lawyers, accountants, tax advisers, and tax consultants. 
2 Includes tax consultant association, employee association, and chamber of commerce. 
3 Includes IMF and OECD. 
4 Includes house of representative and tax ombudsman’s office 
 
Interview process 
I conducted face-to-face interviews with participants whenever possible. Not all 
participants were available during my field work trips to Indonesia, and not all 
Australian participants had time in their busy schedules for a face-to-face appointment. 
These participants were important sources of information because they played key roles 
in the implementation of HWI tax policy, so different interviewing modes were utilised 
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to ensure their inclusion in the sample, i.e. face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews, 
and email interviews (Denscombe 2007). 
An argument could be made for both face-to-face and telephone interviewing. While 
face-to-face interviewing is commonly employed in semi-structured and in-depth 
interviews, telephone interviews are appropriate for structured interviews (Fontana & 
Frey 1993), short (Harvey 1988), or to ask for details about very specific situations 
(Rubin & Rubin 2011). Studies comparing telephone with face-to-face interviews have 
found that mode of interview does not significantly influence the quality of data 
(Brustad et al. 2003; Opdenakker 2006; Sturges & Hanrahan 2004). Therefore, the 
strategy I adopted was to keep the telephone interviews shorter and more targeted, while 
the face-to-face interviews gave opportunity for more exploratory questioning and 
discussion. 
While almost all participants in Indonesia were interviewed in person, two of the 14 
participants in Australia were interviewed by telephone. The telephone interviews were 
supplemented with information from prior email exchanges with participants.  
In some cases, telephone interviews were used for follow-up after an interview, as a 
supplement to face-to-face interviews, to ask for more comments or for elaborations on 
a particular issue. Face-to-face interviews followed by a telephone interview are 
categorised as ‘face-to-face and telephone’ interviews in Table 3.2. 
In one case, a prospective participant who was considered a valuable informant had left 
Indonesia and was not able to participate in a telephone interview, though he was 
willing to take part in the study. We communicated via email. Although the quality of 
126 
 
‘interview’ material obtained via email has been questioned (Burns 2010), the context in 
relation to this participant led to acceptance of this interview as legitimate. Although it 
is generally believed that face-to-face interviews provide richer data than telephone 
interviews, and telephone interviews provide richer data than e-mail interviews 
(Schneider et al. 2002), evaluation of quality should always rest on knowledge of 
context.  
For some participants whom I interviewed face-to-face, follow-up questions were sent 
through e-mail to clarify, to obtain additional data, to fill in gaps from the previous face-
to-face interview, or to ask additional questions that emerged after I had read the 
interview transcript. I categorise this kind of interview as ‘face-to-face and e-mail’. 
In total 54 interviews were conducted in Australia and Indonesia, of which 14 
interviews were conducted in Australia and 40 were in Indonesia.33 This difference in 
number of respondents between the two cases was not regarded as a threat to the quality 
of the study. The difficulty in recruiting respondents in Australia (as mentioned above) 
was offset by the richness of the available secondary data compared to that for 
Indonesia. In other words, the lack of available official documentation in Indonesia had 
to be compensated for through recruitment of more respondents who could discuss the 
HWI initiative. 
 
 
                                                 
33  One respondent in the Indonesia group did not reside in Indonesia and was interviewed by email. The 
respondent was categorised in the Indonesia group based on a strong relationship to the topic. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of Interview Modes 
Modes Australia Indonesia 
 
Total 
 
Face-to-face 9 38 47 
Telephone 2 - 2 
E-mail - 1 1 
Face-to-face and telephone 2 - 2 
Face-to-face and e-mail 1 1 2 
    
Total 14 40 54 
All interviews in Australia were conducted one-on-one, while in Indonesia three ‘elite’ 
interviewees (Rubin & Rubin 2011, p. 179) were accompanied by their staff, and on 
some occasions, accompanied staff gave their opinions.  It is not uncommon, according 
to Rubin and Rubin (2011), for elites to ask to have their subordinates present during 
interviews. In such cases, accompanied staff counted as an interview participant only if 
they offered their own opinions on the matters under discussion (two ‘accompanied 
staff’ were counted as participants). 
I conducted the first interview in Australia on 22 September 2011 through telephone. 
The last interview conducted in Australia was on 30 May 2012. In Indonesia, the first 
interview was conducted on 3 January 2012 and the last interview was 19 April 2013. 
The interviews lasted an average of 50 minutes, with the longest interview lasting one 
hour and 20 minutes, and the shortest 14 minutes.  
All participants were asked for permission to record their interviews. All interviews in 
Australia were recorded, while 28 of 39 interviews in Indonesia (excluding the sole e-
mail interview) were recorded. When interviews were not recorded, I took short notes 
during them to help recall important information and useful quotations.  
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While almost all interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ places of work, five  
interviews (three in Australia and two in Indonesia) were conducted in other locations 
(coffee shop, restaurant, library, or tax court). Interviewees chose the interview 
locations. Table 3.3 shows some information about the interviews conducted in both 
countries. 
In this thesis the terms interviewee, respondent, informant and participant are used 
interchangeably without any particular consideration for different meanings. For a 
further discussion of the differences of those terms in the research context to reflect a 
researcher’s view of her or his relationship with the people being interviewed, see 
Seidman (2006, p. 14). 
Table 3.3 Summary of Interviews in Australia and Indonesia  
 
 
Australia Indonesia Total 
    
Number of interviews 14 40 54 
Number of participants 14 42 56 
Gender of participants    
     Female 1 
(7.14%) 
3 
(7.14%) 
4 
     Male 13 
(92.86%) 
39 
(92.86%) 
52 
Place of interview    
     Participants’ work place1 11 38 48 
     Other places2 3 2 5 
  
 
Notes:  
1 Includes telephone and e-mail interviews. 
2 Places such as coffee shop, restaurant, library, and tax court. 
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Linguistic considerations 
Interviews conducted in Indonesia, my home country, were in Bahasa Indonesia. The 
internet interview with a former IGO’s official working for DGT living outside 
Indonesia was conducted in English, even though this respondent was included in the 
Indonesian sample group in the previous tables. When direct quotations from interviews 
conducted in Bahasa are given in this thesis, they are translated into English. 
In Australia all interviews were conducted in English. As English is not my first 
language, taping interviews and later transcribing them was particularly important for 
understanding the content of the Australian interviews. It is openly acknowledged that 
at times the meaning of phrases lost some of their nuance due to my non-native ears. On 
the positive side, I and those I interviewed talked in the same ‘taxation language’. No 
taxation concepts were raised that were problematic for me or my interviewees. 
I transcribed taped interviews and translated of selected quotations from the Indonesian 
interviews into English.  
The semi-structured interview schedule 
Interviewing was intended to capture private reflections and understandings of events. 
Therefore, I chose an in-depth and semi-structured mode of interview to permit 
participants to reconstruct their experiences of the topic discussed and to allow me to 
explore participants’ thoughts, feeling and reasoning (Denscombe 2007, p. 111) without 
worrying about following a strict questionnaire.  
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The interview questions varied from one respondent to another but were based on two 
broad themes: establishing interviewees’ understanding of the HWI policy and seeking 
interviewees’ views and analysis of aspects of it (i.e., its appropriateness, its potentials, 
the positives and the negatives in implementation, supportive and unsupportive 
elements, and challenges and opportunities). Apart from these two broad themes, 
questions were asked to develop rapport with participants, depending on the situation. 
For instance, at the beginning of the conversation I asked how many years they had 
been in the HWI unit (for tax officials) or assisting HWIs (for tax practitioners) when 
dealing with the Tax Office, or I shared my experience as tax official in Indonesia. 
Questions also varied from one participant to another depending on their positions and 
roles, particularly those from the tax officials group of participants. Table 3.4 contains a 
list of questions that I prepared as guidance for interviewing participants. 
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Table 3.4 Questions Used to Guide for Interviews 
Objective 
 
Questions Respondent group 
   
Developing rapport Can you describe your working experience? 
Specifically in relation to the HWI unit or HWI 
taxpayers? 
 
All groups 
   
Information of HWI 
unit 
The background story of the establishment of 
HWI unit 
 
Can you give me a background story that led to 
the idea of the establishment of the HWI unit? 
 
The objective of the HWI unit 
 
1. As far as you understand, what were the 
purposes and priority that the Government 
wanted to achieve through the establishment 
of the HWI unit? 
2. In your view, why did the Government 
choose to prioritise that (based on 
interviewee’s answer no. 1)? 
 
Mechanisms used to achieve its objective 
 
1. Could you explain how the Tax Office 
achieves objectives set for the HWI unit? 
2. Could you show me any specific measures set 
up following the establishment of the HWI 
unit (e.g., information system, laws and 
regulation, or structural changes within the 
Tax Office) to facilitate achievement of the 
objectives? 
 
Actors involved  
 
1. In your opinion, who initiated the idea to 
establish the HWI unit in the Tax Office? 
2. Apart from that initiator or designer of the 
policy (if any), who else was involved in the 
process of setting the HWI unit (it may also 
include actors from outside the Tax Office) 
who gave assistance. 
 
Challenges 
 
1. What challenges does the Tax Office face 
when dealing with HWI taxpayers? 
2. In general what challenges does the Tax 
Office face in dealing with taxpayers? How 
does the Tax Office deal with those 
challenges? 
 
Tax officials group – 
strategic level 
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Objective 
 
Questions Respondent group 
   
Implementation of 
HWI unit 
Actors’ understanding of the policy 
 
1. Based on your understanding, what are the 
objectives of the HWI unit? 
2. Were there any specific efforts made by head-
quarter to share knowledge about the HWI 
unit (e.g., its background, objectives, 
measures used)? * 
3. What in your opinion in terms of supports 
was provided by headquarters to implement 
this unit? * 
 
Tax official group – 
operational level 
 
 
 
* Specifically for 
Indonesian respondents 
   
Perception about 
policy 
Stakeholders’ views on the policy 
 
1. What is your opinion in relation to the 
decision by the Government (Tax Office) to 
establish an HWI unit? 
2. What challenges does the Tax Office face in 
managing tax compliance of taxpayers in 
general and HWI taxpayers in particular? 
3. What in your opinion are the supports that 
were offered and should have been offered in 
relation to the operation of the HWI unit? 
4. How were your experiences when dealing 
with the HWI unit? † 
Participants other than 
tax officials group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† Specifically for HWI 
taxpayers or their 
advisers 
   
As mentioned in section 3.3.1, I also utilised a recording of an interview with senior 
official in the MoF and DGT in relation to bureaucratic reform and tax administration 
reform in Indonesia. 
3.3.3 Data analysis 
Interview material gathered during the research were coded manually (that is, 
classifying themes emerged from data using single descriptive words or short phrases 
(e.g., Saldana 2009)). Manual coding was performed using word-processing software. 
More powerful qualitative coding software such as NVivo or ATLAS.ti was 
unnecessary given that there was little reason to believe that the frequency of codes or 
themes would shed light on the questions being asked. One comment from a well-
positioned and insightful person might prove far more relevant for understanding the 
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fate of the HWI unit in Indonesia than the more common-place answers given by the 
majority of tax officials within DGT. Themes were evaluated in terms of their 
theoretical importance rather than the frequency of occurrence. The materials coded 
included 42 taped interview transcripts, 13 sets of interview notes, one email 
conversation and analytic memos.  
Analysed data that emerged from the above material was triangulated with data from 
other sources to test their consistency. Links were made from commentators and 
policymakers between one theme and another, or as guidance to search for more 
information and gather more material. These other sources included annual reports, 
policy documents, Hansard records of parliamentary inquiries, and newspaper and 
magazine articles. 
Following Liamputtong and Ezzy’s (2005) recommendation, I began the manual coding 
procedure by formatting pages of data into three columns (see also Saldana 2009, p. 17). 
The first column contained the data from the interview transcripts, field notes, or 
documentation. The second column contained preliminary coding notes and jottings. 
The third column contained the lists of the final codes. Once codes were derived for the 
data, I analysed the qualitative data using the codes to identify key events, points of 
agreement and conflict. 
3.4 Ethics, confidentiality and conflicts of interest 
The Australian National University (ANU) Human Research Ethics Committee gave 
ethical approval for this research. It is important to note that this research did not 
involve any individual taxpayer data. Rather, it was aimed at understanding the 
collective learning of the HWI tax officers who have worked with HWI cases, and with 
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insights from stakeholders about policy and governance arrangements, not individual 
taxpayer cases. Interviews proceeded only after voluntary informed consent was 
obtained, either verbally when I explained the nature of the research and their rights to 
potential participants or, in only 3 cases, provided participants with a standard consent 
form.34 
In accordance with my promise to participants to maintain their anonymity, 
participants’ identities (their names or positions in the organisations, and organisations’ 
names other than ATO and DGT) are not disclosed. When direct quotations from 
participants are given in this thesis, a code of RA or RI followed by a three-digit 
number and an identifier of respondent group are used. Code RA is used for respondents 
interviewed in Australia and RI is for respondents interviewed in Indonesia (including 
one respondent who resides elsewhere and was interviewed through email). Although 
efforts were made to disguise the identities of the participants, some insiders might be 
able to identify certain individuals by connecting their quotations with the context of the 
time, position and events. This is most likely with respect to the few interviewees 
holding high-level positions within the MoF and DGT. Every effort was made to 
minimise this possibility through careful presentation of data. 
Ethical issues became pronounced due to my insider-outsider status, which granted me a 
‘more complete acceptance’ (Dwyer & Buckle 2009, p. 58) by my Indonesians 
respondents than might otherwise have been possible. In this respect, respondents were 
more open in expressing their opinions, thoughts, and experiences related to the 
                                                 
34  Participants who chose not to sign the consent form told me that ‘it was just a formality’ and that ‘I 
would not have interviewed them if they did not consent’. 
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problems that arose during the formation of the HWI units in particular and 
Indonesian’s tax administration in general. A similar ethical situation was faced by 
Talbot (1998) in conducting research on the very sensitive topic of mothers who 
experienced the death of an only child: her respondents said that ‘… they would never 
have shared certain aspects of their experience if [she] had not been a bereaved mother 
too’ (p. 172). Some of my DGT respondents too said that they would not have told 
certain stories if I were not a DGT official. Some of the stories they told me were 
labelled ‘off the record’. If interviewees asked me to keep some parts of the 
conversations off the record, I did not use this information in any quotations, although I 
did use the insights to enrich my understanding and to guide me to find any publicly 
available related information. 
Although my insider status in the Indonesian case study conferred advantages in 
recruiting participants, it was potentially an impediment to the data collection. Dwyer 
and Buckle (2009, p. 58) pointed out two possible problems that may occur due to 
insider status. First, participants can provide incomplete explanations of their individual 
experience as they presume the researcher has similar experience, knowledge, or 
thoughts. I occasionally recorded sentences such as ‘I think you understand well what I 
mean’, ‘I guess I don’t need to explain to you in detail about this’, or unfinished 
sentences in interviews both in Indonesia and Australia. Secondly, the researcher’s 
experience can colour her/his perception about the subject under study, resulting in an 
interview that is influenced by the core aspects of the researcher’s experience and not 
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the respondent’s.35 In other words my insider status in Indonesia might bring me to a 
conflict of interest position. 
In order to overcome these methodological challenges, I made efforts to neutralise the 
conflicting duality of my insider-outsider status in the following ways. First, when 
respondents started to pull me into their ‘identity group’ (Kanuha 2000, p. 439), I tried 
to distance myself from the subject under discussion by ‘pushing’ my respondents a 
little bit further to elaborate upon any coded responses that they presumed I had already 
understood or should have known. For instance, instead of providing me with detailed 
information with regard to ‘disharmonised’ relationships between DGT and other 
agencies in relation to data-sharing processes, my Indonesian respondents would prefer 
to say ‘I think you already understand. Coordination [between governmental agencies] 
is a “luxurious commodity” here in Indonesia’. Although I understood what she/he 
meant, instead of giving the informant a signal of confirmation, I would follow the 
comment up with a question, such as ‘Why has coordination between agencies become 
a luxurious commodity?’ or ‘Could you give me examples about this to elaborate more 
about what you mean?’ By doing this, I not only distanced myself from situations with 
which I was familiar, but I was also able to pursue deeper insights from the respondents 
and put to one side any preconceptions I may have had. 
Second, in order to maintain my impartiality and objectivity in this research, 
particularly with regard to the Indonesian case study and my status as a member of the 
organisation under study, I made special efforts during the research to be aware of my 
                                                 
35  Nevertheless, Srinivas (1996), as cited by Aguilar (1981, p. 26), pointed out that bias that might come 
from a researcher’s insider status might very well be a source of insight as well as error. 
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personal judgments or perspectives and avoid incorporating them into this research. 
Giving seminars and talking to others about my research in Australia, where I was based 
for my PhD, helped give me a sense of perspective on where a line was to be drawn 
between my personal views and experiences and the systematic and impartial collection 
of data about the HWI unit. Every effort was made to ensure that the findings of this 
research were ‘a function solely of the informants and conditions of the research and not 
of other biases, motivations, and perspectives’ (Guba 1981 cited in Krefting 1991, 
p. 216). 
Summary 
In examining the implementation stage of a policy transferred from one jurisdiction to 
another, it is important to obtain information not only from documents about the policy 
event but also from stakeholders who were directly or indirectly involved or affected by 
the policy. This enables development of an understanding of what actually happened as 
well as what was expected to happen. The focus of this study, therefore, was on 
Indonesia’s practices in implementing a transferred policy. Because of this focus, the 
interview data from Indonesia was richer and more complete than that from Australia. 
Australian tax officials were generous with their time and information, but other 
Australian stakeholders declined to discuss how Australia’s HWI unit was set up and 
operated. My outsider status with respect to the Australian taxation community (e.g., tax 
advisers, consultants, accountants and taxpayers) might have contributed to this 
situation, given the nature of the topic to be discussed with a foreigner like myself. 
Fortunately, secondary data, particularly from others’ research on the same area and 
publicly available institutional documents, helped cover shortcomings from this side. In 
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contrast, access to interviewees was relatively easy in Indonesia and this compensated 
for shortcomings in government agencies’ documentation. 
In order to gain insight from actors involved in the implementation of HWI units in 
Australia and Indonesia, I conducted 54 interviews involving 56 participants (14 in 
Australia, 42 in Indonesia). Fourteen interviews were conducted in Australia with 
middle- and senior-level officials at the ATO, a representative of an international 
organisation, and an academic. Some of the participants from the ATO had been 
involved in the HWI unit since its inception.  
In Indonesia, 40 interviews were conducted with a greater variety of participants. 
Participants from the tax official group came from the highest level at the DGT (2 
echelon I), the mid-level (6 echelon II and 5 echelon III) and the lowest level (6 section 
heads, echelon IV), included one tax auditor. They represented actors in both strategic 
and operational positions. As the HWI unit in Indonesia was relatively new when the 
study was conducted, all but one participant from the HWI unit were involved in the 
unit since its inception. A participant from an international organisation who assisted 
DGT in setting up the HWI unit participated in the interview through an email 
interview. Interviews were also conducted in Indonesia with stakeholders outside the 
tax office, particularly with those who were directly involved with or affected by the 
works of the HWI unit (e.g., taxpayers, tax practitioners, and taxpayer’s representative). 
To gain insight from those indirectly affected by the HWI unit’s work, I conducted 
interviews with actors who represented academia, the tax ombudsman, and business 
associations about the work of the DGT in general and the HWI unit in particular. 
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The documentation gathered and analysed in this research was publicly available or 
obtained through special request. Sources of documentation included tax authorities, 
other government agencies, NGOs, the mass media, and published research. This 
research does not include any individual taxpayer data. Data from tax authorities (the 
ATO and DGT) appears in aggregated form. In the Indonesian case study, when 
documentation was not publicly available, a special request was submitted. While some 
requests were granted, others were not successful, mainly due to confidentiality 
concerns.  
In the next chapter I discuss the development and implementation of the HWI policy in 
Australia; this includes my analysis of primary and secondary data relating to 
Australia’s HWI Taskforce, with particular focus on answering questions as how the 
policy is practiced in this country. The chapter provides valuable background when 
reflecting on how the HWI unit in Indonesia was set up, and acts as a benchmark for 
evaluating the Indonesian HWI unit’s services. 
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Chapter 4 
The High Wealth Individual Initiative: An 
Australian Approach 
 
 
…let me again pose some questions for you. 
Have you found or heard of any other tax 
administration that has so openly established a 
specific focus and task force in the area of high 
wealth individuals? Have you found any other 
tax administration that has so professionally and 
determinedly pursued those activities in the face 
of sometimes hostile criticism? 
(Michael Carmody, former ATO Commissioner, in 
front of Senate Economics References Committee, 
9 February 2000) 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter depicts how the Australian model of managing the tax compliance of very 
wealthy taxpayers was developed. Australia was an important source of information and 
advice for setting up an HWI unit in Indonesia’s DGT, as described previously. 
Australia also provided rich documentation on developing a policy with sensitivity to 
the context in which the policy is required to work. This chapter illustrates the degree to 
which Australia’s HWI unit was embedded in policy development within the ATO and 
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the process of organisational and administrative change, and was consistently supported 
at the highest level of government. 
The HWI unit in Australia: its beginnings and influence 
Establishing a dedicated unit within a tax administration to monitor the tax compliance 
of very wealthy taxpayers is not a new practice. In 1983 – more than a decade before the 
ATO set up its HWI unit in May 1996 – France’s tax authority had come up with the 
idea of creating a unit within its tax administration that was aimed at strengthening tax 
compliance and enforcement efforts directed towards its HWIs. However, this 
regulatory model did not gain popularity internationally until the 1990s, at which time 
the ATO formed its HWI taskforce and introduced a new approach to monitoring the tax 
compliance of HWIs and their entities (see Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1 Number of countries with HWI units 
Source: OECD (2009a; 2013b) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
143 
 
The approach to tax administration introduced by the ATO in 1996 had never before 
been applied and was considered a ‘regulatory innovation’ (Black, Lodge & Thatcher 
2005; see also Hong & Braithwaite 2011, p. 6). It was innovative in that it used ‘new 
solutions to address old problems’ (Black 2005, p. 4). Tax avoidance and evasion are 
not new problems for tax authorities around the world, but strategies for minimising tax 
have developed in sophistication to the point that tax authorities must find new solutions 
to manage them (Gravelle 2010). The institutional arrangements and compliance 
monitoring approach pioneered by the ATO attracted international interest in the early 
2000s (see Figure 4.1). Even the US tax authority (Internal Revenue Service – IRS) was 
interested in learning from the ATO (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011). 
Like [the] ATO, the IRS is taking a close look at high-income and high-wealth 
individuals and their related entities. In 2009, [the] IRS formed the Global High Wealth 
Industry (GHWI) program to take a holistic approach to high wealth individuals. IRS 
consulted with the ATO to discuss ATO’s approach to the high-wealth population as well 
as its operational best practices. (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011, p. 46, 
my emphasis) 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the increased popularity of the HWI regulatory model among tax 
administrations, particularly since 2008, from two national tax authorities in the 2000s, 
to at least 17 tax administrations with some kind of institutional arrangement that 
focuses on HWIs as a taxpaying group. Undoubtedly the increased population of HWIs 
around the globe, advancements in communication and information technology, and the 
increased degree of freedom of both human and capital movement HWIs have prompted 
increased activity by tax authorities to meet the challenges of collecting tax from this 
group of taxpayers. 
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Transferring a tax policy from other jurisdictions is not as simple as importing a 
machine that will be installed in a plant in another country. A policy does not live in a 
vacuum. It must relate coherently to existing policies to work effectively and sit 
harmoniously within the socio-political environment in which it operates (e.g., Rose 
1993). For successful implementation a policy requires support from other elements, 
which may include policies in other fields, organisational structure, laws and regulation, 
politicians, government, industry and other institutions, and more importantly the 
cultural aspects within which actors and institutions implementing the policy are 
embedded (Hogwood & Gunn 1984).  
A policy is developed in a polity with certain underlying objectives, which may change 
the policy when the objectives are altered. Transferring a policy without considering 
other factors surrounding the policy in its originating setting and without understanding 
its underlying objectives may lead to what Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p. 17) termed 
‘incomplete transfer’; that is, a kind of policy transfer in which ‘crucial elements of 
what made the policy or institutional structure a success in the transferring country may 
not be transferred’ (p. 17). This is likely to lead to policy failure.  
Dolowitz (2000b) provided an example of this kind of policy failure from the 1990s, 
when the Thatcher government introduced the UK’s Child Support Agency (CSA), a 
policy transferred from the American Child Support Enforcement System (CSES).  
The CSA did not work as the UK’s government originally hoped because insufficient 
attention was given to the context into which the policy was to be implemented. Politics 
and ideology played important role in how the CSA policy was implemented in the UK. 
The failure CSA in the UK was in part down to the ideological leanings of the Thatcher 
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government, who framed single parent families as a social scourge that threatened the 
fabric of society. This ideological base had driven policy objective into different 
direction differed from that in it original country.  
The above example gives insights into the issues that are of central importance in 
considering policy transfer in relation to collecting tax from HWIs. Attention needs to 
be given to understanding the policy’s underlying objectives, the measures employed to 
achieve the objectives, and what elements support the policy in its originating setting 
(e.g., institutional arrangements). The HWI Taskforce in Australia is supported by many 
other policies, institutional arrangements, regulation and organisational structures that 
make it possible to operate in such a way that it has been regarded internationally as a 
best practice model of how to improve the tax compliance of HWIs (Senate Economics 
References Committee 2000).  
The HWI Taskforce was not established merely to increase government revenue from 
this taxpayer segment (an objective that, as discussed in Chapter 5, became the 
Indonesian tax system’s primary orientation). Rather, it was formed to improve the 
ATO’s understanding of wealthy taxpayers, identify their tax planning techniques, and 
develop administrative and legislative proposals to address undesirable tax minimisation 
practices (The Auditor General 2000). Of course, achievement of the targeted revenue 
also became part of the set of goals associated with the policy. Increased revenue 
collection was a commitment made by the ATO to justify the government’s investment 
in its special HWI unit.  
Other institutional initiatives that supported the way in which the ATO’s HWI 
Taskforce operated were the ATO compliance model and the Taxpayers’ Charter. The 
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compliance model changed the ATO’s operational practices, not only in relation to 
taxpayers but its staff (Hobson 2003). The Charter, on the other hand, played a role in 
eliciting cooperation and containing resistance once a partnership between the tax 
authority and taxpayer had been established (V. Braithwaite 2005).  
This chapter consists of three parts. The first part elaborates the ATO compliance model 
and the Taxpayers’ Charter which have been used to guide compliance management in 
the ATO since 1997. A fundamental change that the compliance model introduced was, 
first, that the enforcement measures that the ATO applied in securing compliance from 
taxpayers should include a greater variety of strategies. It begins with learning, 
educating, and persuading, and only when these fail, it escalates pressure up a 
regulatory pyramid, first with warnings then sanctions of increasing severity with 
prosecution or some other severe sanction at the top of a ‘regulatory pyramid’ 
(Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001, p. 412). Second, the Model and the Charter took into 
consideration taxpayers’ individual circumstances when dealing with compliance issues. 
Understanding taxpayers’ circumstances gave the ATO the opportunity to use a variety 
of enforcement strategies with the intention of improving future compliance. The 
circumstances influencing compliance were captured by the acronym BISEP, 
representing business, industry, sociological, economic and psychological drivers of 
compliant and non-compliant behaviours.36 
                                                 
36  BISEP represented the idea that for understanding the compliance of an individual or group and for 
acting proportionately based on that understanding, the tax authority and its official needed to understand 
the taxpayer’s individual circumstances (Hobson 2003, p. 154). For details about what is included in each 
category, see Appendix C. In the context of large corporate taxpayers, a sixth factor called S = System of 
compliance is added. 
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With respect to internal relationships among tax officials, the compliance model was ‘a 
new way of talking and communicating’ (Hobson 2003, p. 139). Sharing best practices, 
sharing stories in meetings, and increased discussion among staff about cases they 
found in the field were examples of improved inter-staff communication after the 
introduction of the model (Job & Honaker 2003, p. 117). By improving staff 
communication, the compliance model improved inter-staff relationships. Good inter-
staff relationships are a crucial element when an organisation introduces a new policy, 
such as the HWI initiative in Indonesia, partly because good inter-staff relationships 
will facilitate the flow of policy knowledge and feedback on policy implementation 
(Cawsey 2012). 
The second part of this chapter describes a regulatory initiative to manage tax 
compliance of the wealthy taxpayers group in Australia, the HWI Taskforce. I discuss 
the historical background for the establishment of the Taskforce to expose the basic 
reasoning behind its introduction and to demonstrate the kinds of support underpinning 
its development. Understanding the social and political situation before and during the 
formation of the Taskforce gives a sense as why certain principles were embraced to 
determine Taskforce objectives; the mechanisms employed to achieve those objectives; 
and the relationships that were built among actors who were involved with or were 
affected by the policy. These are discussed in the third part of this chapter, along with a 
discussion about how the ATO compliance model and the Taxpayers’ Charter were 
embedded in the HWI Taskforce operation, providing a cultural base from which the 
HWI initiative grew, guided by principles, and actioned through mechanisms supported 
by powerful actors. 
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4.1 The introduction of the ATO compliance model and the 
Taxpayers’ Charter37  
The introduction of a responsive regulatory enforcement approach in the ATO occurred 
during the 1990s at a time when the organisation was facing constant media and public 
scrutiny due to perceptions that it had excessive power and used it unfairly (Gumley & 
Wyatt 1996; Job & Honaker 2003). There were claims that the ATO was ‘out of touch’  
and ‘lacked understanding’ of ‘commercial reality’ ('The critics' 1997, p. 193) and that 
poor use of penalties ‘threatened the integrity of the tax system’ (Chamberlin 1996). 
Such criticism brought demands for change, not only from the community but from the 
national government.  
Facing media and public scrutiny, along with political demands for greater 
accountability, the ATO adopted several measures intended to make it more 
accountable, open and responsive to taxpayers (Murphy 2004a). Under the influence of 
the New Public Management perspective (Hood 1991), nomenclature changed, as did 
the priority given to on-going cooperative relationships. All branches of public 
administration were required to change their thinking in relation to the community: 
They became ‘clients’ and ‘customers’, a way of thinking that challenged traditional 
conceptions of the ‘forever reluctant’ taxpayer.   
                                                 
37 A detailed discussion about the ATO compliance model and the Taxpayers’ Charter in this section is to 
provide a description that ATO’s effort in managing tax compliance of HWI taxpayers was not a sole 
initiative. It was supported by other initiatives including–perhaps more importantly–the way the ATO and 
its staff treated taxpayers. This integral part of managing tax compliance, as we will see later, was not 
taken into consideration in the Indonesian context when it adopted the HWI policy. Actors sent to learn 
from the HWI unit in Australia were not aware of the existence of other supporting elements such as the 
ATO compliance model that implements a responsive regulatory approach to taxpayers and uses the 
Taxpayers’ Charter. In the thesis limitations, I acknowledge that the interviews about the effectiveness of 
the Charter and compliance model were restricted to the ATO preventing a more critical analysis. This 
was, however, tangential to the purpose of this thesis. 
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The introduction of the Taxpayers’ Charter was one of the measures that the ATO 
adopted in response to these developments. Formally launched in July 1997, the 
Charter was designed to improve the relationship between the taxpaying community 
and the ATO and to help reinforce the community’s confidence in the ATO’s operations 
(ATO 1998b). More importantly, the introduction of the Taxpayers’ Charter indicated 
an initial step away from the long-established style of command-and-control 
enforcement toward a more progressive style, represented ultimately through the 
adoption of a responsive regulatory enforcement model (Hobson 2004; Job & Honaker 
2003; Murphy 2004a; Shover et al. 2003).  
The responsive regulatory enforcement model was the ATO’s compliance model. In 
Australia the responsive regulatory model has been applied by numerous regulatory 
agencies both at the federal and states levels (Wood et al. 2010). The ATO is one of the 
regulatory agencies that adopted the idea of ‘responsive regulation’ in its compliance 
activities. The idea of responsive regulation and the ATO compliance model was first 
introduced in the Cash Economy Task Force report (Cash Economy Task Force 1998). 
The model was introduced ‘to complement principles underlying the Taxpayers’ 
Charter’ (ATO 1998a) and ‘to bring the Taxpayers’ Charter into life’ (RA009, 
academic). The model required the ATO ‘to foster a more cooperative and participative 
regulatory regime and to become more open [or transparent] and accountable in its 
enforcement activities’ (Cash Economy Task Force 1998, n.p.). Transparency and 
accountability in enforcement by regulatory agencies has long been an issue in other 
countries and in other regulatory arenas. 
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The ATO Commissioner at that time, Michael Carmody, in his comments on the 
introduction of the model, stated that the model was based on two premises (ATO 
1998a): 
One is that the ‘one size fits all’ solutions are no longer appropriate. Different approaches 
are required to support and acknowledge those trying to do the right thing, while targeting 
our toughest approaches to the hardened evaders. Secondly we will work closely with 
different industries to develop joint approaches to improving compliance and providing a 
level playing field for legitimate business. 
The ATO’s approach to compliance was therefore twofold (Wood et al. 2010, pp. 13–
14). First, it sought to maximise the number of taxpayers who chose to comply 
voluntarily. In order to achieve this goal the ATO had to help taxpayers to meet their tax 
obligations and understand their rights and entitlements as easily as possible. Second, 
the model aimed to deter, detect and address any non-compliance practices, with the 
emphasis on understanding the reasons behind non-compliance in different industry 
groups, and developing appropriate and proportionate responses to non-compliant 
individuals and entities on the basis of this understanding. 
 
Figure 4.2 ATO Compliance Model 
Source: Cash Economy Task Force (1998, p. 58) 
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Figure 4.2 presents the ATO compliance model in diagrammatic form. As illustrated in 
Figure 4.2, the model also incorporates external factors that might play a role in 
influencing a taxpayer’s compliant and non-compliant behaviour. The factors are 
grouped into the five BISEP categories. A better understanding of the various external 
factors and how they influence taxpayer behaviour was intended to assist the ATO to 
develop ways to encourage the motivation to do the right thing and, at the same time, to 
limit the motivation to be non-compliant (Cash Economy Task Force 1998, p. 23). 
The ATO compliance model incorporates the concept of motivational postures to 
remind tax officials of this positioning and the importance of cultivating the most 
positive social relationship they can build with taxpayers (Braithwaite 1995; 
Braithwaite et al. 1994). Posturing to authority is pictured on the left side of the pyramid 
in Figure 4.2. Motivational postures reflect how people orient themselves to engage 
with the regulatory system (Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001, p. 410). Taxpayers use 
postures to signal the social distance they wish to maintain between themselves and 
authority. Social distance reflects the degree of liking and willingness to defer to 
authority. Postures determine the influence processes that are likely to be required to 
change non-compliant practices (Braithwaite 2009, p. 89). The four motivational 
postures arranged on the left side of the pyramid from bottom to top reflect openness to 
influence by the Tax Office, namely: the postures of accommodation and capture, 
compliant postures that are receptive to education and supervisory interventions to 
improve their compliance; the posture of resistance, a confrontational stance to the tax 
system as well as to tax officers, but which is open to debate and persuasion over 
compliance, perhaps closer scrutiny as long as this occurs respectfully; and the posture 
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of disengagement, the most socially distant posture (both dislike for taxation and refusal 
to defer to the tax office) and which requires more coercive measures to elicit 
compliance. 
The elements shown on the centre face and on the right side of the pyramid in Figure 
4.2 group the enforcement and regulatory strategies the ATO intended to use to elicit 
compliance among those operating in the cash economy. Enforcement strategies 
featured in the centre panel of the pyramid represented incremental enforcement actions 
to signal to the taxpayer that the ATO would escalate enforcement if the taxpayer was 
not prepared to adopt a cooperative posture (Braithwaite 2009, p. 88). There are two 
basic premises of this enforcement strategy: first, it is assumed that most of the taxpayer 
population is located at the base of the pyramid. In the case of Australia and some 
developed countries like the US or the UK, evidence shows that this assumption is 
accurate (J. Braithwaite 2003a, p. 179). However, this has been called into question by 
the research of Elea Wurth (2012). Second, the ATO has capacity and readiness to 
follow through on non-compliance (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; V. Braithwaite 2003a, 
p.5). Given these assumptions, the broadest coverage of enforcement strategies is aimed 
at encouraging voluntary compliance through approaches like education and convenient 
and efficient service delivery which helps taxpayers meet their obligations with least 
effort and cost. The approach of the ATO to non-compliance is more targeted, moving 
to a higher level of enforcement activity with those taxpayers who fail to comply in 
response to broader appeals for public cooperation. Strategies of visiting businesses and 
checking records increase the level of intrusiveness and oversight. For those who still 
do not comply, follow-up enforcement action will be more intrusive with audits, for 
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example. These measures, if unsuccessful, can be followed up with highly intrusive 
measures such as prosecution (Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001). 
On the right side of the pyramid are broader categories of regulatory responsiveness, the 
progression from bottom to top reflecting increasing levels of regulatory intrusiveness. 
At the base of the pyramid, the approach of the ATO is self-regulatory. In other words, 
taxpayers are informed and given responsibility to manage their tax compliance 
voluntarily. Under self-regulation, they are trusted to do so. The tax authority’s role at 
this level is providing taxpayers with the means of ‘doing the right thing’ with ease 
(e.g., education, accessible information, choices, service deliveries). Self-regulation 
relies on and generates cooperative relationships in the taxpayer community. Going up 
the pyramid, the style of engagement becomes more punitive and command-and-
control, with less opportunity for tax officers to use discretion in how they deal with 
non-compliance. Although coercion is present as an option in Figure 4.2, threats of 
severe sanction are kept in the background in compliance model thinking. The existence 
of these punitive sanctions and taxpayers’ knowledge about the capacity of the ATO to 
get as tough as needed are known in the population and if left in the background, will 
encourage more voluntary regulation (Cash Economy Task Force 1998, p. 25). When a 
command regulatory style has been used and elicited compliance, there is no reason for 
not placing trust in the taxpayer to comply voluntarily. Taxpayers should be allowed to 
self-regulate or operate under an enforced self-regulatory model (with some checks in 
place to make non-compliance readily detectable). Under the ATO compliance model, 
taxpayers should not be stigmatised as perpetual tax offenders. 
Whatever regulatory strategy and enforcement action is chosen, the model emphasises 
the importance of abiding at all times by the principles of procedural justice which were 
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embodied in the Taxpayers’ Charter (Braithwaite 2009, p. 88), as pictured on the outer 
right side of the regulatory pyramid. Regulatory enforcement strategies are aimed at 
enforcing the law through processes that abide by the principles of the Charter.  
In short, the ATO compliance model offers a full range of enforcement strategies and 
regulatory actions that the ATO and its officials might choose when dealing with 
taxpayers. Choice is determined by the particular circumstances of the individual or 
entity as revealed by the BISEP and by taxpayer willingness to comply. Treating 
taxpayers in accordance with their individual circumstances is in accord with the 
Taxpayers’ Charter. Taxpayers should be trusted to do the right thing, be treated with 
respect, be informed about the Tax Office’s concerns and analysis, and have the 
opportunity to present their case with a fair and reasonable hearing. These principles of 
engagement with taxpayers are integrated into the compliance model and the 
Taxpayers’ Charter. 
The introduction of the ATO compliance model brought about a paradigm shift in the 
ATO. Understanding taxpayers (Cash Economy Task Force 1998); making compliance 
easier, cheaper, and more personalised (ATO 2013c); tailoring interventions in response 
to circumstances (Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001); and listening to taxpayers before 
they contest decisions meant that taxation administration had to shift from being 
isolated from the community with a command-and-control style of operation to being 
far more dialogic about objectives and principles, how they would be achieved and how 
coherent the overall compliance strategy was within the ATO. 
After being introduced in 1998 for the cash economy and small and medium business 
enterprises (SMEs), the ATO compliance model was extended and applied to individual 
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taxpayers, large business and to the HWI Taskforce. Before discussion turns to how the 
taskforce applied the compliance model to its daily operation, the next section describes 
the background to the establishment of the HWI Taskforce initially as a special unit in 
the ATO. 
4.2 High wealth individual taskforce: background and role overview 
This section describes the political background of the establishment of the HWI 
Taskforce and its current development. 
4.2.1 Historical background and political setting 
It has long been a common public belief that along with big corporations, very wealthy 
individuals do not pay their fair share of taxes. In the US for instance, Hochschild 
(1981) concluded that ‘almost everyone, rich and poor, is incensed that the very wealthy 
do not pay their fair share of taxes’ (p. 280). Hochschild’s conclusion remains current. 
Bartels (2005) found that the majority of his respondents believed that the very rich 
were asked to pay less than they should (see also McClosky & Zaller 1984 for another 
study in the US). In Australia the public has also become sensitised to the issue of HWIs 
not paying their fair share of tax (J. Braithwaite 2003b, p. 245). Along with this 
commonly held belief, the Australian public also perceived tax authorities as ‘soft on 
the big end of town while being hard on ordinary taxpayers’ (Senate Economics 
References Committee 2000, p. 5). In a nation-wide survey, Braithwaite et al. (2001) 
found that Australians perceived the Tax Office as being more willing to use its power 
in relation to making small business and wage and salary earners pay their tax than in 
making large companies and HWIs pay theirs (Braithwaite et al. 2001, p. 7). 
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The perception of unfairness is connected with the view that it is easier to collect tax 
from individuals and small businesses in some respects. Dealing with wealthy taxpayers 
is more challenging because they have complex business and financial structures. Tax 
officials do not always find it easy to understand the structures through which HWI 
taxpayers arrange their tax affairs, and even when they do understand them, they can be 
unsure about their legitimacy. Complexity of tax and business affairs does not 
necessarily mean tax evasion or avoidance occurs. Tax officials need to be confident in 
their judgements. Very wealthy taxpayers have access to the brightest financial advisers 
as well as ‘tax engineers’ who provide them with tax minimisation techniques that are 
more sophisticated than those tax officials usually encounter.38 
During 1995-96, the ATO raised concerns about some wealthy individuals’ income tax 
behaviour. An ATO study of the accumulation of wealth by certain individuals and the 
taxes they paid revealed that some HWIs sampled in the analysis were ‘employing 
strategies which allowed them to accumulate wealth, enjoy a lavish lifestyle, but pay 
little or no tax’ (Joint Committee of Public Account and Audit 2001, p. 74). 
Furthermore, in its advice to Treasurer Ralph Willis, the ATO’s analysis revealed that: 
…in the 1993 financial year, 80 individuals each with a net worth of over $30 million had 
returned taxable income of $20,000 or less … The tax minimisation techniques employed 
by these individuals involved the use of trusts. (Joint Committee of Public Account and 
Audit 2001, p. 74)  
                                                 
38  See John Braithwaite’s (2005) book Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue for a study of how aggressive 
tax planning has been marketed in the U.S. and Australia in which tax advisers, financial planners, 
accountants and lawyers play a significant role in the industry; and more importantly the study found that 
aggressive tax planning is not only driven by supply, but also there is a demand side induced by 
competition. 
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Another study conducted by the ATO in mid-1990 identified certain tax planning 
arrangements used by some wealthy individuals to avoid tax. These included such 
practices as:  
 redefining income as capital by the use of multiple trust structures to conceal a 
common controlling mind; 
 creating artificial losses (revenue as well as capital) to neutralise otherwise taxable 
profits, particularly through the use of related party transactions and acquiring 
companies or trusts with accumulated losses;  
 disguising distributions to HWIs and family members as loans and other benefits 
which were claimed to be non-taxable;  
 using offshore trusts to hold significant funds;  
 using charitable trusts and overseas organisations to disguise benefits to HWIs and 
family members; and  
 converting activities undertaken for private pleasure into tax losses (e.g., pleasure 
craft, horse breeding and racing) (Joint Committee of Public Account and Audit 
2001, pp. 74–75; see also J. Braithwaite 2003b, p. 245).  
This, however, is not to deny that trusts provide an appropriate structure to meet a range 
of legitimate needs of charities, educational and non-profit organisations, families, 
solicitors and other professionals (Joint Committee of Public Account and Audit 2001, 
p. 75). 
John Braithwaite has suggested that it was this kind of evidence that caused the Keating 
government (Labor party) to use high wealth taxpayers as an election issue in 1995 
(J. Braithwaite 2003b, p. 245). In the election campaign, Prime Minister Keating 
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detailed Labor’s funding plans for its election promises, revealing a plan to crack down 
on massive tax avoidance amongst some of Australia’s wealthiest people (Farnsworth 
1995). 
Eighty individuals, each with a net worth of over $30 million, [had returned] taxable 
incomes of $20,000 or less. And not only that, because of that, they'd avail themselves of 
the Medicare exemption, of low income rebates and generally ran a policy of exploiting, 
wilfully, the tax system. (Paul Keating, former Prime Minister, cited in McDonell 1996) 
In a press conference, Prime Minister Keating (accompanied by the Treasurer, Ralph 
Willis) showed a diagram labelled ‘High Rollers’ Trust Web’, claiming that they would 
raise $800 million a year by attacking a tax rort that was claimed as the biggest since 
‘the bottom of the harbour’ scheme of the early 1980s (Farnsworth 1995).39  
The figure of $800 million revenue was controversial and became a subject of heated 
debate (Parliament of Australia 2000). The debate continued and widened in the 
opposition it attracted as illustrated by the following exchange from ABC radio’s 
Background Briefing program ‘Hunting Down The Rich 100’ (30 June 1996) 
(McDonell 1996 see box below). 
  
                                                 
39  The “bottom of the harbour” term was used to refer to complicated methods used for avoiding 
company tax that were very popular in Australia in the 1970s and 1980s. The methods involved either 
stripping a company of its assets before tax became payable, or using another company as the entity upon 
which tax became liable while maintaining that the latter company never had sufficient assets to pay the 
tax owed. The methods were labelled ‘bottom of the harbour’ schemes since the records of the stripped 
companies were, metaphorically, sent to the bottom of Sydney Harbour after they had served their 
purpose (Popple 1989, p. 259). For a more thorough discussion about tax schemes popular in Australia in 
the 1970s and 1980s, see Trevor Boucher’s book Blatant, Artificial and Contrived: Tax schemes of the 
70s and 80s (Boucher 2010). 
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Box 4.1 Dialogue ABC reporter with a tax barrister 
Source: McDonell (1996). 
 
The Labor Party lost government in the 1996 election and the Coalition (the Liberal and 
National parties) came to office in a landslide victory. Interestingly, the issue was used 
by the newly elected Howard government to set up an institutional arrangement within 
the ATO to find an effective management strategy to enhance compliance for HWI 
taxpayers. The incoming government claimed that it was their promise to develop an 
HWI regulatory initiative to improve tax compliance of the wealthy, even though they 
had opposed Keating’s idea (Costello 1996). 
Although never explicitly expressed, one of the reasons for the establishment of the 
HWI unit was to repair the budget, which at that time had an underlying deficit of $10.3 
billion (1995-96 budget year). The estimated underlying deficit for the year 1996-97, 
when the HWI Taskforce was set up, was $5.6 billion. For the year 1998-99, the 
Stephen McDonell (Reporter): The tax lawyers have struck back hard, attacking the 
credibility of the High Wealth Project, the Tax Commissioner, the former Treasurer 
and the supposed figure of $800 million in avoided tax. 
Norman Rosenbaum (Tax Barrister): If that $800 million is not there at the end of 
the day and this is just a myth, those people responsible for this myth have to be made 
accountable. 
Stephen McDonell: When you speak of those responsible, I suppose you mean the Tax 
Commissioner, the Treasurer, who? 
Norman Rosenbaum: I would be going back to Treasurer Willis, the then Treasurer 
Ralph Willis, who at the time made the announcement. 
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projected underlying deficit was $7.2 billion (Commonwealth of Australia 1996). In his 
Budget Speech, Treasurer Peter Costello offered measures for repairing the budget 
which could be achieved through expenditure savings, ‘with a contribution from 
reduced tax expenditures and measures to curb tax avoidance’ (Costello 1996, p. 2). 
Establishing the HWI unit was a policy implemented by government that was publicly 
committed to addressing a ‘fiscal crisis’ – a reason that is commonly given when a new 
tax-related policy is introduced (e.g., Sharman 2010). 
The new Coalition government allocated substantial funds for the establishment of the 
HWI Taskforce, as mentioned in the Treasurer’s Budget Speech 1996-97: 
In keeping with our stated position during the election campaign, I announce tonight a 
major effort to improve tax compliance.  
The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) will be provided with additional funds in 1996-97 
and 1997-98 to establish a special high level task force to improve the compliance of high 
wealth individuals with our income tax laws.40 
Enhanced investigation activity and analysis will allow a greater understanding of the 
complex arrangements used by some high wealth individuals to minimise tax, and to 
progressively develop administrative and legislative proposals to deal with these 
arrangements and others that may be put in place in the future. (Costello 1996, p. 7, my 
emphasis) 
In May 1996, the Government allocated additional funds of $19.2 million (Table 4.1) 
over two years for the establishment of the HWI Taskforce as ‘the implementation of 
election commitments’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1996, p. 3).  
                                                 
40  ATO defines HWI as ‘an Australian resident who, together with associates, effectively controls $30 
million or more in net wealth’ (Australian Taxation Office 2008, p. 4)  
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In the 1998-99 Budget, the Government extended funding for the taskforce for a further 
two years (Table 4.1) until 2000-01. Between the budget year of 2001-02 and 2005-06 
the ATO did not receive ‘specific purpose funding’ from the government.  
Table 4.1 Funds Allocated by the Government to the HWI Taskforce and the 
Growth of HWIs 
 
Budget Year 
 
 
1996-
1997 
 
 
1997-
1998 
 
 
1998-
1999 
 
 
1999-
2000 
 
 
2006-
2007 
 
 
2007-
2008 
 
 
2008-
2009 
 
 
2009-
2010 
 
 
Funding (million A$) 
 
9.7 
 
9.5 
 
9.5 
 
9.5 
 
12.7 
 
18.3 
 
23.6 
 
27.0 
 
HWI Population 
(individual) 
 
180 256 333 491 1140 1342 1669 2644 
Source: Budget Paper No. 2 year 1996/97, 1998/99 for budget data and McAlister (2010) for HWI 
population data. 
As the HWI population had grown almost fivefold in the intervening years, the 
Government provided additional funding of $81.6 million to the taskforce in the 2006-
07 Federal Budget, which was to cover the next four-year period until 2009-10. At this 
time, the HWI Taskforce was moved into the SME business line41 as there was 
considerable commonality in taxpayers’ profiles and tax risks between certain HWIs 
and closely held private SME groups (Inspector-General of Taxation 2011, p. 10). 
Initially, the HWI Taskforce had been managed within the ATO’s Large Business and 
International (LBI) business line.  
The continuing financial support provided by the Federal Government over eight years 
implies two conditions that underpinned the operation of the taskforce. First, it 
                                                 
41  The ATO’s operations are managed through three groups: compliance; people, system and services; 
and law design and practice (Australian Taxation Office 2014). Each group is divided further into 
business and service lines (BSLs) or business lines. According to new ATO organisational structure, for 
instance, the former ‘HWI Taskforce’ is now called ‘private groups and high wealth individuals’ business 
line and is under the compliance group (Australian Taxation Office 2014). 
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demonstrates commitment from the Government of the day to ensure that the taskforce 
had a secure and important role within the ATO, to protect the integrity of the tax 
system, and at the same time to enhance the confidence of the Australian taxpaying 
community that the ATO’s compliance activities were directed at the wealthy as well as 
ordinary taxpayers. Second, given that the budget had to be approved by the Parliament, 
funding for the taskforce was further legitimated by political support. These two 
elements, the support of the Government and Parliament, were important for the 
taskforce’s prospects of success, considering the taskforce would be dealing with some 
of Australia’s wealthiest and most powerful taxpayers with high public profiles. 
The story outlined above shows that, in the Australian context, there was substantial 
political support for the HWI policy from both the left and right of the Federal 
Parliament. Such support legitimated the program in the eyes of the public and provided 
the program with secure funding. At the same time, the politicised beginning of the 
taskforce became a source of resentment among some segments of the population. The 
figure of $800 million a year of unpaid taxes became ‘a frequently cited focus of 
resentments’ (J. Braithwaite 2003b, p. 251). Furthermore, according to Braithwaite, this 
led to a situation in which the Commissioner of Taxation at times was seen as ‘a co-
conspirator with the government in whipping up a ‘witch-hunt’ against HWIs’ (p. 251). 
In short, there were a number of reasons that led to the decision to establish an HWI 
unit in Australia in the mid-1990s. First, the ATO had to deal with public perceptions 
that HWIs did not pay their fair share of tax and that the ATO was being hard on 
general taxpayers while soft on the very wealthy. Second, HWIs used special tax 
arrangements to create and preserve their income and wealth that required a new 
administrative approach within the ATO to make sure that a well-informed, highly 
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skilled workforce could manage compliance effectively. Third, considerable tax revenue 
was at risk due to the higher likelihood of non-compliant behaviour among the HWIs, 
revenue which was required by a government dealing with a (perceived) budget crisis.  
4.2.2 The HWI Taskforce’s objectives and processes 
The establishment of the HWI Taskforce followed an ATO study42 of better ways of 
managing compliance when dealing with HWIs and the complexity of HWIs’ business 
and tax arrangements. The HWI Taskforce had several objectives, which included 
(McAlister 2010; Parliament of Australia 2000; Senate Economics References 
Committee 2000):  
 improving Tax Office understanding of HWI taxpayers and their group;  
 identifying tax planning and minimisation practices employed by HWIs;  
 improving voluntary compliance from that particular taxpayer segment;  
 contributing to legislative amendments, particularly laws that removed tax 
minimisation opportunities; and  
 building community confidence in the tax system by sending a message to the 
community that HWIs are seen to be complying with the tax system.  
These objectives were formally and publicly disclosed. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the Taskforce applied a ‘holistic approach’ (ATO 
2008, p.8) to managing the tax compliance of the HWIs, that is, an approach that was 
based on understanding the entire business and financial affairs of groups effectively 
                                                 
42  The study was called Health of the System Assessment (HOTSA) (The Auditor General 2000, p. 17). 
HOTSA were required for all internal budget programs including the HWI program. 
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controlled (as opposed to legally owned) by the HWI. This means that the ATO brought 
all associated entities, both business and private, in which the HWI had a key decision-
making role, together into the analysis (ATO 2008, p. 8; Inspector-General of Taxation 
2011, p. 10), rather than assessing an HWI’s personal return and the returns of the 
various entities under their control as separate returns.  
Moreover, the Taskforce compiled a tax history of the individual and their group, 
together with information on business structures, financial and offshore arrangements, 
family connections, and details of specific transactions. Understanding taxpayer’s 
individual circumstances and taking appropriate regulatory actions based on that 
understanding are important elements of the responsive regulatory style adopted in the 
ATO compliance model.  
The holistic approach provided the ATO with a more thorough understanding of HWIs’ 
compliance issues. Recognising the benefits of the approach, the ATO then applied it in 
other compliance programs such as that for ‘wealthy Australians’, those occupying the 
band of wealth below HWI (RA004, tax official).43  
Australia’s initiative, by monitoring HWIs and their related entities holistically, has 
been acknowledged by the OECD as an advantageous approach (OECD 2009, p. 60) for 
managing compliance of this particular segment of taxpayers due to the complexity of 
their business affairs. Some tax authorities have followed the ATO in implementing the 
approach, for instance the Inland Revenue (New Zealand) in 2003, the SARS (South 
                                                 
43  ‘Wealthy Australians’ are defined as ‘those effectively controlling net wealth between $5 million and 
$30 million (Australian Taxation Office 2010b, p. 62). 
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Africa) in 2006, and the IRS (the United States) in 2009. Douglas Shulman (2009), the 
Commissioner of the IRS, acknowledged the adoption of the approach by saying: 
We’ve looked at what other countries have done … So here’s our game plan. Going 
forward, we will take a unified look at the entire web of business entities controlled by a 
high wealth individual…. Our goal is to better understand the entire economic picture of 
the enterprise controlled by the wealthy individual and to assess the tax compliance of 
that overall enterprise. We cannot do this by continuing to approach each tax return in the 
enterprise as a single and separate entity. We must understand and analyze the entire 
picture. (Emphasises added)  
The strategic reasoning behind monitoring HWIs is because they play a strategic role 
for all entities under their control in decision-making processes. They are the ‘strategic 
foci of decision-making’ (J. Braithwaite 2003b, p. 268). Identifying this feature of the 
HWI environment, recognising the poor fit between how HWIs operate and how the 
ATO operated with HWIs’ entities falling in separate administrative lines, and finding a 
better way of adapting to the HWI environment, is an example of how a regulatory 
agency can show flexibility to utilise limited resources more efficiently (J. Braithwaite 
2003b, p. 268). 
In order to understand the ‘bigger picture’ of an HWI’s business structures and its tax 
affairs, the ATO needs to gather information. Useful data may already be available in 
the internal system (e.g., tax returns, tax payments), and from other external sources 
such as states’ land titles offices, the property sales database, the Australian Securities 
Exchange and commercial share registry, annual investment income reports from 
investment institutions, and other federal, and state or territory agencies, including the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). Information from 
both internal and external sources provide the ATO with a base for profiling and risk-
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assessing taxpayers and their related entities, as one respondent from an international 
organisation suggested:  
You can’t address the risk [from this particular taxpayer] if you don’t have the 
knowledge; if you have no basis of assessing their potential; if you have no idea of how 
their affairs are structured…you have no basis for addressing [the] risk they represent. 
(RA014, international organisation)  
To effectively analyse the information obtained in relation to HWIs, the taskforce has 
developed a system, known as the HWI system, which allows them to retrieve 
information, collate and integrate data, and map the relationship between groups of 
individuals, entities and transactions. Through this system the HWI Taskforce is able to 
determine the ownership of linked business and private entities, that is, who effectively 
controls the group, and to estimate the value of taxpayers' wealth based on that map 
(ATO 2008, p. 4). 
These operations of the taskforce are an important example of organisational flexibility 
in responding to external demands and show considerable capacity to build networks 
across government departments, different levels of government and across both public 
and private institutions to gain the intelligence and knowledge needed to regulate the 
HWI sector. 
4.2.3 The performance of the HWI program  
When the HWI Taskforce was established in 1996, some believed that the newly elected 
government was primarily driven to collect revenue to reduce the budget deficit, as 
illustrated from an ABC radio interview: ‘…on the other hand the Government's 
obviously looking for revenue’ (John Passant, academic, cited in McDonell 1996). 
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Evidence for the truth of this belief can be seen in the Treasurer’s Budget Speech before 
the Parliament (Costello 1996, pp. 1–2, emphasises added): 
Our predecessors had Australia on a path of deficit and debt to the next century. 
Our Government could not stand back and ignore the problem. Although we did not 
create it, we will take the responsibility to fix it. 
Mr Speaker, you don’t turn around a nation’s finances, a nation’s future without making 
some hard decisions. But if we avoid the hard decisions now they are only going to get 
harder in the future. 
The tightening measures have to be fairly shared. We cannot expect those who rely on 
pensions and allowances – low income earners – to bear the cost. So we are asking high 
income earners to make a contribution and business to make its contribution too. 
During the course of this research, however, it emerged in this way that revenue was not 
the only narrative within the ATO around the HWI Taskforce.44 This is not to say that in 
Australia revenue derived from the HWI unit was not important, as a parliamentary 
hearing involving the taskforce’s highest-ranking officials showed (Parliament of 
Australia 2000). Revenue collection from the HWI program is at the core of the 
accountability of the policy to the parliament. 
The HWI Taskforce’s performance can be categorised into four types: compliance 
work, risk assessment, revenue collection, and administrative and legislative responses 
(Senate Economics References Committee 2000, p. 59). 
                                                 
44  This is different from Indonesia where the achievement of targeted revenue is the main aim of the 
HWI initiative in particular and the tax system more generally – see Chapter 5. 
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Compliance work 
Conducting compliance activities refers to the effort that the tax authority (including the 
HWI Taskforce) makes in order to understand and influence taxpayer behaviour through 
education, persuasion, and sanctioning. The taskforce’s compliance activities includes: 
identifying new HWIs, ongoing monitoring and reviewing risk assessment of identified 
HWIs, requesting additional information, escalating higher risk cases to review or audit, 
and prosecuting cases of serious non-compliance (ATO 2012a, p. 54). Table 4.2 
presents a summary of ATO performance (1996–2012) with regard to the number of 
identified HWIs, compliance activities and revenue collection. Milestones are 
represented in the right hand column. It has been suggested that without proper 
compliance initiatives (including audit and prosecution) an HWI unit risks missing a 
valuable opportunity to increase its understanding of the HWI segment and its revenue 
collection (OECD 2009a, p. 61). 
Risk assessment 
Risk assessment is the activity that the taskforce undertakes to assess whether there are 
risks arising from a taxpayer’s self-assessment of their tax obligation. The HWI 
Taskforce uses three risk review steps which include: the preliminary risk review 
(PRR), comprehensive risk review (CRR), and specific review (SR) (ATO 2008, p. 
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28).45 The ATO uses risk assessment to allocate its limited resources to areas which 
exhibit greatest risk and more importantly to minimise its intrusion into the affairs of 
low-risk taxpayers. See Table 4.2 for a comparison of the numbers of reviews and 
entities per annum. 
Table 4.2 The Australian HWI Taskforce’s Performance (1996-2012) 
Year  
HWIs 
identifie
d 
Reviews/
audits 
 
Cash collected 
(cumulative since 
1996) 
 
 
Milestones/ Events 
1996 180 - Nil HWI Taskforce established 
 
1998 256 87/14 $60.8 million Shift from assessment to audit focus 
 
2000 491 151/27 $198.2 million ANAO conducted performance audit and finds 
HWI Taskforce delivering Government 
outcomes 
 
2002 608 230/28 $512.1 million Cash collections increase 
 
2004 712 194/33 $1.238 billion Cumulative cash collections exceed $1 billion 
 
2006 943 275/38 $1.542 billion ATO receives $81 million over 4 years for 
HWI program 
 
2008 1342 439/27 $2.114 billion ATO receives $89 million over 4 years for 
HWI program 
 
2010 2644 852/31 $2.271 billion Improved data mining system sees doubling of 
HWI population 
 
2012 
(YTD) 
2630 657/93 $2.807 billion HWI Taskforce is merged with the 
mainstream business line under the portfolio 
‘private groups and high wealth individuals’ 
 
Source: the ATO (2012a, p. 55). 
                                                 
45  PRR forms an initial view of risk (or hypothesis) and acts as a filter before it is escalated to a more 
intensive review, which involves requesting information through questionnaires. CRR is used to develop 
a more in-depth understanding from what has been gathered from PRR; this involves requesting taxpayers 
to lodge an ‘expanded tax return’. An expanded tax return is a form of tax return specifically tailored to 
the HWIs segment that includes the schedules for companies, partnerships, and trusts on top of the 
schedule of HWI as individual taxpayers (Australian Taxation Office 2013a). This return provides the 
taskforce with more comprehensive coverage of how HWIs and their entities determine their tax 
liabilities. SR is used to examine one or more specific risks that have been identified (e.g., specific 
transactions) (Australian Taxation Office 2008, pp. 28–31). 
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Revenue 
Revenue is the taskforce’s most visible, high-profile performance indicator, and has 
been subject to scrutiny from its early years of the taskforce’s operation. Since its 
establishment, the taskforce has collected revenue of $2.807 billion (see Table 4.2). 
Direct (or cash) revenue refers to actual cash collection received in one particular year 
as a consequence of the taskforce’s activities. This, as a consequence, does not include 
the net tax payable by HWIs and their associated entities that is paid where there is no 
taskforce action on the individual or entities concerned (The Auditor General 2000, p. 
49). It also does not capture the general deterrence effect of the existence of the 
taskforce – taxes that would have been paid had there not been fear that the HWI 
Taskforce might detect the unpaid taxes. And it does not capture any other voluntary 
compliance effects that the non-punitive compliance work of the taskforce achieves. 
The figures in Table 4.2 are therefore likely to underestimate the value added by the 
taskforce. In terms of the compliance model, if the HWI unit is doing its job well, HWIs 
will judge it to be in their best interest to comply voluntarily because they do not want 
to direct effort to the ATO for review/audit/prosecution activity. The extent to which a 
regulator decreases opportunities for less compliance is an unknowable yet very 
important element in any analysis of regulatory effectiveness.  
The HWI Taskforce attempted to attribute a change in tax compliance behaviour of 
HWIs and their related entities to compliance activities other than those directed at 
them, thus regarded as ‘indirect revenue’ resulting from the taskforce’s work. In its 
report, ANAO (2000) suggested that such an attribution was ‘difficult … and certainly, 
cannot be proven as correct or otherwise’ (p. 50). Indirect revenue outcomes of the 
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taskforce was measured by comparing the growth in net tax paid by HWI and their 
related entities with the growth in net tax paid by a larger population group from which 
they had been extracted (i.e., HWIs from business individuals, HWI-related companies 
from private companies). Based on data of early years of the taskforce operation (1996-
97 and 1997-98) ANAO concluded that ‘since the creation of the taskforce, tax paid by 
HWI-controlled companies has increased by more than that paid by other private 
companies’ and considered that the derived indirect revenue figures claimed by the 
taskforce represented ‘a reasonable estimate of indirect revenue resulting from the 
activities of the taskforce’ (pp. 50-51). The most current data relating to this matter, 
however, are not publicly available. 
Legislative and administrative responses 
The other outcome of the taskforce is the structural reforms it has contributed to the tax 
system. By analysing HWIs’ taxation affairs, the taskforce has been able to identify 
various tax planning techniques or arrangements which seek to exploit loopholes or 
grey areas in the law. Based on such analyses, the HWI Taskforce has provided the 
government and the Ralph Review of Business Taxation (1999) with advice which has 
resulted in initiatives, including legislation, to rein in several tax planning techniques in 
use by HWIs, as stated by Mr Carmody, Tax Commissioner at that time, before the 
Senate Economics Reference Committee hearing on 9 February 2000:  
[T]he intelligence gathered from our operations has contributed significantly to the 
outcomes of the business tax review [Ralph Review of Business Taxation]. It should be 
noted as part of our responses to supporting compliance that it is not just a matter of 
enforcement or not just a matter of service, it is a matter of a wide range of factors 
including identifying and supporting proposals to the government where there are 
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deficiencies in the law. The high wealth individuals project has been an invaluable part of 
that. (Senate Economics References Committee 2000, p. E267).  
Advice provided by the taskforce was then followed up by the government proposing 
changes in legislation through the Parliament:  
We have provided advice to government over a period of time. Government has 
announced changes to law and the Parliament has passed changes to law in respect of 
some of that advice. It has foreshadowed reforms arising out of the Ralph review of 
business tax. Some of those measures have been enacted. I mentioned those loss [sic] 
integrity measures in particular. Others have been foreshadowed by government. (Mr 
Fitzpatrick, cited in Joint Committee of Public Account and Audit 2001, p. 95) 
Tax reform measures introduced by the government that benefited from the work of the 
taskforce included taxing trusts in the same manner as companies, strengthening the 
accrual rules and transfer trust arrangements that apply to foreign trusts, removing the 
scope to create artificial losses and to duplicate losses, and extending fringe benefits tax 
to benefits provided to shareholders and beneficiaries (ATO 2000, p. 19).  
To sum up, the institutional arrangement introduced by the ATO in the form of the HWI 
Taskforce to manage the tax compliance of HWIs was influential in changing the tax-
paying behaviour of this taxpayer segment. The innovative approach that the taskforce 
employed, by integrating the monitoring of HWI-controlled companies, coordinating 
information-sharing networks, risk-assessing companies and groups, and reviewing 
legislation has generally been regarded as a positive contribution to the increase in tax 
paid by HWIs and their related companies (The Auditor General 2000, p. 51). The 
policy has been recognised as a successful and internationally distinctive risk-leveraging 
strategy (see also J. Braithwaite 2005, p. 85).  
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The evidence for the success of the Australian HWI program presented above is strong. 
The next question is, how do the operations of the HWI Taskforce connect with the 
more fundamental structural and cultural changes that took place with the introduction 
of the compliance model and Taxpayers’ Charter into the ATO? In the next section I 
discuss the implementation of the ATO compliance model in the HWI initiative with 
particular attention to the application of some of the responsive regulation principles in 
the operation of the HWI Taskforce. 
4.2.4 The implementation of the ATO compliance model in the HWI initiative 
After the ATO compliance model was introduced in 1997 in the cash economy sector, it 
was rolled out throughout the ATO’s business lines, with some adjustments according 
to the market in which the model was employed (J. Braithwaite 2003a). The HWI 
Taskforce was established before the model was introduced. Nevertheless, it was 
required, like other business lines and groups, to integrate compliance model thinking 
into its operations. In order to show how the ATO compliance model is a supporting 
element of HWI policy and administration, in this section I discuss practices the 
taskforce adopted from the ATO compliance model’s principles, namely: understanding 
taxpayer behaviour through a holistic approach; building community partnerships 
through taxpayers’ ‘networks of influence’ (Rawlings 2005) in the business sector and 
financial sector; sending clear signals in advance to taxpayers and their advisers through 
the HWI booklet; and building compliance through greater flexibility to encourage and 
support voluntary disclosure initiatives (J. Braithwaite 2003b, p. 269; Cash Economy 
Task Force 1998, p. 26). 
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(1) Understanding taxpayers’ individual circumstances 
Understanding taxpayers’ individual circumstances is an important feature of the 
compliance model, in that it determines the actions the ATO undertakes in response to 
any particular non-compliance stance or risk of non-compliance. The HWI Taskforce 
has adopted the principle of understanding taxpayer behaviour in a sophisticated way (J. 
Braithwaite 2003b, p. 269). The task requires a micro-macro analysis, that is, involving 
compilation of a tax history of the individuals and their group (micro level) while also 
monitoring macro conditions (e.g., a significant lift in commodities exports) and 
examining tax payments to check whether or not they reflected these macro conditions. 
The initial task was challenging. 
Putting them together … putting that picture [of HWIs together] and dealing with the 
very complex [tax] law. That’s probably the biggest challenges. (RA005, tax official) 
The critical thing is you need to understand your population…. (RA006, tax official) 
If you can’t start with some insights on how these taxpayers operate, how they derive 
their income, [and] how their affairs are structured, you don’t have any basis for 
conducting proper investigation of their affairs; whether their comply or not. (RA014, 
international organisation) 
After more than a decade of experience derived from the taskforce’s method, and using 
sophisticated diagnostics, the ATO understands how to map privately owned entities 
and to trace the individuals in control (ATO 2011). 
The ATO can allocate its limited resources to the taxpayers that demonstrated the 
greatest risk of failing to meet their compliance obligations. Taxpayers assessed as low-
risk are given the opportunity to self-regulate themselves so as to minimise the 
intrusiveness of ATO compliance activities. Risk differentiation and tailored 
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compliance actions are only possible through the Tax Office investing time and 
resources in the difficult task of gaining a better and thorough understanding of HWIs 
and their associated entities. 
(2) Building community partnerships 
Partnerships that the ATO built with the community was aimed at improving 
intelligence and developing shared community understanding, an essential element 
underpinning the compliance model (Cash Economy Task Force 1998, p. 31). In the 
context of HWI taxpayers, building strategic relationships helped the ATO in 
developing its understanding of taxpayers’ practices. This aspect of compliance model 
thinking when applied to the HWI Taskforce also involved establishing task Force 
legitimacy and maximising prospects of cooperation and compliance among HWIs. In 
the context of HWIs, their community may include accounting firms, tax advisers, and 
legal advisers through whom HWIs seek advice in relation to their business and tax 
affairs; professional bodies (e.g., the Taxation Institute of Australia, National Institute 
of Accountants, and Certified Public Accountant Australia) who provide the ATO with 
policy recommendations; or industry associations through which HWIs or their entities 
lobby government and influence opinion about future policy directions. Partnerships 
with other elements of civil society such as NGOs that are concerned with taxation 
issues (for example, the Tax Justice Network) also prove valuable to the Tax Office, 
although traditionally the ATO has ‘less vigorously pursued’ such partnership (J. 
Braithwaite 2005, p. 73). 
Building partnerships with the HWI community can also be seen as a way for the ATO 
to develop a ‘web of influence’ (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, chap. 23) of tax 
compliance of the very wealthy through a dialogic approach. Braithwaite’s (2003b) 
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study found that advisers play an important role in securing the compliance of the very 
wealthy. Because tax practitioners play a pivotal role in the Australian taxation system 
(Tomasic & Pentony 1990; Wurth 2012), it is desirable to involve the profession in the 
process of improving taxpayers’ compliance in a more formal way.46 Tomasic and 
Pentony (1990) argued that tax practitioners not only acted as intermediaries between 
the Tax Office and the taxpayers, but they also influenced ‘the ethical climate and level 
of compliance with taxation laws’ (p. 1). 
Because high wealth individuals never understand … they don’t understand the 
complexity of the tax laws. They put it in the hands of the advisers and they say: ‘you go 
away and do it’, and the advisers do it. And ultimately, they [HWIs] are responsible for 
what goes in the tax return. (RA014, tax official) 
Current studies (e.g., Tan 2009; Wurth 2012), however, reveal that taxpayer-tax 
practitioner relationships are far more complex than Tomasic and Pentony suggested. 
Using a Tax Practitioner-Client Role Model, Tan (2009) found that aggressive tax 
decisions employed by taxpayers arise from a complex interplay between taxpayer and 
practitioner. Tan argued that the conservativeness or aggressiveness of the advice that 
practitioners give to their clients is associated with their assessment of the likelihood of 
clients being audited or sanctioned, risk propensity, their perceptions of the needs and 
expectations of the other, and trust in the relationship. 
Using a propensity and opportunity model for tax practitioner preparation compliance, 
Wurth (2012) concluded that tax practitioners form distinct and very different clusters 
                                                 
46  Tax practitioners refer to ‘all those who are paid by clients (taxpayers) to assist them with their 
compliance work or to provide advice on tax planning’ (Tan 2009, p. 11). The terms used include tax 
practitioners, tax preparers, tax professionals, professional tax advisers, tax consultants, tax specialists, 
tax agents, tax lawyers and tax accountants. 
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of preparation compliance: from the ‘duteous’ cluster which exhibited the most virtuous 
approach to preparation practice and had the highest level of compliance, to the ‘outlier’ 
cluster which represented ‘an extreme version of the [a]ggressive pattern of results’ (p. 
xv). The ‘aggressive’ cluster, according to Wurth, is those who voice a compliant 
approach to preparation practice and yet report the highest level of non-compliance 
within their clients’ returns. Also of great interest were the ‘contingent’ group who 
watched the ATO for signals of what was acceptable for reducing tax and what was not. 
Wurth suggested that recognising that there are multiple distinct groups of practitioners 
who hold different propensities and perceive different opportunities for non-compliance, 
is important for regulators as they tailor their regulatory strategy. 
Building partnerships with tax advisers to improve compliance of the HWI segment was 
part the HWI Taskforce’s strategy: 
So … part of the strategy is engagement. Go and talk to advisers, explain what we’re 
seeing and get them involved, because the Taskforce has identified that most of the 
wealthy individuals are represented by accounting firms. (RA006, tax official)  
This kind of engagement is captured in a formal and regular consultative forum with 
major accounting firms (ATO 2008, p. 9), at which the ATO advises them about what 
its plan is, and at the same time discusses compliance risks in relation to the HWI 
segment, gaining knowledge and information from stakeholders in the process. 
(3) Sending a clear message in advance to taxpayers 
The basic logic of responsive regulation is that most people will abide by the rules 
without a lot of intervention because they see clearly that the regulators have a clear 
strategy and adequate resources to increase sanctioning in response to ongoing non-
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compliant behaviour (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite 2010). The taskforce has 
implemented this principle by publishing a booklet called Wealthy and wise: a tax guide 
for Australia’s wealthiest people (ATO 2008).47 In general, the booklet is aimed at: 
describing strategies the ATO employs to ensure compliance of the very wealthy; 
outlining taxpayers’ characteristics that influence how the ATO collects information and 
responds to compliance risks; setting out factors that the ATO will review, and its 
compliance process based on that review; and suggesting ways that HWIs can 
endeavour to better manage their tax affairs to reduce the risk of non-compliance (ATO 
2008, p.3). As a communication vehicle between a tax authority and taxpayers, the 
booklet’s ultimate objective is sending a clear message about the Taskforce’s mission so 
that HWI taxpayers and their advisers understand how the Taskforce works and what 
strategies are available to secure compliance. 
According to one senior HWI Taskforce officer the strategy is effective: 
Because the booklet not only told them what we could do to them, it makes it quite clear 
what we expect of them in return. And agents are quite happy with that because they have 
a bit of certainty, they can go back to taxpayers and explain to them: ‘Look, this is what 
we have to do; this is what is required from us’. (RA007, tax official) 
Clear, respectful and honest communication is an essential element of responsive 
regulation, and also of the Taxpayers’ Charter. 
                                                 
47  In September 2012 the booklet was revised and is called Small-to-medium enterprises and wealthy 
individuals: our compliance approach (Australian Taxation Office 2012c). The new booklet provides 
information on the ATO’s process in managing the compliance of this segment, including its risk 
assessment procedures and its compliance approaches. It also explains how the Tax Office uses a ‘private 
group approach’ and how it is used to identify and profile wealthy individual taxpayers and their 
associated entities (Australian Taxation Office 2012c). The revised booklet incorporated the 
implementation of recommendations provided by the Inspector General of Taxation (Inspector-General of 
Taxation 2011). The new version of the booklet extends its scope, to include not only the HWI segment 
but also the entire SME market segment. More importantly, the revised booklet incorporates stakeholders’ 
feedback.  
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(4) Building compliance through greater flexibility to encourage and support 
compliance 
The responsive regulatory model adopted in the ATO compliance model advocates an 
escalating range of enforcement options and sanctions. This approach requires the ATO 
to presume that the majority of taxpayers are ‘good citizens’ and would be willing to 
comply if they understood the tax system and were treated fairly with trust (Cash 
Economy Task Force 1998, p. 41). In adopting this principle the ATO introduces 
initiatives that reflect the trust that it places in taxpayers. One senior official in the 
taskforce described how this principle is practised as follows: 
OK, under self-assessment I’m saying ‘Look, I trust you to do [the] right thing … I’m not 
going to check everything that you’ve done. But with that comes some responsibilities. If 
you think you’ve got a problem with tax and you [unfinished sentence] … I think I want 
you to get used to the idea that you should come forward and discuss it with me in the 
first place. Rather than you wait until I do an audit many years later, because that can be 
very expensive’. (RA04, tax official) 
Initiatives such as voluntary disclosure where taxpayers are encouraged to advise the 
ATO of any changes or of any errors in their tax returns, with reward in the form of 
penalty reductions, or the remission of interest on tax shortfalls in exchange, is an 
example of how the regulatory strategies are pushed down to the bottom of the pyramid 
by communicating to taxpayers a respect for their capacity to self-regulate and for them 
to be trustworthy (V. Braithwaite 2003a). This initiative is not exclusively for the 
HWIs, although the amount of tax revenue potentially at stake is considerably higher for 
the HWI cases than general taxpayers so it makes this initiative more relevant to them. 
At this point it is worth noting that the compliance model emphasises cooperation, 
trustworthiness and self-regulation at the bottom of the pyramid, but also clearly 
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communicates that breaches of the trust will lead to escalation up the pyramid, which 
can rapidly lead to the use of highly intrusive measures if they are called for. 
As noted above, patterns of tax compliance among citizens are thought to form a 
pyramidal shape with the majority of taxpayers having the intention to do the right thing 
at the base of the pyramid, and, with fewer and fewer taxpayers populating subsequent 
levels going up the pyramid (J. Braithwaite 2003a, p. 179). This, however, may not be 
the case with other tax populations, including large corporations, HWIs and tax 
advisers.  
John Braithwaite (2003a) has argued that corporate tax compliance forms an egg-shaped 
pattern, with most taxpayers playing for the grey (see Figure 4.3). That is, the majority 
of taxpayers in this group are satisfied with a ‘reasonably argued position’ rather than 
aspiring for compliance with the spirit of the law (J. Braithwaite 2003a, p. 179). 
Wurth’s (2012) teardrop model of practitioner compliance shares similarities with the 
egg-shaped interpretation, and supports the argument that using legitimate avenues for 
tax minimisation and finding a reasonably argued position has become a widely 
accepted norm for being an ‘honest’ taxpayer in Australia. 
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Figure 4.3 Alternative models of tax compliance patterns of individuals, big 
corporations and tax practitioners (the pyramid, the egg, the teardrop) 
Source: Braithwaite (2003a, p. 180) and (Wurth 2012, p. 142). 
 
No matter what tax compliance patterns are formed by particular groups (individual 
taxpayers, large businesses or tax practitioners), the basic idea of the compliance model 
is that the ATO and its officials should invest in discovering the content for them that is 
relevant to the context in which they operate (J. Braithwaite 2003a, p. 178). Through 
understanding content and context, tax officials are able to provide taxpayers who are 
willing to comply with adequate supports, while at the same time demonstrating power 
to punish those who choose not to comply. 
The concept of responsive regulation has entered into tax research thinking. For 
instance the idea is adopted in Kirchler et al.’s ‘slippery-slope model’ (Kirchler 2007, 
sec. 7.3; Kirchler et al. 2008). The slippery slope framework suggests that in order to 
secure compliance, it is important to consider the position the authorities adopt towards 
taxpayers. The framework assumes that compliance can result under the condition of the 
authority’s strong power as well as under the condition of trust in authorities. When 
taxpayers trust the authority they are more likely to consider it legitimate and will defer 
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to its assessments and cooperate. In other words, voluntary compliance is high if 
interaction with authorities is trusting. Trust can be built through the ‘service and client 
approach’ (Kirchler et al. 2008, p. 220). According to Kirchler (2007, p. 204), such an 
approach is characterised by clear and understandable regulations, transparency of 
procedures, neutrality, respect and politeness with regard to taxpayer treatment, as well 
as support. These are also elements that feature prominently in Tyler’s (1990) work on 
procedural justice (see also Tyler et al. 2013), applied to the tax context by Murphy 
(2004b). 
4.3 Principles, mechanisms and actors in the implementation of the 
HWI initiative in Australia  
This chapter so far has shown how a policy initiative, namely an HWI Taskforce, in a 
well-established and resourced tax authority like the ATO, operated in a way that 
integrated its activity with many influential networks in government and outside. 
Furthermore, its operations were supported by the ATO compliance model that 
extended across the whole ATO, and by the Taxpayers’ Charter which was in effect a 
memorandum of understanding with the community informing them of their rights and 
how the ATO would treat them. The HWI Taskforce was enmeshed in a taxpaying 
culture and governance structure that supported its mission and its operating procedures. 
From the perspective of policy transfer, the cultural underpinning and the governance 
structure were important considerations in setting up a similar administrative arm in 
another tax jurisdiction. 
The Indonesian tax collection culture is vastly different from Australia as are the 
resources at the disposal of the DGT; these issues are discussed in the next chapter. A 
more positive path to follow in addressing the question of how a policy can be 
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transferred successfully from a mature to a developing economy is to address the 
processes of forming policy, informed by other experiences, but suited to the cultural 
context in which it is to be implemented. It is in this regard that the principle-
mechanism-actor frameworks of Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) proved helpful. 
4.3.1 Principles underlying the operation of the ATO and HWI Taskforce 
The principles that the ATO hold are in the public domain. Three are particularly 
prominent. 
First are the principles of the ATO mission statement: ‘We contribute to the economic 
and social wellbeing of Australians by fostering willing participation in the taxation and 
superannuation systems’ (ATO 2013b). The mission statement recognises the 
importance of having voluntary compliance, commits the ATO to contributing to the 
wellbeing of Australians, and embraces the importance of both economic and social 
wellbeing. The mission statement recognises the importance of revenue collection but 
that it must be done in a principled way. 
The second declaration of principles involves accountability with regard to the ATO’s 
operations. Accountability takes the form not only of openness to review by external 
institutions (e.g., parliamentary committees, the IGT, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, 
or the ANAO) but also openness with the community about how they achieve their 
objectives, including ATO planning documents.  
The third principle that feeds into ATO operations is the Taxpayers’ Charter. The 
Charter sets out the way the ATO and its officials conduct themselves when dealing 
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with taxpayers through articulating the 13 principles set out in Table 4.3.48 Since it was 
introduced in July 1997, the Charter has been revised, most recently in November 2003. 
The Charter reinforces the compliance model and vice versa in the ATO’s commitment 
to being more client-focused. This is recognised explicitly in the HWI booklet: 
The guiding principles underpinning our approach to working with taxpayers are reflected 
in the taxpayers’ charter and our compliance model. This involves mutual respect and a 
professional relationship based on a shared understanding of the tax law in identifying 
and evaluating compliance… [The compliance model] is a structured way of 
understanding compliance behaviour, and helps us respond according to: the nature and 
level of risk we identify; the causes of non-compliance; and the level of cooperation we 
receive. (ATO 2008, p. 9, my emphasis) 
The principles of the ATO place constraints on how freely the ATO can pursue its 
revenue targets. This is particularly evident in the values of the mission statement. 
Nevertheless, revenue targets remain important. The history of Australia’s HWI 
Taskforce outlined earlier in this chapter shows that the HWI was set up initially as a 
response to perceived risk to tax revenue due to tax minimisation techniques practised 
by the very wealthy.  
Table 4.3 Principles Embedded in Australia's Taxpayers' Charter  
No Principles 
1 Treat you fairly and reasonably 
2 Treat you as being honest in your tax affairs unless you act otherwise 
3 Offer you professional service and assistance  
4 Accept you can be represented by a person of your choice and get advice  
                                                 
48  When the Charter was introduced in 1997 it included 12 principles. In 2003 the Charter was reviewed 
and extended to 13 principles. 
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No Principles 
5 Respect your privacy 
6 Keep the information we hold about you confidential 
7 Give you access to information we hold about you 
8 Help you to get things right 
9 Explain the decisions we make about you 
10 Respect your right to a review 
11 Respect your right to make a complaint 
12 Make it easier for you to comply 
13 Be accountable 
Source: ATO (2010a) 
 
Moreover, the taskforce was always under pressure in relation to how much tax revenue 
it could generate. The issue of accountability was raised in a Senate Committee hearing 
held on 3 November 2000, as pictured in the exchange in Box 4.2 (Parliament of 
Australia 2000, pp.98–99). On the one hand, this exchange illustrates the pressure on 
the ATO in relation to revenue. On the other hand, the exchange demonstrates the 
principle of accountability, especially to the Parliament. 
Although revenue generated from the taskforce activities must be reported and has been 
the concern of both the government and the Parliament, it has not necessarily made the 
achievement of revenue targets the only policy principle colouring the efforts of the 
taskforce. Rather, the HWI initiative was set up primarily as an effort by the ATO to 
gain public confidence in the integrity of the tax system and change the view that the 
ATO was tough on average taxpayers but lenient on the very wealthy. As these 
respondents in the HWI taskforce revealed:  
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My guess is … at that point in time the focus was making sure that that segment of the 
taxpayer population [high wealth individuals] was seen to pay their fair share of tax … 
and be able to prove to the community that we are doing something about this part of the 
community not paying their fair share of tax. Because there was a perception in the 
community at that time … [supported by CTSI research49] that people suspected that this 
part of the taxpayer population weren’t paying their fair share. That was the perception, 
so whether it’s true or not is another question, but that’s the perception … Sometimes the 
tax office needs to be out there to be seen to be dealing with perceptions and addressing 
people’s concerns and that’s why we started it off. (RA007, Tax official, my emphasis) 
This is another argument for an indirect effect discussed earlier beyond the AUD$ 2.8 
billion tax revenue. That is, it could be that by increasing the legitimacy of the tax 
system HWI Taskforce contributes to voluntary compliance by low and middle income 
taxpayers. 
[Achieving increases in] revenue was not the only objective of the establishment of the 
taskforce … non-monetary outcomes are also important, such as improved public 
confidence in the tax system. (RA002, Tax official) 
The ATO’s deputy commissioner, Michael Cranston, discussed similar issues in a 
media interview (Vedelago 2014). 
If the broader population sees that we make sure that the rich – who can really afford to 
pay taxes – pay, then it’s fairer for them and they are more willing to pay their taxes too 
It’s not just for the return on investment [of the HWI initiative] but the community’s 
expectation we will deal with wealthy people. 
 
 
                                                 
49  Research by the Centre for Tax System Integrity at the ANU undertaken in partnership with the ATO 
1999-2005. 
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Box 4.2 Dialogue at Senate Committee Hearing, 3 November 2000 
Source: Parliament of Australia (2000) 
Mr Kelvin Thomson [Member of Parliament]: Does the tax office have some feel or 
estimate for revenue which has been either collected or saved as a result of the 
measures to which you have referred? 
Mr Fitzpatrick [First Assistant Commissioner]: I have got no estimate of the 
revenue impact of those measures. 
Mr Kelvin Thomson: It is a highly relevant question as to what has become of the 
$800 million and the $700 million gap between what was said at the start of 1996 and 
what was subsequently reported as to whether the measures that are outlined here and 
to which you have referred have been able to generate or save the $700 million. So 
my query is: do you have some feel for that? 
Mr Fitzpatrick: Certainly the measures outlined here, and I have referred to 
previously, will have an impact on the revenue which we estimated to be at risk in 
respect of some high wealth individuals arrangements. From our experience it is 
clear that some of those taxpayers will look for other opportunities on an ongoing 
basis. We need to be alert to those as best we can to address whatever new 
opportunities arise, and that is certainly a clear focus of our intention at the moment. 
Mr Kelvin Thomson: It is not particularly satisfying to me for you to respond that it 
will have an impact and for me or others not to be able to get any feel for the 
quantum of the impact, the dimension of it, whether it goes to the $700 million gap 
or it does not. I might direct the same question to Mr White from the ANAO in terms 
of the Audit Office investigation of this area, whether you then get from this some 
suggestion as to whether these legislative measures have been effective in recovering 
the $800 million or whether they have not. 
Mr White [Executive Director ANAO]: Our report in discussing the $800 million 
makes it clear from the information we saw from the tax office that the $800 million 
is an order of magnitude estimate of revenue that could be gained from both audit 
activity but also from various legislative changes if they were to occur. 
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These principles of contributing to economic and social well-being through voluntary 
compliance and cooperation with the Australian public, of being accountable to the 
government, Parliament and the community, and of acting according to the Taxpayers’ 
Charter shape the way in which the ATO and the HWI Taskforce function in their 
collection of revenue. Principles influence the mechanism used for revenue collection. 
The compliance model is a strategic tool that crosses over from principles to practice. 
As a strategic tool it houses and gives meaning to several specific mechanisms in the 
ATO context. Among these specific mechanisms are a holistic approach to managing 
compliance among HWIs and risk leveraging.  
4.3.2 Mechanisms: monitoring compliance through a holistic approach and risk 
leveraging 
In order to work holistically to improve HWI tax compliance, the ATO required specific 
mechanisms that enabled data linking and matching, to claim priority and to access 
cooperation from other business lines within the ATO. 
Data linking and matching 
In contrast to publicly owned companies, information about the existence, operation and 
finances of a closely held private group (CHPG) linked to a particular HWI was not 
publicly available. Moreover, the business structures and governance processes of 
CHPGs are less transparent than those of public companies. Yet the ATO’s ambition 
involved sketching relationships between grouped entities, including individuals, trusts, 
and partnerships, and determining the ultimate individual who had effective control (as 
opposed to legal ownership) over them. The importance of the task for a tax authority 
trying to establish its HWI initiative was reflected in these comments from HWI 
Taskforce officials: 
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That’s why it’s vitally important to have a system to capture the links, because it helps 
run your business. It’s very important … very important to have a system that captures 
those links. (RA004, tax official) 
We link them, we have a computer system called the HWI System and once you identify 
a high wealth individual, we would link all of the entities that that person had control of. 
(RA003, tax official) 
Identifying wealthy individuals and their related-entities is only possible if the ATO 
facilitates mechanisms through which the taskforce is able to retrieve, collate and 
interrogate data from taxpayers managed by other business lines within the ATO or 
scattered in various governmental and non-governmental agencies. 
Claiming priority and accessing cooperation across business lines  
Entities that link to a particular HWI are typically diverse (ATO 2008, p. 5), which 
means they are very likely to be administered by different business lines within the 
ATO. In order to effectively and efficiently monitor the tax compliance of the HWIs 
and their related entities, the taskforce has to have power to access information about 
these ‘scattered’ entities from other parts of the ATO.  
Cooperation across business lines is institutionalised through a priority rule. The ATO 
introduced a rule whereby other business lines need to gain approval from the HWI 
assigned officer before doing any compliance work with entities that have been 
indicated as HWI-related (RA011, tax official). In practice, except for certain work such 
as tax return lodgement and debt collection, the HWI Taskforce has a prior claim on any 
compliance works with entities that are flagged with a ‘HWI indicator’. Other business 
lines within the ATO (e.g., in the old structure they included the SME and the LBI 
business lines), were expected to offer their cooperation to the HWI Taskforce. 
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So [for example], if LB&I [large business and international] came along and they wanted 
to undertake some audit activities in respect to this company, they would need to 
coordinate that with the HWI Taskforce. They would need to say: ‘Are you undertaking 
any compliance action in respect to this company, because we intend to?’ And we say: 
‘No, you can’t, because we’re already doing an audit’. So, that’s how it works in terms of 
audit. 
… Any compliance actions or any actions from other business lines had to get a clearance 
from the HWI Taskforce for them to do or not; depending what actions we had planned. 
So that sort of bureaucracy cross over … in essence we had … the HWI Taskforce had 
priority of the most of those. If not, it is going to be discussed at a higher level: what 
works and who is going to do what. (RA011, tax official) 
Risk leveraging 
The other mechanism used to monitor tax compliance of the HWIs and their related 
entities is risk leveraging. Risk leveraging means that the ATO categorises taxpayers 
based on the risks they demonstrate. Using an ‘entity questionnaire’, the Taskforce 
requests full details of all private entities associated with an HWI that enables them to 
sketch the business group of one particular HWI. Combined with other information 
already available at the ATO (e.g., tax returns, business activity statement (BAS), tax 
payments) and obtained from external sources, responses from the questionnaire are 
used by the Taskforce to do risk assessment. The Taskforce then follows up taxpayers 
who exhibit high risks by asking them to complete an ‘expanded tax return’. This 
responsive regulatory approach aids compliance in this sense: 
… the genius of the expanded return is that it puts HWIs in the position where they have 
to lie outright rather than ‘overlook’ something. It forces into black and white what had 
previously been grey. Both conscience and fear of deterrence work better in the realm of 
black and white than in the realm of grey. This point applies to both HWIs themselves 
and to their advisers. (J. Braithwaite 2003b, p. 267) 
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That is, by responding to the ATO’s request and completing an expanded return, the 
Tax Office reduces the degrees of freedom for redefining income and deductions for the 
purpose of a subsequent return: If X was reported in a 2012 return, taxpayers’ degrees 
of freedom to re-configure their 2013 affairs in such a way that X was not consistently 
reported are reduced (J. Braithwaite 2003b, p. 267; Braithwaite et al. 2003, p. 206). 
Expanded returns were the break through mechanism that started an agreed process for 
holistic data collection and system building discussed earlier. It was suggested by the 
ATO, challenged by tax agents (J. Braithwaite 2003b), and eventually put into place 
after much dialogue with external stakeholders (RA002, RA004, RA005, tax 
officials).50 
The application of the expanded tax return is also viewed by tax practitioners as ‘a real 
deterrent against aggressive tax planning’ (Senate Economics References Committee 
2000, p. 60) (another impact that goes beyond the direct $2.8 billion revenue), as also 
described by an adviser in Braithwaite’s (2003b, p. 250) study: 
The more information he’s [the Commissioner] got, the less aggressive they will be in 
their tax planning. 
Despite its advantages, this mechanism had its critics (J. Braithwaite 2003b, p. 247–
248). In the early days expanded returns were applied for all HWIs, regardless the risk 
they exhibited to the revenue. Therefore, taxpayers ‘complained bitterly’ (RA002, tax 
official). Complains and criticisms were related to the compliance cost that taxpayers 
                                                 
50 Thanks to Dr Andrew Stout of the ATO for reminding me to acknowledge the ‘expanded return’ 
process as an example of dialogic webs that the ATO developed with the HWI policy stakeholders such 
as tax advisers. 
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should bear for completing the expanded tax return in the forms of professional fees 
paid to the advisers for giving advice and of the cost of the HWI and staff’s time that 
was allocated for completing the return.  
Practice has changed. The expanded tax return is now simpler and shorter and low risk 
HWIs were omitted after a period of time. HWIs who were identified as high risk 
continued to have more intrusive and expensive expanded return required each year. 
Under its compliance model strategy that integrates principles and frames mechanisms, 
the ATO (as noted earlier) invested in data linking and matching, claiming priority and 
accessing cooperation, and risk leveraging through an entity questionnaire and an 
extended tax return. These mechanisms enabled the HWI Taskforce to meet its revenue 
targets while abiding by principles encapsulated in the ATO mission statement, 
accountability, and the Taxpayers’ Charter. 
4.3.3 Actors: gaining supports from different directions  
In implementing the HWI policy, the ATO needed supports from different actors, at 
different point in time, and for different purposes. Four categories of actors have 
contributed to the success of the implementation of the HWI initiative in Australia: 
politicians, tax practitioners, tax officials and other agencies. 
Politicians and political institutions 
Support from politician and political institutions for the ATO in general and the 
Taskforce in particular gives the HWI policy legitimacy and authority. The HWI 
initiative in Australia had political support from the very beginning, as one respondent 
who had been in the taskforce since its inception revealed: 
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… we had political support right from the word go. That is the advantage we had and I 
also mentioned to you the way in which, under our constitution, the Tax Office was set up 
to ensure its independence … that was a great way of helping us as well … (RA007, tax 
official) 
Political support was also manifested through not intervening in the operation of the 
taskforce. 
I received a lot of letters from them [HWI taxpayers], but there’ve been complaint letters 
where they complained to the Prime Minister and the Commissioner of Taxation … It’s 
interesting … when they’ve complained to the Prime Minister you hear nothing at all 
from the Prime Minister’s office. Politically I think in Australia it would be suicide if 
they were to support someone who’s evading tax. Especially … if they came to support 
that person and then we … ended up in the courts, then the Prime Minister would have 
looked pretty stupid having supported someone who broke the law. (RA004, tax official) 
Political support to the taskforce also was provided through funding in the budget. This 
specific purpose funding (Joint Committee of Public Account and Audit 2001, p. 60) 
can be interpreted as political support received by the taskforce from both the 
Parliament and the government. 
Tax practitioners 
Tax practitioners play an important role in Australia’s tax administration context. They 
lodge around 71 per cent of individuals’ tax returns and more than 95 per cent of 
businesses’ (ATO 2011, p. 37), not to mention the role they play in providing tax-
related advice which also influences taxpayers’ compliance behaviour.  
Tax professionals are prominent in the context of HWIs, in that they provide HWIs with 
advice in relation to their personal as well as business tax affairs. In recognising the 
important role tax professions play in influencing voluntary compliance, the ATO has 
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been involving tax practitioners in the implementation of the HWI initiative since its 
very beginning. As mentioned previously, the involvement of tax practitioners occurs in 
the form of a consultative forum at which the taskforce discusses major risks in relation 
to wealthy people and the design of products that support taxpayers in fulfilling their tax 
obligations. 
We are increasing our engagement with tax practitioners and advisers managing the 
affairs of these people [high wealth individuals]. We will work with key intermediaries to 
co-design products that help taxpayers achieve practical certainty and reduce ongoing 
compliance costs. (ATO 2011, p. 17) 
Tax practitioners constitute an important factor in the management of tax compliance in 
Australia (Rawlings 2005, p. 25; see also Ryan 1989; Tan 2009; Wurth 2012). 
Involving tax practitioners in the effort to improve compliance of HWIs involves using 
a ‘network of influence’ (Rawlings 2005) of those moving in the HWIs’ circle. 
It’s about … getting out there and making the professions who represent the high wealth 
individuals – the major law firms or the major accounting firms – aware of us, and what 
we do, and the processes [that we undertake]. (RA003, Tax official) 
So part of the strategy is engagement. Go and talk to advisers, explain what we’re seeing 
and get them involved … we have regular meetings with accounting firms with regard to 
this market or this population … we talk to them on a regular basis … that engagement 
will help to improve the level of compliance. (RA006, Tax official) 
… the predominant people providing advice to the HWI are tax agents, they are the ones 
who are providing advice and saying how the law should be applied, or how they should 
restructure [their business], or how they should try something different … so therefore 
having contact with tax agents is crucial in this regard. (RA011, Tax official) 
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Tax officials 
Tax officials are affected by newly introduced policy, as occurred with the introduction 
of the ATO’s compliance model (discussed in Chapter 2). Tax officials’ understanding 
of the policy objectives is required for the success of the policy’s implementation. In its 
performance audit of the HWI Taskforce, the Auditor General revealed that: 
… staff interviewed by the ANAO … appeared to understand the activities and projects 
that the taskforce was required to achieve … Moreover, taskforce staff indicated that they 
were committed to the success of the taskforce in meeting its required level of 
performance, and making an individual contribution towards that success. (The Auditor 
General 2000, p. 27) 
Staff’s understanding of policy objectives can only be achieved if the policy objectives 
are shared evenly among them, especially those at operational levels. 
The ANAO considers that the taskforce planning is well structured; that it is understood 
by taskforce staff; and that it contributes to achievement of, and reporting on, the 
operational outcomes required of the taskforce. (The Auditor General 2000, p. 27) 
Other agencies outside the ATO 
Other institutions outside the ATO supported the success of the taskforce operation, 
most notably through the provision of information.  
We started mining the data within the ATO, we started using external databases, any 
information we could get on hand, even a newspaper article which says that Mr X had 
sold a large proportion of a particular business and it made three hundred million dollar 
profit ...When I say external databases it was like a property database, it was like a boat 
register or other thing which would kind of add to the picture of their wealth. (RA004, tax 
official) 
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Data sharing frameworks (with governmental and non-governmental agencies) are only 
possible if regulatory arrangements are in place to allow that to occur. In Australia, such 
arrangements are determined by laws such as the Privacy Act 1988, the Data Matching 
Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990 and the Tax Laws Amendment (Confidentiality 
of Taxpayer Information) Act 2010. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the HWI initiative (Taskforce) introduced in Australia in 
May 1996. Although the focus of the taskforce’s work was ensuring compliance of the 
very wealthy with Australia’s tax laws and code, cultural background, frameworks, 
principles and mechanisms shape the way in which the taskforce practises its craft. In 
terms of culture, the most influential framework is the ATO compliance model, 
developed on the basis of a responsive regulatory approach to tax compliance and 
implemented in 1998. The ATO uses the model to gain a better understanding of 
taxpayers’ individual circumstances and to provide them with a proportionate and 
appropriate response to the compliance problems that taxpayers exhibit. The compliance 
model is complemented by the Taxpayers’ Charter, introduced as a service charter in 
July 1997, and revised in November 2003 to extend the idea of a partnership between 
the ATO and taxpayers with taxpayer responsibilities being added to the list of service 
promises. 
The compliance model and the Taxpayers’ Charter are important aids in implementing 
the higher-order principle of maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the tax 
system, to ensure accountability and put the ATO mission statement into practice. 
HWIs, like ordinary taxpayers, should be treated reasonably and fairly, but also they 
should be held accountable to pay their fair share of tax. More specifically, the HWI 
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initiative sought to assure the public and the Parliament that the tax system works fairly; 
that is, those who are wealthy do not take advantages of the laws because of their access 
to sophisticated tax planning arrangements. 
Principles are translated into policy mechanisms that make it possible for the taskforce 
to monitor the tax compliance behaviour of HWIs through a holistic approach. The 
holistic approach involves looking at the compliance behaviour of a HWI and all related 
entities as one case. These cases are managed within the HWI unit with cooperation 
from other business lines, using a risk assessment to concentrate efforts and resources 
and reduce intrusion into the affairs of low-risk taxpayers. 
The implementation of the HWI initiatives required involvement from and support of 
different actors to ensure its success, since the very wealthy are privileged, powerful 
and politically influential. The HWI initiative had strong political support from all sides 
of Australian politics. Moreover the taskforce had special funding support of $119.8 
million from the government for eight years.51 The taskforce built networks with tax 
practitioners, with both government and non-government agencies for the purposes of 
information gathering, and devoted effort to explaining to staff at the operational level 
what the high wealth policy was about and how they were to contribute. 
Understanding that there are other elements in the Australian tax system that underpin 
the operation of the HWI program is a crucial part of learning about this policy before 
                                                 
51  That is, from budget year 1996-97 until 2009-10. Between budget year 2001-02 and 2005-06 the HWI 
initiative was funded internally by ‘ATO base funding’ (Joint Committee of Public Account and Audit 
2001, p. 93). The HWI initiative still exists in the ATO but not as a ‘taskforce’; it is a new business line 
called “Private Groups and High Wealth Individuals” (Australian Taxation Office 2014). 
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examining how it was transferred to other jurisdictions. The analysis in this chapter 
suggests that before a policy transfer, the following elements need to be examined: 
 taxpaying culture and the values of the population, particularly as they relate to 
taxpaying; 
 the principles that are proclaimed to guide the policy and its specific goals; 
 any frameworks that integrate and give meaning to the principles and goals; 
 the mechanisms that allow the authority to turn the principles and goals into 
successful actions; and 
 the actors and stakeholders that are on board and contribute to successful policy 
implementation. 
In May 2009, Indonesia’s tax authority (DGT) decided to add a HWI initiative to its tax 
administration and looked to its equivalent in a neighbouring country, the ATO, to learn 
more about how it was done.  
In the next chapter, the Indonesian tax system, its characteristics, and the challenges it 
faces are described. This is background to my investigation of the processes of policy 
transfer and implementation of the HWI initiative to Indonesia.  
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Chapter 5 
The Indonesian Tax System and the 
Transfer of a HWI Initiative 
 
 
Compared to Australia, Great Britain and the 
United States, Indonesia chose to form its HWI 
office … earlier in the maturation of its tax 
administration system. 
(RI040, international organisation) 
Organisations tend to model themselves after 
similar organizations in their field that they 
perceive to be more legitimate or successful. 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p. 152) 
 
 
Introduction 
Policy transfer involves a policy being adopted in one country after observing its 
operation in others. In the previous chapter I analysed the development and operation of 
the HWI Taskforce in Australia, widely regarded as a benchmark for policy 
implementation in this area. The analysis revealed a taxpaying culture that was 
committed to ensuring everyone complied with their legal obligations and the 
promotion of a tax system with which taxpayers would willingly cooperate. The HWI 
Taskforce was supported by this culture, an overarching compliance model framework, 
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principles of service, accountability and the Taxpayers’ Charter, mechanisms of data 
linking and matching, priority setting and coordination across the ATO to focus on HWI 
cases, risk leveraging and networks of actors inside and outside government. 
HWI initiatives have been adopted by tax authorities in 17 countries because the growth 
in HWI numbers presents tax authorities with similar challenges, including the risks to 
revenue and to the overall integrity of the tax system (OECD 2009a). The globalised 
economy, in which capital flows more freely across jurisdictions, has contributed to the 
rise of these challenges. In the Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia, together with Australia, 
China, New Zealand, and Thailand, are experiencing high growth in their HWI 
populations (Capgemini & RBC Wealth Management 2013, p. 6). Given that tax 
authorities face similar challenges from HWI taxpayers, they regard the transfer of 
policies that have proven successful elsewhere as a useful means of dealing with the 
problem. Nevertheless, proponents of the transfer need to be mindful of how to 
minimise the risks of failure associated with the implementation of the policy in a new 
environment. 
The aims in this chapter are threefold. The first part of the chapter provides an overview 
of Indonesia’s tax system and revenue needs for the state budget that led to the adoption 
of an HWI policy.  
The second part of this chapter describes the policy transfer of the HWI initiative in 
Indonesia. Establishing the occurrence of policy transfer in the development of an HWI 
policy in Indonesia is the first step to explaining policy outcomes. Explaining what 
causes transfer and how the policy is transferred lead to a better understanding of the 
implementation process and its success or otherwise.  
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In the third part of the chapter I examine the design of the transfer in detail. This section 
covers elements of coercion and voluntariness in Indonesia’s adoption of HWI policy, 
and reveals the expectations of government and senior officials at the strategic level of 
the organisation to bring into being a modern tax administration.  
The last part of the chapter describes the failure of HWI policy in Indonesia from a 
programmatic perspective. In this section I answer such questions as: Did the policy 
achieve its intended outcomes? Was the policy an efficient use of resources? Was the 
policy made operational in a way that was consistent with achieving its objectives? 
5.1 Overview of Indonesia’s tax system 
Despite contributing almost 70 per cent of revenue to the state budget (Government of 
Indonesia 2012), the Indonesian tax system experiences low tax compliance levels. 
Indonesia’s low level of tax compliance is reflected by its low tax-to-GDP ratio 
compared with other countries with a similar level of economic development or other 
countries in the same region. This, to some extent, indicates the existence of two major 
problems: substantial informality in the economy (cash or black economy)52 and tax 
evasion53 (OECD 2012a).  
The widespread nature of the cash economy in Indonesia is indicated by the low level of 
registered taxpayers compared to estimated potential registration. Widespread tax 
                                                 
52  The notion of informality includes the concepts of both informal enterprises and informal employment 
(Swaminathan 1991, p. 29) and refers to: ‘… economic activities and transactions that are sufficiently 
hidden so that they are unmeasured or untaxed, and it is presumed that economic agents are at least 
passively aware that bringing these activities to the attention of authorities would imply tax or other legal 
consequences’ (Andrews et al. 2011, p. 3). 
53  The term tax evasion is used to refer to: ‘…an act in contravention of the law whereby a person who 
derives a taxable income either pays no tax or pays less tax than he would otherwise be bound to pay. Tax 
evasion includes the failure to make a return of taxable income or the failure to disclose in a return the 
true amount of income derived’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1975, para. 11.1, emphasis is added). 
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evasion is indicated by the low level of filed tax returns from registered taxpayers and a 
high ‘tax gap’54. These challenges, combined with demand to collect a huge amount of 
money for the state budget, have made achieving revenue targets the primary orientation 
of the Indonesian tax system (Rizal 2011). This section addresses these issues in detail. 
They are likely to be shared by other developing countries and inevitably have a major 
effect on tax policy and administration. The next section (section 5.1) opens with a 
discussion of why Indonesian’s tax system is known as a ‘target system’ (Lerche 1980), 
and concludes with a description of the organisational structure of Indonesia’s tax 
authority. Just as the basic features of Australia’s tax system and tax authority 
influenced how the HWI Taskforce functioned (see Chapter 4), basic features of 
Indonesia’s tax system and tax authority influenced how a HWI unit within DGT was 
likely to function. 
5.1.1 Why Indonesia’s tax system is known as a ‘target system’ 
Generating enough resources to fund development in order to reduce poverty and to 
provide basic public services is a common challenge faced by governments everywhere. 
But the challenge is greater in developing countries, such as Indonesia, where the 
government’s ability to generate revenue is relatively limited. Taxes have been the main 
source of government revenue for Indonesia since revenue from oil and gas began to 
decline in the mid-1980s (UNDP 2013, p. 68); the country’s first major tax reform 
occurred in this period (Asher 1998; Gillis 1990; Lerche 1986). Although the proportion 
of tax revenue to GDP in Indonesia is still low compared to that of other countries in the 
same region, tax revenue has contributed a significant portion of Indonesia’s domestic 
                                                 
54  The Tax gap references to difference between the amount of tax revenue that should have been 
collected and the amount of tax revenue that was actually collected (Brondolo et al. 2008, p. 16) 
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revenue in the last decade, on average 70.3 per cent of total domestic revenue 
(Table 5.1).  
Increasing revenue for the State budget has led the Indonesian government to reform its 
national tax system with particular attention to ‘revenue enhancement’ (Das-Gupta & 
Mookherjee 1998, pp. 416–417; Gillis 1990b, p. 236). Malcolm Gillis observed that 
although the main focus of Indonesia’s first tax reform in the early 1980s was initially 
to address inefficiencies of the tax system, by the end it shifted toward raising revenue 
(Gillis 1989, pp. 94–95). 
Table 5.1 Indonesia: Domestic Revenue (2002–2011)  
Fiscal 
Year1 
Tax2 Non Tax3 Total 
billion (Rp) (%) billion (Rp) (%) billion (Rp) (%) 
2002 210.1 70.4 88.4 29.6 298.5 100.0 
2003 242.0 71.0 98.9 29.0 340.9 100.0 
2004 280.6 69.6 122.5 30.4 403.1 100.0 
2005 347.0 70.3 146.9 29.7 493.9 100.0 
2006 409.2 64.3 227.0 35.7 636.2 100.0 
2007 491.0 69.5 215.1 30.5 706.1 100.0 
2008 658.7 67.3 320.6 32.7 979.3 100.0 
2009 619.9 73.2 227.2 26.8 847.1 100.0 
2010 723.3 72.9 268.9 27.1 992.2 100.0 
2011 873.9 72.5 331.5 27.5 1,205.4  100.0 
Average 485.6 70.3 204.7 29.7 690.3 100.0 
Source: Indonesia State Budget (various years), Indonesia MoF. 
Note:  
1 Data for 2012 and 2013 are not included because they have not been audited.  
2 Tax revenues include domestic tax revenues (i.e., income tax on oil and gas, personal income tax (PIT) and 
corporate income tax (CIT), value-added tax, land and building tax, duties on land and building transfer, excises, 
and stamp duties), and international trade tax (i.e., import duties and export duties) 
3 Non-tax revenues include income from natural resources (i.e., oil and gas, general mining, forestry, fishery, and 
geothermal), profit transfer from state-owned enterprises, and other non-tax revenues collected by government 
agencies (e.g., license fees, fines, service charges). 
In response to the Asian economic crisis in 1997, the Indonesian government again 
initiated tax reform. Tax administration reform in the early 2000s was regarded as 
successful in terms of achieving revenue targets, but not in terms of improving tax 
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compliance (Rizal 2006, p.187). Low levels of tax compliance have always been an 
issue for the Indonesian tax system, but the appetite for reform has always been directed 
to tax revenue (Asher 1998, p. 138). Lerche (1980, p. 50) referred to the prevailing tax 
system in Indonesia as a target system; that is, a tax system in which the achievement of 
revenue targets, that have been determined through a top-down process, is the ultimate 
goal. He observed that in the context of Indonesia’s tax administration system, the 
revenue target is more political in nature than a financial statement to guide revenue 
forecasting and budget decisions. As political targets, Lerche argued, tax revenue targets 
are fixed revenue quotas which the responsible tax administration unit (regional tax 
offices and tax service offices) is required to collect by all possible means. Tax 
officials’ performance relative to the target attracts sanctions or rewards (Lerche 1980, 
p. 50). The use of revenue achievement as the main indicator of success in the 
Indonesian tax administration, as we shall see later, has significant impact on how high 
level officials saw or judged the success of the HWI unit. 
What Lerche observed more than three decades ago is still relevant in Indonesia today, 
in that the targeted tax system works from the top down. Basically, it means that the 
global revenue target that DGT has to achieve in a particular fiscal year ‘is not the sum 
of regional sub-targets developed from the grass roots up’ (Lerche 1980, p. 50). Targets 
are cascaded down to individual officials or even taxpayers (p. 51). For example, if a 
regional tax office (kantor wilayah or kanwil) is given a target of 3.5 trillion Rupiah, the 
target will percolate down to the TSOs (kantor pelayanan pajak – KPP) under its 
supervision.  
Suppose a TSO receives a 750 billion Rupiah revenue target. This target will be 
cascaded to sections within that TSO, especially consultation and monitoring sections, 
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and then within each section the target will be divided among individual account 
representatives responsible for looking after certain taxpayers. Targets are rarely based 
on tax capacity data for specific groups of taxpayers, regions or administrative units, as 
Lerche observed, but rather on the previous year’s achievement with a plus or minus 
adjustment (the adjustment is due to incremental changes in the revenue target from 
headquarters). Moreover, according to Lerche (1980), the ultimate function of the target 
system is ‘to serve as a yardstick for appraising the performance of tax officials and of 
regional or [tax service] … units of the tax administration’ (p. 50). Revenue targets are 
one source of pressure not only for high level officials such as a kanwil chief, but also 
for lower-level officials such as a KPP chief, section heads, or account representatives. 
Tax targets are politically sensitive within DGT in that failure to meet them attracts 
sanctions. Delayed promotion, deployment to a lower-grade position, or transfer to less 
favored places (e.g., remote regions or islands across Indonesia) are sanctions that 
chiefs of units (e.g., kanwil and KPP) and even lower-level staff (e.g., section heads) 
may face when a revenue target is not achieved. Lerche observed that: ‘Loss of face or 
prestige may be penalties for non-fulfillment [of revenue targets] sufficient to motivate 
tax officials’ (p. 51). At the same time, sanctions are also the main source of pressure 
and frustration for officials at the ground level and a source of tension between 
headquarter and operational units. An Indonesian MoF decree governing transfer of 
staff within MoF stated that the performance of a KPP chief is measured in terms of 
his/her ability to achieve revenue targets (Indonesia Ministry of Finance 2009, chap. II).  
Lerche (1980) argued that focusing attention on the achievement of revenue targets as 
the main measure of the tax administration’s performance would adversely affect 
Indonesia’s tax system and tax compliance in the long term (see Brondolo et al. (2008) 
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for a more recent study). The targeted revenue in the state budget has remained 
unrealised in most years in the last decade (Figure 5.1), on average falling short by four 
percentage points. 
 
Figure 5.1 Indonesia: tax and non-tax revenue against targets (2002-2011)  
Source: Indonesia State Budget (various years) 
 
Indonesia’s ability to generate tax revenue remains noticeably lower than that of other 
countries in the region. On average, Indonesia’s tax-to-GDP ratio (and indicator used to 
measure the government’s performance in generating tax from domestic economic 
activities) during the period 2003-2011 was 10.8 per cent, lower than the average of 
15.9 per cent for non-OECD countries in the region and much lower than the average of 
28.7 per cent of tax-to-GDP ratio of OECD countries in the region (Table 5.2). In short, 
Indonesia’s tax-to-GDP ratio is ‘one of the lowest in the G-20 and among emerging 
countries’ (IMF 2011b, p. 20).  
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Table 5.2 Tax Revenue of Selected Asia-Pacific Countries, 2003-2011 (as percentage of 
GDP)  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
  
 
  
Indonesia 10.7 11.2 11.2 11.0 11.3 10.2 10.2 10.6 10.8 
Average all countries 19.2 19.5 19.8 20.1 20.4 20.0 19.2 19.4 19.9 
Selected OECD 
         
    Australia 30.0 30.3 30.0 29.6 29.7 27.1 25.8 25.6 26.5 
    Japan 25.3 26.1 27.3 28.1 28.5 28.5 27.0 27.6 28.6 
    Korea 24.0 23.3 24.0 25.0 26.5 26.5 25.5 25.1 25.9 
    New Zealand 33.7 34.8 36.6 36.0 34.7 33.8 31.6 31.5 31.5 
Unweighted Average 28.2 28.6 29.5 29.7 29.8 29.0 27.5 27.5 28.1 
Asia Pacific (non-
OCED) 
         
    China 17.1 17.6 15.6 16.1 17.2 17.3 17.5 18.2 19.0 
    Hong Kong 10.4 12.1 12.7 12.8 14.2 13.0 12.8 13.9 14.2 
    Malaysia 16.5 15.3 15.4 15.1 14.8 15.2 15.7 14.3 15.3 
    Philippines 12.8 12.4 13.0 14.3 14.0 14.2 12.8 12.8 12.3 
    Singapore 12.9 13.0 12.5 12.7 14.2 14.3 13.2 12.9 13.7 
    Thailand 16.0 16.6 16.3 16.2 16.0 14.9 15.8 16.9 16.9 
    Vietnam 20.9 21.7 22.8 24.3 23.5 24.4 22.3 23.6 24.1 
Unweighted Average 15.2 15.5 15.5 15.9 16.3 16.2 15.7 16.1 16.5 
                    
 
Source: Revenue statistics 1965-2011 (OECD 2012b); IMF country report (various years, various 
country) 
 
Terra and Hudson (2004, p. 786) identified a set of factors that determine a tax 
authority’s ability to maximise tax potential and attain targets: the country’s economic 
structure, level of development, administrative and political constraints on the fiscal 
system, social-political values, and indigenous institutional arrangements. These factors, 
according to Teera and Hudson, interact in different ways at different times in different 
countries, resulting in disparities in tax collection performance. Indonesia’s low tax-to-
GDP ratio therefore may reflect inherent weakness in the tax collection infrastructure: 
poor design of the tax system, weak tax administration, and low social commitment to 
taxpaying. 
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5.1.2 Problems experienced by Indonesia’s tax system 
Indonesia’s low tax burden and high non-compliance is well recognised. In this section 
the three indicators of low taxpaying commitment among Indonesians are discussed: 
low registration, non-filing among those registered, and the tax gap. 
Low proportion of registered individual taxpayers and its consequences 
The first major administrative hurdle faced by the DGT is to bring citizens into the tax 
system through a registration process. The small proportion of individual taxpayers on 
the tax register means that the country has a heavy reliance on corporations as the main 
source of tax revenue for achieving revenue targets. 
In 2011 the total number of registered taxpayers55 was 19.11 million, consisting of 
16.88 million individual taxpayers, 1.76 million corporate taxpayers, and 0.47 million 
treasurer taxpayers.56 The total work-force57 population was 116.38 million in 2011 
(World Bank 2012); thus, only 14.50 per cent of the workforce are registered individual 
taxpayers. Marks’ (2003) research, based on Indonesia’s 2002 National Socioeconomic 
Survey (Susenas) data, found that 63.1 million people should be registered in the system 
as individual taxpayers – almost four times the existing number. On the positive side, 
                                                 
55  The Indonesian tax authority categorises taxpayers into three groups: individual, legal entities, and 
treasurer taxpayers. While individual and entities taxpayers are obliged to file a tax return, the treasurer 
taxpayers are not obliged to file annual tax returns. Treasurer taxpayers are treasurers in government 
agencies whose role is administering financial matters of the agency, and in the taxation context their role 
is mainly as withholding agents for taxes such as salary and wages and VAT. The number of taxpayers in 
the last category is 0.47 million. 
56  Legal entity taxpayers include enterprises (including SOEs), firms, cooperatives, foundations, mass 
organisations, partnerships, and political organisations.  
57  The total labour force comprises people aged 15 and older who meet the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) definition of the economically active population: all people who supply labour for the 
production of goods and services during a specified period (World Bank, 2012). 
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Figure 5.2 does show a five-fold increase in the number of registered individual 
taxpayers in four years between 2007-2011. 
 
Figure 5.2 Indonesia: the growth of registered taxpayers (2002-2011)  
Source: Directorate of Potential, Compliance and Revenue (2012)  
Note: The percentage of unregistered taxpayers would be very helpful in depicting the depth of the 
problem in Indonesia’s tax administration. However, such information is not available. 
 
While the number of individual taxpayers outnumbers corporate taxpayers, Indonesian 
tax revenues rely heavily on taxes derived from corporations which comprise almost 95 
per cent of total taxes revenue (Figure 5.3).58 Reliance on revenue from corporate 
income tax was an issue of concern to the Ministry of Finance when the GFC occurred 
in September 2008. Most of Indonesia’s big corporations were integrated into the global 
market, and profits dropped accordingly, and they were the major contributors to 
                                                 
58  Indonesia’s tax administration classifies tax revenues not only based on who is the bearer of the tax 
but who pays the tax money into the Government’s account. So, for example taxes with respect to salary 
and wages, are withheld by the employer (e.g., corporation, government agencies), although in reality 
they are personal income tax, i.e. the ultimate bearer of the tax is the employee (personal). Yet this tax is 
classified under the classification of ‘income tax generated from corporation’ rather than under the 
classification of ‘personal income tax’. There is no sufficient data available to accurately provide the 
amount of ‘corporate income tax’ paid as opposed to ‘income tax generated from corporation’. Similarly, 
it is impossible to put figure on ‘personal income tax’ as opposed to ‘income tax generated from personal 
taxpayers’: ‘... a direct break-up of income tax into personal and corporate income tax is not available in 
Indonesia’ (Francis 2012, p. 17). The IMF uses prediction to split personal income tax and corporate 
income tax for Indonesian data (IMF 2011a). 
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income tax. Indonesia’s tax revenue plummeted at a time that it needed a fiscal 
stimulus. This, as shown later, was one factor that contributed to the decision to adopt 
the HWI initiative. 
 
Figure 5.3 Indonesia: tax revenue contributions per taxpayer category, 2005-2011 
(as percentage of total revenue)  
Source: Directorate of Potential, Compliance and Revenue (2012) 
 
Relying on corporations as the dominant contributors to domestic revenue is a common 
phenomenon in developing countries (see Arnold (2012) for Indonesia; and Bird and 
Zolt (2004) for other developing countries). Among OECD countries, the average share 
of corporate tax from 1965-2010 was 8.8 per cent (OECD 2012b). The OECD countries 
with the highest proportions of personal income tax to total tax revenue are Denmark, 
New Zealand, and Australia, with 51.8, 45.2, and 39.5 per cent respectively.  
The main reason why corporate taxpayers play such an important role in the Indonesian 
tax system, and why the DGT devotes so much of its resources to this taxpaying group, 
was that the DGT sees more potential in focusing on corporate taxpayers in terms of 
securing tax revenue and meeting targets (RI002, tax official). As discussed earlier, 
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meeting targets is a priority for operational units wary of headquarters’ judgements on 
their performance. One respondent illustrated this by saying that: 
… the policy from our headquarters is driven by their revenue orientation; therefore 
strategies chosen [on the ground] are more on monitoring the corporate taxpayer [than 
individual taxpayers] …’ (RI013, tax official). 
A preference for dealing with corporate taxpayers was a common theme among 
respondents representing tax officials as a group. One respondent, formerly a high-
echelon official, said that: 
You can get Rp100 billion from only one corporate taxpayer, whereas you will need more 
than 100,000 individual taxpayers to only get Rp1 billion. (RI030, former tax official).  
A tax consultant and academic interviewed for this study criticised this way of thinking, 
describing the strategy as ‘looking for something that gives the greatest probability of a 
win’ (RI031, tax consultant). Nevertheless, Indonesian tax officials prefer to deal with a 
small number of taxpayers who contribute much, rather than with a huge number of 
taxpayers who contribute less to the tax revenue. Ultimately, the basis for measuring 
their performance is achieving a revenue target. This is not to say, however, that no 
other key performance indicators are used for measuring a unit’s performance, but 
reaching the target dominates the thinking of officials on the ground, derived from the 
policy from headquarters. 
The low rate of registration among individual taxpayers also signifies the substantial 
proportion of ‘shadow economy’ activity in Indonesia. Schneider and Bajada (2003) 
studied 18 countries in the Asia-Pacific region over a 10-year period (1990-2000) and 
found that the size of the shadow economy and its labour force are much higher in 
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developing economies than in more developed ones. They found that Indonesia’s 
informal labour force was 31.3 per cent of the size of the ‘official’ labour force (the 
second largest in the study, below only Thailand with 40 per cent), and well above the 
22 per cent average of the studied countries (Schneider & Bajada 2003, p. 25). This may 
explain why the proportion of registered individual taxpayers in Indonesia is so low 
(less than 15 per cent of the workforce population based on the World Bank’s 2011 
workforce data) (World Bank 2012)  
Low compliance in filing tax returns: A form of disengagement with the system 
Not filing a tax return that is required by law is the most obvious form of tax evasion. 
The annual compliance rate (income tax returns filed as a proportion of taxpayers 
required to do) has been less than 60 per cent in the last ten years (Figure 5.4). 
 
Figure 5.4 Indonesia: filing tax return compliance rate (2002-2011) 
Source: Directorate of Potential, Compliance and Revenue (2012) 
Note: The purple line indicates filed tax return as a percentage of filing-obliged taxpayers. 
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Failing to commit to this principal tax obligation may reflect a form of disengagement 
from the system59 (Braithwaite 1995; Braithwaite et al. 1994; Braithwaite et al. 2007), 
or alternatively a belief among Indonesians that tax officials do not care about filing 
from individual taxpayers when corporate taxpayers are likely to make a greater 
contribution to the revenue target. Either way, the attitude is one of paying little 
attention to tax obligations and treating such obligations dismissively. 
Tax rules for individual taxpayers have not been developed, the focus has always been on 
corporate taxpayer … the individual taxpayer has not been managed seriously. (RI024, 
tax official) 
Consistent with this interpretation of disengagement and dismissiveness are comments 
from respondents who were very conscious of Indonesian cynicism about the power of 
government and detected the psychological separation in Braithwaite and Braithwaite’s 
(2001, p. 411) description of taxpayers’ motivational posturing: ‘[a] wall has been 
constructed between the regulated and the regulator’. One tax official told his story 
about how difficult it was to meet his designated wealthy taxpayers, even just to 
introduce himself (and his team) as a client contact point: 
It’s really hard to meet them [HWIs] directly; at the very best we could only meet their 
confidants, or at least their tax consultants (RI002, tax official) 
I think they have had bad perceptions of the tax office. They could not believe it when we 
came [to introduce ourselves]. I just met with their confidants. They have built up 
relational distance with us [as tax officers] and the tax office. Our task, in my opinion, is 
                                                 
59  Disengagement with the tax system refers to an outlook not caring about doing the right thing by the 
tax authority and believing the tax authority cannot do anything to them if they choose not to comply with 
tax laws (Braithwaite 2009; Murphy 2002). 
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working out how to change the bad perceptions that already have existed in the minds of 
the public regarding tax officials and DGT as an institution. (RI022, tax official) 
There were taxpayers who had had unpleasant experiences of dealing with the tax office; 
it is hard [to be resolved] ... their hurt feelings are still there. (RI024, tax official) 
Long-held negative perceptions stem from the days when the tax system, DGT, and tax 
officials were widely known to be corrupt and coercive, prior to tax reforms in 1983 
(Toye & Moore 1998) and in the early 2000s (Rizal 2011). In an ‘Innovation for 
Successful Societies’ interview, a former director of the DGT noted that corrupt 
practices were the main problem that the DGT had to deal with in the past (Schalkwyk, 
2009, p. 2). 
One respondent reflected this by saying that it was very challenging to build a 
relationship with taxpayers who were traumatised by their experiences with the tax 
office (RI024, tax official). One taxpayer’s confidant described how, in the past, dealing 
with a tax official meant one must be ready to be extorted (RI038, taxpayer’s 
representative). This made the taxpayers wary, even when communication with tax 
officials was over a simple matter like lodging a tax return. 
The width of the tax gap 
As noted earlier, the tax gap refers to the difference between the amount of tax revenue 
that should have been collected and the amount of tax revenue that was actually 
collected (Brondolo et al. 2008). Most tax authorities examine their tax gap, with the 
goal of understanding which tax-related activities contribute most to it. Tax policy 
strategy is then directed at narrowing the tax gap. By measuring and tracking 
compliance over time through the tax gap, tax authorities are able to identify the 
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magnitude of non-compliance in different areas, as well as evaluate the effectiveness of 
strategies used to address these areas of non-compliance (HM Revenue & Customs 
2005; OECD 2001a). The DGT has not yet undertaken a systematic study to estimate 
the magnitude of the tax gap. The only known research on the tax gap in Indonesia to 
date was conducted by Marks (2003). Marks’ survey suggested that personal income tax 
revenue amounted to only 43 per cent of potential revenue.  
An alternative way to understand a country’s tax performance is by measuring its ‘tax 
effort’ (Stotsky & WoldeMariam 1997, p. 10). Tax effort refers to the ratio between the 
share of GDP and predicted taxable capacity. Taxable capacity refers to predicted tax-
to-GDP ratio, by taking into account a country’s specific macroeconomic, demographic, 
and institutional features (Le et al. 2012, p. 1). A country with a tax effort index above 1 
is regarded as a high tax effort country, meaning that the country utilises its tax base to 
increase tax revenue effectively (Stotsky & WoldeMariam 1997, p. 5). In contrast, a 
country with a tax effort index below 1 is categorised as a low tax effort country, 
meaning that the country has substantial potential to generate tax revenues that have not 
been developed. 
Le et al. (2012) conducted research using data from 110 developing and developed 
economies during 1994-2009 and categorised countries into four groups based on their 
tax efforts and tax collections (Table 5.3)60: low tax collection, low tax effort; high tax 
collection, high tax effort; low tax collection, high tax effort; and high tax collection, 
low tax effort (p. 21). According to this study, Indonesia is among the low tax 
                                                 
60  Le et al (2012) in this study used the value of one as the dividing point between high and low for the 
tax effort index and 18.31 % (median of the tax-to-GDP ratio in the sample of the study) for actual tax 
revenues. A country is regarded as a low-collection country if its actual collection is lower than 18.31 per 
cent, and regarded as a high-collection country if its collection is above this level (p. 1). 
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collection, low tax effort countries, which means that despite relatively substantial 
opportunity to collect tax, Indonesia still struggles in utilising its tax base to increase 
revenue. 
In summary, despite inherent problems faced by the Indonesian tax system discussed 
above, data presented from previous research indicated there is a potential for 
Indonesia’s tax revenue that can be explored: unregistered personal taxpayers, informal 
economy, and tax gap. In order to ensure that tax collections are performing efficiently, 
it is essential to have an effective tax administration system (Alink & van Kommer 
2011). One of the elements of a tax administration system is a tax authority which is 
responsible to administer tax law and regulation. The next chapter discusses Indonesia’s 
tax authority: the Directorate General of Taxation (DGT). 
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Table 5.3 Classification of Countries Based on Tax Efforts and Tax Collection 
(1994-2009)  
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5.1.3 Organisational structure of the Directorate General of Taxation (DGT) 
The institutional characteristics of the organisation responsible for a policy or program 
obviously affect policy implementation. Indonesia’s HWI unit operated within 
Indonesia’s tax authority, the DGT. The DGT is one of the 11 echelon I units within the 
Indonesian MoF portfolio (others include the Directorate General of Customs and 
Excise, the Fiscal Policy Agency, and the Directorate General of Treasury). 
The DGT is the biggest echelon I unit within the MoF. It is similar in size to the bigger 
units in other ministries in the Indonesian government. It is big not only in terms of the 
number of its employees compared to other echelon I units in the Indonesian ministries, 
but in terms of its geographical jurisdiction. With 31,736 employees in 2011 
(Directorate General of Taxes 2012), it accounts for almost 50 per cent of the MoF 
workforce (68,696 people) (Indonesia Ministry of Finance 2014). The DGT’s 
operational offices are located in almost all provinces, cities, and municipalities in 
Indonesia. The archipelagic nature of Indonesia, with nearly a thousand inhabited 
islands (UNDP 2013, p. 51), makes this geographical dispersion extraordinary, with 
profound consequences for administrative coordination and cooperation. Table 5.4 
illustrates the type and number of DGT operational offices in Indonesia.61 
As a central government agency, DGT is responsible for administering central 
government taxes that include income tax for both corporate and individual taxpayers, 
                                                 
61  As of 31 December 2012 there were 34 provinces, 97 cities, and 415 municipalities in Indonesia. 
There are no other echelon I units within the Indonesian government’s ministry offices that have 
operational units covering also many regions of Indonesia. 
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VAT, and stamp duty.62 Previously DGT also administered land and property taxes and 
land and property acquisition duties. The former were handed over to local governments 
in 2011, whereas the latter are being gradually handed over to local governments, 
starting in 2011 with an expected end date of 2014. 
Table 5.4 Types and Number of Operational Offices within DGT (as of 31 
December 2011) 
Type of office Number of 
offices 
Regional office 31 
Large taxpayers tax service office (LTO) 4 
Medium taxpayers tax service office (MTO) 28 
Small taxpayers tax service office (STO) 299 
Counselling and consultation office (CCO)  207 
Technical supporting unit 3 
Source: DGT (2012) 
Structurally, DGT is divided into policy-making and operational functions. Policy-
making functions are carried out at the DGT’s headquarters in Jakarta. In general, the 
main role of headquarters is formulating programs and strategies, and supervising the 
operational units’ program implementation. Headquarters has the power to evaluate the 
operational units’ performance in terms of their revenue target achievement and make 
decisions on rewards and punishments. 
At the operational level there are three kinds of unit: regional offices, TSO, and CCO. 
Regional offices (kanwil) are responsible for coordinating, supervising, and evaluating 
                                                 
62  Sub-national governments (provinces, cities, and municipalities) have the right to collect revenue from 
excises, duties or licence fees other than income taxes, VAT and stamp duty, which may include: business 
licence fees, restaurant and entertainment tax, advertisement excises, building permit excises, vehicle 
ownership duty, land and building taxes, and land and building acquisition duty.  
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TSOs’ performances under its supervision. Kanwil have authority to elucidate 
headquarters’ programs to make them more applicable to the local context. A kanwil is 
an echelon II unit. While formally a kanwil is an operational level office, similar to 
TSOs and CCOs, it is a higher-level echelon than TSOs (echelon III) and CCOs 
(echelon IV). As shown later, this influences the relationship between a kanwil and 
TSOs and CCOs. A kanwil is seen, and to some extent positions itself, at arm’s length 
from headquarters. For instance, revenue targets are allocated by headquarters 
regionally, but a kanwil has authority to cascade the target down to the TSOs under its 
supervision. Another example is that although final decisions to deploy staff are made 
by headquarters, a kanwil has a right to suggest to headquarters which staff should be 
rotated. More importantly, a kanwil chief has authority to evaluate a KPP chief’s 
performance, especially in terms of target achievement, and it is on the basis of this 
information that promotion or demotion is considered.  
TSOs (KPP) function as DGT’s front-liners in dealing with taxpayers. They are the first 
point of contact between taxpayers and DGT; they help taxpayers to register and lodge 
tax returns, provide advice and file objections (although the objection will be processed 
at regional office). KPP also has an audit function. This function is done by ‘functional’ 
staff, that is, tax auditors.63 In order to support its function in remote areas, particularly 
in providing counseling and consultation, a KPP may have CCOs under its structure 
(not all KPP have CCOs under their structure, especially those located in big cities). A 
CCO chief is responsible to the TSO chief.  
                                                 
63  As opposed to ‘structural’ staff, the term used for positions that are regarded as not requiring the 
specialised expertise of tax auditors and tax investigators. 
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This structure is important for understanding the pressure on the HWI unit in Indonesia 
and its ability to coordinate with other parts of the DGT. The HWI tax service office in 
Indonesia is an echelon III unit, similar to the other 330 TSOs (KPP) in terms of 
echelon level, function, and authority. What distinguishes LTO, MTO, and STO is the 
type of taxpayers they serve. LTOs, in which the HWI unit is included, serve big 
corporations (three LTOs are dedicated to this function) and HWIs (one HWI unit 
serves this function).64 All LTOs are structured under the Large Taxpayers Regional 
Office (LTRO), located in Jakarta. MTOs administer corporate taxpayers in one 
particular region; these corporations are not as big as those administered in LTOs. One 
regional office has one MTO under its supervision and several STOs, depending on the 
region’s economic potential. Lastly, STOs administer individual taxpayers, small 
enterprises, and other legal entities (e.g., small enterprises, foundations, co-operatives, 
firms) and are located in almost all cities and municipalities in Indonesia. 
Prior to the establishment of the HWI unit in 2009, all individual taxpayers were 
registered and administered in STOs (together with small enterprises), including those 
eventually categorised as HWIs. The very wealthy were mingled with general 
taxpayers, which made them feel ‘uncomfortable’ (RI016, tax ombudsman). However, 
as a pilot project, Indonesia’s HWI unit was established to only administer HWIs who 
resided in Jakarta (Indonesia’s capital). In other words, some other wealthy individuals 
who resided outside Jakarta were not yet included in the program. 
Understanding DGT’s organisational structure and how relationships are developed 
between different levels of the organisation helps explain the way in which the HWI 
                                                 
64  Before the HWI unit’s function and name was changed in 2012. 
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unit in Indonesia was implemented. Indonesia, according to Hofstede’s (1997) cultural 
typology, is a country with a ‘high power distance’ culture, that is, a culture where ‘the 
less powerful members of an institution and organization accept that power is 
distributed unequally’ (Hofstede & Bond 1984, p.419), and where formality is an 
important characteristic of the culture (Sharma 2003). These characteristics are 
associated with high social inequality and one person (or institution or organisational 
unit) having authority and power over others (Hofstede & Bond 1984). These 
characteristics describe the structure of DGT in social terms. As discussed later, 
differences in organisational level determined the pattern of relationships that the HWI 
unit and its officials had with DGT headquarters, regional offices, other TSOs around 
Indonesia, and other government and non-government institutions that contributed to 
the HWI unit’s performance. 
5.1.4 Organisational bottleneck in the DGT 
The organisational structure of the DGT was described in the previous sub-section. This 
structure is illustrated in a simplified diagram in Figure 5.5. It shows that the tax service 
office (TSO) or KPP is the lowest organisational unit within the DGT. When the HWI 
program was transferred to Indonesia, the organisational structure that was set up to 
accommodate the policy was a TSO – similar to existing TSOs, in terms of its structure, 
functions, and authorities. 
When three senior DGT officials, accompanied by an IMF advisor, were sent to 
Australia in 2008 to learn how regulatory arrangements dedicated to wealthy taxpayers 
were set up, they realised that organisational structure was one of the challenges the 
DGT might face in adopting the regulatory model Indonesia was choosing (RI041, tax 
official). In Australia, the HWI program was run by a unit called the HWI Taskforce, 
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which was regarded as ‘a special high level task force’ (Costello 1996, p. 7). Overall 
leadership of the taskforce was undertaken by a First Assistant Commissioner in its first 
years of operation and then by an Assistant Commissioner.65 This was considered as a 
high level structure, in that the position could represent the ATO in front of Senate 
committee hearings, for instance.66  
 
Figure 5.5 DGT organisational structure (simplified) 
 
A respondent in Australia suggested that a more authoritative power should be granted 
to an institutional arrangement such as the HWI unit due to the nature of its work. He 
asserted that dealing with HWI taxpayers is a ‘very sophisticated game’ and a ‘very 
complex game’ because ‘there will be a lot of stakeholders involved’ (RA003, tax 
official).  
                                                 
65  In New Zealand the HWI unit of Inland Revenue is placed in headquarters within the corporate group 
division. In the US’s IRS, HWI initiative is called the Global High Wealth Industry group and is housed 
in the IRS’s Large Business and International Division in headquarters; in South Africa’s SARS, the unit 
is called High Net-Worth Individual Sector and is hosted within SARS’ Large Business Centre (LBC) in 
headquarters; and in the UK the unit is called High Net Worth Unit under its Charity, Asset & Resident 
division, also in headquarters. All of HWI units are at high-levels within their parent organisations. 
66  A Senate public hearing on  3 November 2003 (Parliament of Australia 2000) with respect to the HWI 
Taskforce was attended by HWI Taskforce personnel rather than the ATO Executive Committee; this was 
not only due to the specificity of the subject but also reflected the acknowledgement of the higher-level of 
the unit.  
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Internally, dealing with HWIs also means dealing with different parts of the 
organisation within DGT. The reason is because dealing with HWIs involves different 
types of companies, in terms of their size and their products/services. Generally 
speaking, HWIs structure their businesses in such a way that the money circulates only 
among their closely tied companies in order to accumulate wealth (Carroll 2000). Tax 
authorities, which design their organisational structure around different types of 
taxpayers: small enterprises, medium-sized businesses, large businesses, and private 
individuals (Alink & van Kommer 2011, p. 235), tend to conduct separate compliance 
programs throughout the business lines, without trying to get a holistic picture of related 
entities with the same individuals in control.  
Tax administration that applies compliance programs based on taxpayers’ size will be 
very likely to overlook high-risk transactions involving HWI-related entities that 
crossed over various business lines (OECD 2009a). In order to get a global view of the 
overall configuration of highly complex group structures, different parts of the 
organisation should be involved in HWI tasks such as taxpayer profiling, risk assessing 
or auditing that may include all linked entities. This mechanism, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, is considered an efficient way to deal with HWIs and has been practised in 
Australia since the HWI initiative was introduced, and since by other countries (e.g., 
New Zealand, South Africa and the US). This coordinating role is one of the important 
features of an HWI unit, and it can only be articulated by placing this unit in a high 
profile position within a tax administration structurally, such as is the case at the ATO. 
Externally, dealing with HWI taxpayers also means dealing with stakeholders who have 
close relationships with taxpayers such as lawyers, accountants, tax consultants, 
investment advisers and other government and non-government agencies. With plentiful 
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financial resources on hand, wealthy taxpayers ‘have access to very smart lawyers and 
accountants’ (RA011, tax official) from whom they get advice on how to structure their 
business and how to manage their tax affairs. Therefore, it is also important for tax 
officials in the unit to have the same ‘level of confidence’ when dealing with this 
community. 
Dealing with other government and non-government agencies about HWI taxpayers is 
needed to gather information and build data-bases. Data acquired from other institutions 
may be very useful when a tax authority is assessing compliance with tax regulations. 
These agencies include vehicle registration authorities, land and property registration 
authorities, corporate, market and financial services regulators and anti-money 
laundering regulators. 
Given the fact that the operation of an HWI program involves various internal and 
external stakeholders, it is important for adopting countries such as Indonesia to learn 
what mechanisms should be applied in terms of organisational structure. Learning 
should include, for instance, whether or not that unit will be structurally constrained 
when dealing with other parts of the tax office and with other institutions. A high-
profile organisational structure for the HWI unit will provide it with more authority and 
give confidence to the staff when dealing with high-end taxpayers and their advisers 
(see for instance OECD 2009, chap. 3; Alink & van Kommer 2011, pp. 278–281). 
Unfortunately, as described later, this was not the case in the Indonesian context. 
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Establishing an HWI unit in Indonesia at a similar structural level as in Australia is not 
a simple matter, since the organisational structure of the MoF (and other ministries) is 
strictly regulated by a presidential decree.67 One respondent explained this situation: 
They [the Australian Tax Office] have a taskforce, but what can we have here? Because 
of nomenclature constraint or anything else, to establish a [new] directorate [at the 
headquarters] or taskforce [an ad hoc structure] is impossible [due to limited time 
available]; therefore we established a tax service office. (RI009, tax official) 
The time available in 2009 for DGT to propose a flagship program (under the ‘quick-
win programs’ concept – see section 6.1) was very limited. Although organisational 
structure seems a simple matter, this results in important consequences in an Indonesian 
context. The vast majority of respondents from the HWI unit argued that the unit was 
similar to other TSOs, although its tasks were actually bigger. ‘Substantially’, one 
respondent said, ‘there is no significant difference with other tax service offices’ 
(RI027, tax official). What the respondent meant was that the unit’s power was similar 
to that of other TSOs. That is, because the HWI unit was an echelon III level unit, like 
other TSOs, it faced ‘structural challenges’ (RI041, tax official) when dealing with other 
units at a similar level, let alone at higher levels.  
Dealing with taxpayers 
When dealing with HWI taxpayers, whose wealth and ‘social capital’ (see for instance 
Bourdieu 1986 for different kinds of capital) made them formidable opponents, HWI 
                                                 
67  President decree number 47 of 2009 determines the maximum number of directorates in one 
directorate general. If the DGT wanted to adopt an organisational structure for the HWI Taskforce such as 
that in the ATO, then the unit should have been placed at its headquarters at least in echelon II 
(directorate). Changing the number of directorates in one directorate general is not a simple process, and 
the time available for DGT to establish the unit was very limited. 
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unit staff felt a ‘psychological barrier’ (RI002, tax official). Bourdieu (1986) defined the 
concept of social capital as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships 
of mutual acquaintance or recognition’ (p. 248). Through social capital, Bourdieu 
argued, actors have more direct access to economic resources that benefit them than 
other people; can increase their cultural capital through contact with experts or 
individuals of refinement; or affiliate themselves with institutions that confer valued 
credentials (Portes 2000). These elements that a wealthy individual can muster created a 
power gap between wealthy taxpayers and tax officials who were relatively young and 
inexperienced. 
One respondent reflected upon his feelings when dealing with an HWI by saying that 
‘there is a psychological barrier when dealing with taxpayers ... a sense of inferiority’ 
(RI020, tax official). This situation is understandable as the vast majority of HWI 
taxpayers in Indonesia have strong connections with high-level officials in other 
institutions (either civil or military) or political parties, people who would protect their 
interests or help them when they were dealing with government agencies (RI015, 
RI023, tax advisers; RI002, RI020, RI021, tax officials). HWIs’ relationships with 
someone with more authority (e.g. government ministers) than the HWI unit officials 
put staff in an ‘inferior’ position.  
Dealing with other sections of the DGT 
Similar problems occurred when the unit was dealing with other parts of the DGT. In 
the first few months of the HWI unit’s operation, following the Director General’s 
verbal instruction, the unit attempted to develop a taxpayers’ database. In doing so they 
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asked for information from other TSOs that administered information about HWIs’ 
related entities.68 As ‘there is no difference’ in terms of authority between the HWI unit 
and other TSOs, such dealings were difficult. The unit did not have sufficient authority 
to force other TSOs to comply with its requests, nor to extract information from other 
units in the DGT at higher levels (e.g., regional offices or directorates at headquarters) 
(RI024, tax official).  
This impediment was multiplied by the fact that the considerable dispersion of the 
DGT’s operational offices (TSOs) has made administrative coordination and 
cooperation between the HWI unit (located in Jakarta) and other TSOs around Indonesia 
very challenging.  
Dealing with other institutions  
The other impediment that the HWI unit in Indonesia had to experience was in dealing 
with other institutions either within the MoF (e.g., other directorate generals) or other 
ministries. Developing an HWI taxpayer database meant the unit had to gather 
information from various institutions. The principles regulating ‘who can contact 
whom’ in Indonesian bureaucratic culture mean that when two different institutions, 
even if they are under the same umbrella (e.g., one ministry), communicate with each 
other they must be represented at the same level of organisation. Thus, it is regarded as 
unacceptable conduct for an echelon III unit (e.g., in the DGT) to send a letter to an 
                                                 
68  In Indonesia taxpayers are administered in a particular TSO based on their residence or any specific 
criterion such as business categories (especially for corporations). All taxpayers’ information is 
centralised in the headquarters. Each TSO is granted access only to information related to taxpayers 
registered in its office. The alternative way to get information in relation to taxpayers registered in other 
TSOs is by requesting needed information from relevant TSOs or asking headquarters. The later 
alternative is the last resort because of the bureaucratic procedures that must be followed. 
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echelon II unit, even in the same ministry portfolio (e.g., Directorate General of 
Customs), let alone in a different ministry (e.g., Ministry of Industry and Trade). This 
organisational bottleneck hindered the work of the HWI unit in constructing a more 
comprehensive HWI database through collecting data from other institutions and 
developing an integrated approach that links all entities related to a particular HWI. 
Summary of Indonesia’s tax system 
Indonesia’s tax administration has been facing pressures from two different directions. 
As the institution which is the primary revenue generator for the state’s budget, DGT 
has been under pressure to maintain revenue targets through a top-down approach. On 
the other hand, the tax system still has fundamental problems of low tax compliance, as 
reflected in three widely used indicators: a low number of registered individual 
taxpayers compared with estimated potential registrations; a low proportion of 
registered taxpayers filing tax returns; and a small amount of tax actually collected 
compared with the tax potentially collectable (a wide tax gap).  
With respect to the cultural background that greeted the introduction of an HWI unit in 
Indonesia, three observations are particularly important. First, the main focus of any 
efforts made by the DGT to improve revenue collection was pursuit of revenue targets 
determined through a ‘top-down’ decree rather than a ‘bottom-up’ process. The reason 
was because revenue targets were (and are) politically sensitive, not only for lower-level 
tax officials (chiefs of regional offices or tax service offices) but for top-level officials 
(i.e., the Director General). Revenue achievement dominates principles of purpose for 
tax policy in the Indonesia context. This is not to say, however, that other principles are 
ignored completely. Service provision, efficiency, and good governance are part of 
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Indonesia’s tax policy principles, but revenue has been the dominant narrative in its 
policy deliberations and priorities. 
Second, the strong demand to achieve tax revenues led to tension about what should be 
happening on the ground. Some tax officials clearly believed that attention needed to be 
given to building better relationships with taxpayers. Others were drawn to the older 
methods of coercion and used whatever methods they perceived were needed to meet 
the revenue target assigned to them. This suggested there may be principles in conflict, 
at least at some levels of the DGT. A related issue that emerged from my analysis was 
the geographically dispersed nature of the many offices of the DGT in Indonesia. The 
challenge of coordination for the DGT with respect to the introduction of new policy 
cannot be underestimated. 
Third, the organisational structure of the DGT proved to be an impediment to the 
implementation of the HWI initiative; it was not flexible enough to tolerate the 
structural changes required for implementing the policy. Placed in the lowest-level in 
DGT’s organisational structure, the HWI unit faced challenges when dealing with 
wealthy taxpayers, with other units within the DGT, and with other institutions. 
5.2 Policy transfer of the HWI initiative in Indonesia 
This section describes various sources of influence that led to the decision to transfer 
HWI policy to Indonesia, actors’ awareness of the existence of the same policy 
elsewhere, and identification of actors involved in the policy transfer process. 
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5.2.1 Global influence and local pressure: rationales for transfer 
Three sources of influence led the Indonesian government to adopt an HWI policy. The 
first was a study commissioned by the OECD’s Forum on Tax Administration (FTA) on 
tax compliance issues of HWIs worldwide. The idea for the study was raised in the 
FTA’s fourth meeting in Cape Town, South Africa in January 2008 (OECD 2009a). In 
March 2008 the OECD set up a ‘focus group’ consisting of tax officials from 14 
countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the UK and the USA) to carry out 
the study (OECD 2009a).  
The study produced recommendations for best practices for dealing with HWIs. 
The experience of countries that have already implemented some or all of those best 
practices suggests that firm action when combined with good compliance activity and 
good service can significantly improve compliance by HNWIs [high net-worth 
individuals]. (OECD 2009, p. 3) 
One of the recommendations was for tax authorities to establish special units within 
their structures, but the OECD had no power to mandate this. The role of international 
tax forums, such as the OECD’s FTA or SGATAR for Asia and the Pacific region, is 
more ‘to promote dialogue between tax administrations and to identify good (or best 
practices) tax administration practices’ (Pinto & Sawyer 2011, p. 27) rather than to 
impose practices on its members or other countries. Actors in the Indonesian tax 
administration acknowledged inspiration from the work of the FTA in the establishment 
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of the HWI unit in DGT.69 This appeared in a document produced by DGT and was 
confirmed in a respondent’s response to my question: 
Special treatment for high wealth individual Taxpayers [sic] has been studied by various 
international forums such as the OECD...and SGATAR.... (HWI TSO 2010a, p. 10) 
In terms of policy we learnt from other countries ... we also read the OECD document. 
(RI020, tax official) 
The second influence from the global sphere came from a so-called ‘invisible force’ 
(Rose 2002, p. 9) pushing policy-makers to pay attention to what their counterparts in 
other countries were doing. Indonesia wanted to be part of the world society (Meyer et 
al. 1997) of modern tax administration. As discussed in Chapter 1, a desire to conform 
to a world-wide model of good government has contributed to the convergence of 
institutional structures globally. The Indonesian tax administration was an example of 
this. The DGT’s former vision statement revealed the organisation’s desire to become a 
modern institution: ‘Be a model of a government institution that implements a world-
class taxation management system’ (Purnomo 2004, p. 219).70 
                                                 
69  Although the report was published in 2009, in October 2008 FTA published a discussion paper which 
described the project and invited public comments. FTA also sent questionnaires to tax authorities that 
had already implemented HWI initiatives. There was international awareness and dialogue around the 
project before the final report was published. 
70  The vision was then revised to: ‘To be the best tax administration in South-east Asia’ (Directorate 
General of Taxation n.d.) 
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High-level officials in the Indonesia MoF (RI018) and DGT (RI030) whom I 
interviewed noted that ‘modern’ was a key word that distinguished tax administration 
reform in 2002 from the previous reforms (1980s and 1990s).71 
The 2002 tax reform was substantially very different from the previous reforms. What 
was that substantial difference? Previously [reforms] did not clearly mention: 
‘modernisation’. ‘Modern’ in what sense? That is, by adopting universal principles of 
‘good governance’ that have been widely adopted by other countries. (RI018, former tax 
official) 
If we looked at the HWI program, we could not see it as a stand-alone policy. It is part of 
a process ... a process to be a modern tax administration. (RI030, former tax official) 
The third source of influence for establishing an HWI unit came from the GFC that 
occurred in the last quarter of 2008. In the previous section of this chapter I 
demonstrated that revenue from taxes has been the mainstay of the Indonesian State 
budget. However, the GFC affected Indonesia’s economy in different ways (Djaja 
2009), including the revenue side of the country’s budget. According to Djaja (2009, 
pp. 2–5), some sectors that contributed the most to the Indonesian economy such as 
plantations, mining (including oil and gas), the manufacturing industry and to some 
degree the trade sector were vulnerable to external shocks when demands from the 
international market eased as the global turmoil worsened in 2008. Consequently, 
income that Indonesian corporations (or corporations that reside in Indonesia) made 
from their businesses declined. As business income declined due to global economic 
conditions, government anticipated a decline in tax revenue from corporations 
(corporate income taxes), the mainstay of tax revenue. The MoF and DGT tried to find a 
                                                 
71  Tax administration reform in 2002 was a stepping stone for DGT reform, including the establishment 
of LTOs, restructuring of TSOs, and ultimately the establishment of HWI tax service offices. 
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way to reduce high dependence on the corporate sector for tax revenue through 
changing course to address the individual taxpayer sector seriously for the first time. 
The change of direction was welcomed by tax officials, who reported that the individual 
taxpayer sector had ‘been abandoned for many years in the Indonesia tax system’ 
(RI027, tax official) and recognised that ‘Indonesian income tax law gives more 
attention to corporations than to individual taxpayers’ (RI009, tax official), as also 
appeared in a DGT document: 
The establishment of the HWI Tax Service Office is an integral part of the modernisation 
of tax administration that has been undertaken by the DGT since 2002. At the start of the 
modernisation process, DGT only focused on corporate taxpayers. Since 2009 ... DGT 
broadened its focus to include individual taxpayers. This practice has been adopted in 
other countries, which were mostly generating revenues from individual taxpayers. (HWI 
TSO 2010b, p. 7). 
In contrast to income tax revenue from corporations, which was volatile in response to 
global economic crises, personal income taxes were relatively stable, at least in the short 
term. A senior official told the story of the initial idea behind the HWI initiative. 
According to my knowledge, this HWI unit was formed to reverse the distribution of tax 
revenue that had been dominated by corporate income tax. The Minister [of Finance] 
wanted personal income tax to contribute more to the tax revenue. This idea came from 
the high proportion of personal income tax revenue in other countries, especially 
developed countries. It was the initial idea. Of course there were other reasons behind it. 
(RI009, tax official) 
… the structure of our tax revenue is highly skewed to CIT, unlike developed countries 
that we went to [when we made study visits], where the role of personal income tax was 
dominant. (RI020, tax official) 
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Domestically, pressure that led to the decision to adopt an HWI policy came from the 
Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In July 2009, Indonesia was 
scheduled to hold its second direct presidential election, after the New Order era. SBY 
was running for his second and final term as President.72  
As mentioned in earlier chapters, in preparation for the election and the last year of his 
presidential term, SBY introduced a series of quick-win initiatives. Framed by the 
bigger theme of bureaucratic reform, the quick-win program resulted in a range of 
flagship programs from different government agencies. These program allowed ‘the 
benefit…[to] be felt immediately by the stakeholders’ and the general public, and were 
chosen ‘to provide a positive image for the implementation of bureaucracy reform’ 
(Indonesia Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucracy Reform 2011, p. 3). A 
document revealed instructions to government agencies to ‘set “quick-wins” [programs] 
that are expected to increase credibility, reputation and trust in your [government 
agency] in the eyes of the stakeholders [public]’ (UPRBN Technical Team – Ministry of 
Administrative and Bureaucracy Reform 2012, p. 18). The initiatives could be in 
different forms, depending on the core business of the institutions. For example, the 
Indonesian National Police proposed, among other things, a quick-win program by 
which procedures for someone to get a driving license would be more transparent (State 
Minister for the Empowerment of State Apparatus 2009). 
                                                 
72  The result was that SBY returned to the office with a landslide election; won by gaining almost 60.80 
per cent of votes. 
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My research revealed that the DGT was given opportunity to nominate a program that 
would support the President’s agenda. In a DGT leadership meeting in late April 2008, 
the idea of establishing an HWI unit was raised: 
The idea to establish a program for managing high wealth individual taxpayers first 
appeared in the Board of Directors meeting in the DGT to implement the quick-wins 
program. (DGT 2011, p. 1) 
Events presented above are consistent with the literature that suggests that a fiscal crisis 
(e.g., Berry & Berry 1992; Sharman 2010), global networks (e.g., Cao 2010; Gilardi & 
Wasserfallen 2009), and the political imperative to ‘do something’ (Sharman 2010) are 
factors contributing to the introduction of new tax policy.  
In the Indonesian context, the fiscal crisis came in the form of anticipated declining tax 
revenue due to global financial turmoil. Global networks took the form of the epistemic 
community of tax experts housed in the FTA and the dialogue that took place around 
the HWI compliance project. The political imperative to ‘do something’ took the form 
of nominating flagship programs for the presidential election in 2009. These events, 
however, by themselves do not prove that the HWI unit in Indonesia is a case of policy 
transfer in Dolowitz and Marsh’s terms. 
Dolowitz (1997) argued that demonstrating actors’ awareness of and interest in the 
policy and institutions of other systems is important to prove the occurrence of transfer: 
‘Without proving that actors were aware of other models and interested in them, even if 
policies look alike[,] it is not possible to prove this was the result of transfer’ (p. 24). 
While the OECD provided a forum for widespread discussion, the evidence is not yet 
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present to show that those who decided to pursue the HWI initiative in Indonesia were 
also the people familiar with the development abroad. 
5.2.2 Indonesian actors’ awareness of and interest in HWI initiatives elsewhere 
Indonesian policy-makers’ level of awareness of HWI operations elsewhere is indicated 
in the following quote from DGT reports: 
In some countries (such as Australia, Canada and France), individual taxpayers who fall 
into the high wealth category are specifically administered by tax authorities through the 
establishment of a taskforce [special unit]. (Indonesia HWI Unit 2010, sec. Executive 
Summary) 
My interviews with high ranking officials similarly revealed actors’ awareness of the 
HWI initiatives operating elsewhere, with particular reference to the ATO’s HWI 
Taskforce and the OECD report in which the operations of such initiatives in other 
countries were discussed.  
When we came up with the idea to establish an HWI unit, we looked to Australia. We 
understood that they already had a model. A model used for managing tax compliance of 
HWI taxpayers. (RI030, former tax official) 
Well … I already knew, which was actually somewhat influential to us in terms of our 
high-wealth individuals initiative … for administering personal income tax of the very 
wealthy, [is] Australia’s model, I knew [about the HWI dedicated unit] from there 
[Australia]. (RI037, former tax official) 
Both the respondents quoted above held strategic positions in DGT at the time of the 
establishment of the HWI unit. Their statements, therefore, represented actors’ 
awareness of the existence of the model elsewhere. Another senior official commented: 
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‘As far as I know … what people mostly referred to [with this initiative] is Australia’ 
(RI009, tax official).  
Interest in the Australian program was manifested by the DGT sending a delegation 
consisting of three senior officials (echelon III level) to the ATO in December 2008. 
The delegation spent five days (from 8 to 12 December 2008) in the ATO’s HWI 
Taskforce southern region office in Box Hill (Melbourne) to learn about Australia’s 
HWI Taskforce.73 One of the delegation members revealed: 
Yes … we knew that Australia had a model for their HWIs. That’s why we were sent 
there to learn about the model. We had a presentation about their HWI taskforce: its 
structure, its functions, how it worked, its results, etc. Our main task was writing a report 
from that visit and presenting it to the Committee.74 (RI041, tax official) 
On this evidence, policy transfer is an appropriate model to use for the establishment of 
Indonesia’s HWI unit. At the same time, forces of globalisation were at work in a 
broader sense in Indonesia that affected its tax administration. The path had been laid 
for establishing a HWI unit within DGT in 2002 by establishing two LTOs dedicated to 
big corporate taxpayers (RI030, tax official). A senior tax official told this story in the 
interview with Schalkwyk of Princeton University’s Oral History Program (Schalkwyk 
2009, pp. 1& 5): 
In my experience, I think actually before the Ministry of Finance started its reform, DG 
Tax has [sic] started earlier, around 2002, our own reform which we call [sic] it Tax 
Administration Modernization. So that was the first time we established a new [tax 
                                                 
73  One other delegation member had left the DGT and lived abroad, and the other was unable to 
participate in the interview. 
74  The Committee was called the Committee for the Preparation of the Establishment of a High Wealth 
Individuals Tax Service Office. 
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service] office, large tax-payer office [LTO], which is like a starting of a pilot project of 
an ideal office for the future. So we started in 2002 and then step-by-step, one by one, we 
add more and more offices to be modernized. (p. 1) 
When we modernized [these] two offices [LTOs], the modernization of the offices was 
the beginning of everything. (p. 5) 
As already noted, Indonesia’s tax administration system wanted to be seen as a modern 
tax administration by implementing certain measures that reflected state-of-the-art 
administrative arrangements: ‘… lean organisational structure, information technology 
that facilitates better service and monitoring, and professional human resources with a 
strict code of conduct…’ (Purnomo 2004, p. 219).  
5.2.3 Identified agents of transfer 
Richard Common (2001, p. 30) has argued that in the case of policy transfer it may be 
difficult to identify with any precision where policy-makers acquired ideas, policies and 
lessons, or even which actors were involved in policy transfer. In the context of the 
HWI initiative in Indonesia, there is evidence of three actors playing an important role: 
the DGT, the IMF as an adviser, and the ATO as an adviser. 
Domestically, bureaucrats/civil servants and tax officials can be identified as agents of 
transfer. They set the policy agenda in that DGT chose the policy that they took to the 
MoF to get approval. DGT then implemented the HWI policy. 
Once DGT had chosen the HWI unit as its quick-wins program, it realised it needed 
assistance from parties in the international community who had access to experience 
and knowledge. The second actor identified as playing a role in transferring the HWI 
program in Indonesia was the IMF (through its representative in Indonesia). 
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The IMF played the role of facilitator in relation to the HWI unit. It had operated as an 
initiator when Indonesia reformed its tax administration after the Asian economic crisis 
in 1997. The IMF initiated the restructuring of tax offices; the Fund’s loan was 
conditional on such reform (Brondolo et al. 2008; Rizal 2011). A senior official 
revealed the background of the 2002 tax administration reform (Schalkwyk 2009, p. 1). 
It was part of a Letter of Intent with the IMF (International Monetary Fund). We had a 
crisis here in 1998, and we had difficulty – I mean the government of Indonesia had some 
difficulty with our economy. There is an agreement; I think we borrowed some money … 
the IMF was kind of overseeing our reform. If I may say, the trigger is basically by the 
Letter of Intent or commitment with the IMF program. The IMF kind of proposed making 
this new office [LTOs], because they are very concerned regarding our capability to 
generate revenue. I mean, at that time, the government of Indonesia has to be able to 
generate its own domestic revenue. 
The official from the DGT saw the contribution from the IMF quite differently in 
relation to the HWI unit: 
The idea was coming from us (RI020). 
We utilise [them]… [We told them,] ‘We want to establish an HWI unit’. [Respondent 
asked me] Do you know…what advantages do the IMF, World Bank and other 
International agencies have? They have good networks. So when we asked [about] the 
HWI initiative, they immediately contacted their networks [to know about] where the 
HWI programs exist; what their success stories were; what did not work and so on. Well 
… those became inputs for us. (RI030, former tax official) 
The IMF provided assistance through its country advisor who was posted at the DGT. 
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IMF provided advisors to aid in formation and development of the dedicated office and to 
review progress and make recommendations. A number of dedicated visits were made by 
IMF officials from May 2009 to February 2011.75 (RI040, international organisation) 
The Fund’s adviser also accompanied the DGT delegation to Melbourne to learn about 
the program (DGT 2011). The role of the IMF continued even after the HWI unit had 
been established by providing technical assistance, reviewing progress of the program 
(IMF 2009) and also providing recommendations when in 2011 the DGT planned to 
expand the initiative to other regions outside Jakarta (IMF 2011c). This plan, however, 
was cancelled for ‘political reasons’ (RI041, tax official). 
The third actor playing a critical role in the transfer process was the ATO. In his 2010 
Annual Report, the ATO Commissioner reported on the Office’s role in assisting the 
establishment of the HWI office in Indonesia (ATO 2010, p. 123): 
Our work with Indonesia assisted their successful establishment of the Indonesian 
Directorate General of Taxation’s High Wealth Individual Office.... 
Australia had a close relationship with Indonesia in terms of economic cooperation, 
manifested in the establishment of AIPEG. AIPEG was aimed at assisting the 
Indonesian government in achieving its economic goals by strengthening the 
government’s capability for policy formulation, coordination and implementation in 
areas affecting the national budget and macroeconomic performance (AIPEG 2010a). 
Australia provided assistance to Indonesia in its tax reforms. 
                                                 
75  A DGT document revealed that dedicated visits to Indonesia by IMF officials started in January 2009 
(Large Taxpayer Regional Office 2010, p. 38) after the idea to establish an HWI unit was raised in DGT’s 
board of directors meeting in April 2008. 
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Many donors have assisted DGT in it’s [sic] reforms. However, AusAID holds the unique 
position of being the only international donor that has provided continuous support to 
DGT’s transformation efforts. The current support vehicle is AIPEG which is assisting 
DGT to improve its tax administration and management capacity and to implement new 
initiatives. This continuous support … has led to the development of very strong 
relationship between DGT and AIPEG advisers, with AusAID now being regarded as the 
most consistent supporter of the DGT modernization program. (AIPEG 2010b, n.p.) 
Under this partnership framework, senior ATO officials were deployed at the DGT. 
Their role was to provide technical advice in areas such as transfer pricing, tax auditing, 
and risk assessment. A seconded official from the ATO also acted as a liaison officer 
between the ATO and the DGT when the DGT decided to learn about Australia’s HWI 
taskforce. 
We promote good governance in tax administration globally. We facilitate international 
secondments and arrange for our technical speakers to address overseas training 
programs. We also participate in the Australian Government’s capacity-building 
programs in countries such as Indonesia … working closely with AusAID and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (ATO 2010, p. 123) 
Senior HWI Taskforce staff made a series of visits76 to the DGT to share their 
knowledge about the HWI program, particularly in terms of its operation at the very 
early stage: client identification, risk assessment method, information technology used, 
staffing, and information security. A respondent from ATO’s HWI Taskforce recalled 
his trip to Indonesia to share his knowledge about forming an HWI unit.   
                                                 
76  The first visit was conducted from 14 to 19 June 2009 when two senior HWI Taskforce officials 
visited DGT’s HWI tax service office to give presentations about the HWI Taskforce. The second visit 
was on 24 June 2009 when another two senior ATO officials accompanied by the IMF Resident Advisor 
visited DGT’s HWI unit. 
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I think when [RA005] and I went over … that was just after or just before DGT really 
sort of started doing this … put in place this unit. (RA004, tax official) 
I was in the high wealth individual taskforce for fifteen years and I built up a lot of 
expertise … and that might be one reason why [RA004] and I went to Indonesia because 
we have that experience. (RA005, tax official) 
A high-level official serving in the DGT at the time acknowledged Australia’s role: 
We wanted to find a way for making [wealthy] individual taxpayers pay their fair share of 
taxes, we did benchmarking [of the policy] and we saw the model of the high wealth 
individual initiative [in Australia]. They [wealthy taxpayers] are monitored by a special 
unit…. (RI037, former tax official) 
In summary, the above discussion shows that three levels of influence operated in the 
policy transfer of the HWI initiative into the Indonesian tax administration: 
international, national (domestic), and organisational. Table 5.5 summarises the 
rationales for why Indonesian actors engaged in the policy transfer of the HWI 
initiative, the actors involved in the process, and the primary source of learning about 
the policy. 
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Table 5.5 Policy Transfer of the HWI Initiative in Indonesia 
Why engage in transfer? Who was involved in 
the transfer? 
What was transferred? 
 
Prime source of 
learning 
 
 
International factors: 
 Recommendation of 
‘best practice’ in 
managing tax 
compliance of HWIs 
appears in FTA study 
report (voluntary) 
 Desire to conform to 
‘modern society’ 
(voluntary)  
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic factors: 
 Political imperative to 
‘do something’ 
(coercive)  
 Fiscal crisis (coercive) 
 
 
 
 
Organisational factors: 
 Organisational mission 
for collecting tax 
revenue 
 
International actors: 
  IMF as advisor  
 ATO as advisor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic actors: 
 Politician 
(Indonesian 
president)  
 Bureaucrats 
(Ministry of 
finance and DGT 
senior staff) 
 
Organisational actors 
 Senior officials 
sent to Australia 
 Official at DGT 
headquarters 
 
 Regulatory 
arrangement for 
managing tax 
compliance of the very 
wealthy taxpayers 
(HWI unit) 
 
 Australia’s 
HWI Taskforce 
    
 
5.3 Indonesia’s HWI initiative: example of an unsuccessful transfer? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, for assessing policy, Bovens et al. (2001) distinguished 
between its programmatic and political dimensions. Since this research focused on the 
implementation stage of a transferred policy, the argument for the success or otherwise 
of the HWI policy was made on programmatic grounds rather than the political grounds. 
I claim that the HWI unit was programmatically unsuccessful.  
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In assessing policy from a programmatic perspective, the focus is on policy 
effectiveness, efficiency and resilience. In this research, a programmatic perspective on 
policy assessment included three aspects: outcome, resources, and operation (Marsh & 
McConnell 2010), with key questions asked about each aspect as follows.  
 Outcome: Did the policy achieve the intended outcomes? 
 Resources: Was the policy an efficient use of resources? 
 Operational: Was the policy made operational in a way that was consistent with 
achieving its objectives? 
5.3.1 Outcomes: Did the HWI unit achieve expected outcomes? 
The HWI unit’s performance with respect to program achievement was disappointing. 
The HWI unit was located within the Large Taxpayers Regional Office (LTRO) 
portfolio. The LTRO contributed 37 per cent (247.55 trillion Rupiah) of the total tax 
revenue of 669.54 trillion Rupiah collected by the DGT in 201177 (Directorate of 
Potential, Compliance and Revenue 2012, n.p.). The HWI unit, however, contributed 
only 625.12 billion Rupiah (0.25 per cent of LTRO revenue). This insignificant amount 
of revenue compared to other LTOs (and even certain STOs78) had become a source of 
criticism in every national coordinating meeting (rakornas) and a source of pressures 
for HWI unit staff. Figure 5.6 illustrates revenue contributed by the HWI unit compared 
to other LTOs in 2011. 
                                                 
77  This was the last fiscal year of the HWI unit operating as a dedicated unit solely for administering 
HWI taxpayers. In 2012, the HWI unit’s name and function were changed (see Chapter 8, section 8.4) 
because it began administering tax for enterprises as well as HWIs. 
78  KPP Pratama Banda Aceh, an STO in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province, for instance, collected 
966.05 billion Rupiah in 2011 (Directorate of Potential, Compliance and Revenue 2012, n.p.). 
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A report from the MoF office described pressures received by the HWI unit staff 
(General Secretary of Ministry of Finance 2010, p. 20). 
The relatively small tax revenue the unit generated compared to other units under the 
Large Taxpayer Regional Office [portfolio] has put staff [at the HWI unit] under 
considerable psychological pressure; the contribution was only 0.23 per cent [in 2010] of 
the total tax revenue of Large Taxpayer Regional Office ... Staff in the HWI unit 
experienced pressures such as the threat of redeployment [to rural areas] if the unit did 
not meet targets and internal pressure from the DGT headquarters to continuously 
increase tax revenue. These pressures worsened the working climate for officials serving 
in the unit. 
 
Figure 5.6 Revenue contribution of the HWI unit compared to other LTOs within 
LTRO portfolio (2011) 
Source: DGT (2012), author’s calculation. 
 
5.3.2 Resources: Was the HWI unit an efficient use of resources? 
The IMF advised on the formation of Indonesia’s HWI unit; in its report, it suggested 
that the HWI regulatory model that had been established in the Jakarta area had 
potential to be expanded to other regional offices across Indonesia (IMF 2011c, pt. III). 
The initial HWI unit only had jurisdiction for Jakarta; therefore, HWIs residing outside 
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Jakarta were untouched by this initiative. If this idea was realised each regional office 
would have one unit dedicated to administering HWIs in its region.  This idea, however, 
was not followed up. An internal DGT document revealed the following reasons for not 
following up this recommendation (Directorate General of Taxation n.d., p. 6): 
As the result of our cost-benefit analysis suggested … establishing a new unit specifically 
intended for administering HWI taxpayers is not the right option ... From the collection 
cost efficiency ratio (CCER) point of view, administering HWI taxpayers by establishing 
dedicated units [such as the one in Jakarta] in other regions ... is inefficient. 
The same opinion was expressed by a prominent Indonesian tax consultant (RI003), 
who was concerned that the investment required to establish regional HWI units would 
be greater than the tax the unit could collect. 
5.3.3 Operations: Was the HWI unit made operational in a way that was 
consistent with achieving its objectives? 
When Australia introduced an HWI initiative in its administration, subsequently 
acknowledged by the OECD as an effective measure for improving tax compliance of 
HWIs, the objective was not merely generating revenue from this segment. The 
Australian HWI initiative’s primary goals were to gain a better understanding of HWIs 
and their related entities and act accordingly. The follow-up actions from that 
understanding could be compliance activities (e.g., auditing or prosecution) or 
administrative and legislative proposals to address tax minimisation practices 
undertaken by HWIs or their entities (The Auditor General 2000, p. 10 ). 
Indonesia’s HWI unit did not operate to the standard of its Australian counterpart. The 
following quotes are views from different actors about the operation of the Indonesian 
HWI unit. 
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It’s like a toothless tiger. (RI001, tax consultant) 
This unit cannot stand alone, right? It must be supported by other elements that must be 
created, so that the unit can be successful. If there are no such elements, as it is now, it's 
useless. (RI008, tax consultant) 
Why do you think the HWI unit is considered unsuccessful? The HWI unit cannot 
function optimally, because it cannot see taxpayers and their business activities as a 
whole [holistically]. Because it could be that all their lifestyles are financed by the 
company, all their investments are made on behalf of the company and the unit has no 
access on it. (RI029, former tax official) 
One high-level official commented that Indonesia’s HWI unit did not meet expectation 
in relation to achieving its higher-order objective: enhancing the confidence of the 
Indonesian taxpaying community that the DGT’s compliance activities were directed at 
the wealthy as well as ordinary taxpayers (RI033, tax official). The unit was merely 
intended to generate revenue, which, as shown above, was not achieved either. 
5.4 Discussion and analysis: the design of the transfer of HWI policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1(a): Policy transfer of the HWI initiative in Indonesia occurred due to 
a political imperative to “do something” to satisfy powerful 
actors who used the policy to advance their political agenda of 
being recognised as having a modern bureaucracy. 
Hypothesis 1(b): Policy transfer of the HWI initiative in Indonesia had elements of 
coercion and voluntariness. Coercion was strongest at the levels 
of the national government and the administering organisation, 
the DGT. Voluntariness was accompanied by active enlisting of 
advice at the international level from the epistemic community of 
tax experts. This mix of pressure had implications for how much 
learning as opposed to emulation could take place. 
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The evidence presented above suggests that various influences led the Indonesian tax 
authority to adopt an HWI policy in 2009. 
5.4.1 Domestic pressures and influence  
The introduction of the HWI initiative in Indonesia was one of many quick solutions 
proposed in response to a command to reform the national bureaucracy. The 2009 
presidential election was a major factor in the establishment of the HWI policy in 
Indonesia (as it had been in Australia – see Chapter 4). In Indonesia, the HWI unit was 
launched a few months before the presidential election in 2009. The introduction of the 
HWI initiative before an election could be seen as an effort by the incumbent 
government to attract public support based on the government doing something with 
regards to wealthy people who, in the general public’s perception, were not paying their 
fair share of taxes. This position was taken by the Australian government when 
introducing its own HWI policy (Chapter 4). 
Pressure to be seen to be doing something in the run-up to an election, with limited time 
available to implement the policy, made the transfer of the HWI policy in the 
Indonesian tax administration more a process of policy emulation than policy learning. 
This is not to say, however, that this was an either-or situation. Indeed, part of the DGT 
tried hard to learn about the policy and to understand how the policy could be 
implemented in the Indonesian context. Having DGT officials travel to Australia to 
learn about HWI policy was part of that learning process. But limited time available to 
implement the policy and demands for rapid results made success almost impossible to 
achieve. 
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Unlike policy learning, where the objective consequences of a policy are well 
considered (i.e., whether the policy has been successful elsewhere, and if so, how could 
it be just as successful in a new context), emulation actors do not pay much attention to 
a policy’s objective consequences. What matters in policy emulation is the symbolic 
and socially constructed characteristics of policies (Maggetti & Gilardi 2014). 
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006, p. 801) argued that countries emulate the behavior 
of their self-identified peers, even when they often cannot ascertain that doing so will in 
fact fit their own context.  
As the anticipated tax revenue from corporate taxpayers declined in 2008, the State 
budget suffered. This was the other domestic factor that shaped DGT policy and became 
a source of influence for transferring the HWI policy. However, the short-sighted 
orientation of Indonesia’s tax system towards achieving annual revenue targets meant 
that the HWI policy was also oriented to short-term goals. This meant that DGT missed 
an opportunity to use the HWI initiative to improve the taxpaying culture of individual 
Indonesians, in particular very wealthy ones, and to promote a system with which 
taxpayers would cooperate. 
5.4.2 International influence 
Internationally, influence came in the form of policy documentation that opened 
Indonesian policy-makers’ eyes to the phenomenon of the fast-growing population of 
the very wealthy and the risks they posed to the integrity of the tax system.  
Indeed, the epistemic community of tax experts played an important role through 
introducing higher-order principles of modern tax administration: good governance, 
efficiency, accountability, and transparency (OECD 2001b). But the way in which the 
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epistemic community spread the idea was far from coercive in the HWI policy: The 
focus was on deliberation and sharing of knowledge and experience from those 
countries with an HWI unit to those countries without such a unit. This is consistent 
with the OECD’s main functions, which are oriented more towards encouraging 
countries to share their experiences, develop best practices and set international 
standards (Owens 2005, p. 1) than to impose certain practices or regulations on 
countries (in contrast to bodies like the IMF, which, for instance, imposed bankruptcy 
law in Indonesia as part of loan conditionality in 1998 (Steele 1999)). Eccleston (2006, 
p.9) noted that although the OECD avoids an advocacy role, its role in disseminating 
specific policy agendas, including taxation policy, has been pivotal. In relation to tax 
administration issues, the policy agenda was disseminated by OECD’s FTA.  
The FTA was created as a forum for dialogue through which tax administrations could 
‘identify, discuss and influence relevant global trends and develop new ideas to enhance 
tax administration around the world’ (OECD n.d.). In promoting best practices of tax 
administration, the FTA works in ‘a collaborative fashion and engages in exploratory 
dialogue’ with involved actors (Pinto & Sawyer 2011, p. 27). To ensure that the results 
of its work are available to as many tax administrations as possible, the FTA publishes 
the results of key studies in the form of reports and information or guidance notes in the 
tax administration guidance series (OECD n.d.). Voluntary compliance with 
international best practices of tax administration, rather that coercion, is the norm in this 
epistemic community. 
The other reason, in the tax policy arena, why voluntariness is so prevalent is because 
‘[t]here is no “anchor” as far as domestic tax institutions are concerned’ (Radaelli 2000, 
p. 35). Although Radaelli discussed this issue in a broader context of tax coordination 
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among members of the EU in areas of direct tax policy, similar conditions apply in tax 
administration. The OECD has recognised that the way in which a regulatory model 
such as an HWI unit is practised might differ from one country to another depending on 
their circumstances (OECD 2008, p. 4), including a country’s tax laws, organisational 
structure of tax administration and availability of resources.  
All of these pressures and influences resulted in high expectations of the DGT in 
general and the HWI unit in particular. This expectation, without any accompanying 
deep consideration of the resources needed to achieve it, invited disappointment. This is 
because as tax administrators, actors involved in the transfer process gave more 
attention on technical aspects of the policy. They were not used to looking at a problem 
from a bigger perspective such as policy consultants or policy ‘think tanks’ might 
(Stone 1996). DGT initiated and implemented transference of the HWI policy to the 
Indonesian tax administration in a very short time span. The broader taxpaying context 
and how the HWI unit might contribute in this context were overlooked. 
5.4.3 Structural flexibility to accommodate new policy 
 
 
 
In the discussion that follows, I conclude that these two hypotheses are broadly 
supported. The discussion about DGT organisational structure in section 5.1.4 showed 
that this factor contributed to the failure of implementing the HWI policy due to its 
rigidity to adopt change. In order to provide the HWI unit with more authoritative 
Hypothesis 2: Transferring a complex policy such as HWI unit requires 
flexibility in organisational structure that is able to tolerate 
structural changes to accommodate mechanisms required to 
achieve policy outcomes. 
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power, for instance, the unit should have been placed in a higher position than a TSO. 
This seemingly simple matter had major consequences in the Indonesian context, 
seriously hindering the work of the HWI unit. 
When a policy developed in a more mature democracy (Australia) is transferred to a 
relatively immature one (Indonesia), it can be hindered more by institutional constraints 
than other factors (e.g., personnel or skills): ‘… socio-political and bureaucratic 
obstacles in each country impede or block the implementation of good practices’ (the 
World Bank cited in Rose 2005, p.1). By analysing HWI program implementation in the 
Indonesian tax administration, I content that the institutional structure that hosted the 
program was not flexible enough to accommodate changes that are required to 
implement new practices. As the result, the HWI program in Indonesia did not develop 
as it was promoted by the epistemic community. 
Implementation of the HWI program required an organisational structure with more 
authoritative power than was given due to the challenges posed by HWI taxpayers. The 
ATO gave an example by granting its HWI Taskforce a coordinating role among other 
business lines. This privilege, however, was not enjoyed by Indonesia’s HWI unit. 
Rigidity of organisation in Indonesian ministries in general and the DGT in particular, 
reflected in the complex process needed to place the program in a higher level of 
organisational structure (see section 5.1.4), resulted in consequences that policy-makers 
had not foreseen: challenges in dealing with taxpayers, with other units within the DGT, 
and with other institutions. 
Failure to anticipate the challenges that arose from organisational structural factors, to 
some extent, was caused by the failure to recognise ‘the cause-and-effect links’ (Rose 
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2005, p. 73) between policy elements, for instance, between the level of organisation 
and authoritative power in the eyes of other units within DGT, taxpayers, tax advisers, 
and other government institutions. Moreover, as Rose suggested, a cause-and-effect 
model of a policy facilitates policy-makers in the adopting country to consider what 
would happen if the policy under consideration were introduced in a new setting. 
Although actors recognised that organisational structure was one of the factors that 
might impede the success of the implementation of the HWI program in Indonesia, the 
hierarchical and bureaucratic nature of Indonesian tax administration meant the lessons 
learnt during the visit to Australia could not be implemented: ‘People learn but 
organizations decide’ (Rose 2005, p. 94).  
Conclusion 
This chapter documents the adoption of the HWI initiative by the Indonesian tax 
administration. Included in my review are forces that influenced the decision to adopt 
the HWI initiative in Indonesia, a description of Indonesia’s taxpaying culture and 
inherent problems experienced by the Indonesian tax system, and a depiction of the 
Indonesian tax administration at the time the policy was introduced.  
Adoption of the HWI policy in Indonesia was influenced by international, domestic and 
organisational factors. The epistemic community of tax administration experts in the 
OECD advocated the idea that countries should dedicate resources to monitoring the tax 
compliance of HWIs as well as providing services. The Indonesian tax authority 
embraced this idea: It needed to improve its reputation, craved positive recognition as a 
modern tax administration, and expected to collect more revenue. The policy, however, 
did not meet its potential when it was implemented in Indonesia. The policy failed in 
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terms of achieving expected outcomes, its efficiency in using available resources and 
implementing mechanisms consistent with achieving its objectives. 
Inherent problems experienced within the Indonesian tax system include low tax 
burdens and high non-compliance, tax officials being motivated by revenue targets and 
not interested in individual taxpayers, a taxpaying culture dominated by disengagement 
with the tax system, and a hierarchical organisation of tax administration with highly 
centralised power and extreme geographical dispersion of offices. Understanding these 
elements when a developing country attempts to transfer a policy from a developed 
country is crucial. No policy works the same way in different contexts. The Indonesian 
tax context differs markedly from that of Australia, from which the HWI policy was 
largely adopted. The context, therefore, affects how the HWI policy is operationalised.  
Given that context matters in adopting a policy from other jurisdictions, it is vital to 
examine more closely the organisational and legislative structures and procedures in 
which the HWI unit was embedded. Actors involved in policy transfer, especially those 
from the adopting country, need to critically analyse how the policy under consideration 
might operate in their own context when they understand that there is a great structural 
gap between the transferring and adopting country, such as that between Australia and 
Indonesia. 
The structural factor that hindered the implementation of Indonesia’s HWI unit most 
significantly was the organisational level of the unit, which was substantially different 
from that of international best practice. In a country such as Indonesia, where the culture 
of ‘large power distance’ exists, in which ‘hierarchy in organizations reflects the 
existential inequality between higher-ups and lower-downs’ (Hofstede 1997, p. 37), 
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structure matters. The DGT placed the HWI initiative in an organisational position 
where the structural level of the unit and its authoritative power was too low.  
This seemingly simple feature of organisational structure reflects a crucial aspect of 
transferring policy from a different setting: flexibility to adopt structural changes. 
Inflexibility of organisational structure to accommodate the HWI unit in a level that 
gave sufficient authoritative power hindered the unit when dealing with taxpayers, other 
parts of the DGT, and other institutions. 
Implementing a transferred policy, however, is not only about organisational structure. 
Understanding the principles underlying the policy is important as well. In the following 
chapter I discuss how influential actors interpreted policy ideas based on their 
understanding. Influential actors set objectives that they prioritised above others. Such 
actors exerted their influence to ensure that the HWI unit implemented mechanisms that 
furthered these objectives. 
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Chapter 6 
Policy Slippage in Transfer of Principles and 
Mechanisms 
 
 
The establishment of this tax service office 
[HWI] is a manifestation of Government’s 
appreciation of the wealthy taxpayers who 
have or should have made a significant 
contribution to state revenues… 
(Directorate General of Taxation 2009) 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the implementation of the HWI unit in Indonesia. I introduced 
the concepts of principles, mechanisms and actors in the research model outlined in 
Chapter 2. Influential actors use available mechanisms to enact principles and achieve 
objectives; the overall purpose is to regulate and coordinate activities to achieve certain 
ends, while simultaneously preventing dissent and the pursuit of alternative pathways 
by competing interests. In this chapter I describe the way in which elite actors in the 
DGT exerted their influence to ensure that the HWI unit was implemented in a way that 
suited their objectives. 
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This chapter consists of three parts. The first part opens with a discussion of the early 
period of the HWI unit’s processes before DGT leadership changed (I called it ‘the first 
period’ of the implementation of HWI unit). During this period, the top leadership 
understood that the HWI unit was a ‘long-term policy’ (RI038, former tax official) 
oriented to building a better relationship with taxpayers and eliciting greater 
compliance. Its policy goals could only be achieved through long-term investment in 
relationship building, and its success or failure could not be measured merely by 
revenue target achievement in the short term.  
Then follows a discussion of the period when the leadership changed (the second 
period). The succeeding Director General interpreted the HWI policy differently, 
probably due to his background in tax enforcement. During this period, internal tensions 
rose. The HWI unit was seen merely as a revenue generator; consequently all its 
mechanisms were directed toward this goal. New practices introduced under the first 
regime were abolished. Different implementation priorities were set by influential actors 
who understood the policy differently. 
The second section of this chapter compares two mechanisms used in the HWI unit 
operation under both Director Generals: the taxpayer’s data management system and 
staff retention practices. The former mechanism was essential for managing the tax 
compliance of HWIs. Effective compliance management required the tax authority to 
gather information on individuals and on entities related to them. This could only be 
achieved by changing the old practices of treating each taxpayer’s return (personal or 
corporation) as a separate case. This innovative approach was introduced by the ATO’s 
HWI Taskforce as part of their strategy to obtain a holistic picture of an HWI’s tax 
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compliance. The holistic understanding of the tax compliance of HWIs and their entities 
could only be obtained through developing a more integrated system. 
The second mechanism of interest discussed in this chapter defined the operations of the 
HWI unit under the second regime and was related to how staff were managed in order 
to change the direction of the HWI unit. Understanding HWI’s tax compliance required 
tax officials to learn about the tax and business affairs of HWIs and their related entities 
and to master more complex and sophisticated laws and regulations to deal with non-
compliance. This knowledge and expertise could only be obtained through long-term 
deployment of staff in the HWI area. 
The last section of the chapter contains an overall discussion and analysis of the 
findings. It describes my use of the evidence presented in the earlier sections to test two 
hypotheses: learning about implementation of the HWI policy requires understanding of 
the principles underlying the policy, and an understanding of the principles underlying 
the HWI policy is essential for choosing an appropriate mechanism for implementing 
the policy. 
6.1 Different understandings of the principles underlying the HWI 
policy  
The following sections present evidence on how influential actors gave different 
meaning and priority to the HWI policy in Indonesia. The two periods of leadership in 
the short life of the HWI unit reflected these differences. In the first period, the HWI 
policy was interpreted as a means for developing relationships with taxpayers and 
restoring trust in the DGT, in the second period the policy was interpreted as a means 
for generating revenue – a long-held overarching principle of the DGT. 
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6.1.1 The HWI initiative as a ‘relationship improvement’ program: first period 
of the HWI unit’s operation 
The HWI program was introduced in readiness for a presidential election campaign 
which was keen to boast of accomplishment in bureaucratic reform. The stated purpose 
of the quick-win program was ‘to provide a positive image for the implementation of 
bureaucracy reform’ (Indonesia Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucracy Reform 
2011, p. 3). The initiative was one of many ‘low hanging fruit’ – easily-achieved actions 
with benefits that the public could feel in less than one year (UPRBN Technical 
Team—Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucracy Reform 2012).  
The DGT suggested to Government that the HWI unit be as part of the quick-win 
program for two reasons. First, DGT aimed to improve its image with the taxpaying 
community through focusing on the top-end segment and improving the services 
provided to this sector (RI030, tax official). As HWIs were (and are) economically as 
well as politically powerful, DGT believed that its image with the general public would 
improve if they could impress wealthier taxpayers with the service they were offering. 
By proposing this program, DGT saw itself making a positive contribution to the 
President’s efforts to position himself for a second term in office.79 
The second and less overt purpose for proposing an HWI unit was anticipation of 
declining tax revenue from the corporate sector due to the GFC that occurred in 
September 2008, and interest in increasing tax collection from individuals as opposed to 
                                                 
79  It could be interpreted as the tax authorities being partisan in favour of one politician against 
others. With a presidential system of government in Indonesia, any government institution–including 
DGT as part of Ministry of Finance portfolio–serves at the pleasure of the president. 
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corporations. Informed by the OECD report about the fast-growing population of HWIs 
globally and the tax revenue they might contribute if their tax compliance was managed 
properly, DGT used the HWI policy as a measure to ‘kill two birds with one stone’. On 
the one hand it was intended to satisfy political imperatives to provide a quick-win 
program through service improvement, and on the other hand it was aimed at generating 
revenue from HWI taxpayers as a stepping stone to ‘turn the revenue proportion to 
became PIT [personal income tax] dominant’ (RI020, tax official).  
The initial purpose of the formation [of the HWI unit] was to turn our tax revenue 
proportion from being dominated by CIT [corporate income tax] into PIT. If our policy 
focus was revenue, then we gave more attention on corporate taxpayers, because in the 
short-term it could generate revenue easier. But, if we wanted to increase revenue from 
individuals a lot of things could be done, and it is a long-term [process]. (RI022, tax 
official) 
Although the objective of revenue-raising existed from the beginning, DGT chose not to 
disclose it to the public. Information in the public sphere proclaimed that this initiative 
was dedicated to providing a better service to HWI taxpayers. 
Formally … what we disclosed to the public was that this unit was established to provide 
[HWI] taxpayers with better services. In fact, at the same time we wanted to closely 
monitor them. (RI013, tax official) 
In addition, an IMF report noted that: 
The stated goals of the HWI program are to educate high wealth taxpayers, provide 
service and enhance the voluntary compliance of these taxpayers. Originally, the DGT 
decided to focus on taxpayer service and outreach and to postpone audits for the first year 
of operations. (IMF 2011, p. 14) 
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In March 2009, the Indonesian President launched the HWI unit in a festive ceremony 
(see Figure 6.1) – as was also the case in the launching of such programs in other 
agencies by other high-ranking government officials. Indonesian newspapers reported 
the event with an emphasis on ‘service’. As depicted in one national newspaper: ‘The 
President … officially commenced on Wednesday the operation of the nation’s first tax 
service office designed to serve the country’s billionaires’ (Adamrah & Suharmoko 
2009). A statement DGT press release following the launching ceremony described the 
DGT position in relation to HWI taxpayers as follows: 
The establishment of this [HWI] Tax Service Office is a manifestation of Government’s 
appreciation of the wealthy taxpayers who have or should have made a significant 
contribution to the State revenues and is also intended to ensure that wealthy taxpayers 
get better service in fulfilling their tax rights and obligations as well as in obtaining 
information in relation to tax laws in a more complete and timely manner. (Directorate 
General of Taxation 2009) 
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Figure 6.1 The Indonesian Minister of Finance, the Governor of Jakarta, the 
President of Indonesia and the Director General of Taxation signing off 
on the formation of the HWI unit, March 2009  
Source:  Presiden Republik Indonesia (2009) 
Leadership within DGT on relationship improvement  
At the launch of the HWI unit, the Director General of the DGT stated (in front of HWI 
unit officials who has been selected through a rigorous process80) that the focus in the 
early stages was to be on maintaining good relationships with taxpayers and their 
advisers in order to win back trust from the taxpaying community. At the same time, the 
unit was asked to develop a good understanding of HWIs’ business and tax 
arrangements through developing a taxpayers’ database. In fact, the unit was not given 
revenue targets for its first year of operation. The following quote is from a mid-level 
                                                 
80  The selection process was so rigorous that staff being interviewed felt so proud of being part of the 
first generation of the HWI unit (RI027, tax official). 
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official at the HWI unit who claimed to clearly recall the wording of the Director 
General’s speech. 
…the Director General said, ‘You are not burdened by revenue targets. Because your job 
is to improve their [HWI taxpayers’] compliance … to change [their behaviour] from not 
compliant into more compliant. What will we do? By providing better service, reminding 
them [with regard to their tax obligations] and so forth. There will be breakthroughs such 
that, at the end, taxpayers will feel that we have started to become friends’. (RI024, tax 
official) 
Mr Nasution, the Director General at the time of the HWI unit’s inception was not a 
career official, and was in fact the first from outside the DGT. He was appointed in 
2006 by the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati.81 The appointment of 
Mr Nasution was understood as the Minister’s effort to gain public confidence in the 
DGT, widely regarded as one of the most corrupt institutions in Indonesia at that time 
(World Bank 2003, p. 4).  
It was understood publicly, therefore, that the HWI unit’s purpose was to improve 
service to HWIs rather than to undertake compliance activities toward them. The public 
would be sceptical if the DGT publicly announced that it was going to increase the 
compliance of HWIs due to DGT’s long-known corrupt practices. 
                                                 
81  Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati was well-known a reformer in the MoF in general and the 
DGT in particular. She was also acknowledged for building a reputation for integrity and was credited 
with reducing corruption and increasing efficiency in the MoF during her leadership (Devlin & 
Schalkwyk, 2009). In the middle of her tenure she resigned from the position to become one of the three 
Managing Directors of the World Bank Group (Mealey & Hanlon 2010). There were widespread 
speculations that her resignation was due to political pressure (Allard 2010; Siahaan et al. 2010; 
Suharmoko 2010), especially from a powerful tycoon who was also a chairman of the biggest political 
party in Indonesia (Gelling 2010; Witular & Hapsari 2010). Her resignation occurred soon after she won 
support for establishing the HWI tax office within the DGT. 
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Well, you know why [we have difficulties to urge people to comply]? Because we do not 
start with building trust, [rather] we started by saying, ‘You have to pay taxes rightfully’. 
[Then the public would respond], ‘You should do the right thing, first’. (RI037, former 
tax official) 
It's unpopular [policy]. Our first strategy was … what we said [to the public] … what we 
highlighted was ‘service’, [by saying] that everything will be made easier for them. But 
we know what’s behind the screen, we have a strategy of monitoring as well, but we 
wrapped it with the word of ‘service’. (RI030, former tax official) 
Actors at the operational level in the HWI unit understood that in its first few years, 
they were expected to achieve the following: restore this taxpayer group’s trust in the 
DGT; develop good relationships through a more personal approach to taxpayers and 
their advisers; develop a database through a profiling program which included data from 
third parties; and understand taxpayers’ business arrangements by identifying all entities 
under their control (RI024, tax official).  
This strategy (i.e., focus on service and outreach programs) was developed because 
DGT’s leaders believed that ‘taxpayers would be more compliant in the long run if they 
fully understood their responsibilities and were given a chance to comply voluntarily’ 
(IMF 2011, p. 14).  
External stakeholders viewed this strategy as a reward that HWI taxpayers deserved to 
receive; as compensation for the tax they have paid and acknowledging their economic 
status and political power (RI011, other organisation; RI016, other organisation). One 
respondent argued that it was acceptable to treat taxpayers differently based on their 
socio-economic status: ‘It is understandable if they [HWIs] are treated differently from 
general taxpayers … because they are richer and politically stronger’ (RI016, other 
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organisation). The meaning was more of offering politeness that of surrendering power 
and becoming captured by more powerful forces outside DGT. 
Passive resistance at the top 
While the focus on service and outreach programs was supported by the majority of 
staff at the operational level and stakeholders outside the DGT, passive resistance was 
observed among actors at higher levels in the DGT headquarters. However, because 
disagreement with one’s superiors is unacceptable in the Indonesian bureaucratic culture 
(Labolo 2013, p. 165), this disagreement was not articulated openly, rather it was 
manifested in passive resistance (RI010, former tax official).  
A former high-level official openly disclosed his disagreement with the idea of using 
service as a strategy when dealing with HWIs as follows.  
Taxpayers are never expecting service from us. That is not what they expected. Do not 
ever think that by providing a better service they will be more compliant. That is not true. 
(RI029, former tax official)  
The DGT publicly articulated strategy of promoting service provision to HWI taxpayers 
as the HWI unit’s primary purpose was contrary to what was done in Australia when the 
ATO introduced its HWI policy in 1996. On many occasions, the Australian 
government and the ATO publicly reinforced the idea that the HWI initiative was a 
program ‘to improve the compliance of high wealth individuals with our [Australian] 
income tax laws’ (Costello 1996, p. 7) and ‘to improve … understanding of these 
individuals and their groups, identify their tax planning techniques … contribute to tax 
reform and build community confidence in the tax system’ (ATO 2008, p. 7). Service 
was one of the elements of concern to the ATO in dealing with taxpayers; providing 
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service to taxpayers was a commitment contained in the Taxpayer Charter and was 
embedded in the compliance model. However, when the HWI program was established 
and was introduced to the public in general, and HWIs and their advisers in particular, it 
was not ‘service’ that emerged as the prime purpose of the program. 
Indonesia’s strategy for the HWI unit in its first stage was criticised by a respondent 
from an international organisation as having ‘started from the wrong premise in relation 
to this group of taxpayers’ (RA014, international organisation). What the respondent 
meant was that by choosing a strategy focused on service provision, the Indonesian tax 
authority presumed that taxpayers in this group were already in a state of willingness to 
consistently comply with all their tax obligations, or in other words, were displaying the 
posture of ‘commitment’ to the tax system (V. Braithwaite 2003b) (see Chapter 4 about 
motivational postures in the ATO’s pyramidal compliance model).  
The Director General understood that the policy strategy he chose with regard to HWIs 
might be criticised, but believed it ‘was the best of a bad set of choices’ (RI0037, 
former tax official) in a situation where ‘people have little faith in state institutions’ 
(World Bank 2003, p. 4) such as the tax authority. His plan was that in the first few 
years of the HWI unit’s operation compliance activities should be deferred to give time 
to develop public confidence in the DGT, build relationships with HWIs and advisers 
and gain knowledge in relation to the HWIs’ business and tax affairs. This strategy 
seemed to be favoured by staff at the operational level, as they knew how negative 
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relationships with taxpayers had been in the past and how taxpayers’ data was still 
‘messy’ (RI024, tax official)82. 
Our task, in my opinion, was working out how to change the bad perceptions that already 
existed in the minds of the public regarding tax officials and the DGT as an institution. 
(RI022, tax official) 
Even after two years of the HWI unit’s operation, taxpayers’ physical data [e.g., tax 
returns, audit reports, assessment letters, etc.] had not been collected from other TSOs. 
(RI024, tax official) 
The Director General’s interpretation of the HWI policy as ‘relationship improvement 
first, and revenue collection later’ was implemented on the ground by DGT’s most 
highly skilled and carefully selected staff. As one staff member (RI027, tax official) 
observed, they were proud to be part of this new unit designed to improve Indonesia’s 
tax system. They undertook activities to build relationships with taxpayers and their 
advisers (e.g., by visiting taxpayers and introducing staff designated as a taxpayer’s 
contact person) and worked at understanding a taxpayers’ profiles through taxpayer 
database development (e.g., by compiling data from internal or external sources in a 
program developed by HWI unit’s staff). They did not do any compliance activities 
such as auditing. 
What have we learnt? 
Comparing what had been done by the Indonesian tax authority with what happened in 
Australia reveals two contrasts in how the two countries introduced their HWI 
                                                 
82  Before taxpayers were administered by the HWI unit, they had been administered in other TSOs 
around the Jakarta region. Taxpayers’ physical data (e.g., master file, tax returns, assessment letters, audit 
reports, etc.) were scattered across those TSOs and should have been collected in the HWI unit. This 
process proved less easy than imagined.  
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initiatives. The Australian government and the ATO deliberately raised the issue about 
the need for closer scrutiny of taxpaying performance of the rich and their related 
entities – issues that easily gained public and political support thanks to the context in 
which the HWI initiative was introduced (as described in Chapter 4). In other words, the 
Australian government and the ATO were ready to use their authoritative power to 
tackle tax minimisation practices employed by small portions of society that could 
undermine the overall integrity of the tax system.  
In contrast to the Australian approach, in Indonesia the tax authority chose to take a 
more subtle, arguably subservient, position to the taxpayers who would be the target of 
this new initiative. The Indonesian government and DGT did not send a signal to the 
general public that closer scrutiny of HWIs and their entities would be applied through 
this new initiative; they did not present taxpaying as a public duty, as was done in 
Australia. Instead of advocating for the general public and the collection of taxes from 
the very wealthy to support the country, with the promise of service provision the 
Indonesian tax authority actually took the side of wealthy taxpayers. Nevertheless, 
despite this apparent failure of imagination, the reasoning on Indonesia’s part may have 
been sound. HWIs and their advisers were virtually the sole contributors to individual 
tax in Indonesia. Unlike in Australia, there was not a large population of middle and 
lower income-earning taxpayers (Yuwono 2009) who might resent the wealthy shirking 
their responsibilities. Under such circumstances, the Indonesian Government and the 
DGT may have had concerns about push-back from the HWI sector. 
In implementing a policy transferred from another place, context matters. Although the 
strategy chosen by the DGT was criticised because it ‘started from the wrong premise’ 
about HWI taxpayers, it is of relevance that almost all respondents at the operational 
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level (in the HWI unit) agreed with the strategy to improve relationships with HWI 
taxpayers as the priority for the first years of operation, before conducting compliance 
activities in the following years. In the Indonesian context, where the public had little 
trust in government agencies in general and the tax authority in particular (World Bank 
2003), rebuilding relationships with taxpayers who were disappointed with the conduct 
of tax officials in the past was a defensible policy strategy. Moreover, staff in the HWI 
unit knew that in order to prosecute compliance activities competently they needed to be 
ready with a strong database, because they would be dealing with sophisticated tax 
planning arrangements protected and defended by the ‘smartest and brightest tax 
advisers’ (RI014, academic). 
6.1.2 HWI initiative as revenue generator: second stage of the HWI unit 
operation 
The first period of HWI implementation and the philosophy behind it, however, did not 
endure after the DGT leadership changed. As documented in an IMF report: ‘With the 
change in the Director General … the focus [of the HWI unit] changed quickly to 
enforcement and audits’ (IMF 2011, p. 14).  
The new Director General was a DGT career official and had long experience in 
compliance. He was known as a ‘hard official’ (RI024, tax official) in the enforcement 
area. One respondent described how the new Director General was really concerned 
with revenue targets83: 
                                                 
83  After the first year, the HWI unit was given a revenue target of 563 billion Rupiah. 
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That [‘service’] period84 only lasted a few months. After the new Director General came 
into office it was a totally 180-degree turn. It was changed completely. Where initially we 
had never thought of revenue, suddenly he came here and said: ‘Why are your revenue 
targets only five hundred billion Rupiahs? It is as small as [the revenue targets of] a TSO 
in Atambua … or do you want me to move all of you there!’85 (RI024, tax official) 
Another respondent had similar views. 
But it was not even a year [of the HWI unit’s operation], then the Director General was 
replaced. The new Director General … you know … His direction was not clear enough. 
We were always demanded to do compliance activities. We … people on the ground … 
got confused. How could we do compliance activities if the data we had were not strong 
enough? (RI002, tax official) 
This respondent continued to say that since the new Director General took charge every 
effort the unit made was directed toward achieving revenue targets through compliance 
activities. For instance, they set aside their work on revamping the database and 
collecting data from third parties in order to develop a better understanding of 
taxpayers’ business structures. Information was still being gathered from other parties, 
but the orientation was merely intended to generate revenue either from counselling or 
auditing.86 As discussed in Chapter 5, achieving revenue targets at the end of the 
financial year is used as a performance indicator against which the TSO chief is 
                                                 
84  That is, a period in which staff members were required to develop relationships with taxpayers and 
their advisers and to develop a taxpayers’ database. 
85  Atambua is a small city in East Nusa Tenggara province near the Timor-Leste border. It is a common 
belief within the Indonesian bureaucracy that being moved to a small rural and city, especially one 
outside Java, is ‘punishment’. 
86  Counselling refers to a practice used by DGT to clarify any discrepancy found in the tax return using 
external data. In this process, it is possible that the taxpayer would agree with the DGT’s findings and pay 
the additional tax owed, or defend his position by providing an explanation and evidence with regard to 
the discrepancy. With the latter condition, DGT can accept the taxpayer’s explanation and close the case, 
or refuse the taxpayer’s explanation and ask the taxpayer to pay the tax owed. If taxpayers refuse to pay 
the tax owed in this counselling stage, then this process can be escalated into auditing or investigation 
depending on whether or not there is an element of criminal offence in the case. 
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evaluated. Achieving revenue targets could mean promotion or at least deployment to a 
more strategic position.87 Failing to achieve them, on the other hand, is likely to lead to 
demotion. 
An official at the HWI unit related that he was always embarrassed when he represented 
his unit in regional and national meetings, at which every unit’s profiles (i.e., revenue 
targets and achievement) were presented. Since the HWI unit was under the LTRO 
portfolio, its targets and achieved revenue could be compared with other LTOs. 
According to this informant, in this context the HWI unit’s contribution looked like ‘an 
ant among elephants’ and became ‘the object of ridicule’ (RI009, tax official) (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.3.2 for the revenue contributed by the HWI unit and other LTOs).  
With a background mostly in the compliance area, the new Director General interpreted 
the HWI policy differently to his predecessor. The HWI unit was requested to perform 
compliance activities. It was seen as a means to achieving revenue targets. The unit no 
longer had special status. It was on a par with other TSOs and was expected to perform 
accordingly. 
Substantial change in policy direction at the top, without involving actors who had been 
implementing the HWI policy on the ground, made staff feel like they were ‘walking 
against the wind’ (RI009, tax auditor). They felt the HWI policy and unit lacked 
direction. This change in interpretation of the policy, according to some respondents, 
was due to the absence of any written policy strategy for the HWI unit. There was no 
                                                 
87  Moving to headquarters, for instance, although still in the same level/echelon, is an example of a more 
strategic position and is regarded as promotion. In contrast, moving to a TSO in an ‘unfavourable’ place 
(e.g., a rural area) is regarded as demotion although the level/echelon is unchanged. 
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basis on which the innovative thinking behind the HWI unit could be raised within the 
DGT and discussed openly in terms of its successes and failures. No opportunity existed 
for learning from experience. In the minds of some respondents, influential actors were 
setting policy direction based on their interests. As one mid-level official revealed: 
In my opinion, the blueprint should have been made when this unit was 
first established; to set the direction for this unit for the next five or ten years … whoever 
the DGT’s Director General is, that blueprint would be applied. In fact [the blueprint of 
the HWI policy] did not exist. (RI002, tax official) 
This perspective also appeared in the IMF report: 
[T]here is still no written and approved comprehensive broad-based strategy document 
necessary to provide direction to the various Directorate stakeholders [in relation to the 
HWI policy]. (IMF 2011, p. 14) 
In short, the two leadership periods during the early years of the HWI unit’s operation 
involved significantly different approaches. The same policy was understood and 
implemented differently according to the leaders’ interpretation of the principles 
underpinning the operation of the unit. The principles that influential actors favoured, 
apparently based on their personal preferences rather than on written documentation, 
steered the direction of coordinated action on the ground. In the first period, a 
philosophy of ‘relationship improvement now, enforcement later’ gave meaning and 
purpose to the work of operational staff within the HWI unit. The philosophy of 
reaching the revenue target which defined the second period was consistent with the 
traditional philosophy and ways of working within the DGT, but left the HWI unit staff 
feeling dismissed and humiliated, without an agenda that they saw as meaningful and 
productive.  
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6.2 Different mechanisms used by different actors  
As the policy principles of the HWI program were interpreted differently by different 
actors in the two leadership periods described above, the mechanisms employed to 
achieve policy objectives changed. When the HWI initiative was understood as a long-
term policy, staff acted with the intention of restoring relationships with taxpayers who 
had been disappointed with the DGT as an institution and in the often unreasonable 
conduct of its officials.  
When the HWI unit’s mission was redirected toward achieving revenue targets, 
traditional mechanisms with which the public were familiar began to resurface, with 
new legitimacy conferred from above. These mechanisms were attached to the long-
held tradition of coercion in DGT and the long-held norm that revenue target 
achievement was the paramount goal of the tax system. How revenue was collected and 
at what cost to taxpayer morale was irrelevant. In the second period of the HWI unit’s 
operation, this old mechanism became entrenched and there was no room to try new 
practices. 
In this section I compare the primary mechanisms used in the two periods of leadership 
to embed a philosophy into the operations of the HWI unit. The first period was one of 
modernisation and development with the intention of changing how the DGT engaged 
with taxpayers. The second period was one of relapse, reinstating past practices and 
bringing a halt to any new way of thinking about how the DGT should function. The 
mechanisms were not directed only at the HWI unit staff; they were designed to unsettle 
DGT operations across the board and herald a new way of operating and engaging with 
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the public. These mechanisms are the development of the taxpayer’s database period 
and the practice of staff rotation.  
6.2.1 Developing a taxpayer database: the innovative and traditional approaches 
As noted above, the HWI unit began its existence under direction to improve 
relationships, and learn more about the operation of HWIs. This learning was to be 
captured through a taxpayers’ database. Staff could use this database to track the affairs 
of HWIs, gathering a body of data over time that would reveal their tax obligations as 
well as the tax they paid. This mechanism is important when dealing with HWIs due to 
the complexity of their affairs, as an informant from an international organisation who 
assisted DGT asserted. 
HWIs commonly employ tax avoidance strategies that use complex business transactions 
involving multiple related businesses. Often, HWI enterprises include large numbers of 
individual businesses that file tax returns in different offices. In its current process, the 
DGT conducts risk assessments and audits on individual entities, not on the enterprise as 
a whole. Also, the DGT divides its audit program into separate offices (i.e., STOs, MTOs 
and LTOs). High-risk transactions that cross functional lines can be easily overlooked. 
(RI040, international organisation) 
Furthermore, this respondent criticised DGT’s information technology, stating that it 
was unable to capture a holistic picture of HWIs’ tax affairs. 
Adding to the problem is … the inability of the administration to even identify and 
document the often large number of businesses controlled by the HWI. The information 
technology systems are more geared toward the processing of tax returns rather than the 
use of the information system to aid in identifying these relationships. Since the major 
compliance risk lies with the business enterprise in its entirety, risk analysis and audit 
need to be conducted holistically rather than separately.   
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The database, therefore, was a core mechanism for realising the objective of the HWI 
unit to ensure that HWIs paid their taxes correctly in the longer term. Staff argued that 
the database needed to integrate data on the tax affairs of wealthy individuals and their 
related entities: the idea was accepted by headquarters. Through being able to access 
taxpayer’s personal tax data as well as tax-relevant data from related entities, the HWI 
unit staff improved their knowledge of how HWIs used tax planning techniques to 
minimise their tax obligations.  
Technically, this process of bringing together personal and entity data violated the 
DGT’s general rule of data access. The general policy was that each TSO (including the 
HWI unit) had access only to data of taxpayers administered in the office; special 
requests had to be made for information about particular entities administered in other 
TSOs, either directly to the relevant TSOs or to headquarters. The transfer of files from 
one part of DGT to another was made more difficult by the fact that files were often 
paper files.  
In short, the information technology and regulatory infrastructure with regard to data 
sharing between the HWI unit and other parts within the DGT, and between the DGT 
and other institutions was not sufficiently supportive of the needs of the HWI unit when 
it was established. Consequently, staff working at the unit needed to find ways that 
facilitated the gathering of relevant information from a variety of sources. These sources 
included other government institutions such as national land titles offices, the 
Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, government vehicle 
registry offices, non-government institutions such as the Indonesian Stock Exchange, 
and the property sales database maintained prominent property agents and developers. 
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Instituting the mechanism of amalgamating data about taxpaying individuals and their 
entities from a variety of sources, setting up a database within the DGT so that 
individuals could be tracked over time, and observing tax planning arrangements was a 
logical challenge for the DGT. Nevertheless, its value was not doubted in the first 
period of the HWI unit operation. This holistic approach for monitoring tax compliance 
of HWIs and their related entities had proven effective in improving compliance of this 
taxpayer segment in Australia (Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001; Hong & Braithwaite 
2011). This mechanism was understood to require a long-term investment in collecting 
data and training staff to use these data. Results of higher tax collection from HWIs 
would not be obtained immediately. Although the data presented above show that the 
HWI unit had free rein to develop its database in the first period of its operations, it is of 
note that no formal evidence exists that headquarters approved the practice. Most 
importantly, no Director General’s decree explicitly sanctioned this practice to ensure 
its continuation. 
When the new Director General came to office in July 2009, the process of developing 
and using such an integrated database was stopped. The reasoning was twofold. First, 
the HWI unit was expected to revert to the old practice of requesting taxpayers’ data 
that was administered in other TSOs. This process, although possible, was not simple or 
efficient due to the long-held bureaucratic mentality of staff in other parts of DGT. 
Moreover, activities such as data integration of HWIs and their related entities were 
time and resource intensive, and did not produce tangible short-term benefits in terms of 
tax collected. These activities therefore were less valued than compliance activities such 
as counselling or auditing. For these reasons, the resources of the HWI unit were 
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directed toward activities designed to produce short-term results (i.e., revenue 
generation). 
Second, rules governing the functioning of the bureaucracy were used to restrict access 
to taxpayer and entity data across DGT and within the HWI unit in particular. The 
information-sharing culture between units in DGT was set back through the use of a 
conservative interpretation of Article 34 Paragraph 1 of Law Number 6 of 1986, which 
regulates how tax officials provide information with regard to taxpayers.88 As one 
official put it: 
As you know … we are only an echelon III unit [the level of most other TSOs] … when 
we ask for information with respect to related entities of a particular HWI from other tax 
service offices … we’re trying desperately but for little result. In fact we have been told 
that they [other TSOs] are bound by Article 34. Can you believe it? It’s funny, isn’t it? 
(RI018, tax official) 
This situation has made staff in the unit feel ‘demotivated’ (RI025, tax official). This 
respondent went on to describe the situation he and his colleagues faced as ‘living in the 
clouds'. This referred to their knowledge of the existence of large amounts of 
information that could be used in developing understanding of tax compliance of the 
HWIs and their entities, but which they could not obtain or use. One respondent in the 
LTRO, which supervised the HWI unit, agreed with this opinion by saying that ‘they 
[people in the HWI unit] are hungry for information [in relation to taxpayers], but they 
have not received adequate support to obtain the needed information’ (RI021, tax 
official). 
                                                 
88  Article 34 paragraph 1 stipulates that ‘Any official shall be prohibited to provide an unauthorised 
party with any information he/she knows or is informed about as a tax official by a taxpayer in the course 
of his /her duties’. 
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The mechanism of information sharing and the integration of data on HWIs and their 
entities was an essential part of the operations of the HWI unit when DGT leaders were 
pursuing the principle of relationship improvement and improved understanding of 
HWI activities. In the second period of the HWI unit’s operation, a change of leadership 
in DGT brought about a resurgence of the target revenue principle for the HWI unit 
(along with other units). Sanctioned mechanisms also changed accordingly. The new 
Director General favoured the old practice of sharing information only when special 
requests were made, and the practice appears to have been given lower priority than 
each unit achieving its revenue targets. Influential actors represented contesting visions 
for the future of the HWI unit and supported a different mechanism of HWI unit 
operation. These different mechanisms profoundly influenced the HWI unit’s 
procedures, and in the second period the long-term effectiveness of the HWI unit was 
seriously undermined. 
6.2.2 Staff rotation as an organisational imperative 
Although not explicitly disclosed, it was understood that actors in strategic positions 
recognised the importance of staff retention for the building of an effective HWI unit. 
This could be inferred from the statement that ‘staff at the HWI unit will serve longer in 
the unit [compared to time served in other units]’ (RI038, former tax official), because 
they needed more time to develop their knowledge in a new field and had more 
experience than necessary for effective management of HWI compliance.  
Staff retention is a feature that makes the HWI regulatory initiative quite different from 
tax authorities’ other initiatives to promote tax compliance. The reason that commonly 
emerged to justify this pattern was that gathering, analysing and understanding 
information with respect to wealthy taxpayers and their related entities is a task different 
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from administering ‘ordinary’ taxpayers or publicly owned companies (OECD 2009a). 
The tax affairs of salary and wages-earning taxpayers are simpler than those of HWIs. 
Moreover, the publicly available information on wealthy people is limited, and privately 
owned companies related to HWIs are not subject to disclosure requirements as is the 
case with public companies. Consequently it requires more effort to gather information 
with regard to HWIs and their related entities. Even after the information is 
accumulated, understanding the information and linking it to produce a complete picture 
of an HWI’s webs of business arrangements is complex, as is the next step of assessing 
any risks that this arrangement poses to tax revenue. Such work demands more time for 
tax officials to comprehend the issues, as this respondent from an international 
organisation suggested: 
…you need more information to understand how these taxpayers derive their income and 
conduct their affairs ... So that’s part of the learning. All of these are learning experiences 
that evolves over time … I guess the point I am making in relation to high net-worth 
individuals is the fact that it involves a long-term process. (RA014, international 
organisation) 
Moreover, greater expertise is required to do the job well. Tax officials in the HWI area 
are required to grasp very complex business and tax laws and regulations so that they 
are able to correctly apply laws and regulations in particular situations. A respondent 
from the ATO’s HWI Taskforce, who was advising Indonesia’s HWI unit, noted that it 
was not easy to deal with the complexities of the HWIs and their entities. 
Yes, it’s not easy for a couple of reasons. The first reason is the law to which they tend to 
operate … is very complex … very complex to understand. And the other issue is that 
they tend to have very sophisticated lawyers. So it is not just income tax law that you 
have to concern with, it’s also administrative law. Not all of us are lawyers. (RA003, tax 
official) 
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As HWI taxpayers typically employ very well-paid and high-quality advisers to carry 
out their business and tax affairs, it follows that the tax officials who deal with HWI 
taxpayers must be of similar quality if they are to succeed (RA004, tax official). Having 
technical capabilities equivalent to these advisers gives the HWI unit staff the authority 
needed to address HWI taxpayers and their advisers. This view was consistent with that 
of respondents from international organisations who had experience with Indonesia’s 
HWI program. The following respondent used the term ‘expertise gap’ to depict what he 
saw as the significant difference in the expertise of Indonesia’s HWI unit officials and 
HWIs’ advisers: 
… the biggest challenge [for Indonesia] in administering HWI taxpayers is the expertise 
gap between the tax administration staff and that of the HWI taxpayer’s financial and tax 
advisers. Further complicating this in the DGT is the rotation policy. Most enforcement 
and service employees are rotated to other positions within two years. Financial and tax 
advisors of the taxpayer normally have many years’ experience coupled with their 
intimate on-going relationship with the taxpayer and their businesses. In developed 
countries, a large percentage of HWI administration employees spend a majority of their 
career in that dedicated unit acquiring both a knowledge of the taxpayer as well as 
expertise in dealing with wealthy individuals and interrelated businesses. (RI040, 
international organisation, emphasis added) 
An ability to identify tax risks in complex structures and arrangements, to build 
relationships with HWIs and their advisers, and to respond to queries from wealthy 
individuals in a clear, timely and consistent manner is crucial for staff in the HWI unit 
(Ernst & Young 2010, p. 29). This expertise can only be obtained through serving a 
reasonable amount of time in the HWI unit, as this respondent from the ATO who has 
been in the Taskforce since its inception commented as follows:  
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When you set up [a HWI unit] you need to retain staff for a lengthy period of time 
because it takes a long time to build the capability of someone to look after a group of 
three hundred entities … I think someone once placed the figure on that at about six years 
to build the capability … If you keep shifting people around, that capability will never be 
built … there’s a lot … you have to learn [in relation to] private groups. Private groups 
are very different from the public groups, where there’s a lot of openness and 
transparency and a lot of public reporting. (RA004, tax official) 
In the initial stage obviously capability of staff is a major challenge. Because you know, 
we work with very complex laws, and structures, and groups. And knowing the 
commercial aspect of how a business is run – it is obviously important for officers to 
understand that. (RA010, tax official)  
Such capability, according to a senior HWI Taskforce official in Australia, who was 
involved in providing assistance to DGT, comprises ‘hard skills’ and ‘soft skills’. The 
hard skills include the ability of staff ‘to go out, get information, talk to the taxpayers 
and their advisers, and make sure they get facts and evidence’, whereas the soft skills 
include background knowledge and astuteness in following the legal and technical 
aspects of very complex transactions and their relation with the tax laws (RA005, tax 
official). 
Retaining staff for a longer period of time in the HWI unit develops their understanding 
of taxpayers in terms of their business and tax affairs, and builds expertise where 
specialised staff are needed. It also offers institutional benefits through strengthening 
recommendations for the development of administrative and legislative proposals to 
address aggressive tax planning techniques practised by HWI taxpayers. Treating staff 
in the HWI unit like all other staff in the DGT in terms of their placement duration, a 
‘business as usual’ mechanism of staff deployment, risked limiting knowledge 
accumulation and meant that expertise in the HWI unit was never built properly 
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(RA004, tax official). Moreover, tax minimisation techniques develop rapidly, so tax 
officials must follow the field closely. This issue was raised by another respondent from 
an international organisation who supervised the DGT in developing its HWI unit. 
[DGT] must first recognise the problems caused by this [expertise] gap and move swiftly 
to hire competent employees and continually train them. Risks posed by HWIs and tax 
avoidance techniques change swiftly. (RI040, international organisation) 
Under the new DGT leadership in the second period of the HWI unit’s operation (July 
2009 to January 2011), staff rotation applied without exception. The general pattern was 
that staff at a certain level (generally echelon IV and above) were rotated to a different 
office every two or three years. This policy is based on an anti-corruption principle. If 
staff are moved after a short period time, they are less likely to be corrupted and collude 
with the taxpayers they administer. This principle, which has merit in its own right, 
clashed with the principle of improving relationships with taxpayers and advisers and 
learning more about their business, which demanded that staff serve more time in the 
HWI area.  
One middle-level official in the HWI unit reflected his experience when he and other 
section heads were rotated to other offices even more quickly than was the norm in 
DGT: 
We were planning to serve there [in the HWI unit] for at least two years, until the unit 
was mature enough. But in fact, I only served for 13 months. I was moved with other 
staff, including [name omitted] section head who initiated and managed the HWI 
information system. The development [of the HWI unit] eventually faltered. The 
continuity and sustainability [of the program] was inhibited. (RI027, tax official) 
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One prominent tax consultant predicted the future and accomplishment of the HWI unit 
would not be different from that of the current LTOs: the HWI unit might be a 
promising initiative in its first few years, but then it would fall back into the ‘business as 
usual’ mode of the DGT. This is considered as an ‘internal weakness’ of the DGT, as a 
respondent from a tax consultancy group described. 
Another obstacle is the pattern of staff rotation. People who have started to mature [in 
terms of their knowledge]; three years engaged in an area, for instance, they will be 
rotated … I see this as one of the internal weaknesses [of the DGT]. (RI023, tax 
consultant) 
In summary, quick staff rotation, designed to prevent collusion and corruption, had the 
consequences of denying DGT staff time to learn about the HWI program and its 
clients. Consequently, the expertise needed to enable the HWI initiative to meet its 
potential and prove its value within DGT never materialised. The mechanism of staff 
rotation undermined the HWI unit’s capacity to realise the goals articulated by the 
former Director General who presided over the unit between May 2009 and July 2009. 
6.3 Discussion and analysis 
The hypotheses that guided this chapter were: 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 3(a): Learning about implementation of the HWI policy requires 
understanding of the principles underlying the policy (particularly 
as enacted in Australia).  
Hypothesis 3(b): An understanding of the principles underlying the HWI policy is 
essential for choosing appropriate mechanisms for its 
implementation. 
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However, the fieldwork revealed a more complex state of affairs. Due to a change in the 
leadership of the DGT89, the HWI unit’s principles and mechanisms were contested. 
Learning and understanding were not absent among staff of the HWI unit – they were 
very aware of what was happening to their unit and why, but their capacity to use their 
knowledge to affect the contestation was limited. In the first few years of the HWI unit, 
two DGT leaders held very divergent views about the principles that should guide it, 
and had no coherent plan to bring together different parts of DGT in the new HWI 
regime. The absence of a meta-principle meant that mechanisms did not have a noble 
purpose for the DGT as a whole – they constituted commands from above that had to be 
followed. Meaning-making through the innovation was confused in a way that was 
demoralising for staff. 
The evidence presented in this chapter points to two major conclusions about the 
contestation of principles and mechanisms in the implementation of the HWI policy in 
Indonesia. First, Director Generals as influential actors may have different 
interpretations of the HWI policy. They assign meaning to the policy and instigate 
actions and mechanisms that mean that the same policy can be implemented in different 
ways under different leadership regimes. In the first period of the HWI unit’s operation 
(May 2009–July 2009), the guiding principle was relationship improvement and 
information gathering for an HWI database which could be used subsequently for 
compliance work. In the second period (July 2009–January 2011), the guiding principle 
was meeting revenue targets; this saw the mechanism of a taxpayer database sidelined, 
                                                 
89 The former Director General was appointed as the Governor of the Central Bank of Indonesia (Bank 
of Indonesia). 
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the special status of the HWI unit discarded, and the resurgence of the mechanism of 
quick staff rotation, which had the effect of undermining HWI staff’s skill and 
expertise.  
The second finding from the evidence presented in this chapter is that absence of 
documentation that outlined principles for how the HWI unit should operate and what it 
should achieve meant that the HWI unit was held hostage to the personal preferences of 
DGT leaders. I detailed a contest of principles among powerful actors within the DGT 
which heralded changes in operational procedures and thwarted the development of the 
HWI unit. 
HWI policy should be supported by higher-order principles that mean that contested 
principles need to be debated publicly, rather than traded as power changes hands. The 
Indonesian HWI policy could have been planned with commitment to principles such as 
‘maintaining confidence of the taxpaying community in the tax system’, ‘maintaining 
integrity of the tax system’, ‘increasing accountability’, ‘promoting holism in 
understanding HWI taxpaying performance’, or ‘implementing a sustainable HWI 
program’ in order to ensure the policy was regarded by all as having a long-term 
perspective. These higher-order principles were (and remain) evident in the operation of 
Australia’s HWI program. Australia implemented its HWI program with a set of 
mechanisms that would ensure its growth, such as the adoption of a holistic approach in 
monitoring HWIs and their related entities, assigning priority to the HWI unit so that it 
could effectively and efficiently access cooperation from other business lines, and 
retaining staff longer than normal to build expertise and accumulate knowledge. 
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In the Indonesian context, failure to understand these higher-order principles was 
arguably linked to the imperative to establish the policy very rapidly (discussed in 
Chapter 5). When a country seeks to adopt a new program from elsewhere, it should 
understand the principles the organisation responsible for running the program will be 
required to follow to accommodate actions and give meaning and purpose to them. The 
Indonesian tax system’s short-sighted revenue orientation contributed to the failure to 
understand the principles of the HWI program. Collecting more revenue from HWI 
taxpayers and their related entities is a logical consequence when the tax compliance of 
HWIs and their entities is improved, but the realisation of this goal required more time 
than was permitted. In order to achieve higher-order principles, HWI policy should be 
understood as a long-term program. Contestation of principles held by influential actors 
in the first two periods of implementation of the HWI unit in Indonesia suggested that 
applied mechanisms were determined by how influential actors interpreted the HWI 
policy. 
Politics is one possible explanation for the favouring of old mechanisms that 
undermined the effectiveness of the Indonesian HWI unit. The political battles 
associated with the HWI unit and in the government more broadly are not the subject of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, on the basis of the fieldwork, it would be negligent to ignore a 
possible political factor. There might have been a political (either internal or external to 
DGT) decision to ensure that the HWI unit did not function optimally. If the unit was 
unable to function well, Indonesia’s HWI unit would be unable to uncover the poor 
taxpaying performance of HWIs, who were also political leaders or had strong 
relationships with past or present politicians, government officials, or military 
personnel. Possibly shortfalls in learning how to introduce the lessons of the HWI unit 
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were connected to the power struggles that occurred at higher levels of government. If 
decisions were taking place at this level, senior officials in DGT would have been wary 
of putting into practice opportunities for trial and error adjustments and adaptation to 
suit the Indonesian context. 
Conclusion 
This chapter postulated that learning about implementation of the HWI policy requires 
understanding of its underlying principles. This understanding is essential for choosing 
appropriate mechanisms for policy implementation. Nevertheless, the evidence I 
gathered about the implementation of the HWI unit in Indonesia suggested that 
understanding principles and choosing appropriate mechanisms are not the only factors 
that predict success. In the Indonesian context, influential actors were important in 
determining the manner of implementation of the HWI unit. 
In this chapter, I argue that lack of commitment to clear and coherent principles and 
competing or contested principles held by influential actors largely determined which 
mechanisms were promoted and allowed to continue without interference. The problem 
was multiplied by the absence of a written policy strategy. This meant that the policy 
direction could be changed dramatically following change in the top leadership 
positions. Actors in leadership positions interpreted the HWI policy idea very 
differently. Based on their interpretation of the policy, different directions were pursued. 
In an immature public organisation such as the DGT, without an established system of 
procedures and protocols, the personal interests of influential actors prevail in giving 
meaning to policy. These powerful actors use their authority to influence their 
subordinates to accept their interpretation of a policy and set in place the mechanisms to 
achieve their desired ends. 
289 
 
The tendency of DGT’s leaders to preserve old practices reflected a poor understanding 
of the scope of change and time that was required to a new policy for HWIs. Timing 
proved to be a crucial factor in implementing the HWI initiative. Lessons learnt from 
Australia’s HWI Taskforce show that the organisation and actors involved in the 
implementation of an HWI policy must be given time to accumulate the knowledge and 
expertise necessary for achieving their policy goals.  
In the next chapter I provide examples of how these two Director Generals during 
implementation of the HWI unit in Indonesia used webs of influence to achieve their 
goals.  
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Chapter 7 
The Use of Webs of Control in Implementing 
HWI Policy, and the Implications 
 
 
…strategically, most actors … prefer to work 
through dialogue before they resort to laying 
strands of reward and coercion. 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, p. 552) 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I identified sources of failure in the implementation of the HWI 
initiative in Indonesian tax administration. These include failure to deal with contesting 
principles and find a higher-order principle to underpin the HWI policy, failure to 
properly consider which mechanisms were appropriate and which were not for 
achieving policy goals, and allowing too little time frame for the organisation and actors 
to learn and accumulate knowledge. These problems were exacerbated, if not caused, by 
the absence of a written strategy that set out the purpose and reasons for the policy and 
of the procedures and processes needed to achieve the desired outcomes. In the absence 
of such documentation (which should have been widely distributed and publicly 
available), the interests of powerful actors (DGT leaders) strongly influenced the policy 
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direction of the Indonesian HWI initiative. Mechanisms chosen to achieve policy goals 
changed according to influential state actors’ desires, without consultation or discussion 
with those affected. 
This chapter presents a picture of the social dynamics that occurred in the DGT during 
the implementation of the HWI policy in Indonesia. I argue that vertical and horizontal 
communication among actors is an important part of the process of implementing a new 
policy such as an HWI initiative, particularly if the policy is adopted from another 
country and requires substantial adjustment to fit local context. Communication that 
reaches all parts of the organisation facilitates explanation and constructive dialogue 
about the purpose of the new policy, how it is to operate, and the resources available to 
support its operation. Furthermore, continuing dialogue with policy stakeholders 
facilitates the organisation’s capacity to respond to problems that occur in 
implementation and promotes continuous learning about how to effectively run the 
program in a new context. 
This chapter consists of three parts. In the first part, the concept of webs of influence 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, chap. 23) is used to explain actors’ efforts to achieve their 
goals. Webs of influence include webs of control (using rewards and coercion to elicit 
compliance with a course of action) and webs of dialogue (using persuasion and 
education to win support for a course of action). While webs of dialogue provide more 
space for involved actors to participate in the process of policy implementation through 
formal and informal channels of communication, webs of controls place considerably 
less importance on debate and persuasion, particularly at lower levels of an 
organisation. Webs of control reward those who comply with influential actors’ 
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directions and coerce or threaten those who do not (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, pp. 
557–558). 
In the second part, this chapter presents empirical evidence about the quality of 
communication between actors in strategic positions in DGT and those at the 
operational level. Many external stakeholders were also neglected when the HWI 
initiative was implemented in Indonesia. Lessons from the implementation of 
Australia’s HWI initiative showed that communication with policy stakeholders is 
pivotal. The ATO was able to learn from outside actors (e.g., tax practitioners, tax law 
consultants, financial advisers) on how the tax authority might best utilise its HWI 
Taskforce to deal with HWIs’ tax affairs (Braithwaite 2001, p. 255). (In this regard, note 
that ‘Taskforce’ originally described a planning and problem solving group that 
comprised knowledgeable and important stakeholders within and outside the ATO 
(ATO 2008, p. 9)). 
Implementation of a ‘foreign’ policy requires understanding of local contexts. Actors 
whose jobs bring them in contact with the everyday reality of taxpaying and tax 
collecting understand the context more than those who inhabit the corridors of power of 
political and civil service decision-making. Learning from tax officials, advisers and 
taxpayers could produce knowledge on how a policy should be adapted in a different 
situation. Communication with stakeholders within and outside the organisation is also 
important to elicit commitment and support. The last part of the chapter examines the 
importance of winning support for new policies in local contexts. 
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7.1 Powerful actors’ use of webs of influence 
In the context of globalisation of regulation, Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) argued that 
‘[d]ialogic webs are more fundamentally webs of persuasion than webs of control’ (p. 
553). In dialogic webs, they suggested, actors from different backgrounds have 
opportunities to convene with each other officially and unofficially, formally and 
informally. Through these meetings and conversations, they define their interests, 
clarifying them for their own purposes and communicating them clearly so that they are 
understood by others. 
The following sections demonstrate that various actors employed webs of dialogue and 
webs of control at different periods of the implementation of the HWI initiative in 
Indonesia. When the HWI unit was initially being considered as a quick-impact 
program, it seemed that influential actors used a dialogic approach to disseminate the 
policy idea to stakeholders: internally to staff at the operational level, externally to 
taxpayers and their advisers (although it should be noted that the use of dialogue at this 
period was limited and not exactly open). Dialogue closed down further as the HWI unit 
swung into action, and had disappeared completely by the time the DGT’s leadership 
changed (see Chapter 6). The next episode of the Indonesian HWI unit’s operation was 
coloured by the use of webs of control to revert to old ways of operating and to meet the 
interests of influential actors. 
7.1.1 Webs of dialogue initially, but limited in scope 
The first form of persuasion delivered by dialogic webs is ‘issue definition’ 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, p. 553). According to Braithwaite and Drahos, influential 
actors utilise their position to define the crucial issue that requires actions. What is 
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defined as crucial may differ from one actor to another, depending how actors 
understand and give meaning to the policy. Once the issue has been defined, dialogue 
follows in order to redefine the interests of actors in solving the problem. Through this 
process, stakeholders are given opportunities to cooperate in solving the problem. 
In the context of implementation of the HWI policy in Indonesia, some actors saw 
multiple issues as connected, other actors less so. The crucial issues that required action 
were providing wealthy taxpayers with better assistance to fulfil their tax obligations, 
restoring trust in the tax authority, and improving relationships with taxpayers, or 
generating revenue from HWI taxpayers through compliance activities so that 
Indonesia’s tax revenue turned from being dominated by corporate income tax to being 
predominantly based on personal income tax. Which issue should have been prioritised 
as the crucial issue differed from one influential actor to another and from one time to 
another. 
Dialogue with internal actors 
In the initial period of the HWI unit in Indonesia, from the time the unit was established 
until the Director General was replaced, the driving force was concern that tax 
compliance of the very wealthy was extremely low. This problem required attention 
from the DGT and needed to be resolved. One high-ranking official in DGT spoke of as 
the critical reason behind the concept of the HWI unit. 
I saw a list of tax payments of the wealthy, whose assets amount to trillions [Rupiah], 
[their tax payments] are very small; smaller than my payments. (RI038, former tax 
official) 
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However, actors in strategic positions in the DGT realised that this issue could not be 
disclosed publicly. Low public trust in the tax authority at that time meant that any 
acknowledgement of a problem with the taxpaying of the wealthy would reflect 
unfavourably on DGT’s performance (RI037, tax official). The public in general and 
HWIs in particular would have demanded that the DGT improve its performance before 
taxpayers were asked to be compliant with their tax obligations. 
At the same time, political forces urging the DGT to take a new approach to HWIs were 
quite strong, as reflected in the opinions of these informants, both from outside DGT: 
Rich people should be given service differently [from general taxpayers]. (RI011, other 
organisation) 
They have contributed to this Republic, why are they treated the same as people in 
general? [Service for them] must be different. (RI016, other organisation) 
In order to minimise political pressure on the DGT, the strategy chosen by the DGT and 
the MoF was to restrict discussion of the issue of tax compliance of HWIs to being for 
‘internal use only’. Disclosing this issue to the public while the public’s trust in DGT 
was low (and political pressures to cooperate with HWIs were high) would have been 
counterproductive to the sustainability of the program (RI037, former tax official). As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, at this early period, the DGT leadership recognised that the 
HWI initiative had to be a long-term policy. The principles of ‘relationships 
improvement first, and revenue collection later’ captured the strategic thinking of the 
leadership in this early period. 
Defining the issue of HWI compliance internally within DGT could be seen as 
influential actors defining their crucial issue through persuasion. Actors in strategic 
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positions sought to develop the same commitment and mutual understanding of shared 
interests between actors at different levels in the DGT. An informant who was a tax 
official at the time recalled his experience of having meetings at MoF and DGT 
headquarters in which the Finance Minister raised concerns about the tax compliance 
behaviour of the very wealthy: 
I attended two meetings with the Finance Minister [something that rarely happened to 
echelon IV staff]. Actually, we were even invited into three meetings with the Minister 
[but the respondent only attended two meetings]. In the meeting, the Minister raised the 
issue that she understood there were a lot of wealthy people who could afford to buy 
luxury cars but paid very little tax ... Therefore, the rich became the target of this program 
[to improve their compliance] … The idea [for setting up an HWI unit] was originally 
like that. (RI002, tax official) 
Dialogue between staff at the HWI unit and higher-level officials in the MoF and DGT 
not only occurred in relation to defining the crucial issue, but continued until the HWI 
unit had been running for several months. In this period (May-December 2009), staff 
discussed the development of the unit on many occasions (RI022, tax official). 
Involvement of staff at the operational level, in the form of formal and informal 
meetings with both LTRO and headquarters, contributed to the flow of ideas from 
actors on the ground: what information system was required to support their works; 
what regulation needed to be reviewed to deal with HWIs; how to deal with bureaucracy 
when requesting taxpayers’ data; or what training was needed for the staff. A paper 
produced by staff at the HWI unit (Indonesia HWI Unit 2010), which discussed 
problems they encountered in the first few months of the HWI unit operation and 
suggestions for improvement, was only theoretical and could only be distributed in a 
dialogic climate. 
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In the early period of the HWI unit’s operation [i.e., before the Director General was 
replaced], we had relatively intensive dialogue with the headquarters and kanwil. We 
provided a lot of feedback about the SOPs [standard operating procedures], how the HWI 
unit should operate [and] constraints we faced on the ground. We even produced a special 
report and gave it to headquarters, something that no other TSO had done before. (RI024, 
tax official) 
Section heads had routine meetings to discuss problems we faced in our jobs ... there was 
no gap between sections [in this HWI office] as we often heard in other offices. We 
delineated the problems and advised headquarters. (RI027, tax official) 
Dialogue with outside stakeholders 
In the first period of implementation of the HWI unit, the DGT sought to use dialogic 
webs with stakeholders outside the organisation such as tax advisers, lawyers, 
accountants, and business or investment consultants. Involving these actors in the effort 
to influence tax compliance of HWIs was a mechanism that the ATO pursued during its 
HWI taskforce operation (Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001, p. 418).  
In Indonesia, however, dialogic webs did not function optimally as a means for 
delivering policy ideas to stakeholders outside the DGT. These kinds of forums 
functioned more as a means to introduce or explain technical aspects of taxation, such 
as how to lodge tax returns online, the meaning of new tax regulations, or how to deal 
with tax auditing (HWI TSO 2010b), rather than forums to discuss strategic issues. 
Even when strategic issues were discussed (e.g., what the HWI unit’s objective was), 
the DGT introduced the HWI initiative as a new way of delivering service to wealthy 
taxpayers (discussed in Chapter 6) rather than as a new regulatory approach for 
monitoring the compliance of this taxpayer group. Consequently, their understanding of 
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the policy was low, which resulted in misperception and even scepticism about it. Tax 
advisers were sceptical about the genuine intention of the policy: 
We had negative experiences [with the DGT] … the DGT always spoke ambiguously … 
they had a hidden agenda [with this unit]’ (RI005, tax consultant).  
The HWI unit? I think it is like ‘hunting in the zoo’. (RI003, tax consultant) 
By ‘hunting in the zoo’90, RI003 meant that DGT would exploit HWIs for generating 
revenue rather than provide them with a better service (as per the HWI unit’s publicly 
stated objective). The public in general and taxpaying community in particular did not 
believe that this was the HWI unit’s true purpose. Although DGT sought to develop 
dialogue with actors from outside DGT, such dialogic forums did not function to deliver 
new policy ideas, let alone gain shared commitment and support.  
Dialogue with outside was different from that with internal stakeholders. DGT was 
under political pressure not to disclose the real objectives of the HWI policy. HWIs are 
people with economic and political power; their connections with political parties, 
senior government officials and high-ranking military personnel placed them in 
advantageous positions in relation to DGT. The HWI policy did not receive strong 
political support, possibly because it was defined as a ‘DGT program’ rather than a 
‘government program’ (RI018, RI034, tax officials). 
As a DGT program, the HWI initiative was hobbled by the public’s long-held 
perception about DGT as a ‘corrupt institution’ (World Bank 2003). DGT failed to 
disclose openly the reasons behind the establishment of the HWI policy and its 
                                                 
90  This expression is equivalent to the better-known English expression ‘shooting fish in a barrel’. 
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objectives. Hence, it fed public suspicion despite efforts made by DGT leaders to 
develop communication with taxpayers and their advisers. 
Communication within DGT was more successful. This was acknowledged by an IMF 
advisor to DGT, who reported that frequent discussion and communication among 
various DGT directorates with a stake in the HWI initiative was quite intensive in this 
period (IMF 2011, p. 14). Nevertheless, these kinds of internal communication forums 
were not yet institutionalised in the DGT; rather, meetings occurred on an ad hoc basis. 
No special group met regularly to discuss problems in relation to the implementation of 
the HWI unit. Formal regular meetings, such as the national leadership meetings 
(rapimnas)91 and the regional coordination meetings (rakorda)92 functioned mostly as 
one-way top-down communication, in which the Director General (in a rapimnas) and 
the kanwil chief (in a rakorda) disseminated instructions to subordinates officials on 
new initiatives (new rules, practices). These forums were also the occasion for units’ 
(regional offices or TSOs) performance evaluations, at which units’ revenue collections 
were compared and ranked. 
The absence of institutionalised forums involving internal actors within the DGT and 
outside stakeholders contrasts with the ATO’s arrangements for their HWIs. DGT did 
not have a special group such as the National Tax Liaison Group (in Australia) (ATO 
2012) in which senior tax officials, particularly from the HWI unit, met with tax 
practitioners to discuss particular issues relating to HWIs, or The Wealthy Forum (HM 
                                                 
91  The national leadership meeting or rapimnas is a regular meeting held by DGT headquarters and 
attended by all directors at DGT headquarters and kanwil chiefs across Indonesia.  
92  The regional coordination meeting or rakorda is a regular meeting held by a particular DGT regional 
office (kanwil) led by the kanwil chief and attended by TSOs’ chiefs under supervision of certain kanwil. 
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Revenue & Customs 2010) in which tax advisers from the UK’s big accounting firms 
meet regularly with senior members of HMRC’s HWI unit to discuss issues such as 
compliance risks, customer service and consultation on proposed policy changes that 
effect wealthy taxpayers. Such a forum can also be used to signal to the taxpaying 
community which practices will become the tax authority’s focus: ‘[In that forum] you 
tell them what attracted your attention’ (RA007, tax official).  
Following the replacement of the DGT’s leader, relationships that were being built 
between actors internally and externally changed dramatically.  
7.1.2 Webs of control after July 2009 
Reward and coercion of HWI unit staff 
As reported in Chapter 6, the DGT leadership change sparked ‘a totally 180-degree 
turn’ in policy direction (RI024, tax official). Not only was the policy focus and 
direction changed, relationships between headquarters and the HWI unit and its staff 
changed as well. Instead of achieving the long-term goal of improving compliance of 
individual taxpayers by using wealthy taxpayers as role models, the priority reverted to 
the short-term goal of annual revenue target achievement. 
An IMF report revealed that ‘changes in leadership and program focus have impacted 
the advancement of the HWI program’ (IMF 2011, p. 14). Leadership change disrupted 
the previously shared interest among involved actors. Dialogic webs among internal 
stakeholders were used less. Powerful actors who wanted to achieve their objectives 
hurriedly utilised a different strategy: webs of control (using reward and coercion) to 
ensure that actors in subordinate positions had no choice but to follow the DGT leader’s 
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new directions. Staff knew the consequence if they did not comply with the directions 
from the top. 
The use of rewards and punishments can encourage the accomplishment of short-term 
goals. Coercion, as seen in the second period of the HWI unit’s operation, took the form 
of being rotated to other TSOs in less favourable areas, or deployment to a lower grade 
position, or being ridiculed in rakorda or rapimnas meetings. These measures pushed 
staff into generating more tax revenue in the short term. One informant described how 
the HWI unit staff were under more pressure in this period:  
‘[because revenue of the HWI unit was insignificant] we were always scolded when he 
[Director General] came here [the HWI unit] or in the [formal] meetings’ (RI024, tax 
official).  
This informant continued:  
‘… we were always being demanded to perform compliance activities [in order to 
generate more revenue] … no matter what’.  
Some operational staff resisted the new Director General’s direction. First, the HWI unit 
staff understood the original intention underlying the HWI policy was that compliance 
activities were not the priority, at least in the first few years of operation. Second, 
infrastructure to support compliance activities (e.g., taxpayer databases, risk assessment 
method and operating procedures) was not yet available. Third, staff at the HWI unit did 
not have the experience necessary to effectively audit HWI taxpayers (IMF 2011, p. 14). 
As suggested by one IMF advisor to the DGT, staff at the HWI unit required more time 
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to accumulate knowledge of taxpayers’ complex financial arrangements, tax planning 
techniques, and association with related entities (IMF 2011, p. 10).  
In these circumstances, using a coercive approach to secure compliance from lower-
level staff meant that staff felt they were treated unfairly; their ideas and suggestions 
were no longer heard and problems they faced were not supported. Staff on the ground 
started to demonstrate attitudes of helplessness and passive resistance, as the following 
respondents revealed: 
We were in a very difficult position … you know what I mean? … If we followed DG’s 
[Director General] instruction [to do compliance activities at this stage] we had no 
sufficient capability [expertise, data, and experience for doing audit to HWIs]. If we did 
not follow his direction we would be punished [and perceived to be underperforming]. 
(RI019, tax official) 
What can we do [with this situation]? We had no choice but follow the instruction [to do 
auditing]. (RI025, tax official) 
The new DGT leader did not take these conditions into account when he asserted that 
the HWI units should generate more revenue through compliance activities. The priority 
was that every unit (TSOs) – including the HWI unit – should achieve the nominated 
revenue targets with their available resources. Actors on the ground were not given 
opportunities to share their ideas about what should be prioritised. Communication and 
dialogic webs that had been developed in the previous period were shattered.  
Passive resistance was visible among HWI unit staff. They ‘…started to be 
demotivated’ (RI025, tax official), and grew anxious about their careers and positions 
(RI024, tax official). 
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From conversations with staff at the HWI unit during my fieldwork from January 2012 
until February 2012, I understood that one reason staff were demoralised after a sudden 
change in HWI policy direction was that they had had high expectations of the HWI 
unit becoming a new regulatory model for improving tax compliance in Indonesia. If 
this new model had been successfully implemented, according to staff in the HWI unit, 
DGT could have used it in other regional offices and HWI staff would have been part of 
that success. One tax official expressed the sentiment in this way: 
During the previous leadership, at the time the HWI unit was established, as far as I 
understood the mission of the establishment of this unit was to create a kind of laboratory 
for DGT [for administering taxpayers with complex transactions] and we were proud of 
being part of such an experiment. (RI027, tax official) 
When channels of communication closed down during the second period of the HWI 
unit’s operation, staff did not know what they should do, as the above informant 
explained further: 
The idea was originally like that, but when the leadership changed, suddenly we had to 
change the orientation [meeting the targets]. Well ... that's what made us so desperate ... 
you know what I mean? (RI027, tax official) 
The above opinion is consistent with the following respondent’s view about his and his 
colleagues’ feeling: ‘We started wavering because the orientation of the unit was 
changed [suddenly]’ (RI024, tax official). 
It was not only actors in the HWI unit who felt confused about what was going on; even 
people in DGT headquarters and LTRO who supervised the work of the HWI unit were 
uncertain. An informant who was involved at the beginning of setting up the HWI unit, 
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but subsequently left the DGT, spoke to me about the development of the HWI unit 
following the leadership change.  
[How this unit operated] was returning to the old model [of how DGT offices operated], 
if I may say I was quite disappointed with the development of this office. (RI038, former 
tax official) 
The respondent was disappointed because the way in which the HWI unit operating was 
not as it had been expected in terms of using innovative approaches to monitor tax 
compliance of HWIs and their related entities such as those practised in Australia and 
other developed countries. 
Changing relationships with outside stakeholders 
Dialogic webs that had developed with stakeholders outside the organisation during the 
first period of the HWI unit’s operation also weakened in the second period. Dialogic 
relationships between DGT and outside stakeholders, although limited in scope, started 
to flourish in the first few months of the HWI unit’s operation. In this period, tax 
officials and advisers met (in some cases) in an equal, supportive and communicative 
environment. Staff communicated with tax advisers and taxpayers to introduce the HWI 
program, provide assistance in relation to tax return lodgements, or respond to 
taxpayers’ inquiries (HWI TSO 2010, pp. 29–32).  
Changing the focus of the HWI unit’s operation to compliance activities changed 
relationships of dialogue into ‘confrontational’ relationships. Advisers met tax officials 
not as policy stakeholders who could give feedback to the policy but while representing 
taxpayers in audit activities. 
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Yes … it [relationship with taxpayers and tax advisers] was changed dramatically 
following changes in policy direction and they could feel the change. (RI019, tax official) 
The change in relationships accompanied change toward a stronger compliance and 
revenue focus. According to one tax adviser, the revenue orientation changed the 
function of audit: 
The taxpayer was annoyed. Audit, for example … Audit should be carried out to examine 
whether the taxpayer have followed the rules … What happened was that the audit 
functioned to generate revenue. Audit was given [revenue] targets. (RI003, tax adviser) 
Stakeholders from outside DGT were also confused about what had happened with the 
HWI unit. To some extent, the sudden change in orientation to compliance activities 
confirmed suspicions about DGT’s untrustworthiness. They saw the gap between what 
had been said publicly and what actually been done. As mentioned earlier, actors from 
the taxpaying community perceived DGT to have a hidden agenda with respect to the 
HWI unit.  
We are confused by the HWI policy. DGT was inconsistent in running the policy … we 
had such an experience in the past. (RI005, tax adviser) 
HWI taxpayers also felt confused, especially after they realised that the HWI unit was 
similar to the TSOs which had originally administered them. A respondent from the 
HWI unit explained his designated taxpayers’ reaction in this way: 
… many of them [taxpayers] assumed that they would be caught, put in a ‘cage’ – using 
their terminology – and ready to be slaughtered at any time. (RI002, tax official) 
The views of taxpayers, as related by the tax official above, were in the context of DGT 
headquarters inviting potential HWI taxpayers to a series of meetings prior to the 
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establishment of the HWI unit.93 They were told that when their tax administration was 
moved from STOs around Jakarta to the new HWI unit, they would be provided with a 
better service (RI020, RI030, tax official and former tax official respectively). The 
inconsistency with actual practice did not go unnoticed by HWIs and their advisers. 
Any new trusting relationships that were being built with outside stakeholders 
subsequently disintegrated. 
7.2 The importance of communication with stakeholders in 
implementation of HWI policy  
Communication among involved actors is a key element in the implementation of a new 
policy. Communication facilitates vertical and horizontal flows of information (see 
Figure 7.1). First, it conveys a policy idea from the top to the bottom of the organisation 
(vertically) and from the organisation to external policy stakeholders (horizontally) 
(represented by green arrows). Delivering the policy idea through dialogic strands 
ensures that it is understood evenly throughout the organisation and by stakeholders to 
whom this policy is intended for. Lessons from the introduction of the Australian 
compliance model in early 1997 (Chapter 4) demonstrated that this approach was an 
effective way to gain support from affected actors, even when resistance existed in some 
parts of the organisation and external stakeholders.  
  
                                                 
93 The meetings were held on 25-26 November 2008 and 1-3 December 2008 as revealed in an 
anonymous DGT document (Formation process of the HWI unit 2011). 
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Figure 7.1 Two-way dialogue 
A new policy might at first be opposed by some members of an organisation and other 
stakeholders, but consistent dialogue involves stakeholders in a process of learning and 
adaptation. Dialogue enables actors to learn policy goals and what the organisation 
expects from them. Following dialogue with involved actors, policy goals may be 
adjusted to suit the current situation and resource availability. The policy is adapted in 
response to consideration of voices from the front line. As long as this adjustment is 
part of a dialogue involving all stakeholders, conflict can be minimised.  
The second flow of communication in Figure 7.1 (represented by blue arrows) are from 
the bottom to the top of the organisation (vertically) and from external stakeholders to 
the organisation (horizontally). Dialogue allows actors on the ground and other 
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stakeholders to provide feedback about how to implement the policy in a more 
‘vernacularised’ (Merry 2006b) way, in keeping with local conditions. It is possible 
because those working with HWI taxpayers have grounded knowledge based on their 
experiences. A bottom-up flow of knowledge allows actors in strategic positions to 
learn from what happens in reality when the policy is implemented. This knowledge can 
be used to improve the policy when necessary. Figure 7.1 illustrates the two-way 
direction of dialogue in policy implementation (vertically and horizontally), which is 
how the webs of influence should have been working in the policy implementation stage 
in DGT. Braithwaite and Drahos (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, p. 557) noted that all the 
interconnections previously developed through dialogic processes could be weakened 
by threats of coercion. 
The following sections detail the consequences produced by the use of webs of control 
when the DGT implemented the HWI initiative. 
7.2.1 Unheard voices from the ground: blocked channels of communication 
Actors on the front line, particularly those in the HWI unit, were concerned about how 
the policy was handled after the leadership change but reluctant to express their 
opinions. The new culture developed in the HWI unit, where lower-level staff had 
opportunity to provide advice through formal and informal channels to senior staff, also 
stopped. HWI staff recognised changed communication practices as a problem (RI019, 
RI025, RI031, tax officials). 
When staff at the HWI unit realised that, due to their structural level in the DGT 
organisation, they had no authority to force other TSOs and other government agencies 
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to provide them with the HWI information they needed, their hope was that 
headquarters would take over this role. According to one informant: 
Due to the nature of HWIs and their entities, our suggestion was that this role [data 
gathering] was played by a higher-level office, either kanwil or headquarters (RI024, tax 
official).  
Unfortunately, as another respondent recalled: ‘we lacked support from headquarters’ 
(RI025, tax official). HWI staff felt they had little choice but do as they were told 
(RI009, tax official). They preferred not to reveal the difficulties they faced in the field 
because if they did so, they would be seen as grumbling or labelled as non-performers. 
The use of webs of control not only blocked channels of communication between 
higher- and lower-level officials (especially those at the HWI unit), but also with 
stakeholders involved in the implementation of and affected by the HWI initiative. One 
respondent commented that communication was essential but was not given much 
attention (RI008, tax consultant). What the respondent meant was that communication 
between DGT as policymaker and policy stakeholders in relation to how the HWI unit 
should operate (such as that of the LTO in early 2000s) would not happen again.94 
7.2.2 Lack of support and missed opportunities to learn from actors on the 
ground 
Since the HWI initiative in Indonesia was transferred from Australia, a country which is 
structurally different from Indonesia, the transferred HWI policy needed to be adjusted 
in terms of how it should be operationalized to make it fit the Indonesian context. 
Actors on the ground translated the foreign ideas about how to effectively manage the 
                                                 
94  That is, the newly developed ethos of the HWI unit would not continue and it would be business as 
usual in DGT (RI001, tax consultant). 
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tax compliance of HWI taxpayers, not the epistemic community of taxation policy 
experts (e.g., IMF advisors, World Bank consultants, and tax experts in the FTA) who 
had spread the idea globally. Global actors did not have sufficient knowledge about 
local contexts such as Indonesia’s taxpaying culture or organisational constraints. When 
it came to implementation of the policy, the distance between global actors and local 
context was too wide.  
As translators of HWI ideas on the ground, staff in the HWI unit had advantage. They 
understood the problems they faced when dealing with Indonesian taxpayers in general 
and HWIs in particular. This knowledge could only be obtained through interaction with 
the Indonesian taxpaying community – experience that tax experts from epistemic 
communities did not have. The HWI staff who had undergone training and skill 
development tried to shorten the distance between the HWI initiative global practice and 
Indonesian context. However, their input was ignored or rejected. 
The lack of success in translation of the HWI policy in Indonesia was in part due to a 
tradition of poor communication within and from the DGT. Actors in high-level 
strategic positions were not in the habit of talking to officials in low-level operational 
positions about problems, except in the brief first period of HWI unit implementation 
(see Figure 7.1). Staff in the HWI unit tried to introduce mechanisms that they thought 
were suitable within the Indonesian context. However, the idea of integrating HWI 
taxpayers’ databases and their related entities (as discussed in Chapter 6), for instance, 
was rejected by powerful actors as it was considered as ‘not in accordance with the 
existing rule’ (RI021, tax official). 
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Instead of developing windows of opportunity for dialogue and learning about the idea 
introduced by the HWI staff, powerful actors interpreted the actions of their 
subordinates as being against the directive of DGT headquarters.95 The result was not 
surprising. The person responsible for the idea of integrating data about HWIs and their 
related entities was transferred to another TSO after less than 13 months in the unit 
(RI027, tax official). Powerful actors used their power to silence those who did not 
comply. 
If dialogic webs had been used, a compromise solution might have been found without 
sacrificing the existing rules, as an informant expressed his idea (RI025, tax official) as 
follows. This tax official suggested that one solution might have been to allow the HWI 
unit list entities that were linked to a particular HWI. Based on such lists, headquarters 
could either grant the HWI unit limited access to the data of HWI-related entities, or 
alternatively provide ready-to-use data in relation to HWI-related entities without 
granting the HWI unit access to taxpayers’ database. This seemingly simple solution did 
not come to the surface because communication did not flow smoothly in both 
directions. 
Apart from being an obstacle to the use of knowledge from actors on the ground, the 
blocked channels of communication were demoralising. Staff of the HWI unit perceived 
that powerful actors did not support or appreciate their work (RI021 and RI025, tax 
officials). 
                                                 
95  This was suggested from conversation with informants who asked not to be quoted directly. 
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It is important to recognise that senior officials in the DGT held knowledge and had a 
perspective that was as important to consider as the views of the HWI unit staff. 
However, and although such sharing of perspectives was beginning to occur in the first 
period of the HWI unit’s implementation, it never took place in the second period. A 
shared interest could have been achieved through a written strategy – as already noted in 
this chapter and in Chapter 6, a crucial element missing from Indonesian HWI policy. A 
formal written plan or strategy would have facilitated open dialogue among policy 
stakeholders, established and communicated policy goals and objectives, helped build a 
consensus for management and direction, and developed a sense of ownership of the 
program (IMF 2011, pp. 14–15). A revised version of the HWI program could have 
proceeded in this way. 
7.2.3 Lack of support and perceived failure from outside stakeholders  
The contrast with the Australian situation at the implementation stage was great. The 
Australian HWI initiative received much attention from a vast array of actors (e.g., the 
public in general, politicians and political institutions, and taxpayers’ ‘networks of 
influence’ (Rawlings 2005) such as tax advisers and accountants). In Indonesia the 
concepts of the policy were not communicated clearly to the public in general or to 
actors who had a close relationship with HWIs (such as tax advisers). Consequently, the 
HWI initiative in Indonesia received little attention or support from actors outside the 
DGT. The business community thought this initiative meant new taxes or tariffs for 
HWIs, as did a prominent investment and business adviser who thought that the HWI 
initiative meant increasing tariffs for wealthy individuals that would cause ‘local 
investors to flee abroad’ (‘Tax for wealthy taxpayers’ 2009). 
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To avoid controversy and to preserve ambiguity about the function of the HWI unit, the 
DGT restricted communication. As already noted, involving stakeholders is crucial in 
every phase of the innovation process (Eggers & Singh 2009), including introducing a 
new policy into the public sector: from generation phase through implementation of 
ideas. With respect to the implementation phase of new ideas in the public sector, 
Sørensen and Torfing (2011, p. 852) have argued that implementation of a new 
initiative is enhanced when collaboration creates joint ownership of the new initiative. 
Moreover, they suggested that developing a feeling of ownership among involved actors 
could reduce resistance to the implementation of the new initiative. This suggests that 
DGT moved in the wrong direction; more communication was necessary, not less. 
DGT should have not only developed vertical communication with internal actors, but 
enhanced horizontal communication with actors outside the organisation (see 
Figure 7.1), especially those who have close relationships with HWIs. As in other 
countries, the tax affairs of HWIs in Indonesia are mostly managed by their advisers 
(RI002, tax official). Good communication with HWIs’ networks of influence at the 
very early stage of the implementation of the HWI program was vital but missing. 
Stronger and more transparent webs of dialogue involving outside stakeholders might 
have minimised resistance and created a feeling joint ownership of the HWI program.96 
The DGT stood to gain three benefits from developing stronger, more formal dialogue 
with tax advisers. First, it could have utilised tax advisers to introduce the work of the 
                                                 
96 This is not to suggest, however, that dialogue alone would have led to a major increase in HWI 
compliance. In order to build trust and cooperation, however, DGT should start with an honest 
explanation about its true motivations when introducing a new policy. 
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HWI unit, its role and expectations to targeted taxpayers. It is likely that taxpayers 
would have been more comfortable learning about what the HWI unit was doing from 
their advisers than directly from the DGT. (That said, formal and honest communication 
in writing to HWIs may also have enhanced transparency and trust.) Second, because 
tax advisers often have close relationships with their clients, they may be a better target 
for improving compliance (Braithwaite & Braithwaite 2001, p. 418). Engaging advisers 
to influence taxpayers’ compliance was an alternative path that DGT could have 
followed in situations where relational distance between taxpayers and the tax authority 
was high and adversarial, especially with taxpayers with whom the DGT had previously 
had serious problems (see Chapter 5, section 5.1.2). Third, good communication 
networks between tax advisers and DGT could have enabled the HWI unit staff to learn 
about the tax, business, investment, and financial arrangements employed by the HWIs. 
More often than not, tax officials lag behind independent tax professionals in their 
knowledge and understanding of the latest developments in tax minimisation and 
avoidance, as one respondent from an international organisation suggested: 
HWI taxpayers in Indonesia employ sophisticated financial and tax advisors. The DGT 
should strive to bring the expertise of the HWI office as close as possible to the levels of 
the taxpayers’ advisors. (RI040, international organisation) 
When this kind of learning process can be institutionalised in a more formal forum such 
as practiced in other countries (e.g., Australia and the UK), any issues that arise in the 
forum can be used to guide proposed policy changes. If such formal engagement had 
been developed in the early stages of the initiation of the HWI program, a cynical 
question from one tax adviser such as the following might not be raised:  
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Did you think that a good policy [such as the HWI initiative] alone could create a 
conducive environment to improve tax compliance [of HWIs in Indonesia]? (RI031, tax 
consultant). 
Another prominent tax consultant saw the HWI policy in Indonesia as a ‘flawed 
imitation’ of policies in more developed countries and one that ‘should be terminated’ 
(RI003, tax consultant). This rejection of the HWI unit might not have happened on 
such a large scale if DGT had created more space for outside stakeholders to be 
involved in shaping and evaluating the program. 
Not just communication but self-interest 
Another explanation for poor support of the HWI unit from the HWIs’ networks of 
influence was that these actors were acting in their self-interest or that of their clients 
(RI020, RI030, tax officials). They did not want HWIs’ tax affairs touched by the tax 
authority. In this view, HWIs used political pressure and the lobbying of tax 
professionals to bring the program down. One respondent endorsed this explanation for 
why the HWI initiative in Indonesia did not develop well. 
Look. The problem that existed in the Indonesian tax system – like any other law in this 
country – is ... sorry I have to say this … it is ‘sharp’ when applied to the general public, 
but ‘blunt’ when applied to the elite. The tax authority does not dare enforce the law 
against rich people; why? Because the rich people have strong networks, they have 
political power, and they have lobbies and strong pressure groups. (RI015, academic) 
The idea of ‘co-optation’ also arose in conversation with respondents. One respondent 
from the group of tax officials recognised this as another source of pressure on 
Indonesia’s HWI program. 
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You know … now in the executive, many ministers have backgrounds as businessmen, so 
it is with the legislators. Do you think they want to see HWI [unit] evolve? It [the HWI 
program] will open their records [in taxation] … they are co-opted [by business interests]. 
(RI018, tax official) 
Nevertheless, some of the respondents from the tax practitioners group (including tax 
lawyers and tax advisers) saw potential in the new HWI unit: 
Actually, there was no problem if the government wanted to establish a HWI [unit], 
because the statistics showed that the number of rich people in Indonesia has increased. 
Especially if we look at the per capita income of Indonesians, that has also increased. 
However, the increase in per capita income was uneven, [it was] enjoyed only by a small 
part of society. (RI006, tax consultant) 
I think in this case, the HWI unit allows closed monitoring to HWIs. If the rich taxpayers 
remained in the TSOs, they would not be monitored properly. By gathering them in one 
office such as the HWI unit, the hope was that they would be monitored more intensively. 
(RI026, tax lawyer) 
7.3 Discussion and analysis 
The hypotheses that guided this chapter relate to the consequences of powerful actors 
using webs of control to secure their objectives. Webs of control influenced the flows of 
policy ideas from the top to the bottom of the organisation and of policy feedback in the 
opposite direction. As a result, knowledge sharing contracted, support was undermined 
and learning was impoverished.  
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The fieldwork also revealed an unanticipated phenomenon as the result of powerful 
actors’ preference to use webs of control: a passive resistance. 
A change in the leadership of the DGT during HWI unit implementation had far-
reaching effects. While I showed in Chapter 6 that change in the DGT leadership 
resulted in a contestation of principles and mechanisms, evidence presented in this 
chapter suggests the dialogic webs that had been developed by previous powerful actors 
were changed dramatically into webs of control by others. 
Powerful actors’ preferences for using webs of control in order to achieve their goals 
resulted in reluctance among actors at lower levels to participate, especially in the 
period of HWI implementation after the DGT leadership changed. The HWI unit staff 
knew they lacked the means that would enable them to actively participate in the 
implementation of the policy through an equal and open dialogue. In the first period, 
they could voice concerns; in the second period, they were silenced. They were denied a 
forum that would facilitate information sharing and provide feedback in relation to the 
policy to actors in strategic positions.  
Hypothesis 4(a): The use of webs of control rather than webs of dialogue by 
powerful actors blocked channels of communication across 
different levels of the organisation and with stakeholders involved 
in the implementation of and affected by the policy. 
Hypothesis 4(b): Poor communication to disseminate new policy ideas such as the 
HWI unit resulted in poor support for the policy and an inability to 
learn from others with local ‘grounded’ knowledge for how the 
policy could be best implemented. 
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When powerful actors used dialogic webs, they increased the degree of inclusion of all 
stakeholders into discussions and the degree of ownership of the policy. Dialogic webs 
developed by powerful actors during the first period of the HWI unit’s operations 
provided a greater space for involved actors to engage with each other in a more 
persuasive, communicative, sometimes contestable but cooperative environment (see 
description of such space in Braithwaite & Drahos 2000; Cartwright 2011). It should be 
acknowledged, however, that dialogic webs used for internal actors were different in 
quality to those used for external actors. Nevertheless, the efforts of powerful actors in 
this period to initiate and maintain dialogue should not be neglected, given that the 
increased scope for discussion departed from the DGT tradition of command and 
control with little transparency.  
Actors’ preference to use dialogic webs during the first period of the HWI unit’s 
operations could not be separated from the principles held by these actors in relation to 
the HWI policy. As discussed in Chapter 6, principles accommodate actions that actors 
choose to take. In the first period, powerful actors gave meaning to the HWI policy as a 
long-term policy. Therefore actors sought to develop relationships with internal and 
external stakeholders. Relationship building included external stakeholders, particularly 
aimed at restoring trust in DGT as an institution and their officials.  
Dialogic webs created respectful forms of regulatory management, negotiation and 
relationship development between actors at different positions, whereas webs of control 
prioritised the use of command and control regulation with powerful actors dominating 
weaker ones. Webs of control are mainly used by actors who want to achieve their goals 
through a short-term commitment while undermining a long-term one (Braithwaite & 
Drahos 2000, p. 558). The use of coercion or threat of coercion by powerful actors at 
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the DGT during the second period of the HWI unit’s operations showed that while it 
might bring about compliance among weaker actors on the ground, it also produced 
negative long-term consequences in terms of capacity-building with staff stakeholders.  
The first consequence of using webs of control in the implementation of HWI policy in 
Indonesia was that it blocked channels of communication, disconnecting actors on the 
ground from the leadership. This did not result in open confrontation, but actors were 
reluctant to follow the new leadership. The guiding principles had changed. Confusion 
reigned.  
The second consequence of use of webs of control was that dissemination of the HWI 
policy idea was poor. Actors on the ground indicated that many stakeholders did not 
understand or accept the changed policy ideas. This prevented the development of 
broad-based support for the policy, and powerful actors could not learn from actors who 
had local grounded knowledge for implementing policy in a more localised way. Actors 
on the ground chose not to convey their ideas about the HWI unit and preferred to ‘do 
something’ that powerful actors asked them to do, even if it did not make much sense to 
them. They understood the consequences that might follow if they did not comply with 
orders from above. 
As the dialogic environment faded, the HWI policy lost support because stakeholders 
had different interpretations of it. The interpretations constructed in the first period by 
the Director General gave rise to mutual commitment and shared interests, especially 
with internal actors. This embedded understanding could not be replaced instantly by 
using coercion, because webs of dialogue had established normative commitments. 
When the webs of dialogue were dismantled, commitment did not immediately change. 
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Commitment to old understanding co-existed as the new regime swung into action, and 
confusion resulted.  
Blocked dialogic communication channels also led to the loss of opportunities for 
powerful actors to learn from other stakeholders outside the DGT, in particular tax 
practitioners, who have rich knowledge about HWIs and their tax and business affairs. 
These actors, if involved in implementing an HWI initiative through a more 
institutionalised dialogic forum, could have contributed substantially to the 
development of the HWI unit. 
Two-way communication could have facilitated actors sharing of broad goals and 
directions with actors on the ground, who in turn could provide actors in strategic 
positions with feedback about how the policy was working. Their local grounded 
knowledge might have benefited the HWI policy by drawing attention to limitations in 
implementation and differences between Indonesia and Australia that affected 
successful implementation. Dialogic webs of this kind allow for ‘fluidity and 
interchangeability’ (Cartwright 2011, p. 54) of ideas and knowledge between actors. 
This is not possible in an environment where less powerful actors are threatened and 
therefore choose to comply half-heartedly. 
Conclusion 
This chapter documents how DGT struggled to implement the HWI policy they 
transferred from Australia. Following the change in DGT leadership, the direction of the 
HWI unit changed markedly. In this chapter I discussed how relationships were built 
between involved actors and stakeholders in the first period of the HWI unit and how 
they changed in the second. The nature of relationships within DGT and with external 
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stakeholders determined how ideas about the HWI policy were understood, accepted 
and supported. 
I argued in this chapter that powerful actors’ tendency to use webs of control rather than 
webs of dialogue blocks channels of communication. Vertical and horizontal 
communication across different levels of the organisation and with stakeholders 
involved in the implementation of and affected by the policy are essential when a new 
complex policy such as the HWI initiative is introduced. Moreover, I asserted that when 
communication with involved actors is poorly developed in implementation of a new 
policy, the policy is unlikely to attract the support needed. A chance to learn from others 
who have knowledge about how the policy could be best implemented is lost. 
The overarching finding from this chapter was that as webs of control crowded out 
webs of dialogue, passive resistance among internal actors and other stakeholders 
emerged. With internal actors, passive resistance was demonstrated by following the 
direction of headquarters half-heartedly, just to show powerful actors that they were 
‘doing something’. Threats from powerful actors were enough to gain compliance from 
lower-level staff in the DGT. For stakeholders outside DGT, resistance took the form of 
cynicism and dismissiveness around DGT’s new agenda. 
Stakeholders from outside DGT, be they HWI taxpayers or members of their networks 
of influence, engaged in passive resistance for two possible reasons. One possibility was 
that these actors were confused about what the HWI policy was about. What was told to 
them at the outset in the first period was quite different from what was finally 
experienced in the second period. During the early period of the HWI unit’s operation 
(the first period), outside stakeholders were invited to events at which DGT disclosed its 
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plan to establish a new regulatory initiative dedicated to HWI taxpayers. Unfortunately, 
these forums did not achieve their objective of delivering policy ideas to the 
stakeholders. Stakeholders, based on their experience in the past with DGT, questioned 
the good intentions behind the plan. When a new Director General came into office and 
the direction of the DGT changed to revenue collection, relationships with these actors 
became more confrontational than collegial. This confirmed what these actors had 
suspected at the outset about the HWI policy. 
Politics is the other possible reason why stakeholders from outside DGT demonstrated 
passive resistance. Again, high politics is not the focus of this thesis; however, my 
analysis suggested that politics was at play in the discontinuity of the HWI program in 
Indonesia. Some of the HWIs with tax matters administered in the new unit were 
affiliated with political parties and institutions. They used their social capital (Bourdieu 
1986) to influence political decision-making in relation to the HWI initiative. Further, 
as pointed out by respondents in this study, many bureaucrats in strategic positions at 
the time of the HWI unit’s early operations came from business backgrounds. They 
sought to protect their taxpaying history, which could have easily been explored if the 
HWI unit had operated effectively. While active resistance would have been possible 
but maybe not sensible, because they would have drawn attention to themselves; they 
chose to resist passively using their networks of influence. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
 
 
If we are ever to think against the pressure of 
our institutions, this is the hardest place to try, 
where the resistance is strongest. 
(Douglas 1986, p.113) 
 
 
8.1 Successful innovation, unsuccessful transplantation 
An HWI initiative is a regulatory arrangement used by tax authorities to improve their 
understanding of the tax and business affairs of wealthy individuals and to enhance their 
compliance management strategy based on that understanding. This initiative was firstly 
introduced by France’s tax authority in 1983, but did not become popular until it was 
introduced by the ATO, with a distinctive regulatory approach, in 1996. The policy was 
then transferred across countries so that by the end of 2013, 17 tax administrations 
globally had adopted HWI initiatives. This thesis has shown that one reason transfer 
from Australia occurred is that the evidence had shown that the innovation worked in 
Australia to varying degrees in the following six ways. After the description of each 
Australian success, I juxtapose what this thesis found to have happened in the 
transplantation of the HWI innovation to Indonesia. 
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1. The Australian HWI program produced early quick audit impacts on an initially 
small group of HWIs. Success bred success as the number of HWIs included in the 
program grew from 180 to 2630 (in 2012). Audit takings also grew. By 2013 $2.8 
billion in extra tax had been collected as a result of HWI Taskforce audits (ATO 
2012, p. 55). 
In Indonesia, in contrast, the politics of reform talked big but failed to start small. 
Later in this chapter I discuss this failure in terms of the Indonesian political context. 
Tax officers were overwhelmed by new compliance challenges with a large group of 
HWIs about which they had little information. The Indonesian HWI unit started its 
program with 1203 HWI taxpayers. Success did not lead to success; there was no 
spike in the revenue collected from HWIs that led to sustained growth in the amount 
of new tax collected over time. 
2. In Australia, the HWI program built the legitimacy of the tax system through both 
major political parties convincing middle and lower income Australians that they 
should pay their tax obligation voluntarily because special efforts to collect more 
from the wealthy were now being made. 
In Indonesia, the reforms were not justified in terms of making the tax system fairer 
by getting the rich to pay their share. Rather it was justified in terms of providing a 
better service to wealthy taxpayers. The wealthy were suspicious of the stated 
rationale for establishing the unit as being ‘... a manifestation of Government’s 
appreciation of the wealthy taxpayers who have or should have made a significant 
contribution to state revenues’ (HWI TSO 2010a, p. 7). Or as said by a member of 
the House of Representatives: 
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They have contributed to this Republic, why are they treated the same as people in general? 
[Service for them] must be different. (RI016, other organisation) 
In the Indonesian context, HWIs pointed to the reality that low and middle earners 
were not even required to lodge a tax return. It was they, the rich, who had served the 
Republic in such large ways, who were being discriminated against. Hence, quite 
unlike the Australian outcome, Indonesia failed to increase the legitimacy of the tax 
system for ‘middle Indonesia’, while it reduced the legitimacy of the system for the 
rich. 
3. Expanded tax returns under the Australian HWI project prevented tax non-
compliance before it occurred by reducing the degrees of freedom of wealthy 
taxpayers in exploiting artificial arrangements. 
In Indonesia, the administrative capacity to make this happen was never mobilised. 
The various reasons for this are discussed later in this chapter, but one revealed in 
my data was the continuous rotation of staff pursuant to Indonesian anti-corruption 
policies, before they had time to get on top of the technical complexity of the HWI 
portfolio. 
4. The Australian HWI Taskforce deployed its growing technical command of the 
affairs of HWIs to propose a variety of law and administrative reforms that also 
prevented some tax losses.  
This did not happen in Indonesia for the same reasons as under point 3. Staff rotating 
in and out of the Indonesian HWI unit never acquired the technical command of the 
tax affairs of HWIs to recommend a suite of law and administrative reforms to 
improve voluntary compliance. Hence, some recommendations provided by the HWI 
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unit staff, such as designing a special tax return for HWI taxpayers like that in 
Australia, and developing a special forum with tax practitioners (Indonesia HWI Unit 
2010, p. 30–31) had never been accommodated. 
5. In addition to the tax collection effect under point 1, these audit impacts delivered a 
general deterrent effect to reduce tax cheating. No quantitative research in Australia 
exists that can estimate the size of this effect, but the qualitative research based on 
interviews with HWI tax advisors and other stakeholders suggest some general 
deterrence impact of the HWI project (J. Braithwaite 2003b). 
Nothing said in the Indonesian interviews for this research suggests a general 
deterrence effect in Indonesia, as those interviewed did not interpret the extra tax or 
tax penalties collected by the HWI unit as substantial. 
6. In addition to a general deterrence effect of compliance work of the Australian HWI 
Taskforce, the qualitative Australian evaluations discussed in the thesis suggest some 
impact of this work in improved voluntary compliance of HWIs, as respondents in 
John Braithwaite’s study revealed (J. Braithwaite 2003b, p. 249). 
It’s the constant surveillance of being on the program that causes compliance... 
Asking the question and getting them to focus their mind on where everything is had 
an impact. 
No such impact is evident in the Indonesian interviews for this thesis. Indonesian tax 
officers seem to have been too frequently rotated, too demoralised, too resistant to 
the HWI project for reasons discussed later in the chapter, to be effective in 
accomplishing improved voluntary compliance by relational regulation. 
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7. Acknowledging the important role played by tax and law advisors to the tax 
compliance of HWIs, the Australian HWI Taskforce established a formal 
consultative forum with stakeholders from this group to discuss compliance risks in 
relation to wealthy people (ATO 2008, p. 9). More importantly, such a forum served 
as a channel of communication for the ATO to deliver its message to taxpayers and 
as the media for the HWI Taskforce officers to learn new things. At the same time, 
the forum provided opportunities for stakeholders to give feedback and comment on 
the relevance and impact of the ATO’s strategies on compliance risk and tax 
administration cost (ATO 2008, p. 9). 
Such an institutionalised forum was never established in Indonesia. Rather, forums 
with tax practitioners occurred on an ad hoc basis. None interviewed for this research 
discussed the importance of involving tax practitioners to improve voluntary 
compliance of HWIs. 
This thesis has contributed to understanding how a taxation policy that was transferred 
from a more developed country worked in a different form in a new setting – a less 
developed country. I conducted interviews in Australia to establish benchmarks about 
the policy. Interviews with various actors in Indonesia helped to understand how those 
actors interpreted the policy. Interviews were the main method used for gathering 
actors’ narratives (Chapter 3) and were complemented by documentation and archival 
analysis. 
This chapter provides a summary and implications of the findings and their contribution 
to theory about policy transfer. In the last part of this chapter I present current 
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developments in Indonesia in relation to the HWI initiative, limitations of the study, and 
avenues for future research.  
8.2 The theoretical contributions of the thesis 
Through examining the adoption of an HWI initiative in the Indonesian tax 
administration this thesis sought to develop a conceptual framework for analysing 
contexts where policies fail after they succeeded elsewhere, particularly failure in the 
process of implementation. 
Three sets of concepts were applicable for understanding the decision that the 
Indonesian government made to adopt the HWI policy and for explaining the 
unintended outcomes of it when the policy was implemented. The first is the concept of 
policy convergence (e.g., Kerr 1983) and diffusion (Rogers 2003 [1995]) derived from 
the globalisation literature. These concepts explain why a developing country such as 
Indonesia was eager to follow the path of more developed countries of having 
institutional arrangements within its tax administration that required established as well 
as sophisticated regulatory infrastructures. The idea of states striving and competing to 
be modern offered by the concept of a race to the top was useful in describing this 
situation. A HWI initiative within a tax administration represented best practice in 
managing the tax compliance of the ‘most challenging’ segment of the taxpaying 
community. Having such a HWI unit in the structure of its tax authority, so that 
Indonesia was regarded as having a modern tax administration, was an important 
motivational lever for policy adoption (as described in the convergence and diffusion 
literature). 
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The central argument provided by convergence and diffusion concepts is that certain 
options gain ascendancy as attractive solutions to solve similar problems faced by states 
because of the existence of a set of global pressures and structural constraints. These 
factors, combined with a rational economic analysis in which efficiency is the prime 
objective, underlie the decision to adopt policies that have proven effective elsewhere. 
Examination of the adoption of the HWI initiative in Indonesia demonstrated that 
efficiency and rationality were not the only contributing factors to its adoption. The 
policy transfer framework (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996; 2000) proved a powerful analytical 
tool, enabling the raising of questions as to why and how a policy is transferred from 
one jurisdiction to the other. By posing these questions, the policy transfer framework 
could reveal the complex set of interactions that occurred in a particular policy transfer 
case. This framework also offered an explanation for understanding why a policy 
transfer led to failure by introducing the notions of uninformed, incomplete, and 
insufficient transfer. These notions, however, are too broad and cannot be used to 
understand processes that may lead to failure at the organisational level such as the 
DGT that is responsible to implement the policy. 
Explaining the success or otherwise of policy transfer can be done from the perspective 
that different sources of pressures exist: international, national and organisational. 
While the focus of this thesis is the organisational level, the role of global ‘invisible 
forces’ (Rose 2002, p. 9) in affecting decision-making processes could not be 
discounted as an influence on the decision to adopt a HWI policy.  
Power and social influence from the international, national, and organisational levels 
were at play in the adoption of the HWI initiative in Indonesia. At the international 
332 
 
level, an epistemic community of tax experts advocated for the HWI policy. The 
OECD’s FTA, the IMF’s FAD, and the World Bank were examples of global powerful 
actors that introduced new ideas in tax policies globally, including to Indonesia.  
At the national level, Indonesia’s political actors were also at play in decisions to adopt 
the HWI initiative. Such actors, in their effort to advance their political agenda, exerted 
pressures that resulted in the decision to transplant the policy.  
At the organisational level, bureaucrats played an important role in determining the 
direction of the HWI policy once it was transferred and adopted. The meaning these 
actors gave to policy and relationships they built with internal and external stakeholders 
determined the destiny of the implementation of the policy in its new context. 
The concepts of policy convergence, diffusion and transfer introduced the idea that a 
policy travels from one place to the other for particular reasons. But why, once the 
policy was adopted and implemented in a different context, did it fail to meet expected 
outcomes? At the very least, it did not work as recommended by experts from the tax 
policy epistemic community.  
The second set of concepts that proved useful in explaining what had happened in the 
implementation phase of the HWI initiative in Indonesia was the principles, 
mechanisms and actors framework (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000). These concepts 
helped understand why actors weigh certain principles over others and how they sought 
to fight for the principles they assigned. In their pursuit of the principles they gave 
greatest weight, actors use mechanisms that they believe could accommodate their 
interests. When the principles of actors conflict with the principles of others, 
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contestation between principles within the organisation occurs. When conflict occurs, 
how do actors maintain their interests so that they can still achieve their goals? The third 
concept that assisted in answering this question was webs of influence (Braithwaite & 
Drahos 2000). 
The webs of influence model assigned an important role to powerful actors at the 
organisational level such as the DGT (i.e., officials in strategic positions) in explaining 
the behaviour and actions of actors in operational positions. The webs of influence 
included webs of dialogue and webs of control. Actors who believed that a complex 
policy such as the HWI initiative required a long-term process and shared commitment 
among involved stakeholders used webs of dialogue, through which actors at different 
levels within the DGT and outside stakeholders had opportunities to share ideas for the 
benefit of the policy. In contrast, actors whose orientation through the policy was short-
term preferred to utilise webs of control. Using webs of control meant powerful actors 
could gain compliance from other actors and stakeholders, although the compliance 
could be more superficial. The negative consequence of using webs of control was that 
it damaged shared commitment developed in the previous period of the implementation 
of HWI unit. Damaged shared commitment and understanding of the policy contributed 
to the failure of the HWI policy implementation in Indonesia. 
Combining the analysis of policy adoption and policy implementation was a theoretical 
development that this thesis contributed to the literature. 
8.3 Summary of the findings 
The major findings address two themes that flow the two theoretical frameworks. The 
first theme relates to policy transfer and the explanations for failure of the HWI 
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initiative within a policy transfer theoretical perspective. The second theme relates to 
failure in implementation perspective. These failures come to light using a principles-
mechanisms-actors and webs of influence framework. 
8.3.1 Obstacles revealed through policy transfer literature 
The policy transfer framework in particular gave rise to hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) which 
signalled the ‘do something’ response and the coercive and voluntary elements in the 
transfer of the policy. These guiding hypotheses led to a realisation of the importance of 
learning in the HWI policy context. Insufficient learning was an important issue in 
unsuccessful policy transfer. 
The adoption of the HWI initiative in Indonesia shows policy learning from the 
international community to some extent, but also shows signs of superficial learning, 
even perhaps emulation. This conclusion was derived from the fact that a HWI unit held 
great symbolic value for the higher echelons of DGT, the MoF and the government. 
They were eager to show that meaningful bureaucratic reforms were occurring in 
Indonesia’s public services in general and the tax administration in particular. 
Importantly, the learning that had taken place led Indonesian actors to focus on 
‘operationalising the machine’, not on understanding the ‘structure of the machine’. 
This meant that actors gave more attention to the delivery of outputs than to 
understanding the foundational principles that would make the policy work well. The 
superficial nature of the learning was demonstrated empirically by two findings, one 
from the adoption phase and one from implementation.  
The political imperative to ‘do something’ (Sharman 2010) at the national level that 
would bring positive recognition of Indonesia having a modern tax administration was 
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accompanied by elements of domestic coercion and haste. Learning was enhanced by 
active enlisting of advice from the epistemic community of tax experts internationally, 
but there was no institutional mechanism for consolidation. 
Transfer of the HWI initiative in Indonesia involved little reflection. The second piece 
of evidence of superficial learning was the rapidity with which the HWI unit was 
attenuated before being given a chance to succeed. 
Further insight into why the HWI unit failed to meet expectations was foreshadowed by 
guiding hypothesis 2 which highlighted structural compatibility between the transferring 
and adopting country for successful outcomes.  
The organisational and legislative structures and procedures in which the HWI unit was 
embedded were largely inappropriate for the kind of change that was hoped for in tax 
compliance. If the structural gap between the transferring and adopting country is large, 
such that the supporting elements in the transferring country are not present in the 
adopting country, a critical analysis is required to identify how the policy might operate 
in the new context. This did not occur in Indonesia with respect to the HWI policy.  
The organisational and legislative structures and procedures underpinning the work of 
the HWI taskforce in Australia included Australia’s tax laws and code, the Australian 
taxpaying culture, the ATO’s regulatory frameworks, and principles and mechanisms 
that shaped the way in which the ATO in general, and the HWI taskforce in particular, 
practised their craft. Failure to recognise that the HWI initiative in Australia was 
supported by these elements, and that there was a higher level of coordination in the 
ATO’s functioning than in the DGT’s, contributed to unsuccessful transfer. 
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Guiding hypothesis 2 threw light on another characteristic of Indonesia’s tax system 
that made change difficult. Geographically dispersed collection offices had their own 
lists of registered taxpayers and their own compulsory revenue targets. There was no 
advantage for them in cooperating with a new HWI unit at the same level of authority as 
their own. Managing the tax compliance of HWIs requires understanding of the tax 
affairs of the HWIs as individuals, and their related entities. HWI-related entities were 
administered in TSOs around Indonesia; acquiring data about HWI-related entities 
demanded a system that would support the unit with rich information and well-defined 
and understood information-sharing procedures. In Indonesia, the development of a 
data-sharing culture was the top priority of the HWI unit but it clashed with the well-
entrenched practices of DGT. Structural flexibility did not exist, and geography did not 
make it easy to change. 
Connected with the physical constraints of geography and data reporting was the 
taxpaying culture of Indonesia. The Indonesian tax system is an institution that the 
Indonesian people, including HWIs, largely distrust. Therefore, changing the way the 
tax system engaged with HWIs was not readily embraced as a credible means of 
improving the tax system. The tradition of taxpaying in Indonesia is of imposing a low 
tax burden and tolerating high non-compliance, within a culture dominated by 
disengagement with the tax system. The low tax burden and high non-compliance is 
reflected in Indonesia’s low tax-to-GDP ratio compared to similar countries in the 
region. Introducing a new HWI unit into such a system required broad-based efforts to 
change the public perception of the whole system and engagement with taxpaying if it 
were to be successful. 
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Hypotheses 1 and 2, stemming from the policy transfer literature, were useful in 
shedding light on the challenges of adoption of an HWI program. Indonesia’s program 
was based on Australia’s. Indonesia did not have Australia’s legal or organisational 
infrastructure in which to embed their HWI unit. Moreover, Indonesia’s geography, 
revenue target operations and dispersed and independent data collection system (within 
local TSOs) was not ready to accommodate an HWI unit whose operations needed to be 
integrated with TSOs across the country. Finally, unlike Australia, Indonesia did not 
have a trusted tax authority and compliant taxpaying culture. 
Transferring a policy from another country requires thoughtful consideration of the 
policy in question and its related aspects in its transferring country, as well as the policy 
environment in which it is to be implemented. This is particularly important when the 
policy was transferred from a country that differs from the adopting country in many 
aspects. Transfer of the HWI initiative from Australia to Indonesia represented this 
situation. 
8.3.2 Obstacles revealed through a principles-mechanisms-powerful actors 
framework 
The focus of this thesis was on the implementation stage of a transferred policy, in 
particular on the conditions at the organisational level which were crucial in 
determining the success or otherwise of the policy. Hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b) introduced 
the idea of policy transfer being implemented through powerful actors articulating key 
principles and supporting mechanisms that led to the realisation of those principles.  
Hypotheses 4(a) and 4(b) guided the research to look for how ideas about the HWI unit 
and its requirements were shared in the organisation. The research found evidence of 
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both webs of control and webs of dialogue, and as foreshadowed in hypothesis 4(a), 
webs of control in time dominated webs of dialogue so that there was less sharing of 
information and knowledge horizontally and vertically. Without webs of dialogue and 
with the domination of webs of control, traditional tax collection practices reasserted 
themselves. The HWI unit disappeared in the same confusion as it began. These 
hypotheses provided useful insights into how the HWI unit fared at implementation. My 
research produced a deeper understanding of obstacles to implementation. 
First, rigidity in the structure of the Indonesian tax administration system restricted the 
possibilities for new tax policies. Rigidity meant that when the HWI unit was 
introduced, most of DGT carried on with a business as usual approach. Tax 
administration practices were not adjusted to support ‘regulatory innovation’ (Black, 
Lodge & Thatcher, 2005) and experimentation (Dorf & Sabel 1998). One specific 
example of this rigidity was in the mechanisms used to set workloads and evaluating 
performance. 
Second, revenue targets and their achievement placed constraints on change. This was 
the overarching principle governing the Indonesian tax system, and was well entrenched 
in the mindset of tax officials. Over 30 years ago Lerche (1980, p. 50) called 
Indonesia’s tax system a ‘target system’, that is, a tax system in which the ultimate goal 
is the achievement of revenue targets determined through a top-down process. Lerche’s 
description has endured in reality (Brondolo et al. 2008). In Indonesia’s tax 
administration, target achievement serves as a measure for reward as well as 
punishment. Rewards and punishments control priorities and activities of individual tax 
officials.  
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A third obstacle that became apparent as implementation was realised was time. Having 
time to explain principles and develop mechanisms was a crucial factor for the 
implementation of a ‘foreign’ policy such as the HWI initiative. New foreign policies 
need time to be fully understood and bedded down. Limited time was allocated for 
implementing the HWI policy. This inevitably meant that the process of implementing 
the HWI initiative lacked some important supporting elements. The predicted decline in 
tax revenue in 2008 due to the GFC (i.e., fiscal crisis) and a looming presidential 
election in July 2009 (i.e., political imperative) put pressure on the DGT to implement 
the HWI initiative quickly. The limited time available for implementation of the policy 
gave little room for reflection on the problems that might be encountered in transferring 
the policy from elsewhere. Limited time given to realise the HWI unit’s output in terms 
of revenue collection made powerful actors chose to use webs of control rather than 
webs of dialogue to disseminate policy ideas, particularly during the second period of 
HWI unit implementation. Moreover, the limited time span from when the policy was 
set up until being implemented meant the HWI policy was run without a proper written 
plan. 
The fourth obstacle, signalled in hypothesis 4(b), was the lack of the horizontal and 
vertical communication needed for change to occur and to ensure the whole 
organisation understood the role and expectations of the HWI unit and supported its 
goals. Understanding of the policy means policy ideas, principles and goals are shared 
evenly across actors involved in and affected by the policy. The way in which policy 
ideas are communicated by actors in superior positions is important in determining how 
they are understood and accepted by those in subordinate positions (Job & Honaker 
2003). Powerful actors in DGT during the second period of HWI unit operation failed to 
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use channels of communication with internal and external stakeholders when the policy 
direction changed. The HWI unit staff responded to demands from headquarters, but 
DGT as a whole did not have a coherent framework communicated throughout the 
organisation about how the ambition of increasing tax collections from individual 
taxpayers was going to be realised. Consequently, the same policy was accepted and 
understood differently. 
The fifth obstacle was failure to plan for continuing dialogue so that problems of 
implementation could be talked through and resolved as they emerged. Dialogue 
amongst actors at different levels across an organisation increases levels of participation 
and commitment. Dialogic webs used in communicating policy ideas provide various 
actors with an opportunity to share a coherent philosophy to learn, understand, adapt, 
and trial ideas. Dialogic webs mean that all actors participate in the process voluntarily 
rather than coercively (see Job and Honaker (2003) for a description of the Australian 
context when the ATO compliance model was introduced). DGT’s powerful actors’ 
tendencies to use webs of control during the second period of implementation of the 
HWI policy silenced actors in subordinate positions.  
Lastly, there was a need to acknowledge that when actors felt that they could not 
participate in the decision-making processes of implementing change, the risk of 
resistance to that change increases. Resistance was not a hypothesised outcome of this 
research. Poor communication was anticipated to result in poor support and poor 
learning. Resistance became apparent as a result of the interviews. Resistance in 
response to the HWI unit’s introduction meant that although tax officers were 
accustomed to following directions from DGT headquarters, they did not follow the 
directive about the new HWI policy as commanded. TSOs would not pass over files to 
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assist the HWI unit develop its integrated individual–enterprise database. When the 
second period of implementation set in, the HWI unit followed directions to collect 
revenue. But even here, there was passive resistance. Their hearts were not in it and they 
communicated a sense of meaninglessness and confusion over their tasks. 
In short, obstacles for implementation of the HWI policy in Indonesia can be 
categorised as problems of institutional capital, human capital, and social capital. The 
institutional factors included a culture of tax non-compliance in Indonesia, DGT's 
revenue target culture (with a history of coercive and corrupt practices that has 
undermined cooperation with the tax authority), and a geographically dispersed tax 
authority organised around the achievement of designated revenue targets.  
The human capital factors included insufficient training of auditing staff and those 
developing policy. Part of the problem was that learning was superficial because 
training was not sufficiently in-depth, and there was insufficient time to acquire 
knowledge and absorb and share the learning that had taken place. Policy staff did not 
give deep and broad consideration to the contextual factors that come into play at the 
implementation stage and make a policy work. 
The social capital barriers stemmed from the rigid hierarchy that defines DGT. 
Communication within the organisation was poor. Webs of control in which directives 
are given through a command-and-control style from the senior levels of the 
organisation to subordinates has traditionally characterised DGT. Webs of dialogue 
were set up in the first period of the HWI unit implementation to facilitate information 
exchange from bottom to top and top to bottom. These webs of dialogue did not endure. 
As webs of control dominated webs of dialogue, the DGT executive did not learn about 
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the frontline officials’ successes and failures. The social distance between the top and 
bottom of the organisation, and poor communication with collapse of the webs of 
dialogue, meant low trust and high resistance to directives received from above. 
8.4 Resistance: an overarching theme of the findings 
The overarching and somewhat unexpected theme that explains the failure of 
implementation of the HWI initiative in Indonesia is the resistance to follow directives 
exhibited by actors on the ground. The human dimension is one of the factors most 
critical to successful change implementation (Georgalis et al. 2014, p. 3). Employees 
play an important role in change initiatives (Fugate et al. 2012). They not only act as 
change implementers, but also and more importantly they are change recipients. 
Therefore, according to Fugate, the success or otherwise of the initiative is to a large 
degree determined by their commitment.  
Introducing the HWI initiative in the Indonesian tax administration heralded significant 
change in tax administration management. The initiative changed long-held practices in 
relation to how the tax authority should deal with taxpayers in general and affluent 
taxpayers in particular. As Job and Honaker’s (2003) study of the introduction of a 
responsive regulatory model in the ATO (discussed in Chapter 4) showed, resistance 
may come from actors who are afraid to try new ideas or who prefer to maintain the 
status quo. Often, resistance reflects an individual’s objection on how authority is using 
its power, rather than objection to an authority having power (Braithwaite 2009, p. 254). 
This was most likely to be the case in DGT where power distance was the norm and 
staff were accustomed to obeying their superiors. Obedience, nevertheless, did not 
preclude feelings of threat. 
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The HWI initiative adopted from Australia introduced new approaches to dealing with 
the taxpayer community – regulatory approaches never previously attempted in the 
Indonesian tax administration. In these regulatory approaches, in which both service and 
compliance activities existed side by side, the question was not whether to punish or to 
persuade, but rather when to punish and when to persuade (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, 
p. 21). The DGT leadership had not reconciled their thinking to how these concepts 
could co-exist, possibly due to their immersion in a long-running culture of coercive 
approaches. Compliance activities (represented by auditing, for instance) were 
undertaken not as a regulatory strategy to send a message to non-compliant taxpayers 
and the public in general that what they had done (e.g., tax avoidance or evasion) was 
unacceptable and to return them to a compliant state, but rather to collect more revenue. 
Changing this long-held culture was challenging, particularly among those who 
believed that the coercive approach was an effective way to meet revenue targets. And 
when tax officials were sufficiently coercive, there is little question that taxpayers paid 
whatever was owing. 
The resistance of many DGT actors to the HWI unit and the changes it brought resulted 
in ‘punitive’ actions toward HWI unit staff. Webs of control replaced the newly 
introduced webs of dialogue. Coercion undermined the commitment of staff on the 
ground to pursuing the HWI unit’s agenda. Coercion, took the form of deployment 
(actual or threatened) to an undesirable place when revenue targets were not met. 
Headquarters’ dismissal of the new practices invented by HWI unit staff for developing 
a taxpayer’s database, without considering the importance of integrated data to the HWI 
unit, was another example of how the threat of coercion undermined proper HWI policy 
implementation. Resistance was not discussed openly: it was expressed through 
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removing the mechanisms that the HWI unit staff needed to continue their innovative 
agenda. In response, staff at the HWI unit were demoralised. They too felt resistance. 
But they followed orders from their superiors. Their resistance took the form of 
disapproval in silence. Theirs was a passive resistance that could not be safely voiced. 
8.5  Limitations and future research 
The limitations of this study exist at the level of study scope and methodological rigour. 
The scope of the study was restricted to adoption and implementation of the HWI policy 
within the ranks of the DGT. A focus on principles, mechanisms and actors at this level 
was considered innovative in this thesis. Too often the assumption is made that a policy 
adopted at the top of an organisation will be implemented automatically. This thesis 
considered the possibility that efforts in implementation were worthy of research in 
their own right. When this research was planned, the political forces at work that would 
undo the decision to adopt an HWI policy and undermine implementation were not 
obvious. The political process forces were not visible or openly discussed in interviews. 
But at least some of those interviewed thought that a political story existed. This thesis 
did not uncover this story. Interviews with more senior actors in the DGT and the 
government might have informed this study about the magnitude of political pressure on 
the HWI unit, but I was not successful in obtaining these interviews. For example, of 
ten invitations I sent to members of Indonesia’s House of Representatives (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) only one responded and participated in the interview. I 
interviewed seven senior tax officials at the DGT, but it was not enough to reveal 
political narratives about the HWI policy.  
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The original intention of conducting a comparative study between Indonesia and 
Australia was thwarted by some methodological problems. The access I had to tax 
officials and stakeholders was not comparable in the two countries. I managed to 
interview 42 respondents in Indonesia and only 14 respondents in Australia. For this 
reason, the Australian case was used as a benchmark of best practice in implementation. 
A wealth of information on the HWI Taskforce enabled me to extract a set of 
propositions about how an HWI initiative should proceed. 
A third issue affecting methodological rigour was familiarity with interviews, both 
culturally and institutionally. With Indonesian respondents from DGT officials, 
culturally discussing policy that had been defined top-down with an outsider such as 
myself was uncommon.97 Informants, especially those from middle-down levels, 
hesitated to disclose their thoughts, feelings and opinions on the way in which senior 
officials treated them and how the HWI unit was run. Instead they used metaphors to 
describe their opinions. With Australian respondents, my status as an outsider as well as 
a foreigner to the Australian taxpaying community institutionally hindered me from 
attracting more participants to discuss the HWI policy in Australia (with the exception 
of the tax officials group). 
Finally, the single case study in this research limited the power of generalisation of the 
findings. Future research should attempt to involve multiple cases in multiple countries. 
Comparing different new initiatives in one tax authority would help disentangle sources 
of resistance: are they fuelled by cultural, whole of organisation issues or are they more 
                                                 
97  In Chapter 3 I discussed my status as ‘insider-outsider’ during the course of this study for the 
Indonesia context. 
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a function of poorly planned implementation strategies? Alternatively, a study of 
established HWI units across different countries would shed light on the elements and 
approaches that enhanced prospects of success in building positive relationships with 
HWIs and responsive approaches to collecting their taxes. 
8.6 Implications of the study for the field of policy transfer and 
implementation 
This research is novel in that it combines analysis of policy transfer with analysis of 
policy implementation using the concepts of principles, mechanisms, actors and webs of 
influence. Few previous researchers (e.g., Christensen 2013; Sharman 2010) have 
combined policy transfer analysis (macro) with analysis of policy implementation 
(micro). Whilst macro forces such as globalisation and policy convergence are 
acknowledged as contributing factors for transferring policy from elsewhere, my study 
also found that national and organisational factors influenced the process of transfer and 
shaped outcomes of implementation. This research demonstrates that it is unwise to 
underestimate the ability of local powerful actors to facilitate or impede the success of 
implementing a transferred policy. 
Adding policy implementation analysis into a policy transfer case provides a deeper 
understanding into why a best practice policy from the global sphere does not fit certain 
contexts such as that of the HWI policy in an Indonesia context. A micro level of 
analysis at the organisational level offered in this thesis has potential to be adopted in 
other policy transfer studies, because there will always be organisation(s) which are 
responsible to implement a policy once it is transferred from elsewhere. The success or 
otherwise of the implementation to some degree is determined by factors existing at the 
organisational level.  
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This study is a reminder for national policymakers and global members of the epistemic 
community that a policy transferred from one country to another may take a form that 
even the actors that initiated the transfer process had not imagined. Although this issue 
has been raised by various authors (e.g., Bauer (2013) in economic policy, Biesma et al. 
(2009) in health policy, and Ladi (2004) in environmental policy), the findings 
presented in this thesis reiterate the importance of studying the broader context of the 
policy under consideration (i.e., principles underlying the policy, cultural background, 
regulatory infrastructures, and institutional arrangements), not only the technical aspects 
of the policy. 
8.7 Current developments in Indonesian politics and HWI initiative  
In the middle of writing this thesis (April 2012), I received an email from a colleague in 
Indonesia informing me about a surprising change in the HWI unit. A Finance Minister 
decree stipulated changes to the HWI Tax Service Office98 in both its name and 
function. The High Wealth Individual Tax Service Office (HWI TSO) was to be 
incorporated into the Large Taxpayers Tax Service Office IV (LTO IV), but importantly 
the unit’s function was also changed substantially. The office’s function was altered so 
that it would administer state-owned companies, especially those engaged in the service 
sector (e.g., banking, insurance, construction, transportation, etc.), as well as HWI 
taxpayers. 
This change occurred in spite of internal and external recommendations (including from 
IMF advisors) to continue the HWI initiative as a unit dedicated solely to administering 
                                                 
98  The Minister of Finance who approved this change was not the same Minister who approved the 
establishment of the HWI unit in 2009. 
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individual taxpayers. Indeed, there was a recommendation to expand the unit model 
across other regional offices throughout Indonesia (General Secretary of Ministry of 
Finance 2010; IMF 2011c). Prospects of continuation and growth, however, were 
supplanted by the short-term revenue-generating policy orientation of the Indonesian tax 
system. This detracted focus from the HWI unit’s long-term policy goal of improving 
the tax compliance of wealthy individuals. Although HWI taxpayers are still 
administered at this new TSO, their insignificant tax revenue contribution compared to 
that of state-owned companies will reduce the attention given to HWIs. Adding 
corporate taxpayers to the HWI unit’s responsibilities will relieve some of the 
psychological pressures on HWI unit staff: The HWI unit will no longer be ‘an ant 
among elephants’ because of its small tax collection and no longer a ‘source of ridicule’ 
(see section 6.2, Chapter 6). However, the wisdom of the change from an institutional 
perspective may be questioned. Bird and Zolt (2003) warned that tax-related policy 
should not be altered on a temporary basis to meet short-term agendas. Nevertheless, the 
tax system’s long-held orientation to revenue target achievement and political 
expectations expressed in some interviews of ‘business as usual’ surely contributed to 
the decision to discontinue the HWI unit as a regulatory unit dedicated solely to 
managing the tax compliance of Indonesia’s very wealthy individual taxpayers. 
In Chapter 5 I suggested that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of the HWI 
initiative in 2009 was to support an incumbent president who would run in the 
presidential election with a strong message of promoting bureaucratic reforms. The 
president’s party won in a landslide, and SBY was re-elected for his last term. While a 
political perspective was not within the scope of this thesis, it is nevertheless important 
to note that some authors believe that the significant loss of votes for the Democratic 
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Party in 2009 was due to the failure of SBY’s administration to reform Indonesia’s 
bureaucracy (Nashrillah 2014) and the corruption allegations involving the Democratic 
Party’s elites and legislators (Cochrane, 2013).  
A recent national survey revealed that 85 per cent of respondents were dissatisfied with 
the performance of the SBY administration: ‘How can an administration that came to 
office with 60 per cent of the popular vote have fallen this deep [sic]? This means that 
all they had was an image without actual results’ (‘SBY’s term ends’ 2013). In April 
2014 Indonesia held a national legislative election. While the result has yet to be 
finalised, preliminary results suggest that SBY’s party, the Democratic Party, won 
significantly fewer seats than in the previous election. In July 2014, a new president 
from another party was elected.99  
These political developments align with my study’s finding that the decision to adopt a 
policy transfer of the HWI initiative in Indonesia was primarily to satisfy a political 
imperative to provide an image of public service reform. This is not to denigrate the 
considerable efforts devoted to making it work. Advocates of reform who wait for an 
opportune moment to pursue change can be genuine in their commitment and pursuit of 
principles and mechanisms that will unseat old patterns of behaviour. 
Discontinuity of the HWI tax service office’s function as a unit dedicated solely to the 
administration of taxes for wealthy taxpayers has been disappointing. HWI initiatives in 
Australia and other countries have been successful in improving the tax compliance of 
wealthy taxpayers and their related entities (OECD 2013b). Importantly, if managed 
                                                 
99  The decision of the final national legislative election has to await the Constitutional Court’s 
judgement due to the lawsuit filed by several parties challenging the legality of the results.  
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properly, a HWI initiative can also improve public confidence in the integrity of the tax 
system (Michael Cranston, ATO’s deputy commissioner, cited in Vedelago (2014)). 
The lessons to be learnt from the HWI unit in Indonesia are many. They can be 
summarised by concluding that if a policy is transferred from elsewhere, recognising 
and compensating for institutional differences requires detailed study and planning, 
recruiting and training for human capital needs to be amply resourced, and leadership to 
use webs of influence (both webs of control and webs of dialogue) to harness social 
capital to carry the policy forward into full implementation. While these steps are likely 
to be important in any policy transfer situation, they are particularly vital when policy is 
transferred from developed countries to developing ones.  
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Appendix––A: Method for Selecting 
Literature on Taxation Policy 
 
Developing the search criteria 
All references included in the review had at least one of the core terms policy, transfer 
and taxation in their abstracts. I searched using other relevant keywords in combination 
with those core terms. Table 1 shows the combinations of keywords and terms used in 
the literature search. I employed Boolean search terms (‘AND’, ‘OR’, ‘NOT’) to make 
the process more efficient.  
Table 1 Search terms used in selecting literature 
Policy Transfer Taxation 
Law(s) Diffusion Taxes OR Tax 
Regulation(s) Band-wagoning Goods and Sales 
Institution(s) Lesson drawing Value Added Tax 
OR VAT 
Idea(s)  Learning Fiscal 
Program(s) Convergence State revenue 
Ideological Isomorphism  
Concepts Systematically 
pinching idea 
 
Instrument(s)   
Regulatory 
arrangement(s) 
  
Institutional 
arrangement(s) 
  
Administrative 
arrangement(s) 
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Other criteria that I set for this selection process were publication, time period and 
language. That is, the selected works must have been published in peer-reviewed journal 
articles, between 1991 and 2012 inclusive, and written in English. 
Identifying data sources 
The review was based mainly on electronic searches with searching of print material 
only when needed. Electronic data sources included internet search engines, notably 
Google and Google Scholar, and general academic databases, such as the Social Science 
Citation Index and International Bibliography of the Social Sciences. 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
In order to decide which retrieved materials would be included in further analysis, I 
developed a set of inclusion/exclusion criteria. Studies of policy transfer included in the 
review had to be in the area of taxation (local or national tax, direct or indirect tax, or 
tax administration in general) and demonstrate a process of policy transfer of tax policy 
from one jurisdiction to another – within a nation or between nations. 
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Appendix––B: Summary of Studies in the 
Diffusion and Policy Transfer 
Literature on Taxation 
 
Source Regions/ 
Countries 
Period Research focus Research findings  
 
Berry and 
Berry (1992) 
48 states in 
the U.S 
1916-1937 Assessing the factors 
that prompted states to 
adopt taxes (the 
gasoline tax and the 
individual income tax) 
Using event history analysis and a 
pooled cross-sectional time-series 
technique, this study tested five 
factors that explained state tax 
innovation which include: 
(1) economic development; (2) 
party control explanations; (3) the 
presence of an election; (4) the 
existence of a fiscal crisis; and (5) 
the presence of neighbouring states 
that have previously adopted a 
similar tax. It is suggested that 
while there is little support for the 
first two factors playing a role in 
the decision to adopt tax in a given 
state, the other three factors 
increased the probability of the 
adoption of similar taxes. All these 
three factors created opportunity for 
politicians to shield themselves 
from the political costs of 
supporting a tax increase. 
Radaelli 
(2000) 
European 
Union 
1990s Examining public 
policy transfer in the 
EU, in relation to the 
single currency, tax 
policy and media 
ownership through the 
concept of 
isomorphism 
Policy transfer within the EU 
involves the EU Commission and 
member states. This paper asks how 
policies that have the support of the 
EU are transferred to member 
states. The author uses the concept 
of isomorphism to argue that the 
EU catalyses the isomorphic 
process through working or 
watching for the adoption of the 
policy in one member state. Once 
one member state takes action to 
adopt a policy, others follow. 
Mechanisms involve coercion, 
mimetism (copying) and normative 
influences. Central to how the 
process works is the establishment 
of technocratic legitimacy for the 
European Commission. 
Technocratic legitimacy in relation 
to the single currency involved both 
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coercion and mimetism. Coercion 
was reflected in the strong power of 
the Deutschmark in the European 
monetary system. Germany was 
perceived to have the most 
successful national model of 
monetary policy, and other 
countries followed Germany’s lead. 
In the taxation field, however, 
technocratic legitimacy remains 
poor. It is because the very idea of a 
national tax system that is 
considered optimal (or most 
desirable) for tax harmonization 
does not exist. The mechanism of 
normative pressures is more 
prevalent in the taxation context, 
where an epistemic community has 
been very active in calling for some 
forms of tax reform (pp.25, 37-38). 
In the field of media ownership 
regulation, the Commission used a 
two-step process of developing a 
model, waiting for that model to be 
adopted in a member state, and then 
encouraging the transfer of that 
model to other member states. 
Radaelli 
(2003) 
European 
Union 
1990s Examining the code of 
conduct against 
harmful tax 
competition as a new 
governance 
architecture in tax 
policy and comparing 
it with the open 
method of 
coordination (OMC) 
 
The study sought to answer three 
questions: (1) to what extent does 
the code of conduct on business 
taxation follow the template of the 
OMC? (2) Is a ‘new governance 
architecture’ – based on learning 
processes and the inclusion of 
social actors – emerging in EU tax 
policy? (3) What are the results 
achieved by the code? The OMC is 
a means of spreading best practice 
and achieving convergence towards 
the EU goals (p.513). The idea is to 
use the EU as a transfer platform 
rather than as a law-making system. 
It is argued that the tax code against 
harmful tax competition is 
consistent with the basic features of 
the OMC. That is, the code of 
conduct seeks “compliance” based 
on guidelines, peer review, best 
practice, benchmarking, learning 
and diffusion of shared beliefs 
among policy-makers. 
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Ashworth et 
al. (2006)  
308 Flemish 
municipalitie
s in Flanders, 
Belgium 
1991-1999 Analysing the 
elements that affect 
the decision to 
introduce an 
environment tax 
(green tax) 
The purpose of this paper was to 
see if regional diffusion had an 
influence after taking account of 
internal factors known to affect the 
adoption of green policy and 
changes in tax policy more 
generally. The authors concluded 
that political factors are highly 
significant in the introduction of a 
green tax: The presence of an 
election discourages the adoption of 
the green tax, and left oriented 
governments are more likely to 
introduce a green tax. Evidence of 
regional diffusion was also found. 
Neighbour effects were significant: 
The adoption of the tax by a given 
municipality was more likely when 
neighbours had adopted a green tax. 
Also important for green tax 
adoption was having municipalities 
that were ideologically similar 
adopt the tax. 
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Eccleston 
(2006) 
OECD and 
115 other 
countries 
1990-2000 Exploring the specific 
processes that led to 
the spread of VATs 
across countries 
 
Tax reform generally and 
consumption tax proposals in 
particular achieve political 
prominence when policy elites 
agree on the goals of tax reform and 
there is wider political acceptance 
of problems with the tax policy 
status quo. However, it is important 
to recognise that policy problems 
and associated solutions are 
socially constructed and depend on 
how actors interpret their context. 
The role of actors and policy 
entrepreneurs in linking policy 
proposals to the political problems 
confronting government leaders is 
then important.  Despite an 
emerging elite consensus on the 
merits of VATs, there has been 
considerable variation in terms of 
when VATs were introduced, the 
rates at which they have been 
levied, and the manner in which 
they have been administered. In 
terms of the policy transfer 
literature this amounts to a case of 
policy emulation, in which policy 
ideas, rather than specific policy 
settings, have been transferred. 
Swank 
(2006)  
16 developed 
countries 
1981-1998 Examining the spread 
of neoliberal tax 
policy in developed 
democracies 
The tax treatment of corporate and 
capital income has changed 
dramatically across the capitalist 
democracies. The basic goals of tax 
policy have also shifted from 
redistribution and interventionism 
toward efficiency. National policy-
makers have responded to common 
international and domestic 
pressures to be competitive. Yet, 
the shift to a neoliberal tax structure 
was not solely a response by 
national policy-makers to these 
common forces. It is suggested that 
US tax reform in 1986 which 
brought a drop in corporate tax 
rates shaped tax policy changes in 
other nations. In the long term, all 
nations have moved toward the 
U.S. neoliberal tax structure. In the 
short-term, responsiveness to U.S 
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tax reforms was greater where 
uncoordinated market institutions 
were dominant. The research 
suggests that pressures to compete 
for mobile assets anchor the process 
of diffusion of neoliberal tax 
policy. However, economic and 
political costs may slow diffusion 
of neoliberal tax policy. There was 
little evidence to suggest that the 
diffusion was driven by systematic 
policy learning or social emulation. 
Stewart 
(2007) 
Ghana 1980s-
1990s 
Examining transfer of 
tax ideas to developing 
countries since 1980s 
in the context of 
structural adjustment 
by using Ghana as an 
example, with 
particular attention on 
VAT reform 
 
Ghana’s VAT reform of 1995 was 
enacted by elected officials with the 
engagement of external and 
domestic actors. It was led by 
bureaucratic and political actors in 
need of increased tax revenues. The 
lack attention paid to domestic 
political issues and little 
involvement of public and 
parliament in policy consultation 
led to the policy failure. Learning 
from this experience, the 1998 
VAT reform involved a more 
engaging political consultation and 
compromise, including “educating” 
members of parliament about the 
VAT. 
van Stolk 
and Wegrich 
(2008)  
6 developed 
countries 
2005-2006 Analysing the driving 
forces for the choice of 
particular performance 
indicators for 
administrations 
overseeing tax and 
social security in six 
countries (Australia, 
Canada, Netherland, 
Sweden, the UK and 
the US). The study 
compares global 
influences and 
domestic constraints 
resulting from 
legislation and systems 
of administration  
In both taxation and social security 
administration, reform ideas at the 
abstract level take place across 
governments through existing 
international networks and shared 
values on public service delivery 
(e.g. New Public Management), but 
how those ideas are turned into 
actionable goals within a country is 
far more likely to be determined by 
domestic consideration. With 
regard to tax administration, a 
world-wide focus on the 
relationship with the client (i.e. 
taxpayers) is noted as having 
impacted on the internal 
organisation of tax agencies. Most 
notably, a client focus has meant 
that tax administrations have 
restructured around the activities 
rather than the types of taxes that 
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are administered. In keeping with 
an interest in service quality is an 
over-abundance of performance 
indicators in the service category. 
This is of note because tax 
administrations have been rather 
resistant to adopting these ideas in 
the past due to their traditional 
hierarchical “compliance culture” 
concerned with upholding an image 
of uniform enforcement of rules. 
Yet, these performance indicators 
differ across countries. While 
“service quality” is shared across 
countries as a strategy to increase 
“voluntary compliance”, the driving 
force in the development of related 
PIs has been more domestically 
based, for example by governance 
arrangements primarily, and only 
via domestic debate is there likely 
to be adoption of internationally 
recognized benchmarking 
indicators. 
Baturo and 
Gray (2009) 
15 Eastern 
Europe 
countries 
1994-2007 Examining factors that 
explain the wave of 
adoption of the flat tax 
in Eastern Europe 
It was found that the presence of 
other market-minded reforms do 
not predict adoption of the flat tax. 
Instead, rational learning, where 
economically right-wing 
governments evaluated the success 
of the reform (as measured by their 
ability to attract foreign investment) 
in the medium term, plays the 
largest role. In other words the flat 
tax has taken off in Eastern Europe 
not as a result of blind imitation, 
but by policy makers rationally 
updating their beliefs about the 
tax’s appropriateness for their own 
country after observing its success 
in neighbouring countries. 
Ellis (2009)  Slovakia, the 
Czech 
Republic 
2004-2008 Examining the reason 
for the adoption of a 
flat tax in Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic 
and whether such 
adoption is a product 
of policy diffusion 
 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
were latecomers to adopting a flat 
tax. Unlike Latvia and Lithuania, 
where changes in tax policy were 
relatively easy, changing the tax 
scheme in Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic have been much more 
difficult. These countries owe the 
adoption in large part to the 
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commitment of right-wing 
politicians, political parties and 
think tanks. These actors helped to 
explain why a flat tax was to be 
adopted in both countries. The idea 
of the flat tax addressed some 
important issues such as preventing 
tax evasion, attracting foreign direct 
investment, and simplifying tax 
collection. Commitment to and 
knowledge of the flat tax, however, 
did not guarantee adoption. The 
political environment had a pivotal 
role to play for the success of 
adoption. The adoption of flat tax 
policy required centre-right 
governments. This condition 
explained why the adoption of a flat 
tax policy in Eastern Europe is 
considered “late adoption”. 
Gilardi and 
Wasserfallen 
(2009) 
26 cantons in 
Switzerland 
1990-2007 Investigating the 
extent to which 
interdependent tax 
decision making 
follows rational 
competitive pressures 
or other dynamics 
 
Spatial interdependence is 
examined as an explanation of 
personal income tax rates in Swiss 
cantons. In addition to measuring 
neighbouring cantons, the number 
of commuters is introduced as a 
measure of spatial interdependence, 
the argument being that a canton 
does not want to have a non-
competitive tax rate and a non-
competitive tax rate will be 
reflected in the size of its commuter 
population. The study found that 
the tax rates for higher income 
earners were similar among 
neighbouring cantons and among 
cantons where many commuters 
lived, although neighbouring 
cantons seemed the stronger 
predictor of tax rate. The authors 
concluded that the fact that policy-
makers reacted more consistently to 
the decision of their neighbours, 
than the decision of cantons from 
which competition pressures are 
most evident (high number of 
commuters), may indicate that 
interdependent tax policy-making is 
less rational than expected (pp. 21-
22). Also influencing tax rates were 
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social networks comprising a 
regional conference of finance 
ministers which built cooperation 
and downplayed competition 
among cantons. The authors also 
suggest that tax reforms in 
neighbouring cantons may have 
been a way of legitimizing 
politically controversial tax cuts to 
the wealthy rather than a driving 
force for change. 
Kim et al. 
(2009) 
66 Florida 
counties in 
the U.S. 
 
1988-1991 
and  
1988- 
2003 
Exploring the 
phenomenon of the 
adoption of 
infrastructure surtax 
(i.e. Local 
Government 
Infrastructure Tax-
LGIS) by examining 
factors that influence  
subnational 
government’s decision 
to adopt the policy 
 
It is suggested that factors such as the 
neighbouring counties previously 
adopting Local Government 
Infrastructure Tax (LGIS), the 
population density, and a millage rate 
for the property tax are the major 
factors explaining the probability of 
early adoption. While the first two 
factors influence in a positive 
direction, the third factor influence 
the probability of adoption in a 
contradictory direction. The study 
found that political ideology (recalled 
from presidential election data) did 
not play a role in policy adoption at 
subnational level. The authors argued 
that political consideration at the 
federal level was not significantly 
important in decision at the county 
level. The study concluded that the 
pattern of LGIS diffusion reflected 
more the competition model of 
diffusion rather than social learning. 
The explanation for this is because 
counties are more likely to act more 
competitively in seeking to secure tax 
bases due to lack of a strong tax base 
such as income compared to the 
federal or state government. 
Cao (2010) 133 OECD 
and non-
OECD 
countries 
 
1998-2006 Studying policy 
changes in capital 
taxation by focusing 
on policy 
interdependence 
induced by network 
dynamics at the 
international level 
 
This study offered two 
hypothesises: first, similarity in 
network positions induces strategic 
competitive races in corporate 
taxation and peer competitive 
pressure.  Second, the closer the 
two countries are in networks, the 
more ‘‘similar’’ they are in terms of 
domestic economic policies. This 
proximity facilitates policy learning 
and emulation and therefore policy 
diffusion. It is concluded that 
policy diffusion in corporate 
taxation was caused by the 
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competition mechanism that was 
induced by network position 
similarity in the network of 
portfolio investment and the 
network of exports. It is also 
suggested that socialisation 
mechanisms (policy learning and 
emulation) that were induced by 
network position proximity in the 
inter-governmental organisation 
(IGO) networks also drove policy 
changes. While in policy learning 
the consequences of similar policies 
in other jurisdiction influence the 
adoption of the policy in question 
in other jurisdiction, in policy 
emulation, on the other hand, the 
objective consequences of the 
policies is less considered. Rather, 
the symbolic and socially 
constructed characteristics of the 
policies are pivotal. The evidence is 
stronger in the IGO networks that 
facilitate policy learning than those 
that facilitate emulation. The study 
also found that contiguity in 
geography causes policy 
interdependency. 
Kemmerling 
(2010)  
9 European 
countries and 
9 OECD 
member 
countries 
Unspecified Reviewing tax policy 
convergence for four 
major fields of 
taxation (i.e. VAT, 
corporate income tax, 
personal income tax, 
and excises) after 
Europeanization 
This paper suggests that the 
competition and co-ordination 
explanations alone are not sufficient 
to explain the role of 
Europeanisation of national tax 
systems. In direct taxation, the 
mechanism of competition is 
enhanced by forms of supranational 
imposition, whereas in indirect 
taxation the mechanism of co-
ordination is enhanced by policy 
learning. These differences can be 
summarised in two different 
“models”. In the first model 
relating to indirect taxation, 
governments seek new forms of 
public revenues to compensate 
revenue losses or to cope with 
increasing demands for public 
goods. The role that the EU played 
in this model was as a catalyst for 
spreading ideas and might also have 
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been a source of legitimation for 
national governments fearing the 
electoral consequences of raising 
indirect taxation. In the second 
model relating to direct taxation, 
rising tax rates and revenues would 
face less electoral costs since they 
disproportionally affect smaller 
segments of the electorate: large 
companies and rich voters. In this 
context, the EU cannot be used as a 
legitimation device or as a ‘learning 
ground’. The expansion of 
Europeanisation after the 
introduction of the single market 
has sharpened conflict of interests 
among member states. 
Martin 
(2010)  
States in the 
US 
1971-2006 Examining the 
diffusion of cigarette 
taxation in U.S. states 
 
It is suggested that cigarette 
taxation at the level of US states is 
influenced by interdependence 
between states. The effects of such 
influence, however, are not even 
across all states. Government 
ideology plays a role in determining 
the diffusion influence. It is argued 
that only those US states, whose 
governments are not right-wing, 
used the opportunity of being near 
higher taxed states to employ high 
cigarette taxes themselves. The 
concept of conditional diffusion is 
introduced to recognise the role of 
domestic factors in moderating 
interdependence. 
Miller and 
Richard 
(2010)  
States in the 
USA 
2000-2005 Examining the 
diffusion of the R&D 
investment tax credit 
among states in the US 
It is concluded that: (a) the main 
purpose of the adoption of R&D tax 
credit policies is for economic 
development. Policy-makers are 
motivated by the belief that R&D 
investment will create jobs; (b) 
States with more R&D activity are 
more likely to adopt R&D tax 
credits; (c) States with higher 
corporate tax rates are more likely 
to adopt R&D tax credits; (d) 
Single-party control of both 
chambers of the legislature and the 
governor’s office makes the policy 
more likely to be adopted; (c) 
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States economically matched with 
other states are more likely to adopt 
the same policy than neighbouring 
states. 
Prakash and 
Caro (2010) 
14 
communities 
in 3 cities in 
Massachusetts 
(US) 
1990-2007 Comparing 
municipalities in 
Massachusetts that 
participate and do not 
participate in property 
tax work-off programs 
(TWOPs) by 
identifying factors 
affecting the adoption 
and the diffusion of 
the policy 
 
Using Mohr’s theory for adoption 
and Roger’s theory for diffusion as 
conceptual frameworks this study 
offered the following explanation 
for the adoption and the diffusion 
of property tax work-off programs 
(TWOPs). In relation to the 
adoption of the program it was 
hypothesised that local 
governments were more likely to 
adopt TWOPs when they were 
motivated: (a) to help the senior 
homeowners; (b) to value the 
seniors’ contributions, and (c) to 
meet demands from senior 
homeowners and advocate groups. 
With regard to the diffusion of the 
program it was hypothesised that 
TWOPs would be diffused 
successfully among the local 
governments which: (a) are able to 
afford to devote some financial and 
human resources for the initial 
launch; (b) perceive the relative 
advantages of a TWOP compared 
to the other existing property tax 
relief programs; (c) embrace the 
program’s philosophy of valuing 
the contributions of senior 
homeowners; and (d) perceive the 
positive consequences of other 
participating communities. The 
results from the study support the 
hypotheses concerning both the 
adoption and diffusion of TWOPs. 
Factors such as significant benefits 
of the program, modest financial 
cost, and manageable 
administrative burden led to 
adoption of the program. Efforts to 
secure adoption of the program in 
nonparticipating 
counties/municipalities were 
constrained by insufficient financial 
resources and political support. 
With regard to the diffusion of the 
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program, factors such as 
community attributes, program 
attributes, and availability of 
communication channels affected 
diffusion. The study also suggested 
the important role that local leaders 
played. Communities where the 
leaders were well informed about 
the program were more likely to 
pursue the adoption of the program. 
Sharman 
(2010)  
19 countries 
employing 
national tax 
blacklists 
Unspecified Tracking mistakes in 
tax blacklists, to check 
for the presence and 
direction of this kind 
of “policy plagiarism”  
Policy-makers usually learn from 
successes and failures of others to 
craft better policy.  It is claimed 
that national tax blacklists have 
been transferred internationally, but 
the lists have tended to lead to 
dysfunctional policy outcomes. The 
problem has been a non-reflective 
approach whereby the tax blacklist 
of one country are compiled 
through cutting and pasting from 
foreign models, copying existing 
mistakes in the process. While 
possible factors behind 
dysfunctional transfer might 
include coercion from epistemic 
communities (e.g. the World Bank 
or IMF) or the privileging of 
normative acceptance and 
legitimacy over technically efficient 
policy outcomes, these mechanisms 
did not seem to play a role in this 
context. The main factor 
contributing to this failure is the 
short-term political imperative to 
“do something” about tax evasion. 
This is particularly more acute in an 
environment of fiscal crisis and 
popular discontent. It is also 
suggested that adopting blacklists 
as an effort to protect a state from 
revenue loss seems unrealistic. 
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Jensen and 
Lindstädt 
(2011)  
20 OECD 
member 
countries 
 
1980-1998 Examining the 
international 
dimensions of 
corporate tax policy by 
exploring how tax 
policy decisions 
diffuse across borders 
 
Different from existing theories of 
corporate tax competition, this 
study build a model of social 
learning to explain clustered tax 
policy cut. This approach allows 
differentiating instances of 
diffusion by social learning and 
diffusion by pure competition. It 
argued that corporate tax policy 
does not follow the pattern of pure 
competitive dynamics in 
international tax policy making: 
Governments do not simply cut 
corporate taxes because other 
governments have done so. Rather, 
governments attempt to learn new 
information from the policy of 
other governments and imitate them 
only when that information points 
to the viability of the policy. The 
authors concluded that although 
competitive dynamics can influence 
tax policy, the temporally clustered 
corporate tax cuts in the OECD, to 
some extent, have originated in 
social learning, not tax competition. 
Seljan and 
Weller 
(2011) 
 
States in the 
US excluding 
Alaska and 
Hawai‘i  
1997-2006 Examining how passed 
and rejected tax and 
expenditure limits 
(TELs) policy 
proposals in one state 
affect whether the 
policy is proposed in 
other states 
 
It has been known that 
communication of information is 
the primary driver of policy 
diffusion. Previous studies, 
however, could not conclude what 
type of information influences 
policy diffusion. In this study, the 
authors disentangle political and 
policy information by analysing the 
effect of information on policy 
proposals. Political information 
provides information about the 
relative support for a policy 
(political viability), whereas policy 
information provides information 
about the effectiveness of a policy. 
The result concluded that the US 
states are more likely to propose 
TELs when their geographic 
neighbours have successfully 
passed the policies and less likely 
to propose TELs when their 
neighbours have rejected such 
policies. The negative effect of 
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neighbours’ rejections indicates the 
flow of political information 
because rejections reveal no 
information about the policy 
effectiveness. 
Barthel and 
Neumayer 
(2012)  
19 selected 
countries 
signing 
double 
taxation 
treaties 
(DTTs) 
1969-2005 Examining reasons 
behind the 
proliferation of double 
taxation treaties 
(DTTs), even when 
bilateral foreign direct 
investment (FDI) 
position between the 
two countries is 
asymmetric 
It is found that the probability of a 
country signing a DTT with a given 
partner country increases if regional 
peers and foreign countries 
competing with the country in 
terms of exports have previously 
signed DTTs. However, that 
country is only influenced by other 
countries which export similar 
product rather than by those serving 
similar market. This means only the 
former group is regarded as 
competitors for foreign capital. It is 
argued that net capital importing 
countries find themselves in a 
‘prisoners’ dilemma’ situation. That 
is, while it is not beneficial for 
them as a whole to enter treaties 
with the standard provisions (i.e. 
OECD model treaty), each single 
country has an incentive to sign in 
order to gain a competitive edge in 
global competition for capital. 
Moreover, in order to offset its 
inferior position in the global 
market, a country has an even 
stronger incentive to sign a DTT 
with major capital exporters, if 
focal countries have signed treaties 
with them. 
Squires and 
Lord (2012) 
The United 
States and 
United 
Kingdom 
2010-2011 Examining whether 
the introduction of Tax 
Increment Financing 
(TIF) from the US to 
the UK, as a spatially 
targeted economic 
development policy, 
was regarded as a 
policy transfer, and the 
capacity of 
policymakers and 
practitioners in an 
adopting country to 
make necessary 
The study concluded that in the 
case of the adoption of TIF in the 
UK, the policy was more regarded 
as ‘a modified policy “idea” rather 
than transfer’ (p.817). The study 
identified twelve factors that were 
considered as key elements for the 
success or failures of Tax 
Increment Financing (TIF) policy 
transfer to the UK. Five are relevant 
to the present study: similarity of 
the problems, level of governance 
arrangements, political will, 
localism interest, and ease of 
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Source Regions/ 
Countries 
Period Research focus Research findings  
 
adjustments to 
encourage policy is 
adapted to the 
contextual 
circumstances of the 
policy’s new 
environment 
legislative change. The study also 
noted several factors that need to be 
considered when transferring a 
policy: (1) the involvement of 
stakeholders in drawing lessons; (2) 
the structural complexities of 
institutions, particularly in what 
rules are set in place; (3) the power 
relations of actors involved.   
Ward and 
Cao (2012) 
26 OECD 
member 
countries 
1995-2004 Explaining 
geographical and 
temporal variation in 
green tax burdens by 
considering domestic 
and international 
determinants and 
modelling 
international 
influences using 
spatial lags 
 
The authors concluded the domestic 
factors, the influence of other 
states’ policies through policy 
interdependence, and the 
interactions between the two have 
contributed to the adoption of a 
“green tax” in a given country. The 
domestic factors included: special 
interest politics and the role of 
legislative median. Legislative 
median refers to the party (or 
parties) that dominates parliament 
(e.g. Martin & Vanberg n.d.). The 
authors did not find compelling 
evidence that the ideological 
affinity between states conditioned 
the reception of other states’ 
policies. They argued that 
ideological affinity is only one 
factor that might condition the 
diffusion of ideas about policy. 
Diffusion, they argued, is likely to 
occur over various networks. In the 
case of “green tax”, the networks 
link experts and economists, 
businesses, and the environmental 
movements. The authors also 
argued that in general, the closer 
two countries are in international 
networks, the more similar they are 
in terms of domestic economic 
policies because close connections 
facilitate policy learning and 
therefore policy diffusion. With 
regard to international factors, the 
authors found a contradictory 
conclusion about tax competition: 
Countries with structurally similar 
trade patterns do not appear to 
influence each other. What appears 
to matter for policy-makers was the 
369 
 
Source Regions/ 
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perception about a country’s 
general competitive position, rather 
than having a competitive edge on 
other specific countries. 
Christensen 
(2013) 
New Zealand 
and Ireland 
1980s and 
1990s -
2000s 
Seeking to account for 
the different extent of 
neoliberal reform in 
two “similar” 
countries  
 
The study suggested that the 
diverging tax policy trajectories of 
New Zealand and Ireland—two 
small liberal market economies—
since 1980 are not well accounted 
for by conventional ideational, 
partisan, or political-institutional 
explanations. It is concluded that 
the varying degree of neoliberal 
reform is better understood as the 
result of differences in the 
institutionalisation of economic 
knowledge within the state. It is 
argued that the policy role of 
bureaucrats is shaped by training 
through three channels: expertise, 
ideas, and identity. Differences in 
administrative institutions between 
the two countries have given rise to 
profound distinctions in the 
identities, expertise, economic 
ideas, and approach to policy 
advice of tax policy bureaucrats, 
which in turn had a major impact 
on tax policy-making. The author 
suggested that factors such as the 
political colour of the government, 
the political-institutional setting, 
and public opinion also played a 
role in policymaking.   
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Appendix––C: Elements of BISEPS in the 
ATO Compliance Model 
B Business The extent and nature of the group’s business activities and transactions. 
Location and size of industry. 
Business plans and strategies. 
Entity and group structure. 
Capital structure, financial performance and ratios. 
Business age. 
I Industry Conditions affecting the industry – region, seize and participants 
Industry associations. 
Industry profit margins and cost structure. 
Nature of the competition. 
Industry skill level. 
Impact of technological and business change. 
Financial performance. 
Industry norms and regulatory environment. 
S Sociology Knowledge and norms of the professional/business group, e.g. standard 
of record keeping and lodgement timeliness. 
Culture of the organisation and management. 
Approach to community and corporate citizenship. 
How the group deals with finances and paying tax. 
Linkages to gatekeepers and advisers. 
Age of the HWI. 
Gender of the HWI. 
Education level of the HWI. 
Ethnic background of the HWI. 
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E Economy Domestic, international environment and trade conditions. 
Key overseas developments. 
Government policies – interest rate, inflation, tax system and economic 
reforms. 
P Psychology Management of objectives and philosophy. 
Views and reactions of management to wider community. 
Approach to managing risk and drivers of the risk strategies. 
Attitude and relationship with the ATO. 
Trust 
S System of 
compliance 
Decision making system, process and organisational structure. 
Quality Assurance standards and records. 
The support and authority the corporate taxpayers’ tax compliance team 
receives from management or from the HWI. 
The degree of ease in accessing information. 
Nature and purpose of transaction, e.g. value, type, conduct, methods, 
timing, costs and benefits. 
Compliance history. 
Tax analysis of issues and expected range of tax results. 
Sources: adapted from the Australian Taxation Office (2000a, p. 17) and Cash Economy Task Force 
(1998, p. 20). 
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